4. To that which is objected, that finite and infinite are passions of quantity: it must be said that although in God there is no quantity of mass, there is nevertheless quantity of power; moreover, this quantity of power is not only attended to in the power operating externally, but quantity of power is also called excellence of value, whether in absolute or in relative things. Hence it can be posited concerning everything about which a degree of excellence with respect to another can be posited. And such is not only the divine power, but also the divine being. And therefore the notion of infinity befits both.
5. To that which is objected, that infinite and immense denote a departure from measure and from mode: it must be said that in a limited nature, departure from mode and measure denotes a defect. But in a nature that is above every restricting limit, it denotes absolutely no defect, because, according to Augustine, "God is mode without mode." This indeed is said because His immensity is His mode, which is not restricted by the limits of any measure. And in this way, the lack of mode does not induce a lack of species or beauty, but rather the excellence of both.
6. To that which is objected, that infinite is said through opposition to the minimum: it must be said that this is true of the infinite founded upon a quantity repugnant to simplicity, such as quantity of mass, but not of that which is founded upon quantity of power, because this supremely accords with simplicity, as has been said.
7. To that which is objected, that nothing infinite terminates: it must be said that the infinite, insofar as it lacks the notion of completion, does not terminate with the termination of completion; the infinite, also insofar as it lacks the notion of a terminus, does not terminate as a terminus within; nevertheless it can terminate as completing and beatifying: because the appetite of a beatifiable thing is never quieted except in a thing that has immense goodness, where it can desire nothing beyond.
8. To that which is objected, that nothing is infinite which is finite to the highest truth: it must be said that something being finite to the highest truth can be understood in two ways: in one way, because the highest truth judges that thing to be finite to the highest truth, and in this way that proposition has truth; in another way, because it does not exceed the judgment of the highest truth, which, because it is immense in itself, can comprehend every immensity in itself: and in this way it does not follow that what is finite to it is finite absolutely, but rather there is here the fallacy of the qualified and the absolute .
9. To that which is objected, that if God could do only one thing, such that He could not do other things, the divine power would be called finite: it must be said that it is not similar, because power is directed outward and toward created effects, which are finite; hence if He could do only one thing, it would follow that His power would not extend except to what is finite, and thereby that it would be finite. But it is otherwise with the divine being, because that is absolute and as it were directed inward: and although it is one alone, nevertheless that one is immense, both because that being has no limitation within itself, and because it is the font of all being, and because nothing can exist without the divine being. Whence, because the divine essence is in all things, just as the divine power, and if per impossibile infinite things were posited to exist, God would be in all of them: hence it is that the divine being has infinity in itself, just as also the divine power.
10. To that which is objected, that unity is maximally finite, etc.: it must be said that this has truth concerning that unity which enters into the constitution of a thing or of number in the manner of a part, a terminus, or a completion; and this is an aggregable unity, which joined with another induces a greater numerosity, and such a unity draws its origin from the limitation which form attributes to matter itself: and therefore it is the principle of measuring in the genus of discrete quantity. But the divine unity is not of this kind, because it can neither enter into the constitution of another as a part, since it is most perfect, nor does it draw its origin from elsewhere, since it is first: therefore it is neither limited nor measured, but rather immense, because neither restricting nor restricted, neither by another nor by itself.
11. To the objection that what is this is more finite: it must be said that this something is properly said by distinction from what is something of a certain quality, and that is here and now, because it has the contraction of place and time. For the individuation of a thing existing in a genus, accidental properties necessarily accompany it, the collection of which is not to be found in another. But it is not so with the divine being: for although the divine being is called this on account of its supreme completeness and distinction from every other being, it is nevertheless not in a genus: therefore neither is it said to become this through contraction or through the addition of either matter, or essential property, or accidental property; and therefore it is this in such a way that it is not contracted to here and now, but is always and everywhere, far more excellently than any universal, which depends on particular being and by reason of that admits some contraction. And therefore, although universal being is finite, nevertheless nothing prevents the divine being from being infinite.
12. To the objection that everything which is separated from something according to place is finite: it must be said that the case is not similar, because what is separated from something according to place is so separated from it that it is not in it, and therefore by this very fact is contracted and limited and finite. But what is separated according to essential difference from something can nevertheless be in it: just as God is essentially distinguished from the creature, He is nevertheless in every creature by power, presence, and essence. And therefore from such a mode of separation of forms, finitude and limitation cannot be inferred, as from the mode of separation according to position.
13. To the objection that in the divine things abstract terms are said concretely, and conversely: it must be said that the abstract of what is finite, which is said concretely, is finitude, not end: for the concrete term taken from end is not called finite, but limiting, just as finite is said from finitude; and therefore that argument does not hold.
14. To the objection that everything comprehensible is finite: it must be said that the divine being is not comprehensible to a finite power, although it is simple, because simplicity and immensity are rooted in the same thing insofar as it has infinity according to virtual quantity, as was shown above. And therefore, just as it cannot be known according to part and part, because it is supremely simple, so neither can it be totally comprehended on account of its supreme immensity.
15. To the last objection, that either something of God is finite or nothing: it must be said that whatever belongs to God as existing in God — since it is God Himself, not a part of God — necessarily possesses the character of the infinite; because nevertheless "everything that is received in something is received not according to the mode of the thing received, but according to the mode of the receiver," and the power of the created intellect is finite: hence it is that it knows Him finitely, and from this very fact it has its beatification in Him. Nor however is this intellect false, because it places the mode of finitude around itself as knower and around its own cognition, not however around God as known, since it understands Him as infinite, although it is by no means able to comprehend His infinity, as was shown more fully in the question concerning the comprehension of the soul of Christ.
ARTICLE II.
Whether trinity and infinity can stand together.
Next it is asked whether trinity and infinity or immensity can stand together. And that they are incompossible is shown as follows.
1. Because a creature is finite, whatever is in it is finite: therefore since the divine being is immense, whatever is in it is actually infinite: but in the divine there is number or plurality of persons: therefore it is necessary that it extend itself to infinity: therefore it does not stand at trinity.
2. Likewise, since there is a twofold infinity, namely virtual and numerical, it is impossible for the divine being to lack infinity of power: therefore by equal reasoning, if we posit in God a true plurality, just as also a true power; therefore it is necessary that it have infinity.
3. Likewise, a power altogether infinite, when it emanates according to every mode of its potency and infinity, emanates infinitely through every mode: but the divine power is thus infinite and emanates according to every mode of its infinity in the production of persons: therefore the same as before.
4. Likewise, a person producing two either can produce more, or cannot. If it cannot: therefore by producing it loses its power; if however it can: therefore either it is not of supreme liberality, or it is necessary to produce such that there is no standing still.
5. Likewise, if the light of the sun were immense, it would generate from itself infinite splendors: therefore since the eternal light is immense, and the splendor proceeding from it is a true person; it is necessary that there be an infinity of persons there: therefore trinity and infinity do not stand together.
6. Likewise, either the production of persons attests to power, or it does not. If it does not: therefore it ought not be posited in one who is supremely powerful: if it does: therefore a greater multiplication attests to a greater power, and the greatest to the greatest, and an infinite to an infinite: therefore trinity does not stand with infinity.
7. Likewise, if the divine power were in its every-way actuality with respect to the production of creatures, it would be necessary that it produce infinite creatures: therefore since it is thus with respect to persons, it is necessary, if it is infinite, that it produce infinite persons.
8. Likewise, because the divine intellect is infinite, it is necessary that it understand infinite things: therefore since the divine speaking is infinite, it is necessary that it speak infinite things: but as many as the things spoken, so many are the words: as many the words, so many the persons: therefore infinite.
9. Likewise, for the intellect to be perfect, it does not suffice that it understand itself, but also that it understand itself understanding: therefore for the intellect to be of infinite completeness, it is necessary that it reflect upon itself with infinite reflections; but by understanding itself it generates a word: therefore by a second reflection a second word, and so on to infinity: therefore if infinity is to be posited in God, then not a trinity.
10. Likewise, either God can understand more than three persons, or he cannot. If he cannot: then his intellect is finite and limited: if he can understand more: but nothing is understood that does not exist in some way either in itself or in its proximate or remote principle: therefore it is necessary either that the divine understanding be limited, or that more than three persons be posited regarding the divine being, either actually or potentially.