Callicles: Yes.
Socrates: But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and the cowardly are the bad?
Callicles: Yes.
Socrates: Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly equal degree?
Callicles: Yes.
Socrates: Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal degree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? (i.e. in having more pleasure and more pain.)
Callicles: I really do not know what you mean.
Socrates: Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good because good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that pleasures were goods and pains evils?
Callicles: Yes, I remember.
Socrates: And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who rejoice—if they do rejoice?
Callicles: Certainly.
Socrates: Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with them?
Callicles: Yes.
Socrates: And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with them?
Callicles: Yes.
Socrates: And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of the presence of evil?
Callicles: I should.
Socrates: Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain evil?
Callicles: Yes.
Socrates: The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of pleasure and of pain?
Callicles: Yes.
Socrates: Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy and pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has more?
Callicles: I should say that he has.
Socrates: Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from our admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what is good twice and thrice over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we allow to be good?
Callicles: Yes.