On the contrary: 1. Supreme immensity does not take away the supreme perfection of the producing power, neither by way of nature nor by way of will or liberality, therefore neither the supreme perfection of production: but the perfection of production necessarily requires a limit both on the part of the principle and on the part of the terminus: but there would be no limit if it proceeded to infinity: therefore the supreme infinity of divine being does not posit infinity in persons.
2. Likewise, infinity in God does not take away the perfection of order — for it does not follow that if God is infinite, he is on that account disordered — but the order of perfection necessarily posits a first, a middle, and a last; but where these are, there is not innumerability, but only a trinity: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, infinity in God does not take away the perfection of connection, for this contributes to supreme love: but perfect connection cannot exist unless one person proceeds immediately from another, otherwise there is not supreme kinship: but this does not proceed beyond the number three: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, immensity in God does not take away the perfection of beatitude: but knowledge of each person belongs to the essence of beatitude: therefore if a creature cannot simultaneously and at once know infinite persons, it is impossible for any soul ever to be blessed in God: if therefore immensity is compatible with the perfection of beatitude, it is compatible with a plurality of persons. But no plurality is more fitting for the soul capable of beatification than a trinity: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, the infinity of divine being does not exclude the unity of essence; for God is one and immense: if therefore unity recedes more from immensity than any plurality however small: if immensity can stand with unity, much more can it stand with trinity.
6. Likewise, the immensity of the divine being does not exclude the simplicity of nature: if therefore complete simplicity is more repugnant to immensity than any plurality whatsoever, if infinity stands with simplicity, much more strongly will it stand with trinity.
7. Likewise, the infinity of the divine being does not exclude the property of the person, therefore neither the true distinction of the same: therefore it does not posit confusion; but where there is infinite numerosity, there is confusion: where there is confusion, there is indistinction: but if this is not to be posited in the divine being, therefore the plurality of persons stands in a finite number: therefore infinity does not conflict with trinity in God.
8. Likewise, the infinity of the divine being does not exclude causality according to the threefold genus of cause, namely efficient, formal, and final; nor does the infinity which is in him posit more modes of causality in God: therefore if it can stand with the threefold genus of cause, it can equally stand with the trinity of person, especially since there is a correspondence of these to one another according to the appropriation of power, wisdom, and goodness, which correspond to the three persons and the threefold mode of causing.
9. Likewise, the infinity of the divine being does not exclude the conformity of Creator and creature according to a twofold representation, namely of vestige and image: if therefore in the image there is a representation of the distinction and origin of the divine persons, according to the correspondence of the persons: if in the Trinity there were infinite persons, there ought to be infinite persons in the image; but if this is impossible, it remains that the trinity of persons does not conflict with the divine immensity.
10. Likewise, the immensity of the divine being does not exclude the inhabitation of God in the mind through the gift of the Holy Spirit; but if there were infinite persons producing and produced, since every producing person sends and gives the produced person, then therefore in the gratification of one soul it would be necessary that infinite persons would fall between the gratified soul and the person first sending or gratifying. If therefore it is not possible to traverse an infinity, it would be impossible that the soul through gratification would return to the first principle, if there were an infinity of persons: since therefore the immensity of God stands with the inhabitation of grace, in which the Son, who is the image of the Father, through the gift and bond of the Holy Spirit leads us back to the Father; therefore the immensity itself concerning the divine being stands with the trinity of persons.
CONCLUSION.
In God the highest infinity stands together with the trinity of persons.
I respond: It must be said that without doubt the highest infinity and the plurality of persons stand together in God: and this is evident as follows.
Infinity is posited in God not by way of defect, but by way of excess, excess, I say, not of superfluity, but of perfection and nobility. Because, therefore, infinity in God posits neither superfluity nor diminution, but supreme perfection, therefore in the emanation of the divine persons one must posit immensity with respect to the producer and the product and the mode of producing, but not infinity with respect to number. For if the persons in the divine were infinite according to number, this infinity would necessarily introduce defect or superfluity. For since there are two noble modes of emanating — by way of nature and by way of liberality — either the two persons emanating by these modes would not perfectly receive the entire immensity of the producer's power, and thus would be imperfect; or if they did receive it, the others would be superfluous. But if in the divine being, by the very fact that it is immense, it is impossible for anything to be superfluous or diminished, then it is necessary to posit God as triune and immense.
Again, because the infinity of the divine being posits immensity on the part of the producer and the product and the mode of producing: just as the divine being, because it is immense, cannot be doubled but is one alone, so it is necessary that in the divine there be one sole paternity, one sole filiation, one sole procession, and thus one sole Father, one sole Son, one sole Holy Spirit; and through this it is necessary to posit God as immense and triune. Moreover, just as if there were many gods, neither would have in itself the immensity of the whole divinity, but rather a part of omnipotence and nobility: so if there were many fathers, neither would have the immensity of paternity; if many sons, none would have the immensity of filiation, but only according to a part. For if each one had the entire fullness and immensity of paternity, there could be in them only one paternity, just as in many persons there can be only one deity. It remains, therefore, that if in the divine being there is true infinity and true plurality, the plurality cannot be extended by infinity beyond the Trinity, according to what the pious faith asserts.
Finally, because that infinity bespeaks every manner of completion, it follows that it does not exclude the perfection of power, of order, of connection, of beatitude, of representation, and of indwelling. And since all these things necessarily give to understand a Trinity in three persons, as is evident from what was previously objected, it is manifest that supreme immensity in no way conflicts with, but accords with, the eternal Trinity.
And therefore the arguments for this position are to be granted.
1. To that which is objected to the contrary, that just as in a creature, because it is finite, whatever is there is finite, so it ought to be in God that whatever is in Him by reason of infinity ought to be infinite; it must be said that, as has already been touched upon, to the divine being belongs infinity of power and dignity, not of mass or numerosity: and such infinity is found both in the essence and in the persons, whether producing or produced, whether in themselves or in their emanations; all of which is found perfectly and integrally in the three persons: and therefore it is not necessary that they be extended to an infinity of numerosity by reason of the infinity of divine being .
2. To that which is objected, that God cannot lack infinity of power, etc., it must be said that the case is not similar with this infinity and with that one: because, since greatness of power signifies rather an approach to simplicity than a departure from it, while multitude of numerosity signifies a departure from the one and the simple; and God and the divine being is so immense that together with this it is simple and supremely one: it follows that infinity of power belongs to Him, but not of personal numerosity .
3. To that which is objected, that a power altogether infinite, since according to every mode of potency it emanates infinitely, diffuses itself through every mode: it must be said that since perfection together with infinity remains in God, that holds true of every mode of emanation and diffusion which belongs to supreme perfection; but this is according to a twofold mode of producing what is perfect, namely of nature and of liberality, each of which must be unique in itself, not doubled nor repeated twice or thrice, much less proceeding to infinity, because this would introduce superabundance and defect, as was shown in the preceding arguments.
4. To that which is objected, that the person producing two either can produce more or cannot; it must be said that not being able to produce beyond those two does not indicate a defect of power, but rather its complement: because in those two productions the productive power manifests itself most perfectly and most infinitely, both with respect to the immensity of the persons produced, and with respect to the actuality of the productions themselves; because in the same mode and not otherwise the generative and spirative power in the Father has actuality in generating and spirating, in the same mode by which it has had actuality from eternity. For just as splendor continuously flows from the sun, so the Son, who is the splendor of the Father , indeed much more excellently continuously flows from the Father.
5. 6. To that which is objected, that if the light of the sun were immense, it would generate from itself infinite splendors: it must be said that the case is not similar, because the splendor emanating from the sun is neither entirely perfect nor equal to its origin; and therefore it does not contain within itself from a single production the entire power and clarity of irradiating light, but rather according to degrees of proximity and distance it partakes of and receives more or less from the fullness of the fontal light. But it is otherwise in the Son, who is the Word of the Father and the most perfect splendor, in all things equal to the Father, receiving from the Father everything that the Father has within Himself; and therefore, just as the infinity of the eternal light does not remove the equality with the eternal splendor emanating from it, so it does not introduce an infinite multiplication of splendors, since the single splendor contains that entire immensity within itself.
7. To that which is objected, that if the divine power were in its every mode of actuality with respect to creatures, it would produce infinite creatures, etc.: it must be said that the case is not similar, for a twofold reason: both because the creature is finite, and therefore none corresponds equally to the producing power; and because the creature is essentially distinguished from the producer, and also from other creatures according to a distinction in its intrinsic principles and co-attached accidents. But it is not so in the divine persons: both because the produced is infinite, just as the producer, and because they are not distinguished by essence, but by origin; and therefore, since there are only two distinct and distinctive origins, there are and can be understood only two emanating persons, in whom the immensity of the fontal productive power shines forth most sufficiently.
8. To that which is objected, that the divine intellect understands infinite things, since it is infinite: it must be said that although God understands infinite things, He comprehends all things by His own single self, because by understanding Himself He understands all things; so also, although He speaks many things, yet He speaks all things in one Word. For by the same Word by which the Father speaks Himself, He speaks whatever He speaks; for the Father, by understanding Himself with the most complete and singular act of understanding, in which the intellect is equated to the one understanding, and conversely, generates the Word, which is the likeness of the Father in all things equal to Him. Whence, just as the Father by understanding Himself understands whatever He can understand, so by speaking the Word He speaks whatever He can speak and whatever can be spoken in the Godhead. Whence neither can He Himself speak another word, nor can any person in the Trinity, because by that Word is spoken whatever can be spoken.
And if you object that just as God has infinite reasons with respect to intelligible things, He ought similarly to have infinite words: it must be said that the case is not similar, because reason and idea denote a relation and likeness to intelligible things to be created and produced, or capable of being produced, which are capable of being multiplied in manifold and innumerable ways; but word denotes a relation to the one speaking and to the first object understood and the supreme principle, of which it is the hypostatic likeness; and therefore in no way, neither in reality nor in understanding, does multiplicity befit it, just as neither does it befit the first principle primarily and principally understood by itself.