For examine all those variations which I mentioned above, and see that they do not exist in any 'bound Natures,' not in the sea nor on the dry land, not in the luminaries nor in the stars, not in trees nor in roots ; nor even in animals—and yet there is sensation in animals—nor even in birds, though they have sight and hearing. But if hawks are birds of prey, they are all birds ofprey; if wolves are destructive, they are all ravagers; and if lambs are harmless, they are all innocent, and if serpents are cunning, that subtlety belongs to all; but man, owing to his Freewill, can be like them all, while they cannot become like him. On this account they have a (fixed) Nature, while we have Freewill.
The word Freewill must stand for a reality.
Thou usest the word 'Freewill,' learn its independence from the word ; thou usest the word 'Slavery,' learn the bondage (of slavery) from the word; thou usest the word 'Nature,' recognize its immutable fixity by the word ; and thou speakest of 'God,' recognize His actual Existence by the word. For all these are words which are not at variance with their (underlying) realities. If thou namest these things when thou wishest, thou must of necessity acknowledge them to thyself even if |xx thou dost not wish. Speak against Freewill, and in virtue of what it is we can know how powerful Freewill is, since it has struggled with its power against its power. [Ov. p. 47.] For even when a man says that there is no Freewill, he is able to say there is no Freewill because he has Freewill; and, therefore, in proportion as that Freewill artfully changes itself in various ways, so those changes tell us that Freewill exists. For a 'bound Nature' cannot be changed. Why then is it necessary for us to obtain from another direction testimony as to whether Freewill exists or not ? For, behold, in virtue of being what it is, the evidence for it is proclaimed. For when it denies itself, (saying) that it is not independent, it is convicted of not being in bondage. For when any one acknowledges that Freewill exists, it is not right that Necessity should come near it.
The Teaching about the Constituents makes all teaching futile.
But if, as these say, the Constituents of Good and Evil overcome, and are overcome, they are able to believe in a Mixing of Good and Evil, just as if they denied that there is a Mixing, then they are able to believe that Freewill exists. But if they say that, when the evil Constituent is large, Freewill is subject to compulsion ; what, then, is it that the Heretics teach in their Congregations except the Error which they have been taught ? For if they teach it is because there is Freewill; supposing there is no Freewill, let them shut their mouths and not teach.
The Will cannot affect the nature of physical poisons.
But let them be asked, are they Teachers of Freewill or Changers of our Nature ? If a man eats by mistake from a deadly root, the Will of the eater cannot change that deadly thing, seeing that it is not an unfettered Will that he should change it; but it is an evil Constituent, the nature of which cannot be changed by words. How then can the just Judge condemn mankind (by asking), why they have not changed by the Will the evil Nature which cannot be changed by the Will ? [Ov. p. 48.] Therefore, let them either admit that unfettered free Wills are changed to Good or Evil or let them admit that if they are 'bound Natures' of Good and Evil, they are Natures which cannot be conquered by words. For they ought to supply an antidote as a medicine to counteract a deadly poison. For it is right that by natural illustrations that Teaching should be refuted which was composed deceitfully from analogous phenomena in Nature. But |xxi Truth is strong enough to destroy with the single reply which it makes the numerous fabrications of Falsehood.
The great diversity of our thoughts shows that we have Freewill.
For it is obviously clear from what I say that there are not Weights of Good and Evil conquering one another and being conquered by one another. For, behold, in a single hour one can think even a hundred good thoughts. And if because there was at that time much Good in a man, his good thoughts were numerous within, behold that man can do the reverse of this in the same hour. For directly after these good thoughts a man can think a multitude of evil thoughts. Which one of these, therefore, do they affirm to be more than the other ? And if they say that the Evil was most (in amount), how then since all that Evil would be in the man did it permit him to think all those good thoughts ? And if that Evil made room of its own Will, that Evil is good, which has this good Will. For how did that Evil which, when it wished, finally conquered the Good, consent to give way before it at first ? [Ov. p. 49.] But if they say that the Good exceeded (in amount), in which of a man's limbs, did all the Good hide itself, and make room for the small amount of Evil to go up and show a great victory ? If, therefore, the Evil submitted to give way before the Good, the Evil is better than the Good, in that it took the crown and gave it to its opponent. But if the Good consented to give place to the Evil that it ( i.e., the Evil) might be victorious, the Good is more evil than the Evil in that it gave place to the Evil to do corruptly.
The Soul is not a Mixture: it has free Choices.
It is, therefore, clear to any one who has knowledge that Weights and Constituents of Good and Evil neither outweigh one another, nor are outweighed by one another ; but on the contrary, there are real free Choices which conquer one another and are conquered by one another, since all the Choices can become one Choice. For if good Choices spring up in us from the good Root which is in us, and evil Choices are produced in us from that evil Root which is in us, then these (powers) in us are not independent free Choices, but Natures fixed by Necessity.
Freewill could not separate the Constituents.
For if, as one of the Heretics says, Purity and Foulness were mixed together, it is not Freewill that would be required to separate the good Will from the evil Will, but a strainer to |xxii separate the pure from the foul. For in the case of things that are literally mixed together, a separating hand is required to separate them like the skilful hand which separates with a fire the dross from the silver, and separates with a strainer the pure from the foul.
If Freewill cannot alter visible Evil, how can it alter spiritual Evil, a bound Nature ?
But if they say that these Natures in which there is mixed an excrement have 110 Freewill whereby they may separate the Foulness from them, let us leave them a little. Even if we wander a little from our subject, let us go with them where they call us. For Truth on account of its strength goes wherever it is led as a victor, and where it is pressed towards a defeat, there it gains the better crown. Let us leave, therefore, the 'bound Natures' and let us come to 'the independent Minds' ; let us see if the Wills of these men in whom there is Freedom can separate and send out of themselves the evil Ingredient, that by (the example of) the visible Mixing of the visible Evil we may believe that also the invisible Mixing of the invisible Evil can be separated. [Ov. p. 50, 1. 12.] If there is a quantity of harmful poison or deadly phlegm in any of these men, let them tell us : will 'the blameless Conduct of Freedom' separate this Evil, or will drugs and medicinal roots ? Does not this fact refute them (and convince them) that the harmfulness which I have mentioned cannot be separated by 'the righteousness of Freedom,' but by medicinal skill ? If, therefore, this small Evil which is mingled with us is not expelled from us by 'blameless Conduct,' but by the virtue of drugs, how can' Commandments and Laws' separate that mighty and powerful Evil which is mixed in Souls ? For, behold, as experience teaches us, (medicinal) virtue can separate from us even the Evil which we have mentioned by means of skilful (medical) methods, and not by the 'Conduct of Freedom.' For if they talk such nonsense let no one hear those who would relate empty tales to foolish minds. [Ov. p. 51.] For empty allegories are believed (only) by one whose mind is empty as regards the Truth.
The proper cure for Evil if it is a poison.
If, therefore, that deadly Evil is mixed in mankind like a noxious poison let them hear the true reasoning with a healthy ear. Just as when a vessel of poison is filled up, an emptying is necessary by means of drugs that that poison may not overflow |xxiii and produce in us pains and hurts ; so also when Evil is excessive in the Soul a discharge is necessary for it, either from month to month or from year to year. For, behold, just as poison becomes excessive in us from nutriment, so they say that "Evil collects and increases in us from Foods." If, therefore, the measure of the Evil of both kinds becomes excessive in us, it is clear that there must be a discharge and an emptying of the fullness. For, behold, it is also the case that when blood or phlegm increases in us (then) a discharge is necessary for them.
Forgiveness is no cure for such Evil; much less vicarious forgiveness.
Those, therefore, who ought to expel Evil from mankind by a visible working, lo, they are purging away the sins of mankind by an invisible forgiveness. But though the sins of mankind do not depart from them they are added to those who (say that they) purge them sevenfold. For around their necks is hung the debt of sins for the pardon of which they have falsely gone surety. For also madness, though it does not depart from a dog which has gone mad, enters sevenfold into those who are bitten by the dog. [St. Matt. x. 14.] But the disciples were commanded that they should shake the dust off their feet against whoever did not receive them, [ Ov. p. 52.] let us shake off the dust of our words against these who do not receive the Truth of our words. For if vengeance was ready to come for the dust of feet, how much more ready will vengeance be for the Truth of a word which is treated despite-fully by him who hears !
If Freewill cannot alter fevers how can it subdue the Great Evil?
But I wish to know this : is Freewill the cause of sins, or is Evil the fountain of sins ? But if it is Evil as they say. free Volitions cannot block up the springs of Evil. By what method then is the Evil made subject to our Will ? For, lo, when we wish, we stir it up in us to injure us, and when we will we keep it quiet within so that it cannot harm us. A plain demonstration refutes their obscure Teaching. For, behold, not even a fever within us is subject to our Will, so that when we wish it may rage and abate. If, therefore, this slight fever is not subject to our Freewill, who can make subject to our Freewill that great Evil about which they speak ? If that Evil made itself subject to us, there is nothing kinder than it, for it has made its great power subject to our weak Will. But if the power of Good makes Evil subject to us, it is clear that whenever it hurts us |xxiv that same Good stirs it up to hurt us. And, therefore, even if that Evil is evil because it hurts us, yet that which permits Evil to destroy us is more evil than it.
See how our Will is unable to alter the Nature of things.
But we are not venturing to blaspheme against the Good, but (this is said) in order that by means of what is considered blasphemous, though it is not blasphemous, the blasphemy of madmen may perchance be refuted. For one cannot bring into the way a man who is walking outside of the way, [Ov. p. 53, l. 2.] unless one goes a little from the way after him into the wilderness. See, then, that the Nature of things does not follow our Wills, but our Will goes after the Nature of Creation, in that we use them according to their natural adaptations (lit., as they are natural and for what they are natural). But if even fire is not cold or hot according to our Will, how is the fierce power of that Evil which possesses an Existence of its own made subject to the Will of those who are created ? But Evil does not possess an Existence of its own, because Freewill possesses empire over itself. And fire always retains its hot nature, but Evil does not retain the nature of its being even as much as the fire which is a created thing. And, though we do not wish to be burnt, yet fire still acts according to its own nature, and when we go near it, it burns us. How then is that Evil, which is mixed in us, if it also has an injurious nature, able to injure us when our Will wishes to be injured ? If our Will gives it power, then the wickedness of our Will is stronger than the wickedness of Evil ; and according to their preposterous Teaching it is found that Evil is therefore accused by our Freewill because, as Freewill wishes, and in proportion as it wishes, Evil opposes it. And in vain do they blame Satan since their Will is more hateful than Satan. But if Evil can injure our Freewill whenever it (i.e., our Freewill) wills to be injured, it is clear that they are calling Freewill Evil, though they not not aware of it. [Ov. p. 54.] For fire which burns does not wait for Freewill to will or not to will, but it injures alike him who wills and him who does not will—both of them—if they approach it.
The Will cannot change the nature of fire: how can it conquer the Evil Element ?
But if they think "that our Will is able to conquer Evil," let us then dismiss the strife of Controversy, and let us come to actual experience. Let one of them stretch even the tip of his |xxv little finger into the fire, and if his Will can conquer the power of the fire that it may not injure him, it will be possible to believe that the injurious nature of Evil can be conquered. But if the fire causes irritation and pain over the whole body when it has touched only our finger, how does that injurious Evil, since it is all mingled with the whole of us, not also injure us like the weak fire ? If they say that He ( i.e., God) has not allowed us to conquer fire by our Freewill, who then granted them power over Evil to conquer it by means of their Freewill ? But if another Good (Power) granted to Freewill the power of conquering Evil, all their blasphemy applies to Him Whom they praise. For all the censure is attached to that (Good One). For if He thus changed Evil so that it might not injure us like injurious fire, it is clear that He is also able to change any Evil that injures us at present that it may not injure us. But if He was unable, is our victory still certain ? And let them persuade us (and show) how their Freewill conquers Evil when it cannot conquer fire. But whichever proof they may choose, they are fettered by the one they choose. If they say that because fire by its nature possesses heat on that account our Freewill is unable to conquer it, [Ov. p. 55.] it is evident that Evil does not possess Freewill by nature ; and on that account our Will is able to conquer it.