The Lantern

Discourse to Hypatius 13

CCEL

False views about the origin of Evil make the Law an absurdity, or make Good akin to Evil.

But if the Evil which is in us is evil, and cannot become good, and if also the Good in us is good, and cannot become evil (then) these good and evil promises which the Law makes are superfluous. For whom will the Rewarder crown—one who is victorious by his Nature and cannot fail ? Or whom, again, will the Avenger blame—that Nature which fails and cannot conquer ? But if that good thing which is in us is obedient to |xiii something evil, how can we call that Good, seeing that it has a close relationship to Evil ? For by means of that thing whereby it becomes obedient to Evil its kinship with Evil is perceived. For that Evil would not be able to draw it to itself if it were not that its lump had an affinity to the leaven of Evil. See therefore, also, that what they call a good Nature is, in virtue of what it is, convicted of being an evil Nature; inasmuch as it has an evil Will which is drawn away after Evil. But inasmuch as it has an evil Will, all Evil things had a tendency towards it. [ The evil Will is the root of Evil. ] For there is nothing more evil than an evil Will. For that is the root of evil things. For when there is no evil free Will, then evil things come to an end. For the deadly sword cannot kill apart from the evil Will of its holder. [Ov. p. 38.]But see, already when we have not advanced to the contest (even) before the contest, the enemies of the Truth have been conquered beforehand.

The Will is its own explanation.

And if any one ask, what then is this Will ? we must tell him that the real truth about it is that it is the power of Free-choice. And because it is not right to scorn a good learner, let us now like those who hasten and pass on throw him a word, that is to say, one of the words of Truth. For, even from a single word of Truth, great faith dawns in a sound and wise hearer ; just as a great flame is produced by a small coal. For if a single one of a few coals of fire is sufficient to make scars on the body, one of the words of Truth, also, is not too weak to clean away the plague spots of Error from the soul. If, therefore, any one asks, "What is this Will, for though it is one thing, part of it is good, and part of it evil ?" we shall tell him that it is because it is a Will. And if he asks again, we shall tell him that it is a thing endowed with independence. And if he still continues to indulge in folly, we shall tell him that it is Freewill. And if he is not convinced this unteachableness of his teaches that because there is Free-will he does not wish to be taught. But if he is convinced when they say to him that there is no Freewill, it is truly wonderful that in the annulling of his Freewill, his Freewill is proved, that is to say, by his being in a desperate state. [ The very denial of Freewill proves that it exists. ] And the matter is as if some eloquent person wished to harangue and to prove that men have no power of Speech. And that is great madness; |xiv for he says there is no power of Speech when he uses the power of Speech. For his power of Speech refutes him, for by means [Ov. p. 39.] of Speech he seeks to prove that there is no power of Speech. When Freewill, too, has gone to hide itself in a discussion and to show by argument that it does not exist, then is it with more certainty caught and seen to exist. For if there were no Freewill, there would be no controversy and no persuasion. But if Freewill becomes more evident when it hides itself, and when it denies (its own existence) it is the more refuted, then when it shows itself it is made as clear as the sun.

The Will is not enslaved, but is the Image of God.

And why does Freewill wish to deny its power and to profess to be enslaved when the yoke of lordship is not placed upon it ? For it is not of the race of enslaved reptiles, nor of the family of enslaved cattle, but of the race of a King and of the sons of Kings who alone among all creatures, were created in the image of God. For see every one is ashamed of the name of slavery and denies it. And if a slave goes to a country where men know him not, and there becomes rich, it may be that, although he is a slave and of servile origin, he may be compelled to say there that lie is sprung from a free race and from the stock of kings. And this is wonderful that, while slaves deny their slavery, yet the Freewill of fools denies its own self. And see, if men give the name of slave to him who says that there is no Freewill, he is displeased and becomes angry, and begins to declare the Freedom of his family. Now, how does such a person on the one hand deny Freewill, and on the other acknowledge it ? And on the one hand hate literal slavery, and (on the other) acknowledge spiritual slavery ? If he chose with intelligence and weighed the matter soundly it would be right for him to acknowledge that (principle) that he might not be deprived of the mind's free power of Choice. [Ov. p. 40.] And here he is exposed who blasphemes very wickedly against the Good One, the Giver of Freewill, Who made the earth and everything in it subject to its dominion.

Freewill is denied by those who wish to blame God for their failures.

But there is no man who has gone down and brought up a crown with great toil from the hard struggle, and (then) says that there is no Freewill, lest the reward of his toil and the glory of his crown should be lost. The man who has failed says there |xv is no Freewill that he may hide the grievous failure of his feeble Will. If thou seest a man who says there is no Freewill, know that his Freewill has not conducted itself aright. The sinner who confesses there is Freewill may perhaps find mercy, because he has confessed that his follies are his own ; but whoever denies that there is Freewill utters a great blasphemy in that he hastens to ascribe his vices to God ; and seeks to free himself from blame and Satan from reproach in, order that all the blame may rest with God—God forbid that this should be ! But if he is intelligent he ought not to think that a being endowed with power over itself is similar to a thing which is bound in its Nature. [ The mystery of the Will is a part of a wider mystery. ] And, moreover, it would not be right for any one, after he has heard that the Will . . . to ask (and say), 'But what, again is the Will ?' Does he know everything, and has this (alone) escaped his knowledge, or does he know nothing at all since he cannot know even this ? But if he knows what 'a bound Nature' is, he can know what an unconstrained Will is, but that which is unconstrained cannot become constrained, because it is not subject to constraint. But in what is it unconstrained except in that it has (the power) to will and not to will?

The power of Freewill is obvious but unspeakably difficult to explain.

And if he is unwilling to be convinced in this way, it is because the power of his Freewill is so great, and our mouth is unable to do it full justice ; our weak mouth has confessed that it is unable to state its unconstrained Will. For it is a Freewill which subjects even God to Investigation and rebuke, on account of its unconstrained nature. It ventured to bring up all this because it desired to speak about that which is unspeakable. [Ov. p. 41, l. 5.] But that (Freewill) which has ventured to make statements concerning God, itself is not able to state its own nature perfectly. But concerning this, also, we say to any one who asks that this is a marvel which it is very easy for us to perceive, but it is very difficult to give a proof of it. [ But it is impossible to explain anything completely. ] But this is not so only in this matter, but it is the same with everything. For whatever exists may be discussed without being searched out; it can be known that the thing exists, but it is not possible to search out how it exists. For see that we can perceive |xvi everything, but we cannot completely search out anything at all ; and we perceive great things, but we cannot search out perfectly even worthless things. [ Let us thank God that our Knowledge of things is limited. ] But thanks be to Him Who has allowed us to know the external side of things in order that we may learn how we excel, but He has not allowed us to know their (inward) secret that we might understand how we are lacking. He has allowed us, therefore, to know and not to know that by means of what can be known, our childish nature might be educated, and that our boldness might be restrained by those things which cannot be known. Therefore, He has not permitted us to know, not that we may be ignorant, but that our Ignorance may be a hedge for our Knowledge. [ Knowing that our powers of knowing are so limited we can avoid vain and weary searching. ] For see how we wish to know even the height of heaven and the breadth of the earth, but we cannot know ; and because we cannot know we are thus restrained from toiling. Therefore, our Ignorance is found to be a boundary for our Knowledge, and our want of Knowledge (lit. simpleness) continually controls the impetuosity of our boldness. For when a man knows that he cannot measure a spring of water, by the very fact that he cannot, he is prevented from drawing out what is inexhaustible. [Ov. p. 42, l. 5.] And by this experience it is seen that our weakness is a wall in the face of our boldness. Thus, too, when we know that we cannot know, we cease to investigate. For if, when we know little, the impetuosity of boldness carries us on and proceeds to those things which may not be known, who is there who will not give thanks to Him. Who has restrained us from this wearisomeness, even if we do not wish to remain within the just boundary within which He has set us ? Our Ignorance, therefore, is a bridle to our Knowledge. [ Yet we are not to be ignorant, but to seek after practical Knowledge. ] And from these instances it does not follow that the All-knower wished to make us ignorant, but He placed our Knowledge under a helpful guardian ; and better is the small Knowledge which knows the small range of Ignorance than the great Knowledge which has not recognized its limits ; and better is the weak man who carries about something that is necessary for his life than the arrogant strong man who burdens himself with great stones which cause his destruction. [ Our chief Knowledge is to know what subjects can never be known. ] But our chief Knowledge is (just) this—to know that we do not know |xvii anything. For if we know that we do not know, then we conquer Error by our Knowledge. For when we know that everything that exists is either known or not known, thereby we acquire the true Knowledge. For whoever thinks he can know everything, falls short of the Knowledge of everything. For by means of his Knowledge he has gained for himself Ignorance. But whoever knows that he cannot know, from Ignorance Knowledge accrues to such a one. [Ov. p. 43.] For in virtue of the fact that he knows that he cannot know, he is enabled to know, that is to say, (he knows) something which profits him.

No external force compelled my Will when deciding not to come to see thee.

If, therefore, as I said above, though the Will is one, part of it compels and part of it is compelled, by whom was I compelled not to come except by my own Will ? O that some unknown external Constraint had opposed me ! For perhaps with the whole of my being I would have contended against the whole of that (Constraint) and been victorious. (O that it had been thus), and that an inward Constraint had not opposed me, (a Constraint) of which I know not how to give an account ! For I am not able to state how part of me contends with another part ; in virtue of being what I am, I conquer, and am conquered continually.

The heretical Teaching says that the Will is a Mixture.

But we are not stating the case as the Heresies state it. For they say that Constituents of Good and Evil are mingled together in us, and "these Constituents conquer one another, and are conquered by one another." But although Error is able to deck out what is false, the furnace of Truth is able to expose it. For we say that free Volitions conquer one another, and are conquered by one another ; for this is the Freewill which the voice of the Law can transform.

Consequences of the denial of Freewill.

And if they say that if Freewill comes from God, then the good and evil impulses which belong to it are from God ; by saying this, what do they wish to say ? Do they wish to affirm that there is no Freewill ? And if they deny Freewill what can they believe ? [Ov. p. 44.]For if they deny Freewill the Law and Teaching are of no use ; and so let books and laws be rolled up and let judges rise from their thrones, and let teachers cease to |xviii teach! let prophets and apostles resign their office! Why have they vainly laboured to preach ? Or what was the reason of the coming of the Lord of them all into the world ?

Freewill and the teaching about the Constituents are incom patible.

But if they profess belief in Freewill—which is actually what they profess—that Freewill which they profess to believe in compels them to deny that Evil which they believe in. For both of them cannot stand. For either our Will sins, and (at other times) is proved to be righteous, and for this reason we have Freewill; or if the Constituents of Good and Evil stir in the Will, then it is a Constituent which overcomes, and is overcome, and not the Will.

Freewill means Freewill not a 'bound Nature.'

But if any one says that everything which stirs in our Freewill does not belong to Freewill, by his Freewill he is making preposterous statements about Freewill. For how does he call that Freewill when he goes on to bind it so that it is not Freewill. For the name of Freewill stands for itself; for it is free and not a slave, being independent and not enslaved, loose, not bound, a Will, not a Nature. And just as when any one speaks of Fire, its heat is declared by the word, and by the word 'Snow,' its coolness is called to mind, so by the word 'Freewill' its independence is perceived. But if any one says that the impulses that stir in it do not belong to Freewill he is desiring to call Freewill a 'bound Nature,' when the word does not suit a Nature. And he is found not to perceive what Freewill is, and he uses its name rashly and foolishly without being acquainted with its force. [Ov. p. 45.] For either let him deny it, and then he is refuted by its working, or if he confesses it, his organs contend one against the other ; for he denies with his mouth what he confesses with his tongue.

The Law of God presupposes Freewill.

For the Giver of Freewill is not so confused (in mind) as this man who is divided (against himself) part against part, that He should become involved in a struggle with His nature. For He gave us Freewill which, by His permission, receives good and evil impulses, and He furthermore ordained a Law for it that it should not do overtly those Evils which by His permission stir invisibly in it. And let us inquire a little. Either though He may have had the means to give us Freewill, He did not wish to give it, though He may have been able to give it, or He may |xix not have had the means to give, and on this account He was unable to give it. And how was He Who was unable to give freewill able to give a Law when there was no Freewill ? But if He gave the Law, the righteousness which is in His Law reproves our Freewill, for He rewards it according to its works.

The diversity among men proves that Freewill exists.

And if there is no Freewill, does not this Controversy in which we are involved concerning Freewill, bear witness that we have Freewill ? For a 'bound Nature' could not utter all these various matters controversially. For if all mankind were alike saying one thing or doing one thing, perhaps there would be an opportunity to make the mistake (of thinking) that there is no Freewill. But if even the Freewill of a single man undergoes many variations in a single day so that he is good or evil, hateful or pleasing, merciful or merciless, bitter or pleasant, blessing or cursing, grateful or ungrateful, [Ov. p. 46.] so that he resembles both God and Satan, is it not established by thousands of witnesses that we have Freewill ? And, behold, at the mouth of two or three witnesses is every word established. [Deut. xix 15. S. Matt. xviii. 16.]

Man alone has Freewill. Compare him with other creatures and see the difference.