Callicles: Yes, I did.
Socrates: But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have pleasure?
Callicles: Clearly.
Socrates: Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant?
Callicles: I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means.
Socrates: You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know.
Callicles: Well, get on, and don’t keep fooling: then you will know what a wiseacre you are in your admonition of me.
Socrates: Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in drinking at the same time?
Callicles: I do not understand what you are saying.
Gorgias: Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes;—we should like to hear the argument out.
Callicles: Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling of Socrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions.
Gorgias: What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let Socrates argue in his own fashion.
Callicles: Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little peddling questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them.
Socrates: I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the great mysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought that this was not allowable. But to return to our argument:—Does not a man cease from thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the same moment?
Callicles: True.
Socrates: And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment?
Callicles: Very true.
Socrates: Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment?
Callicles: Yes.
Socrates: But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as you have admitted: do you still adhere to what you said?
Callicles: Yes, I do; but what is the inference?
Socrates: Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good and evil, for they are different. How then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in another light, which could hardly, I think, have been considered by you when you identified them: Are not the good good because they have good present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present with them?
Callicles: Yes.
Socrates: And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good—would you not say so?
Callicles: Certainly.