Socrates: And the foolish man and the coward to be evil?
Callicles: Certainly.
Socrates: And he who has joy is good?
Callicles: Yes.
Socrates: And he who is in pain is evil?
Callicles: Certainly.
Socrates: The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the evil has more of them?
Callicles: Yes.
Socrates: Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad as the good, or, perhaps, even better?—is not this a further inference which follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the good and the pleasant are the same:—can this be denied, Callicles?
Callicles: I have been listening and making admissions to you, Socrates; and I remark that if a person grants you anything in play, you, like a child, want to keep hold and will not give it back. But do you really suppose that I or any other human being denies that some pleasures are good and others bad?
Socrates: Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me as if I were a child, sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as if you were meaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you were my friend, and would not have deceived me if you could have helped. But I see that I was mistaken; and now I suppose that I must make the best of a bad business, as they said of old, and take what I can get out of you.—Well, then, as I understand you to say, I may assume that some pleasures are good and others evil?
Callicles: Yes.
Socrates: The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil?
Callicles: To be sure.
Socrates: And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the hurtful are those which do some evil?
Callicles: Yes.
Socrates: Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and drinking, which we were just now mentioning—you mean to say that those which promote health, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and their opposites evil?
Callicles: Certainly.
Socrates: And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil pains?
Callicles: To be sure.
Socrates: And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and pains?
Callicles: Certainly.
Socrates: But not the evil?
Callicles: Clearly.
Socrates: Because, if you remember, Polus and I have agreed that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good;—and will you agree with us in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions, and that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good, and not the good for the sake of them?—will you add a third vote to our two?