MISHNAH: If somebody said “I am a nazir” and another person heard it and said, “and so am I”, “and so am I”, “and so am I”, [A1 declares to be a nazir, A2 hears A1 and says “so am I”, A3 hears A2 and says “so am I”, A4 hears A3 and says “so am I”.] all of them are nezirim. If the first one was permitted, all are permitted [If the first went to an Elder who dissolved his vow, the others did refer to a non-existent vow; their vows are non-existent. Cf. Mishnah Nedarim 9:7.] ; if the last was permitted, the last is permitted and all others forbidden [In general, if Ai had his vow dissolved, automatically all vows of persons Aj, j > i, are dissolved.] . “I am a nazir” and another person heard it and said, “my mouth is as his mouth and my hair as his hair,” he is a nazir. “I am a nazir” and his wife heard it and said, “and so am I”, he can dissolve hers [Even though the initiative is his, it does not limit his power to dissolve his wife’s vows (cf. Nedarim Chapter 10).] but his vow remains. “I am a nezirah” and her husband heard it and said, “and so am I”, he cannot dissolve [Nobody can dissolve his own vow. If he could dissolve his wife’s vow, his own would be dissolved, as explained in the second sentence of this Mishnah.] .
HALAKHAH: “If somebody said ‘I am a nazir’ and another person heard it and said, ‘and so am I’,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “and so am I”, “and so am I” [This version has only two people responding, with most of the Babli and some Mishnah mss. The paragraph is discussed in detail by J. N. Epstein, מבוא לנוסח המשנה, p. 477–479.] . Who is the Tanna of conjunctions? Rebbi Jehudah [He holds that there is a connection between the statements only if they are formulated as conjunctions; cf. Chapter 1:2, Note 40, Giṭṭin 9:7, Notes 85–101.] . But following Rebbi Meïr, “I am,” “I am”. Does the Mishnah require that all of them follow immediately after the speaking of the first [If the number of additional nezirim is reduced to 2, is that because both A2 and A3 refer to the original vow, not that A3 refers to that of A2? In that case, there would not be time for three additional people to express their vow if the rule at the end of the paragraph be followed.] ? It was stated [The same baraita is quoted in the Babli, 21a, for the same conclusion.] : If the middle one was permitted, all following him are permitted, all preceding him are forbidden [This is only possible if Ai+1 refers to Ai’s vow, not to A1’s. Therefore, the original text of the Mishnah is correct and essential.] . The Mishnah applies even if not all of them follow immediately after the speaking of the first, but each one follows immediately after the speaking of the preceding person [This is explicit in Tosephta 3:2: “If somebody said ‘I am a nazir’ and another said ‘so am I’ but not immediately after him, the first is forbidden but the second is permitted.”] . What means “to follow immediately after the speaking”? [Berakhot 2:1 (Notes 50–52), Moʻed qaṭan 3:7 (83c 1. 37). Babli 20b, Makkot 6a, Baba qama 73b, Šebuot 32a. In the Babli, the longer version has an additional word: “peace upon you, my teacher and master.”] Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The time needed for greeting between two people. Abba bar bar Ḥana in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The time needed for greeting between teacher and student, that he say to him, “peace upon you, my master.”
If one said, “I am a nazir for 100 days, and another heard it and said, “so am I for 100 days”, and repeated [It is not clear who is speaking, whether the second is making an additional vow or the first is repeating after the second. In the first case, if the first had his vow permitted, the second was not permitted; the “main vow”, his hitching on to the first person’s, becomes an accessory to the second vow which needs separate permission. In the second case, the first vow of the first person (the “main”) cannot become permitted unless the Elder also permits the secondary vow (the “accessory”.)] and said, “so am I”, the main [statement] becomes an accessory. If one said, “I am a nazir;” somebody said “and I” following immediately the first, another heard it and said, “so am I” following immediately the second. If the first became permitted, so does the second [And the third.] . If the second became permitted, the third was not permitted [The Tanna of this baraita disagrees with the argument of the preceding section and holds that, since the vow of the second is predicated on the first, the third also depends on the first but not on the third. Therefore, if the first vow is annulled, all are annulled; if any other vow is annulled, that alone is annulled but nothing else.] . If one said, “I am a nazir twice,” and two people heard it and said, “so are we”, are they two nezirim or is each of them a nazir twice? [The question is not answered. The answer is obvious both for R. Jehudah and for R. Simeon (Chapter 2, Note 100; Tosephta 2:8).] If he was permitted, they were permitted. [It seems that a sentence is missing: “If he was permitted, they did not become permitted.”] He was not permitted. If two said, “we are nezirim,” another heard it and said, “so am I,” did he make a vow regarding both of them [Then he would have vowed two neziriot.] or did he make a vow parallel to each of them? [The question is not answered. The answer is obvious both for R. Jehudah and for R. Simeon (Chapter 2, Note 100; Tosephta 2:8).] If they were permitted, [he] [Reading הוּתַּר “he was permitted” for incomprehensible הַיּוֹם “today”.] was permitted; if [he] [Reading הוּא “he” for הֵן “they”.] was permitted, they were not permitted.
“My mouth [shall be nazir] from wine [This refers to the Mishnah, where one person says “my mouth shall be like his mouth.” Somewhere it must have been mentioned that the mouth is the organ to which wine is forbidden. Similarly, if head or foot are mentioned, reference must be to the corresponding taboo imposed on the nazir. Then it is a valid vow of nazir by Mishnah 1:2.] , my head from shaving, my hand from impurity, my foot from impurity; my head shall be nazir; my liver shall be nezirah, [This is a separate set of rules. If somebody says, my x shall be nazir, he is a nazir as long as x is a body part necessary for survival (Babli 21b, Tosephta 3:3).] ” he is a nazir. “My walking shall be nazir; my talking shall be nazir”; he did not say anything. Why? Because he referred the vow to something on which life depends. “Vow, vow [One invokes the rule of gezerah šawah, “equal cut” (cf. Berakhot 1:1, Note 70; Nedarim 1:1, Note 18, 1:4, Note 159.) The nazir starts his obligation with a vow, mentioned “here” (Num. 6:2). Another personal obligation accepted by a vow is that of paying “the valuation of living persons”, mentioned “there”, (Lev. 27:2). In a different formulation, the argument is in Sifra Beḥuqqotay Parašah 3(6).] .” Just as “vow” mentioned there refers to something on which life depends, so “vow” mentioned here refers to something on which life depends.
“ “I am a nazir, and you,” etc. If he was permitted, she is permitted [This must refer to Mishnah 1, the case that the wife says “and so am I”. Then her vow is dependent on his; if his vow is declared non-existent, so is hers. But in Mishnah 2, saying “amen” makes her vow independent of his; if his vow were permitted, hers would still exist.] . If she was permitted, he is not permitted.
What about, “and so am I [The last case in Mishnah 1, if the husband says “so am I” to his wife’s vow.] ,” how do you treat this? As “amen, it is confirmed for you, [Then he confirmed his wife’s vow. The confirmation of a wife’s vow by her husband is irrevocable.] ” or “you did well [This is talk, not confirmation.] ”? The elder [Rebbi] Ḥiyya and the elder Rebbi Hoshaia. It is stated: If a woman made a vow to be anazir; her husband heard and said to her, “why did you make a vow of nazir? What did you do to make a vow of nazir? I would not like that you made a vow of nazir! There is neither vow nor oath here;” he did not say anything [The only language which the husband is empowered to use is that of dissolution, הפרה. Any other language is invalid; cf. Nedarim 10:10, Note 95 (Babli Nedarim 77b).] . But if he said, “you did well that you did make a vow of nazir; I liked that you did make a vow of nazir; if you had not made a vow of nazir I would have told you to make one”, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated on this, in all of these cases he cannot dissolve [In his opinion, confirmation of a vow is not restrictedr to a fixed formula, but dissolution would be.] . But Rebbi Hoshaia stated: In all these cases, he can dissolve unless he said “amen” or “it is confirmed for you”, then he can no longer dissolve.
MISHNAH: “I am a nazir, and you [The husband makes a vow and invites his wife to join him. As the Halakhah explains, he makes his vow conditional on her concurrence.] ?” If she said “amen”, he may dissolve hers [By asking her, he did not waive his privilege of dissolving her vows.] , and his is void [Since his vow is conditional on hers, his disappears with hers. “Void” is also the reading of Maimonides (in his Mishnah Commentary and his Code, Nedarim 13:14), against the Babli in Mishnah and Gemara which reads “confirmed”. Y. Qafeḥ in his edition of Maimonides’s Commentary notes (in his grandfather’s name) that the disagreement between Rav Jehudah and Abbai in the Babli (22b) may be based on different readings in the Mishnah.] . “I am nezirah, and you [The wife makes a vow and invites her husband to join her.] ?” If he said “amen” [By this act, not only did he become a nazir but he confirmed her vow and, therefore, lost his power of dissolution.] , he cannot dissolve.
HALAKHAH: If she is permitted, he is permitted [This now refers to the first sentence in Mishnah 2 and explains why his vow disappears with hers. The explanation is that given by Abbai in the Babli, 22b.] . If he is permitted, she is not permitted [Since her vow was an independent act.] . Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because he makes his vow conditional on hers, if he says, on condition that you [accept] [But if the Mishnah is taken as formulated, that the husband’s vow is absolute and the wife is only invited to participate, if she has her vow revoked by an Elder, his vow is not touched.] .
[Text from Nedarim 10:10, Note 95.] Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The husband who said “there is no vow, there is no oath,” did not say anything. Also the Elder who said “it is dissolved for you, it is voided for you,” did not say anything. But everybody has to follow his own rules. The husband says “it is dissolved for you, it is voided for you,” and the Elder says, “there is no vow, there is no oath”.
MISHNAH: If a woman had made a vow of nazir but drank wine or defiled herself for the dead, she receives forty [lashes] [Since she violates biblical prohibitions, is duly warned by two witnesses, and persists in her action, she is subject to the biblical punishment of at most 39 lashes.] . If her husband had dissolved her vow but she did not know that he had dissolved her vow [Since the husband can dissolve his wife’s vows in her absence.] when she drank wine or defiled herself for the dead, she does not receive forty [lashes] [While there was criminal intent, there was no crime committed. The husband had legitimized her actions.] . Rebbi Jehudah said, if she does not receive forty, let her receive blows of rebelliousness [Rabbinic punishment, usually reserved for transgression of rabbinic rules.] .
HALAKHAH: “If a woman had made a vow of nazir,” etc. Biblical whippings are 39 lashes [Mishnah Makkot 3:10.] . One evaluates him; if he can stand it, one whips him, if not, one does not whip him. Blows of rebelliousness: one strikes him until he accepts [To follow rabbinic rules.] or until he dies.
It is written: “The Eternal will forgive her [Num. 30:6,9,13. The verses refer to girls or women whose vows are dissolved by father or husband. The verses assume that they felt impelled to make vows for some hidden guilt. In the Babli, 23a, the verse is interpreted to refer only to the case of the woman violating her vow, not knowing that it had been dissolved. The speaker there and in Tosephta 3:14 is R. Aqiba.] .” This tells that she needs forgiveness. When Rebbi Jacob came to this verse, he used to say: If somebody needs atonement having intended to get pig’s meat but happened to get kosher [animal’s] meat, so much more one who had the intent to get pig’s meat and got pig’s meat.
It was stated [Tosephta 3:10; Babl1 22a.] : “A woman made a vow as nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I;’ if the first’s husband heard and told her, ‘it is permitted to you,’ the first one is permitted but the second forbidden [The Babli explains that in contrast to an Elder, who has the power to retroactively annul a vow from the start, the husband can only annul his wife’s vow from the moment he heard about it. Therefore, for the second woman, the reference was to a valid vow and she is a nezirah.] . Rebbi Simeon says, if she said, my intention was only to be like her, in her state, the second also is permitted.”
There, we have stated [Mishnah Šebuot 5:3: “If 5 people claim a deposit which he holds for them and he swears that he holds nothing of theirs, and this was false, he can be prosecuted for one perjury. But if he said, an oath that I hold nothing of yours, and of yours, etc. (using the singular in each case), he can be prosecuted for 5 perjuries. R. Eleazer says, [he can be prosecuted for 5 perjuries] only if he mentioned ‘oath’ at the end (to make it clear that he meant an oath for each of them singly.) R. Simeon says, only if he mentioned an oath in every case,” i. e., an oath that I hold nothing of yours, and an oath that I hold nothing of yours, etc. The following Mishnah 5:4 deals with the case that one claimant demands from him wheat, barley, and spelt which he holds, and he swears falsely that he holds nothing, he is prosecuted for one perjury. But if he swears that he holds neither wheat, nor barley, nor spelt, he is prosecuted for each item separately; R. Meïr says, even if he swore that he did not have wheat, barley, spelt. For this part of the Mishnah, cf. Ketubot 13:4, Notes 79–86.] : “Rebbi Eleazar says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ at the end. Rebbi Simeon says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ for every item.” [From here to the end of the Halakhah, a parallel text is in Šebuot 5:4 (36b 1. 46).] Rebbi Joḥanan said, [Rebbi Simeon implies] [The parallel text and the quote later in this paragraph show that the text in parentheses belongs here.] if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest [Since in the preceding Mishnah, R. Simeon held that the “oath” only referred to the first item on the list; if there was no perjury for the first item, there was no perjury. (The Babli agrees, Menaḥot 103a.) As long as he did not say, “an oath for barley, and an oath for spelt”, he cannot be prosecuted for lying about these items.] . Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree with this [It is established in Šebuot that R. Jehudah is the anonymous Tanna of these Mishnaiot. He agrees that no prosecution is possible if the oath regarding the first item of the list was true.] . If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not [When she said, “so am I”, she only referred to the first woman in her present state, as nezirah, without further thought. This supports the colleagues’ interpretation.] ; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the baraita supports the colleagues: “A woman made a vow as nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I;’ if the first’s husband heard and told her, ‘it is permitted to you,’ the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. Rebbi Simeon says, if she said, my intention was only to be like her, in her state, the second also is permitted.” Because she said “to be like her, in her state;” therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state,” the first is permitted and the second forbidden [Interpreting R. Simeon’s opinion, they hold that any vow or oath only refers to the item mentioned as its object.] . Since there, where there was no original nezirut, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more [The argument of R. Jacob bar Aḥa is rejected. If an accessory vow is interpreted maximally, an original oath cannot be intepreted minimally.] ? When Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest, if he attaches [He explicitly attaches the second and third items to the first. Then it is clear that he cannot be prosecuted for perjury if he swore correctly on the first item.] : If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.
The following is obvious: If her husband did not dissolve for the first [woman] and she transgressed her vow, she is whipped. Can the second be whipped [If the second woman stated that “my intention was only to be like her, in her state,” and the first violated her vow and now cannot be a nezirah while she undergoes the purification rite, when the second also violated her vow.] ? Rebbi Yose said, since one is whipped, the other also is whipped. Rebbi La said, this [R. Yose’s statement.] follows Rebbi Simeon. Can the second not be considered like one who said, I am a nezirah after twenty days [That the vow should count again after the first woman was purified.] ? Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion; for Rebbi Simeon declares him free, because his offering was not according to the custom of offerers. [Mishnah Menaḥot 12:3 (formulated in the masculine), cf. Halakhah 2:4, Note 66. There does not exist an intermittent vow of nazir; if the second woman’s vow was valid, it remains valid.]
MISHNAH: A woman who had made a vow of nazir and designated her animal [Really three animals for her prescribed sacrifice.] when her husband dissolved her vow, if the animal was his, it leaves and grazes with the herd [Since one cannot dedicate anybody else’s property, the animals are not dedicated.] . But if the animal was hers [If the spouses had signed a contract of separation of properties by which the husband renounced his right of administration and usufruct. Then the wife can dedicate her property without asking the husband’s consent.] , the purification offering shall die [Since an animal designated as purification offering can never be redeemed.] , the elevation offering shall be brought as an elevation offering [Since elevation offerings can be brought as voluntary gifts; Lev. 1.] , the well-being offering as a well-being offering [Most well-being offerings are voluntary gifts. But those are eaten during two days and the intervening night (Lev. 7:16) while the nazir’s well-being offering follows the rules of thanksgiving offerings which may be eaten only during one day and the following night (Lev. 7:15). The nazir’s offering also needs an accompanying gift of bread, similar to the thanksgiving offering. But since the woman is no nezirah after the husband’s dissolution of her vow, the bread cannot be offered. (The bread is baked on the day it is offered; since the husband has to dissolve the vow before it has run its course, there is no dedicated bread.)] , to be eaten on one day; it does not need bread. If she had money not designated [Money put aside for her sacrifices, without specifying which money should be used for which animal.] , it should be given as a donation [Given to the special Temple account, to be used for elevation sacrifices if the altar otherwise would be vacant.] . If the monies were designated, the value of the purification offering shall be thrown into the Dead Sea [Where it will be quickly dissolved by the chemicals in the water. “Throwing something into the Dead Sea” means: “making sure it cannot be used.”] ; one may not use it [Since it is designated for a sacrifice.] but there can be no larceny [Since the sacrifice cannot be offered, misappropriation of the money cannot be prosecuted; the rules of Lev. 5:14–16 cannot be applied.] . For the value of the elevation offering, they shall bring an elevation offering; it is subject to the law of larceny. For the value of the well-being offering, they shall bring a well-being offering, to be eaten on one day; it does not need bread [Well-being sacrifices remain the property of the offerer; they may be sancta, but are not “The Eternal’s Sancta”, never subject to the rules of Lev. 5:14–16.] .
HALAKHAH: “A woman who had made a vow of nazir,” etc. Does this mean it became holy by dedication [Since in the absence of a contract to the opposite, all property of the wife’s is administered by her husband, how can the wife dedicate animals for her sacrifices without asking her husband to do it for her?] ? But if a third person gave her a gift and said, on condition that your husband have no right of disposition over it [This is one scenario in which the husband has no say in what she does. (Cf. Nedarim 11:8, Notes 69–70; Babli 24b.)] , then it is hers. Rebbi Mattaniah said, if he gave her power over his properties [The husband gives her the right to sign for everything concerning their properties. In this case, she is able to dedicate the animals but he retains veto power. In the scenario described in Note 63, he has no veto power.] . If he comes to protest, it did not become holy; otherwise, it became holy.
There [Mishnah 5:3: If an Elder annuls the vow for which animals already had been reserved, the animals are profane. Why are the wife’s animals not profane if her husband dissolves her vow?] , you find it possible to say, “it should go grazing”, and here, you say so? There, the Elder eliminates the vow from the start; here, he [The husband. In the Babli, 19a, the question of the reach of the husband’s action remains unanswered. Only for the Elder, the Babli agrees, Ketubot 74b.] eliminates only from that moment onwards.
Who dissolves her obligations [It is agreed that Num. 30 gives the husband the right to dissolve his wife’s vows. But where is it written that the husband can eliminate the sacrifices which are implied by his wife’s vow?] ? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, it is a decree of Scripture: “He dissolved her vow;” he dissolved her obligation [Num. 30:9: “If on the day of his hearing he stops her and dissolves her vow [and] obligations.”] . The one who dissolved her vow dissolved her obligation.
It was stated: They [The sacrifices offered after a vow of nazir was dissolved. The Mishnah mentions that no bread is offered; it is a logical consequence that the officiating Cohen does not receive a foreleg from the goat offered as well-being sacrifice since Num. 6:19 makes the gift of the foreleg dependent on the gift of bread.] need neither bread nor foreleg. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Do well-being sacrifices which are brought after death [If the estate of a deceased person included animals dedicated for well-being sacrifices, the heirs have to offer these animals in the Temple.] need bread? He turned around and said, is it not the same during his lifetime, do they not come for nothing [A person made a vow for sacrifices and afterwards dedicated certain animals to satisfy his vow. If then these animals were lost or ran away, he dedicated other animals and offered them; when afterwards the original animals are found, they have to be sacrificed; this is “for nothing” since the vow already was fulfilled.] ? You say, they need bread, and here they need bread. Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya that well-being sacrifices which are brought after dissolution do not need bread [Since this is stated in our Mishnah. The question is why did R. Abun bar Ḥiyya not conclude (with the Babli, 24b) from the Mishnah that well-being sacrifices after the dedicator’s death do not need bread?] . What is the difference between death and dissolution? In the case of death, they already were prepared to need bread; In the case of dissolution, they never were prepared to need bread [In the case of animals dedicated to fulfill a vow of well-being offerings, they can immediately be brought to the Temple and offered. But a well-being offering for a vow of nazir cannot be brought before the period of the vow has expired; before that time the dedication is potential, rather than actual.] . It was stated: There is a reparation sacrifice after dissolution [If the wife became impure before her vow was annulled, she incurred the obligation of a reparation sacrifice. If the husband then dissolves her vow, the obligation is not dissolved since his action is not retroactive (Note 77).] ; there is no reparation sacrifice after death [Reparation sacrifices are parallel to purification sacrifices (Lev. 7:7). Since purification sacrifices after death are impossible, so are reparation sacrifices.] . If she died, her reparation sacrifice is not offered, since there is no reparation sacrifice after death. If he dissolved for her, her reparation sacrifice is offered since that reparation sacrifice does not come for nothing.
There, we have stated [Mishnah Šeqalim 2:6.] : “Leftovers for nezirim are for nezirim; what is left over from a nazir is for donation [If moneys were collected to help indigent nezirim with the expenses of their sacrifices but not all was used, the remainder has to be kept in trust to be used in the future for the same purpose. But if a person dedicated his own money for his sacrifices and had money left over, that should go to the account for offerings (Note 68).] .” Rav Ḥisda said, only if his purification offering was presented last. But if his well-being offering waspresented last, what is left over is for a well-being offering [Mishnah Šeqalim 2:6 also states that leftovers of monies for purification offerings go to the offerings account, but leftovers for well-being offerings must be used for well-being offerings.] . Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if his well-being offering was presented last, it is a general rule for a nazir that his leftover be for donation [Overriding the general rules of Mishnah Šeqalim 2:6. In the Babli, 25a, this rule is attributed to R. Joḥanan (and, therefore, declared to be practice to be followed.)] . A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “The following are undesignated monies: any which contain money for purification offerings that should die. Even if he designated money for purification offerings that should die, it remains undesignated. [This refers to Mishnah Meʻilah 3:2 which decrees that money left over from unspecified funds set aside for nazir’s sacrifices must be given to the Temple’s offering account. Such money can be used for elevation or well-being offerings only if absolutely no money of purification offerings is mixed in (since one has to avoid the danger that the value of purification offerings be totally lost if anything goes wrong with that kind of sacrifice.)] ” A baraita supports Rav Ḥisda: “This is for my purification offering and the rest for my nezirut [The required elevation and well-being offerings.] . Then he died. One commits larceny with all of them but not with part of them [Since well-being offerings are not subject to larceny by its owner, misappropriation cannot be prosecuted unless one can prove that money for elevation offerings is involved.] .” [A different version of this baraita is in the Babli, 26b; Tosephta Meʻilah 1:10.] It does not say, when he died it should be given for donation.
Rav Ḥisda said, a nazir’s leftover bread shall be left to decay. Rebbi Yose said, that is correct. You cannot sacrifice it by itself since (reparation sacrifices) [Instead of אָשָׁם “reparation sacrifice” one has to read לֶחֶם “bread”. While there are all kinds of offerings of flour and baked goods (Lev. 2), no offering of bread alone is authorized.] cannot be brought alone. You cannot sacrifice it together with another nazir’s since no nazir sacrifices without bread [Also, nowhere do we find a procedure to redeem sacrificial bread.] . Therefore, it was necessary to say that a nazir’s leftover bread shall be left to decay. They wanted to say, the same rule applies to his leftover bread as to his leftover wine offering [Required in Num. 6:15, following the rules of Num. 15:1–16.] . Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, his leftover wine offering is most holy; it should be given to donation accounts [Since all leftovers of sacrifices characterized as “most holy” are to be given to the donation account of the Temple (Mishnah Šeqalim 2:5).] . In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, Samuel, Rav Ḥisda, and Rebbi Eleazar, all three said the same. Rav Ḥisda, as quoted here [About wine offerings, in the interpretation of R. Yose ben R. Abun.] . Samuel, as Rebbi Yasa [For historical reasons, one has to read ר׳ יסא instead of ר׳ יוסי.] said, when I still was there [In Babylonia.] , I heard the voice of Rav Jehudah asking our teacher Samuel: If he designated his sheqel and died? He said, it should be given as donation [But leftover money to be used for the Temple tax of a living person is profane (Mishnah Šeqalim 2:5).] . The leftover of his tenth of an epha [To buy the required flour offering belonging to a purification offering.] : Rebbi Joḥanan said, he should bring it to the Dead Sea; Rebbi Eleazar said, it should be given as donation [Mishnah (Mishnah Šeqalim 2:5).] .
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Money can be non-designated, no animal can be non-designated [Money can be used to buy any animal; an animal usually defines the sacrifice for which it can be used: A female exclusively for a purification offering, a young male for an elevation offering, an older animal for a well-being offering. The same argument is in the Babli, 26b.] . Rav Sheshet said, it was stated thus: [Sifra Wayyiqra II Parašah 6(2), Babli 27b, Keritut 27b.] “I might think that one could not satisfy his obligation with his father’s sacrifice, with an animal which he dedicated, whether from a minor sin for a major sin [A minor sin is one not punished either by divine exstirpation or by capital punishment. The latter are major sins. Since all purification offerings are the same, if it were possible to use one’s father’s designated purification offering for oneself, it would not matter for which sin his father designated the animal.] , or from a major sin for a minor sin, or from a minor sin for a minor sin, or from a major sin for a major sin, since he cannot shave for his nezirut with his father’s animal; but he could satisfy his obligation with his father’s sacrifice, with money he dedicated, whether from a minor sin for a major sin, or from a major sin for a minor sin, or from a minor sin for a minor sin, or from a major sin for a major sin, since he can shave on money for his nezirut, any time it is not designated, but not if it is designated. The verse says [For purification offerings, Lev. 4:29,32. For the nazir, Num. 6:14. The mention of his sacrifice in Lev. 4:32 is redundant; this is given as motivation for the restrictive interpretation of all three verses.] , ‘his sacrifice’, he can only satisfy his obligation with his sacrifice, not with his father’s sacrifice.” Talking about money, one mentions “not designated”. [But non-designated animals are not mentioned. This is Rav Sheshet’s support for Rebbi Abba’s statement.]
An animal is not subject to the rules of the non-designated at the beginning [Cf. Note 106.] , but it is subject to the rules of the non-designated at the end [If an animal develops a defect and can no longer be offered on the altar, it must be redeemed and the redemption money may be used for any type of offering.] . Money is subject to the rules of the non-designated at the beginning, but it is not subject to the rules of the non-designated at the end [Cf. Note 121.] . Money is subject to the rules of the non-designated at the beginning, as we have stated: “If he had money not designated, it should be given as donation.” An animal is subject to the rules of the non-designated at the end [As written, this is a non sequitur. It seems that one has to read: An animal is not subject to the rules of the non-designated at the beginning.] , as we have stated: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if he brought three animals but did not explain. [Mishnah 6:12. If somebody brings his three animals to the Temple without specification, the officiating priests do not have to ask him to designate the animals for specific offerings since the situation is clear, cf. Note 106.] ” They are subject to the rules of the non-designated at the beginning, [This must read: Money is not subject to the rules of the non-designated at the end.] as we have stated [Tosephta Meʻilah 1:10. The text there is more complete: “ ‘These are for my purification offering, the remainder is for the rest of my nezirut’, when he died. The money’s worth of the purification offering shall be thrown into the Dead Sea; one may not use it but there can be no larceny. The remainder may be used for either elevation or well-being offerings. One commits larceny about all but one cannot commit larceny about a part.” If the moneys were under the rules of the non-designated, any surplus would have to be used for donation, i. e., to buy elevation offerings. Since it may also be used for well-being offerings, it is not subject to these rules.] : “ ‘These are for my purification offering, the remainder is for the rest of my nezirut’, when he died. One commits larceny about all but one cannot commit larceny about a part [Since no money destined for well-being offerings can be misappropriated by its owner.] .” It is not subject [One has to read: “An animal is subject”, cf. Note 112.] to the rules of the non-designated at the end, when he brought money and redeemed it for an animal. If he designated a donkey [An animal unfit as sacrifice is simply representing its money’s worth.] , it is as if he designated money. If he designated an ox [A sacrificial animal in general, but not for a nazir who is required to offer one female and one male sheep, and one male goat. The Babli rules that the animal must be treated as a sacrifice unless it be blemished, when it follows the rules of money (27b).] , Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Julianus, both speak in Shammai’s name. One says, he is like one who designates money; the other says, he is like one who designates an animal [It cannot be redeemed unless it develops a blemish; Lev. 27:10.] .
MISHNAH: If one of the bloods was sprinkled for her [The essence of any sacrifice is that its blood should be sprinkled on the walls of the altar. Once at least one of the sacrifices was presented, the nezirut is completed. The husband cannot dissolve a vow which no longer is active.] , he cannot dissolve. Rebbi Aqiba says, even if one of the animals was slaughtered for her, he cannot dissolve. When has this been said? If she shaves in purity. But if she shaves in impurity [And then has to start anew.] he may dissolve since he can say, I cannot stand an unseemly wife [Since as a nezirah she is forbidden to comb her hair, lest she tear one out.] . Rebbi says, he may dissolve even if she shaves in purity, since he can say, I cannot stand a shorn wife [While she could wear a wig after shearing off her hair, the Babli (28b) explains that the husband can object to her wearing a wig, which is difficult to keep clean. Therefore, a vow which will cause his wife to have to wear a wig is one which causes pain to the husband and is one which he may dissolve (Mishnah Nedarim 11:1).] .
HALAKHAH: “If one of the bloods was sprinkled for her,” etc. He dissolves for her because of her hair [While she could wear a wig after shearing off her hair, the Babli (28b) explains that the husband can object to her wearing a wig, which is difficult to keep clean. Therefore, a vow which will cause his wife to have to wear a wig is one which causes pain to the husband and is one which he may dissolve (Mishnah Nedarim 11:1).] . Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It is a decision of Scripture: “He dissolved her vows,” he dissolves what is on her [He disagrees and holds that living with a shorn wife imposes no hardship on the husband and, therefore, the general rules of vows do not permit the husband to dissolve his wife’s vow of nazir. But he finds a special dispensation which empowers the husband to dissolve his wife’s vow of nazir. The verse, (Num. 30:9) is slightly misquoted; instead of הפר נדריה it should be והפר את נדרה. As in most cases, the argument is from the part of the verse which is not quoted: “But if on the day on which her husband hears it, he prevents her, and dissolves her vow which is on her …” This gives the husband the power to dissolve any vow she makes regarding what is on her; i. e., her hair. (In Sifry Num. 153, the verse is interpreted to mean that the husband has a say only over vows which are on her, i. e., after she made them. A preëmptive dissolution is invalid just as the Mishnah here states that a dissolution after the end of the period is invalid.)] . Whenever he dissolves her vow, he dissolves what is on her. Rebbi Eleazar said, it [The Mishnah, which considers the nezirut completed once the blood of a single animal was sprinkled on the altar in the final ceremony.] follows Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion, after she was transferred from the prohibition to the positive commandment [From the moment when she starts the final ceremony, she is no longer forbidden to shave her hair but ordered to shave the hair and burn it in the fire under the well-being sacrifices. Since shaving the hair cannot be prohibited and required at the same time, the nezirut is completed according to everybody.] . The rabbis say, “afterwards, the nazir shall drink wine,” after all these actions [Cf. Mishnah 6:9. In their opinion, the nazir may shave only after the conclusion of the entire ceremony.] . Rebbi Simeon says, even after a single action [Mishnah 6:12; cf. Note 128.] . Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi (Bevai) [Read: Eleazar.] . “When has this been said? If she shaves in purity. But if she shaves in impurity, he may dissolve since he can say, I cannot stand an unseemly wife.” Therefore, shaving in purity does not make her unseemly. Who holds that shaving does not make unseemly [Therefore “unseemly” cannot mean “shaven”; it must refer to the fact that she cannot drink wine. Since R. Simeon allows the nazir to drink wine after the offering of one animal, before he shaves, he asserts that shaving and not drinking wine are separate matters.] ? Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, even Rebbi thinks so: “Rebbi says, he may dissolve even if she shaves [in purity], since he can say, I cannot stand a shorn wife.” Should he not say, I cannot stand an unseemly and shorn wife [Therefore, the argument that the husband suffers if his wife does not drink wine is applicable only if her vow was not completed and she shaves in impurity.] ? Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi (Jehudah) [Read: Aqiba; the reference is to the Mishnah.] said that only for the purification sacrifice, since a purification sacrifice would be invalid if not in her name [If the husband were able to dissolve his wife’s nezirut after the slaughter of her purification offering, that offering would become invalid and would have to be burned outside the Temple precinct. Both elevation and well-being offerings may be used if the original intent became void.] . That means, as long as it is alive it is surrendered to Heaven only by slaughter [Even though we say (Mishnah Qiddušin 1:6) that “a promise to Heaven is like a delivery to a person”, an animal dedicated as purification offering becomes Heaven’s property only by its slaughter, in contrast to all other sacrifices for which the dedication also equals delivery.] .
MISHNAH: A man can declare his son [His underage son. Why a father should have such power is a matter of disagreement in the Babli, 28b/29a.] a nazir but a woman cannot declare her son a nazir [Since rabbinic law knows no materna potestas.] . How is this? If he shaved him or relatives shaved him [If either the son or some relatives provided the sacrifices required while the father already had dedicated either animals or the monies needed for them.] ; if he protested or relatives protested [If either the son or relatives protested the father’s action, the child’s nezirut is voided. If the father already had dedicated either animals or the monies needed for them, they have to be treated according to the rules detailed in Mishnah 4 in the case of the woman who had prepared her sacrifices when her vow was dissolved by her husband.] , if he had designated animals, the purification offering shall die; the elevation offering shall be brought as elevation offering; the well-being offering shall be brought as elevation offering; it may be eaten for one day and does not need bread. If he had money not designated, it should be given as donation. If the monies were designated, the money’s worth of the purification offering shall be thrown into the Dead Sea; one may not use it but there can be no larceny. For the value of the elevation offering, he shall bring an elevation offering; it is subject to the law of larceny. For the value of the well-being offering, he shall bring a well-being offering, to be eaten on one day; it does not need bread. A man may shave on the basis of his father’s nezirut, but a woman may not shave on the basis of her father’s nezirut. How is this? If his father was a nazir and had set aside unspecified money for his nezirut when he died, and he said, I am a nazir on condition that I may shave on my father’s money, Rebbi Yose said, the money shall be given as donation, for he cannot shave on his father’s money. Who may shave based on his father’s nezirut? If both he and his father were nezirim and his father had set aside unspecified money for his nezirut when he died; this one shaves on his father’s nezirut.
HALAKHAH: “A man can declare his son a nazir,” etc. [Since the Mishnah deals with a difference between a man and a woman, it quotes another difference, regarding people afflicted with skin disease. The text is from Soṭah 3:9, Note 228.] “A man”. This refers not only to a man; from where for a woman? The verse says, “afflicted with skin disease,” whether man, woman, or minor. If it is so, why is “a man” written? For the next theme, “a man is dishevelled and has open seams, no woman is dishevelled and has open seams.”
A man can declare a nazir, and a man can shave [A man can declare his son to be a nazir, and the son can shave on the offerings which his father brings for him.] . Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Meïr: [Tosephta Idiut 2:2.] In 24 matters are the House of Shammai lenient but the House of Hillel stringent, and this is one of them: The House of Shammai say, a man cannot declare his son to be a nazir but the House of Hillel say, a man can declare his son to be a nazir. It was stated about those who are nazir from the womb [This sentence seems to be incomplete.] . Some want to say, until he grows two pubic hairs [I. e., the father can declare his son to be a nazir until the latter reaches adulthood.] . Some want to say, until he reaches the time of vows [Mishnah Niddah 5:6: “The vows of a girl 11 years and one day of age or a boy 12 years and one day of age are checked.” If they know what they are doing, their vows are valid.] . Everybody agrees that he can no longer declare him a nazir once he reaches the time of vows [Once a boy’s own vows are valid, his father can no longer make vows for him. In the Babli, 29b/30a, the matter remains undecided.] .
“If he shaved him or relatives shaved him; if he protested or relatives protested,” in any language it is a valid protest [No particular language is prescribed for these protests.] . If he sat before a barber [The protest must be verbal; a silent action does not count.] , it is not a protest; may a relative protest [If the child sits in a barber’s chair, may a relative protest for him? The question needs no answer since the relative can protest anywhere.] ?
May his own vow of nazir and that of his father fall on him together [If he is between childhood and adulthood and it is not clear which vow would apply. The positive answer is given by the story.] ? [Parallels are in the Babli, 29b, and Tosephta Niddah 5:15.] It happened that Rebbi Ḥanina ben Ḥanina [In the Tosephta, Ḥananiah ben Ḥananiah. In the Babli, R. Ḥaninah.] ’s father made him a nazir and Rebbi Simeon ben Gamliel [In both other sources, Rabban Gamliel. Since the story presupposes the existence of the Temple, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel would have to be the president of the revolutionary government in the war against the Romans, Rabban Gamliel his father.] checked him whether he had grown two pubic hairs. He said to him, why are you checking me? If my father’s nezirut is on me, I am a nazir; otherwise, I declare being a nazir. Rabban Gamliel stood up and kissed him on his head and said, I am sure that you will not die from old age before you taught instruction in Israel. Rebbi Eleazar bar Ṣadoq [A Tanna of the first generation at Jabneh.] said, I saw him sitting and explaining in Jabneh.
Rebbi Aḥa: Rebbi Immi said that Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked: May his bird be eaten when its neck was broken [If the child who was declared nazir by his father became impure, his father has to bring a couple of birds for him. Both birds (pigeons or turtle doves) are killed by having their necks broken by the Cohen’s thumbnail (Lev. 5:8). The meat of one of them, offered as purification sacrifice, should be eaten by the priests. If the boy’s vow is valid in biblical law, there is no problem. But if it is valid only rabbinically, then the priest who eats this meat commits two sins, since (a) he slaughters in the Temple what is not a legitimate sacrifice and (b) he eats meat forbidden outside the Temple precinct since it was not ritually slaughtered. In the Babli, 29a, R. Joḥanan holds that the vow is biblically valid; there are no problems. R. Simeon ben Laqish holds that the vow is rabbinic; his position is that articulated by R. Mani in this paragraph.] ? Instead of asking about a bird whose neck was broken, why do you not ask about a slaughtered bird [Since it is forbidden to bring profane animals into the Temple precinct, one could ask not about birds, but about the animals required for the nazir who finishes his term in purity, whether his purification offering could be eaten by the priests.] ? There is one doubt, here are two doubts [The sacrifices of the pure underage nazir have only the problem of the validity of his vow in biblical law. The sacrifice of the impure in addition has the problem that the consumption of meat from a bird whose neck was broken is forbidden to everybody except priests in the Temple in the line of duty.] . Rebbi Mani said, here also it is one doubt, as it was stated: One who perforates or tears out is not guilty because of profane slaughter in the Temple courtyard [It is forbidden to ritually slaughter profane animals in the Temple precinct. If the animals are killed in other ways than by slaughter, that prohibition was not violated (other prohibitions may have been violated). Cf. Babli Ḥulin 86a. There remains only the problem of eating the meat; the irregular slaughter in the Temple precinct is not an infraction.] . The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: There is not even one doubt, following him who says that slaughtering birds is not clear from the Torah [Ritual slaughter of four-legged animals is clearly prescribed in the Torah. In the desert, all non-sacrificial slaughter was forbidden, Lev. 17:1–7. When the Israelites entered the Land, profane slaughter was permitted, Deut. 12:21. Profane slaughter has to be executed “as I commanded you”, i. e., by the method of slaughter used in the Tabernacle. In all of Lev., slaughter is described by the verb שׁחט, Arabic سحط “to cut the throat”. According to this argument, birds should be killed by breaking their neck, rather than by cutting their throat.] : “They spread them a spread,” [Num. 11:32, speaking of the quail. In Sifry Num. 98, the metathesis שחט - שטח is attributed to R. Jehudah.] they spread out slaughtered [birds].
So far, if they are equal. If he was nazir once, his son nazir twice? He and his son nazir once, [but] he was a pure nazir, his son an impure nazir, [or] he an impure nazir, his son a pure nazir [Here starts the discussion of Mishnah 7. As explained in the next paragraph, R. Yose requires that the son’s vow precede the father’s dedication. How would R. Yose deal with the case that the vow of the son’s second nezirut precedes the father’s dedication but the actual realization of the vow starts only after the father’s death? Both for the anonymous Tanna, who allows the son unrestricted access to his father’s dedicated money, and for R. Yose, the question arises whether the money can be used for a sacrifice for which it was not intended (money for the offerings in purity for the reparation offering of the impure or vice versa)? The questions are not answered, neither here nor in the Babli (30b).] ?
What is Rebbi Yose’s reason [That the son’s vow must precede the father’s dedication.] ? “His offering to the Eternal for his vow” [Num. 6:21.] , that (his sacrifice precede his vow) [The two parentheses have to be interchanged. The correct text is copied in Num. rabba 10(42), Yalqut #709.] but not (that his vow precede his sacrifice). They wanted to say that Rebbi Jehudah [In the Tosephta, 3:18, it is explained that R. Jehudah and R. Meïr hold that any unspecified money in the estate can be used by the son for a future nezirut (but specified money has to be treated by the rules of Mishnah 6.) The opinion of R. Yose is shared by R. Eleazar (ben Shamua) and R. Simeon (ben Ioḥai). The problems with the text of Tosephta and Babli are treated at length by S. Lieberman (Tosefta ki-Fshutah p. 537–538). The Yerushalmi does not treat the anomaly that, by tradition, the daughter cannot use the father’s dedicated money even if she is the only heir (Babli 30a/b).] would agree with Rebbi Yose. It was found said that neither of them agrees with the other.