MISHNAH: The house of Shammai say, dedication in error is dedication, but the House of Hillel say, dedication in error is not dedication. How? If one said, the black ox which comes out of my house first shall be dedicated, and a white one came out; the house of Shammai say, it is dedicated [We assume that he simply wanted to dedicate one of his animals as a sacrifice and since most of his animals were black, he mentioned black. If he had said explicitly, “the first ox which comes out of my house shall be dedicated if it be black,” the House of Shammai will agree that there is no dedication. Since oxen are possible as sacrifices, the dedication mentioned here is dedication as sacrifice.] , but the House of Hillel say, it is not dedicated. The gold denar which first comes into my hand shall be dedicated, but it was a silver one; the house of Shammai say, it is dedicated, but the House of Hillel say, it is not dedicated. The wine amphora which first comes into my hand shall be dedicated, but it was a one of oil; the house of Shammai say, it is dedicated, but the House of Hillel say, it is not dedicated [Even though all three Mishnaiot illustrate the same principle, the statements imply that the positions of the Houses of Hillel and Shammai apply to all kinds of dedications. Mishnah 1 exemplifies dedications for the altar, Mishnah 2 money donations, and Mishnah 3 things which could be brought to the altar as accessories but never are sacrifices on their own. The three Mishnaiot are an introduction to the nazir vow made in error treated in Mishnah 4.] .
HALAKHAH: “The House of Shammai say, dedication in error is dedication.” There [Mishnah Terumot 3:8. The following two paragraphs are Halakhah Terumot 3:8, explained there in Notes 85–92.] , we have stated: “If somebody intends to say heave but says tithe, tithe but says heave, fire offering but says well-being offering, well-being offering but says fire offering.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if he intends to say “profane” and says “fire sacrifice”, he dedicated it. Rebbi Yose said, we consider only whether he intended to dedicate but erred because of something else. What is the status of this Mishnah? In the opinion of Rebbi Jeremiah it is in dispute, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose it is everybody’s opinion.
“With his lips but not in his mind.” I could think that I exclude him who decides in his mind; the verse says (Lev. 5:4): “To articulate”. But Samuel said, he who decides in his mind is not obligated until he pronounces with his lips. But did we not state: “(Ex. 35:5) Everyone who volunteers in his mind,” that is he who decides in his mind. You say, that is he who decides in his mind, but maybe that is he who pronounces with his lips? When he says (Deut. 23:24): “What comes out from your lips you have to keep,” that speaks about him who pronounces with his lips. Therefore, how can I confirm “every one who volunteers in his mind?” That is he who decides in his mind. What Samuel said refers to a sacrifice.
There [Mishnah Šeqalim 2:3.] , we have stated: “If somebody collects coins and says, ‘these are for my Temple tax [Half a biblical šeqel (Ex. 30:13). While the relation of the biblical ŝeqel to currency in circulation may have varied from time to time, at the beginning of the tax season the amount was clearly stated and known to everybody (Mishnah Šeqalim 2:4). Therefore, nobody who mentions the Temple tax will intend to dedicate more than the stated amount. In contrast, a purification sacrifice can be a sheep or a goat (Lev. 4), in special circumstances also a couple of birds or a flour offering (Lev. 5).] ,’ the House of Shammai say, the excess should be given as a donation [They hold that the entire amount was dedicated even if only part can be used for the purpose stated.] , but the House of Hillel say, the excess is profane [Explained in Mishnah 2:4; Note 13.] . ‘That I shall be able to pay my Temple tax,’ they agree that the excess is profane [The formulation makes it clear that the amount in excess of the required tax is not dedicated.] . ‘These [monies] are for my purification offering’, they agree that the excess is profane. [The text is shortened so much as to be unintelligible. The Mishnah reads: “ ‘These are for a purification sacrifice,’ they agree that the excess should be a donation (cf. Chapter 4, Note 90). ‘That I shall be able to bring a purification sacrifice,’ the excess is profane (Note 8).”] ” [From here to the end of the next paragraph, the text is Halakhah Šeqalim 2:3. The Yerushalmi text reproduced in the Babli (editio princeps) is too closely adapted to Babylonian spelling to be useful for variant readings.] Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little [He starts a cache of small coins with the declared intention of collecting money for either his future Temple tax or purification sacrifice.] . But if he says “these [He declares that all his coins shall be dedicated to the stated purpose. The House of Hillel will agree that everything is dedicated and if it cannot be used for the stated purpose, it should be given to the Temple’s donation account.] ,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah [Šeqalim 2:4.] supports Rebbi Bevai: “Rebbi Simeon says, what is the difference between Temple tax and purification sacrifices? Only that the Temple tax is a fixed amount [Half a biblical šeqel (Ex. 30:13). While the relation of the biblical ŝeqel to currency in circulation may have varied from time to time, at the beginning of the tax season the amount was clearly stated and known to everybody (Mishnah Šeqalim 2:4). Therefore, nobody who mentions the Temple tax will intend to dedicate more than the stated amount. In contrast, a purification sacrifice can be a sheep or a goat (Lev. 4), in special circumstances also a couple of birds or a flour offering (Lev. 5).] .” Where do we hold? If he says, “that I shall use it for the Temple tax,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation [Read with the Šeqalim text: “Is profane” (as explained in Note 13).] . If he says, “that I shall use it for my purification offering,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane [Read with the Šeqalim text: “Should be given as a donation” (as explained in Note 13).] . But we are considering one who says “these [The monies are already collected; he declares them dedicated for a given purpose.] .” Since the Temple tax has a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess is profane. Since purification offerings do not have a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess should be given as a donation [Cf. Chapter 4, Note 90.] . How does Rebbi Yose handle this? He explains it if he collects little by little [The argument of R. Simeon applies only if the stated intent is to collect money for the Temple tax, not if the declaration is made on monies already available. In the latter case, R. Simeon may agree that the excess is earmarked for donation.] , following the House of Hillel.
If somebody put aside his Temple tax in the belief that he owed it and it turned out that he did not owe [After the dedication he remembered that he already had paid.] , it was not dedicated [In the next paragraph, it will be determined that this is the opinion of the House of Hillel.] . If he put aside two in the belief that he owed twice and it turned out that he owed only once, how do you treat the second [In the first case, the entire dedication was in error; it is invalid. But in the second case, there is a valid dedication. In order to be able to speak of a second, the amounts must have been dedicated one after the other. But if two animals were dedicated simultaneously, it is clear that a choice of one over the other in this case would be an act of retroactive validation, which is not accepted in biblical law; both coins certainly remain dedicated.] ? If he believed that he owed it and it turned out that he did not owe [In that case, the dedication is removed as being made in error.] , [or as] if he said: “these” [Referring to R. Yose’s opinion in the preceding paragraph, implying that the money should be donated to the Temple.] ? [In Šeqalim, this is introduced with a referral clause, “let us hear from the following.” That clause is correctly missing in the present text since the argument from Šeqalim is not presented here.] If somebody put aside a purification sacrifice in the belief that he owed it and it turned out that he did not owe, it was not dedicated. If he put aside two in the belief that he owed two and it turned out that he owed only one, how do you treat the second? As if he believed that he owed it and it turned out that he did not owe, or as if he had said “these” [By contrast, in Šeqalim it is stated that the dedication is not removed automatically, that the second animal has to be sent to graze until it develops a defect or becomes too old to be an acceptable sacrifice. The implied conclusion seems to be that the redemption money for that animal is a donation to the Temple.] ?
There [Mishnah Menaḥot 12:2.] , we have stated: “If somebody says, ‘I undertake [to bring] on a pan [A cereal offering fried in oil on a flat clay pan, Lev. 2:5–6.] ’ and he brought in a deep vessel [A cereal offering cooked in boiling oil in a deep clay vessel, Lev. 2:7.] , in a deep vessel and he brought on a pan. [“What he brought is acceptable but he did not fulfill his vow.”] ” Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This is the House of Shammai’s [Why should a flour offering be acceptable if it was not properly dedicated? Since it is forbidden to bring profane food into the Temple precinct (Deut. 12:26), the House of Hillel should hold that an offering which does not fulfill the specification of the donor’s vow has to be rejected by the officiating priests. But for the House of Shammai, who hold that a dedication is always valid, even if made in error, the nonconforming offering is not profane.] , since the House of Shammai say, “dedication in error is dedication.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yose [Since R. Yose was R. Ze‘ira’s student’s student, one has to read: R. Yasa (Assi).] : Why do we not explain it according to everybody, if he said, “I said, on a pan”? [If the person who made the vow agrees that the present offering does not satisfy his vow, there is no reason why it should not be accepted as a separate offering.] But if he said, “I undertake [to bring] on a pan,” and then he changed his mind [Immediately.] and said, “in a deep vessel”, he fulfilled his duty. Rebbi Ḥanina [It seems that one has to read “R. Ḥinena”.] and Rebbi Yasa came in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said, “I undertake [to bring] on a pan or in a deep vessel,” turned around [Immediately.] and said, “on a pan”, and turned around and said, “in a deep vessel”? [Since he demonstrates that he did not make up his mind, do we hold him to his last statement or can he satisfy his vow with any of the kinds mentioned as possibilities?] Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Hama in the name of Rebbi Yose: He determines even orally [This is an independent statement. From the Mishnah in Menaḥot it follows that the donor’s statement determines the kind of cereal sacrifice he is required to bring, even if as yet he owes no flour.] . They thought to say, even holidays determine [If he vows the sacrifice for a holiday, he cannot satisfy his vow on a workday.] , even vessels determine [If he vowed a cereal sacrifice without specifying its kind and then put the flour into one of the acceptable vessels without saying a word, the vessel determines the kind of offering he vowed and he cannot change it any longer.] .
There [Mishnah Temurah 2:3.] , we have stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, He [God, in instituting the rules of Lev. 27:10 ff.] made error equal to intent for substitution, but not for sacrifices.” Ḥizqiah said, in error: a prohibition, the one who substitutes: a prohibition [He explains the Mishnah. Once an animal has been dedicated, it cannot be exchanged for another animal as long as it did not develop a blemish (Lev. 27:10). A person who intentionally violates this prohibition is whipped. It is asserted that a person who unintentionally violates the prohibition is also whipped (see the next paragraph). But a dedication in error is not a dedication for the House of Hillel.] . If he wants to say “profane” but said “an elevation sacrifice”, it is sanctified [While for vows one requires that “his heart and mouth be in unison”, for Temple dedications only the pronouncement counts (Deut. 23:24).] . If he wants to say “an elevation sacrifice” but said “profane”, it is not sanctified. It follows that Rebbi Joḥanan, interpreting Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, parallels Rebbi Jeremiah’s explanation [In the first paragraph of this Halakhah (Terumot 3:8, Note 86).] regarding the House of Shammai on sacrifices. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, may one understand that “He made error equal to intent for substitution, but not for sacrifices,” if somebody dedicates a firstling? [This is a question for Ḥizqiah. Without his comment, we would have read the Mishnah in Temurah to state that substitution in error is substitution, dedication in error is not dedication. But he insists that for R. Yose ben R. Jehudah, substitution in error is criminally punishable. Now everybody agrees that dedication in error is not punishable, but where do we find that intentional dedication should be punishable, to justify R. Yose ben R. Jehudah’s formulation? The answer is that the dedication of a firstling (which must be given to a Cohen) for any other sacrifice is forbidden (Lev. 27:26) and, therefore, should be subject to criminal prosecution.] Can it be dedicated? Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Aḥa, and Rebbi Yasa say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody dedicated a firstling and it was brought to the altar, it is not sanctified even for its money’s worth [The firstling is sanctified at birth and never becomes the rancher’s property. The rancher has to raise the calf or lamb for 30 days and then is obligated to deliver it to a Cohen. Since nobody can dedicate what is not his, any dedication of a firstling by the rancher is void, not only invalid. In the case described, any Cohen can come and take the firstling from the altar and eat it (since only the blood of a firstling is given to the altar but nothing of its meat). There can be no prosecution for a nonexisting act.] . If somebody dedicated a blemished animal for the altar, even as a substitute it is not sanctified [The example of dedication of a blemished animal cannot be used as illustration of R. Yose ben Jehudah’s statement. A blemished animal cannot be dedicated; therefore, it neither can become a substitute sacrifice. The rules of substitutions and dedications are identical for blemished animals.] . But if somebody dedicated an animal with a temporary blemish. Is that consistent [(Logically) connected. This technical term appears as מְחֻוָּר “whitish, clear” in the Babli, pointing to differences in the pronunciation of ב, β in Galilee and ب in Babylonia. Cf. H. Guggenheimer, Die Aussprache des “Bet” in talmudischer Zeit, Bulletin, Verband jüdischer Lehrer und Kantoren der Schweiz Nr. 21, 1977, pp. 4–5.] with whipping [Since a temporary blemish does not permanently disqualify the animal from the altar, the dedication cannot be a crime. Again, there is no difference between dedication and substitution; R. Yose ben R. Jehudah cannot refer to this case.] ? Rebbi Yudan, Rebbi Mattaniah’s father, said, explain it if he gave unblemished animals for the upkeep of the Temple [Donating unblemished cattle, sheep, or goats for the upkeep of the Temple clearly violates the injunction of Lev. 27:9 to reserve such animals for the altar. However, that rule is formulated as an obligation, not as a prohibition and, therefore, involves no prosecutable offense. In the next paragraph it is established that R. Jehudah and his son found a biblical source which allows one to find a prohibition in Lev. 27:9. The rule of R. Yose ben Jehudah is valid only for him and his father, not for most other Sages.] .
Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah follows his father’s method: If somebody dedicated unblemished animals for the upkeep of the Temple, he violates a positive commandment [Lev. 27:9.] . Why also a prohibition? The verse says: “The Eternal spoke to Moses לאמר” [Lev. 27:1. It is assumed that this heading applies also to the paragraph Lev. 27:9–34 since v. 9 starts with a connecting ו.] : a prohibition was pronounced [“He said ‘no’ ”. The underlying pronunciation of לאמר cannot be recovered from the indications given here.] , the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi was sitting and studying the rule that “a firstling cannot be substituted” when Bar Pedaiah’s father was passing by. Rebbi saw him, and said, do I know what I should say here, “the Eternal spoke to Moses לאמר,” could one explain the words of Rebbi Jehudah? Is it written thus? [Soṭah 5:1 (ס), explained there in Notes 8–10, Horaiot 1:3 (ה).] It follows what Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: For interpretation, one removes from its beginning to its end. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: Even a middle word [In the application here, the word is split by duplication of a letter, לאמר as אמר לא.] . “You have to pour oil on.” You have to pour oil on a flour offering, to subject all flour offerings to pouring.
There, we have stated [Mishnah ‘Arakhin 6:1. The argument refers to the part of the Mishnah which is not quoted: “The public sale of orphans’ property goes on for 30 days, the public sale of Temple property goes on for 30 days, and one publicly announces mornings and evenings. If somebody dedicates his property while the lien if favor of a wife’s ketubah was in effect, Rebbi Eliezer says, if he would divorce her, he has to make her vow not to have any usufruct from him; Rebbi Joshua says, it is not necessary. Similarly, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says regarding a guarantor of a woman’s ketubah whose husband divorces her, that he shall make him execute a vow of usufruct lest he could plot against his property and take his wife back.”] : “The public sale of orphans’ property [The administrator of an estate whose beneficiaries are underage can sell real estate to satisfy claims against the estate only under supervision by the court. There has to be a 30 day public notice of the land being up for sale; at the end of the period the parcel is sold to the highest bidder.] goes on for 30 days, the public sale of Temple property [Sale of real estate donated to the Temple.] goes on for 30 days, and they are publicly announed mornings and evenings.” Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Eliezer is afraid of trickery [If the wife has to vow not to have any future usufruct from her past husband in order to collect her ketubah from the Temple, she cannot remarry him. R. Eliezer suspects that a husband who donates his property to the Temple might want to get it back by divorcing his wife, waiting until she has collected her ketubah, then remarrying her and receiving the ketubah money as dowry.] , Rebbi Joshua is not afraid of trickery. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai and Rebbi Joshua the House of Hillel [He disagrees with R. Mana and holds that their differences are systemic. This is the only opinion quoted in the Babli, ‘Arakhin 23a.] . Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say, a person may ask about his dedication; could he say that he does not have to vow usufruct? [This text seems to be corrupt. Since in our Mishnah, the House of Shammai hold that dedication in error is valid, it is clear that they must hold that a vow of dedication cannot be abrogated by an Elder (cf. Nedarim, Introduction p. 422, Chapter 9). Therefore, the text must read: דְּבֵית שַׁמַּי אוֹמְרִים. אֵיו אָדָם נִשְׁאַל עַל הֶקְדֵּשׁוֹ. וְהוּא דַהֲוָה אָמַר. אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְהַדִיר הֲנָייָה. וּדְרִבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ כְּבֵית הִלֵּל. דְּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים. אָדָם נִשְׁאַל עַל הֶקְדֵּשׁוֹ. וְהוּא דַהֲוָה אָמַר. צָרִיךְ לְהַדִיר הֲנָייָה. “Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say, a person may not ask about his dedication; could he say that he does not have to vow ususfruct? Rebbi Joshua follows the House of Hillel, since the House of Hillel say, a person may ask about his dedication; could he say that he has to vow usufruct?” The “vow of usufruct” is a vow never to have any usufruct from the person designated in the vow.] Rebbi Joshua follows the House of Hillel, since the House of Hillel say, a person may not ask about his dedication; could he say that he has to vow usufruct [Since he could ask an Elder about his vow, he does not need any tricks.] ? In any case, could not a man ask about his vow of usufruct? [R. Eliezer should agree that a man who cannot have his dedication annulled may try to have his vow of usufruct annulled.] Rebbi Joshua agrees that a guarantor must execute a vow of usufruct [R. Joshua will agree that the husband of a woman whose ketubah is collected from a third party has to promise never to take her back. It is not that the guarantor has to vow; he has to ask the divorcing couple for their vows.] . What does Rebbi Joshua say about a gift? Since he gives voluntarily, he does not have to vow usufruct, or since [the recipient’s] power is small and [the donor] may change his mind, does he have to vow usufruct? Let us hear from the following: The husband of a relative of Rebbi Ḥaggai owed on a document [Greek χάρτης, Latin charta, “papyrus, roll of papyrus”.] . The creditor came and foreclosed. The case [After the foreclosure, the husband divorced his wife and she went to court to foreclose on the foreclosed parcel since the lien of her ketubah preceded the creditor’s loan document.] came before Rebbi Aḥa, who said, he [The husband owes a vow of usufruct which will forbid him to remarry his wife in order to permit the wife to collect her ketubah.] owes a vow of usufruct. Rebbi Yose said, he does not have to vow usufruct. The colleagues said before Rebbi Aḥa [and] Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Aḥa say it correctly? Since if he takes her back, does not the creditor come and foreclose [If the husband should remarry his divorcee, would not her property become the husband’s property as dowry, and could not the creditor then foreclose it for his claim? It seems that the creditor loses nothing if there is no vow.] ? Rebbi Yose said to them, she turns it into jewelry or keeps it as additions to her dowry [Cf. Ketubot 5:10, Note 218. Before the marriage, they sign a stipulation that the husband shall have no rights to the property. Then the creditor would be left without recourse.] . Rebbi Ḥaggai said, by Moses! Rebbi Yose says it correctly. It was executed following Rebbi Aḥa [In this and similar cases, the husband has to deliver a vow which forbids him any future usufruct from his divorcee.] .
There [Mishnah 4. If a person makes a vow of nazir, designates an animal as his sacrifice at completion, and then asks about his vow and has it annulled, the animal becomes profane.] , you say: “It shall leave and graze with the herd.” And here, you say so [Should not the House of Shammai hold that the animal must remain dedicated if it was designated even in error?] ? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there he asked about his vow of nazir. Because of the vow of nazir [There never was a direct dedication of the animal, only a designation as nazir sacrifice. If there is no nazir, there is no sacrifice. The Babli rejects this argument and holds (9a) either that for the House of Shammai there can be no dissolution of a vow of nazir because there can be no dissolution of a dedication, or (32a) for the House of Hillel substitutions can be revoked.] did his sacrifices become profane.
Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Aḥa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Everybody agrees that nobody can ask about his substitution [There never was a direct dedication of the animal, only a designation as nazir sacrifice. If there is no nazir, there is no sacrifice. The Babli rejects this argument and holds (9a) either that for the House of Shammai there can be no dissolution of a vow of nazir because there can be no dissolution of a dedication, or (32a) for the House of Hillel substitutions can be revoked.] [No Elder has the power to annul a (forbidden) substitution.] . Where do they disagree? About his dedication; for the House of Shammai say, since a person cannot ask about his substitution, he cannot ask about his dedication, but the House of Hillel say, a person can ask about his dedication but not about his substitution [It is difficult to read Lev. 27:10 according to the House of Hillel but the interpretation is confirmed by the Babli, 31a.] .
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Bar Qappara: You catch him at the mention of “ox”, at the mention of “first” [He denies that the reason of the House of Shammai be a comparison with the rules of substitutions but holds that they interpret any statement of dedication for the maximum benefit of the Temple (similar to the position of Rav Papa in the Babli, 32a).] . “The black ox which comes out of my house first,” if a white one came out and the black followed him, you catch him because he is the leader of the black ones. “The white ox which comes out of my house first,” if a black one came out and the white followed him, you catch him because he is the leader of the white ones. “The ox which stands at the manger” and it was lying down, “lying down” and it was standing, should be like what Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he wanted to give heave from wheat and he gave from barley, during nighttime he did not do anything, during daytime, what he did is done [Since at night he could not see what he did, we have to take his word as expressing his intent. Therefore, the heave designated during nighttime is not sanctified. But during daytime, his action overrides his words and the heave from barley is sanctified. Similarly, the House of Shammai will sanctify the ox if the dedication was made under circumstances in which his action can override his words.] . Brown grain and it turned out to be white [For the spelling and definition of these words, cf. Peah 2:5, Notes 85–86. אגרו, אגדו is human food, שחמתית שמתית usually is animal feed.] , even during daytime he did not do anything. “A ram” is nothing [If he dedicated some kind of cattle but the animal coming out of his house was a goat or sheep, even the House of Shammai will agree that there was no dedication.] . “A calf” yes, since it is written: “A calf of cattle as purification offering.” “A sheep” is nothing. “Tetradrachmas” is nothing. “Change” is nothing [This refers to Mishnah 2. If he dedicated the first “denar” which he takes out of his wallet, the House of Shammai will agree that if he takes out only small change, none of which carries the denomination “denar”, it is not dedicated. Also tetradrachmas are never called “denar”. {Denar might mean “money” or “coin” in general. Denominations in late provincial usage may not correspond to standard values.}] . “A gold denar” [Even though an unspecified "denar" in normal speech means "silver denar", the House of Hillel might agree that in a dedication it does apply to an aureus, a gold denar (in honest coin worth 25 silver denars) even though it is always referred to as "gold denar", not simply "denar".] was sanctified.
MISHNAH: A person who made a vow of nazir, asked the Sages and they forbade, counts from the moment of his vow [He regretted his vow. When the vow was confirmed, the time of his regret is also counted.] . If he asked the Sages and they permitted, if he had an animal designated, it leaves and grazes with the herd [Mishnah 4. If a person makes a vow of nazir, designates an animal as his sacrifice at completion, and then asks about his vow and has it annulled, the animal becomes profane.] . The house of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Do you not agree that this is dedication in error, it leaves and grazes in the herd [Therefore, the principle announced in Mishnah 1 does not always apply.] ? The House of Shammai anwered, do you not agree that if somebody erred and designated the ninth as the tenth, or the tenth as ninth, or the eleventh as tenth, it is sanctified [Mishnah Bekhorot 9:8. Every tenth newborn animal of cattle, sheep, and goats has to be brought as sacrifice (Lev. 27:31). The sacrifice is eaten by the rancher and his family; the priests have no part in it. The verse requires that the animals be counted with a staff and the tenth be designated. If the rancher erred between 9, 10, 11, all animals involved are sanctified. But if the error was by a count of more than one, there is no dedication and the animals remain profane.] ? The House of Hillel anwered, not the staff sanctified it, for if he erred and put his staff on the eighth or the twelth, did he do anything? But the verse which sanctified the tenth sanctified the ninth and the eleventh [Lev. 27:31, interpreted in the Halakhah, the Babli Bekhorot 61a, and Sifra Beḥuqqotay Pereq 13(2).] .
HALAKHAH: “A person who made a vow of nazir,” etc. It was stated [Tosephta 3:19, referring to the first sentence of the Mishnah.] : The House of Shammai say, from the moment he asked; but the House of Hillel say, from the moment he vowed. Where do we hold? If he scoffed [For גלגל = לגלג cf. Peah 1:1, Note 178 (Berakhot 6:3, Note 130).] at his vow, everybody agrees from the moment he asked [If he did not keep his vow, the time elapsed cannot be counted. The questions to be raised here are treated at the end of the paragraph.] . If he did not scoff at his vow, everybody agrees from the moment he vowed. But we have to deal with one who is going to ask. The House of Shammai say, since he decided to ask, he is now scoffing. But the House of Hillel say, if he were scoffing, he would not ask. If he made a vow of nazir and scoffed at his vow, one does not let him ask about it unless he kept its prohibitions for the number of days he did not keep the prohibitions, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yasa said, when has this been said? If he vowed a lengthy period [More than 30 days.] . But if he vowed a short period, thirty days are sufficient for him. What is the difference between a lengthy and a short period [In any case, one requires that he keep his vow the number of days for which he vowed.] ? But it must be: When has this been said? If he scoffed at his vow for a lengthy period. But if he scoffed at his vow for a short period, thirty days are sufficient for him [The minimum of a nazir vow.] . Where are we holding? If he scoffed in impurity, everybody agrees that he invalidated everything [Since the impurity of the dead invalidates a vow of nazir by biblical decree.] . If he scoffed in shaving, everybody agrees that he invalidated only 30 days [Since the nazir for many periods shaves every thirty days, Mishnah 1:4.] . But we must deal with the case that he scoffed with wine [This is forbidden for the nazir; he is whipped if his transgression is observed by two witnesses after due warning. Biblical law contains no instructions which would require him to continue his vow for additional days. R. Jehudah’s rule which requires him to continue for an additional time, equal to that in which he disregarded the prohibition of wine, is purely rabbinical.] . That is, if he is still within his period of nazir. But after his period of nazir, he invalidated everything [It follows from R. Jehudah’s rule that he has to start anew if he disregarded the prohibition of wine during the entire prior period of his vow.] .
There [Mishnah Bekhorot 9:8. This starts the discussion of the rules of animal tithes (Note 87).] , we have stated: “If he called the ninth tenth, and the tenth ninth, and the eleventh tenth, all three are sanctified. The ninth may be eaten when it develops a defect [As explained later in this paragraph, the ninth is holy but is not dedicated as a sacrifice. Therefore, it is barred from becoming a sacrifice. The owner has to wait until it develops a blemish (which will be automatic with age); then it can be redeemed and eaten under the rules of profane slaughter.] , the tenth is tithe, the eleventh is brought as well-being sacrifice [It is holy and a sacrifice, but not tithe. Therefore, the priest’s parts are due from it.] .” “It shall be holy” [Lev. 27:32: “About tithes of cattle and flocks, anything which passes under the staff, the tenth shall be holy for the Eternal.” Since the determination of which animal is the tenth is not automatic, any which either is the tenth or is designated as the tenth by the rancher’s staff is holy.] , this teaches that holiness falls on the ninth and the eleventh. [Babli Bekhorot 61a, Sifra Wayyiqra Pereq 16(4).] I could think that both of them should be sacrificed, the verse says “cattle” [Lev. 3:1, speaking of well-being sacrifices.] , “cattle” to include the eleventh. “From the cattle” [In all situations, the expression מן “from” is interpreted to mean: “Not all.” It is then a problem of rabbinic interpretation to determine which kinds are excluded. Since the expression “from the cattle” mentioned in Lev. 1:3 was used to exclude animals used for sinful purposes [Sifra Wayyiqra Parsheta 2(7)], the expression used here can be taken to apply to other situations.] , to exclude the ninth. What reason do you have to include the eleventh and to exclude the ninth? After the verse included, it excluded. You can argue, when are sanctified [animals] subject to substitution [Substitutions of tithe animals arc mentioned in Lev. 27:33.] ? Before [There can be no substitution for an animal which has not yet been designated as sacrifice since that would be a purely profane operation.] or after? One has to say, afterwards. I am including the eleventh which is after sanctification and I am excluding the ninth which is before sanctification.
So far, if he thought that it was the tenth which he called “tenth”. If he knew that it was the ninth and called it “tenth”? The colleagues say, it is sanctified. Rebbi Yudan said, it is not sanctified [In the Babli, 32a, the different opinions are quoted in the name of Babylonian authorities.] . The Mishnah supports the colleagues: “The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Do you not agree that it leaves and grazes with the herd? The House of Shammai anwered them, do you not agree that if somebody erred and designated the ninth as the tenth, or the tenth as ninth, or the eleventh as tenth, it is sanctified.” And they do not accept it! Otherwise, they could have answered: Why do you answer us from something which is sanctified only if not in [willful] error about something which will be sanctified both in error and not in error! As Rebbi Immi said, they were rich in answer [The Talmudim never exhaust all possible arguments but quote only one. The text is better in Pesaḥim 6:2 (32b): עֲשִׁירִין הֲווּ בִתְשׁוּבוֹת.] , or as Rebbi Nasa said, like somebody who has two reasons and he responds by giving one of them.
MISHNAH: A person vowed to be a nazir and went to bring his animal [And from the start it was his intention to use this animal as his sacrifice at the end of the period of nezirut.] when he found that it was stolen; if he vowed before the animal was stolen he is a nazir, after the animal was stolen he is not a nazir [Since the vow was made in error.] . This error was made by Naḥum from Media: When nezirim came from the Diaspora [The Parthian empire, which was not touched by the Jewish revolt.] and found that the Temple had been destroyed, Naḥum from Media asked them: If you had known that the Temple would be destroyed, would you have made a vow of nazir [The question was legitimate for R. Eliezer (Mishnah Nedarim 9:2) who admits that people may ask to annul a vow because of unforseeable circumstances, but the anonymous majority forbid this kind of question.] ? They said to him, no, and Naḥum from Media permitted them. When the case came before the Sages they said, anyone who made his vow before the Temple was destroyed is a nazir, after the Temple was destroyed he is not a nazir.
HALAKHAH: “If a person vowed to be a nazir and went to bring his animal,” etc. Where do we hold? If he saw an animal passing on the market and said, I am a nazir on that animal which passed by, he is a nazir even if the animal was stolen [Since the animal was not his and he could not be sure that the owners would sell it to him, his vow was not dependent on that animal (unless he would spell out that he would not be a nazir unless the animal was sold to him).] . If he thought that he had one and it turned out that he did not, would we say if he was rich and became poor, the nezirut would be invalidated? But we must hold that he said, I am a nazir on the animal I have at home, then went and found it stolen. If he vowed before the animal was stolen he is a nazir, after the animal was stolen he is not a nazir. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say: Rebbi Jehudah asked: If the thieves returned it in the night, did his nezirut return to him retroactively [From the moment of his vow.] or for the future [He has to start anew from the moment the animal was returned. No answer is given.] ?
[Nedarim 9:2, Notes 48–49.] “That was the error of Naḥum from Media.” What was his error? That he found for them an opening due to changed circumstances. “Naḥum from Media said to them: ‘Would you have made a vow to become nezirim if you had known that the Temple would be destroyed at some future time?’ ” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the following he should have said to them: Did you not know that the prophets already had prophesied that eventually the Temple would be destroyed? Then there are no changed circumstances. Rebbi Hila said, still it is changed circumstances. They could have said to him, we knew it, but it seemed to us that this referred to the distant future: “The vision he sees is for many years.”
[Berakhot 7:2, Notes 79–90.] It has been stated: 300 nezirim came in the days of Rebbi Simeon ben Shetaḥ. For 150 of them he found an opening, for 150 of them he did not find an opening. He came to king Yannai and said to him: There are here 300 nezirim who need 900 sacrifices. You should give half of them from your side, I shall give half from my side. The king sent him 450 animals. An informer went around and said that the other one had not given anything from his own money. King Yannai heard about it and got angry. Simeon ben Shetaḥ heard and fled. After some time, important people from the Persian empire came to king Yannai. They said to him: We remember that there was an old man who gave us a rabbinic discourse. They said to him, send and bring him! He sent and gave him his word; he came and sat between king and queen. He said to him, why did you trick me? He said, I did not trick you; you with your money and I with my learning, as it is written (Eccl. 7:12) “In the shadow of wisdom, in the shadow of money.” He said to him, why did you disappear? He said to him, I heard that my lord was angry with me and I wanted to fulfill the verse (Is. 26:20) “Hide a little bit until the rage passes;” he used about himself (Eccl. 7:12): “Knowledge is an advantage, wisdom lets its possessor live.” He said to him, why did you sit between king and queen? He said to him, it is written in the book of Ben Sirach: “Esteem it and it will raise you and seat you among princes.” He said, bring him a cup that he may recite Grace. They brought him a cup and he said: “Let us give praise for the food that Yannai and his company ate.” He said to him, what should I say, “for the food that we did not eat?” He said, bring him something that he may eat. They brought, he ate and recited: “For the food that we ate.” [This paragraph has no place here, it refers to the discussion in Berakhot.] Rebbi Yoḥanan said, his colleagues disagree with Simeon ben Shetaḥ. Rebbi Jeremiah said, about the first action; Rebbi Abba said, about the second action. Rebbi Jeremiah seems to contradict himself! There he wondered about it and here it is obvious for him! He wondered following the Sages; it is obvious to him following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. We have stated about this: If one came, was lying on a couch, and dipped with them, even if he did not eat grain the volume of an olive one ‘invites’ with him, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan: One never ‘invites’ anyone unless he has eaten grain the volume of an olive. But did we not formulate, “two [eating] bread and one [eating] vegetable, then one ‘invites’?” This baraita follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.
MISHNAH: If they were walking on the road and a person came towards them when one said, “I am a nazir unless he is Mr. X”, and another said, “I am a nazir if it is not he”; “I am a nazir unless one of you is a nazir”, “unless both of you are nezirim”, “unless all of you are nezirim”. The House of Shammai say, they are all nezirim [By their rule, anybody who said “I am a nazir” is a nazir, even if his condition was not satisfied.] , but the House of Hillel say, only those whose assertions prove wrong are nezirim. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, none of them is a nazir [Since Num. 6:2 requires that a vow of nazir be clearly expressed, but these people did mention nazir only to emphasize their statements, there is no valid vow.] . If he suddenly returned, no one is a nazir [This is a continuation of the previous Mishnah. The object of the disagreement of the travelers suddenly disappears and it is not possible to determine who is right and who is wrong, who should be a nazir and who should not.] . Rebbi Simeon says, one [Everyone whose vow is in doubt. On the one hand, not to fulfill one’s vow is a grave sin; on the other hand, the sacrifices at the end of the period of nezirut can be offered only if they are due, otherwise the animals would be sinful profane offerings in the Temple. Therefore, it is necessary to offer a new vow which takes care of all possibilities.] should say: If it was as I said, I am a nazir by obligation, otherwise I am a nazir voluntarily. If one saw a koy [An animal neither wild nor domesticated, which partially follows the rules of both kinds (Mishnah Bikkurim 2:9 ff., Note 154).] and said, “I am a nazir if this is a wild animal”, “I am a nazir if this is not a wild animal” [These are statements by different prople walking together. Since all assertions are more or less true, all persons involved are nezirim.] , “I am a nazir if this is a domestic animal”, “I am a nazir if this is a not a domestic animal”, “I am a nazir if this is a wild and domestic animal”, “I am a nazir if this is neither a wild nor a domestic animal”, “I am a nazir if one of you is a nazir”, “if one of you is not a nazir”, “if both of you are nezirim”, then all of them are nezirim.
HALAKHAH: “If they were walking on the road,” etc. Should the Mishnah not read: “whose assertions are correct”? [If Mishnah 6 is translated strictly literally, it reads: “I am a nazir if he is Mr. X”, and another said, “I am a nazir if he is not”; “I am a nazir if one of you is a nazir”, “if both of you are nezirim”, “if all of you are nezirim”. In that case, the House of Hillel should state that the ones whose statements are correct are nezirim.] It is language of opposites, “that she did not bury her son.” [One does not want to express anything negative. A woman who is afraid for the life of her son will assert that she will not bury her son. A different explanation of the paragraph is given by J. N. Epstein, מבוא לנוסח המשנה2 pp. 332–335, more in accordance with the Babli (32b–33a).]
It was stated: “Rebbi Jehudah said in the name of Rebbi Ṭarphon: None of them is a nazir since nezirut exists only by warning.” [In the Babylonian sources, Babli 34a, Tosephta 3:19, “nezirut exists only by הפלאה ‘clear statement’ ”. The meaning is the same here; a legal warning for a breach of the vow could only be issued if the vow was clearly stated.] That is what Rebbi Jehudah said, “doubtful nezirut is permitted. [Mishnah Ṭahorot 4:12.] ”
[Here starts the discussion of Mishnah 7.] Where do we hold? If one says, Reuben, and the other says, Simeon, as you take it, if he is Reuben, one is a nazir, if he is Simeon, one is anazir. But we must hold that one says, Reuben, and the other says, Simeon. He suddenly disappeared, he was neither Reuben nor Simeon; nobody is a nazir.
That is what Rebbi Simeon said, he cannot bring a sacrifice unless it exists [The statement of R. Simeon parallels his own in Mishnah 2:8, regarding the man who vowed to be nazir if his wife bore a son and she had a miscarriage.] .
It was stated [In the Tosephta, 3:19, this refers to people who meet a hermaphrodite and quarrel whether or not he is a man, a woman, or a man and a woman. In the Babli, 34a, there is a question whether to read “9 neziriot”, or “9 nezirim”. The formulation of the Mishnah in the Yerushalmi clearly speaks of only two people who dispute and pile vow onto vow.] : “All of them count nine neziriot”. Are they not ten? [The questioner has a slightly different reading in the Mishnah which exhausts all logical possibilities: Wild animal or not, domestic or not, wild and domestic or not, neither wild nor domestic, one or none or both nezirim.] It is impossible that the words of any of them should not be correct. Rebbi Yasa said, this [The Tosephta which counts 9 possibilities.] is the House of Shammai’s, since the House of Shammai say, dedication in error is dedication.