6. Furthermore, every infinite is said by opposition to the minimum and by recession from it: but the minimum is the most simple in each genus: therefore the infinite signifies recession from simplicity. But the divine being is most simple: therefore it is not infinite.
7. Furthermore, no infinite thing finalizes, because an opposite is not the cause of its opposite, and "nothing gives to another what it does not have"; but God finalizes all things as the most perfect end: therefore God is not infinite, therefore neither with respect to being nor with respect to anything of His.
8. Furthermore, nothing is infinite absolutely which is finite to the supreme truth, which judges all things as they are; but God is finite to Himself, otherwise He would exceed Himself: therefore the divine being is not infinite according to reality: therefore etc.
9. Again, if God could do one thing only, such that He could not do other things, the divine power would be called finite: since therefore the reasoning is similar concerning power and being, and the divine being is nothing but one alone: it follows that the divine being is finite.
10. Again, unity is most finite in itself, since it is the principle of all measurement according to number: if therefore the divine being is one, then it is measured, therefore finite.
11. Again, everything that is this particular thing and determinate is more finite than everything that is not this but common and indeterminate; but common being, namely universal being, is finite: therefore since the divine being is proper and determinate, it will be most finite.
12. Again, everything that is separated from something according to place is finite according to local existence: therefore by equal reasoning everything that is separated according to being is finite according to natural existence: but the divine being is most separated from all things according to being, since this belongs to the first and most complete mover: therefore the divine being is finite according to natural existence.
13. Again, in the divine things it is true that on account of the supreme simplicity what is said in the abstract is said in the concrete, and conversely: if therefore from "end" something is called finite, and this is true and proper: God is the end: therefore also this: God is finite: therefore this is false, that He is infinite.
14. Again, everything comprehensible is finite: but everything simple is comprehensible: therefore everything simple is finite: but the divine being is simple: therefore finite. The minor is proved, because everything that is known wholly is comprehended; but when a simple thing is known, it is known wholly, since it does not have part and part, and necessarily it is finite not only in itself but also to us.
15. Again, either something of God is finite, or nothing; if nothing of God is finite: therefore since by the finite nothing is known except under the aspect of the finite, nothing of God is therefore known by us: therefore we shall never be blessed. But this is a most grievous absurdity: therefore something of God is finite. Either therefore there is to be posited therein something and something, or it is necessary to say that nothing of God is finite in itself: therefore by no reasoning should God be said to be infinite.
CONCLUSION.
The divine being and power, because it is supremely simple, is infinite, insofar as infinite denies a limit with respect to the quantity of power.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing, it must be noted that in a question in which there is a multiplicity of the name, one must first distinguish according to the art before asserting or denying anything. It must be understood, therefore, that infinite is said in two ways, namely privatively and negatively. Insofar as it is said privatively, it removes the act and leaves the aptitude, and in this way that is called infinite which is by nature meant to be finished, yet is not finished, and thus it connotes incompleteness.
But insofar as it is said negatively, it simply removes the end or finitude; but this must be understood in two ways according to the twofold meaning of end. For end is said as terminus, and end as completion: and therefore infinite is said in two ways: either by the negation of the end of completion, and thus evil is called infinite: or by the negation of the end of terminus, and this can be in two ways according to the twofold terminus. For there is a terminus according to material quantity, and there is a terminus according to spiritual quantity: the first is called quantity of mass, the second quantity of power. The infinite, therefore, by the negation of terminus with respect to quantity of mass always signifies some incompleteness in some way, either in act or in potency, because it signifies a departure from simplicity. For such a quantity does not stand together with simplicity in the same thing and according to the same respect, and such an infinite never exists in act but only in potency, while in act it is finite. But the infinite by the negation of terminus with respect to quantity of power does not signify any imperfection, but rather the highest perfection, because it does not conflict with simplicity; indeed, it cannot exist except in what is supremely simple; and in this way the authority of Scripture and the confession of faith posit infinity or immensity in God himself, who is most simple.
The divine being, therefore, is infinite by the very fact that it is supremely simple and simply supreme.
For because it is supremely simple, it is supremely united in itself and in its power; and because it is supremely most united in itself, it has nothing contracting it, nothing limiting it, nothing determining it, and nothing enclosing it in a genus, and through this it is beyond all things and above all things.
Because, again, it is most united with respect to power, being and power are in it entirely the same, and therefore, wherever its being is, there also is its power: and where being is, there is the center and origin and fount of power itself: and where the fount and origin and center of power is, it can always go beyond: and therefore, wherever it has power, it always has greater power and power beyond, and through this, power and simultaneously being must necessarily possess infinity. With this accords that saying from the Book of Causes : "Every united power is more infinite," etc. This infinity, therefore, does not conflict with simplicity; rather, it is consonant with it in a wonderful and inseparable harmony.
Furthermore, because it is the highest simply, it is necessary that it be altogether immense. By this very fact nothing can be equal to it, neither by intensification nor by duplication, as Augustine says in the eighth book of On the Trinity: and it is necessary that it have in itself infinite nobility and goodness, since a finite good, however great it may be, can at some point be matched and equaled through the duplication of finite things, as he says.
Because it is also the highest simply, nothing can be greater, nothing better, either in being or in thought. But thought can surpass every finite thing; for if something is understood to have a limit, it is understood that something beyond it can at least be thought. And so, if the divine being, because it is supremely simple, is equally the highest simply, it is consequently necessary to call it altogether infinite, as the arguments conclude. For it cannot be granted that it is finite in essence and infinite in power, as some have said; for these in God are altogether one, and infinity in one necessarily posits and includes infinity in the other, since one cannot extend itself to anything without the other.
And again, since in spiritual things the same is the greater and the better: since essence and power are of equal goodness, they will necessarily also be of equal infinity.
From this statement we can be led by the hand to understanding how simplicity does not conflict with immensity. For if, as Augustine says, "the greater and the better are the same there"; just as it can be understood that the supremely simple is the best, so also the greatest; just as it can also be understood that the supremely simple is supremely powerful, so it can be understood that it is the most simple and the most infinite: just as it can be understood that it is present to all things through power, so also through essence: and just as all things compared to the divine power can do virtually nothing, so all things compared to the divine essence are virtually the least.
Whence in respect to the divine being this entire world is as something minimal. And this is what is said in Wisdom eleven: For as a grain in the balance, so is the whole world before you, and as a drop of morning dew that falls upon the earth: and in Isaiah forty: Behold, the nations are as a drop from a bucket and are accounted as a grain in the balance: and afterward: All nations are as though they were not, so are they before him, and they are accounted as nothing and emptiness. — It must be conceded, therefore, that not only the divine power, but also the divine being is infinite, as the arguments adduced for this position show.
1. To that which is objected, that infinite is said privatively: it must be said that, as has already been stated, although infinite in a creature denotes a privation with respect to the finite according to the thing and the mode of speaking, nevertheless, as it is posited in God, it denotes a most true position according to the thing, and it denotes a greater completion than that which is finite. For it is not said through the privation of complement, as has already been made clear, but through the privation of limitation and restriction, which denote a falling away from the state of most perfect complement. And therefore that argument does not conclude.
2. To that which is objected, that infinity comes from the part of matter: it must be said that this is true insofar as infinity is founded upon quantity of mass, which indeed draws its origin from the material principle. But it is otherwise when it is founded upon quantity of power, because active power draws its origin from form. But infinity is posited in God in this latter way, not in the aforementioned way. And therefore that objection does not proceed.
3. To that which is objected, that God is an end, therefore He is not infinite: it must be said that God is an end that terminates, not a terminated end, because He is an end not as an intrinsic terminus of a thing, but as terminating every appetite of a beatifiable thing. Therefore infinity is not opposed to the terminating end, but only to the terminated end as an intrinsic terminus. And therefore that objection does not proceed.