10. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ is nearer to things themselves as they are in the Word than as they are in their own genus: it must be said that although it is nearer, it is not however more proportionate. Comprehension, however, in some way includes in itself the notion of proportionality, and that the known be finite to the knower: and therefore, because in their own genus they are finite and proportionate to that soul, they are therefore comprehensible, but not as they are in the immensity of that art, unless perhaps it be understood according as they are in it as in a productive exemplar. And in this way it can be conceded that they are comprehended by the soul of Christ, but in the other way not, on account of the immensity and disproportionality.
11. To that which is objected, that it is equally impossible to know contingent things with certitude as to comprehend infinite things: it must be said that this does not hold true: because, although to know contingent things with certitude is impossible according to natural cognition, it nevertheless becomes possible through an illumination above nature, which elevates the soul to knowing things in the eternal art, in which both contingent and necessary things exist immutably: but to comprehend actually infinite things is impossible not only by natural cognition, but also by gratuitous cognition, because both are created and limited, and on this account do not extend to actually infinite things.
12. To that which is objected concerning the comparison of secrets and infinite things, it must be said that the case is not similar, as is clear from what has been said: because the perception of a secret, however hidden, does not imply anything incompatible with the nature of the created intellect itself. It is not so with the comprehension of the infinite, which implies infinity in act, and thereby in substance and power: which no creature admits in any way, neither through grace nor through glory.
13. To that which is objected, that anything comprehended is comprehensible by a creature: it must be said that although it can be conceded of each thing individually that it is comprehensible by a creature, because each thing is finite, nevertheless all taken together are infinite, and therefore incomprehensible. And therefore that argument does not proceed, because it proceeds from the parts taken separately to the same as they are gathered into one. Whence just as this argument does not hold: this house can contain any individual man by himself, therefore it can contain all men: so neither does that one hold.
14. To the objection that the soul of Christ comprehends all the differences of being, and that the potency of any species extends to infinite individuals: it must be said that the potency toward infinite things can be understood in two ways, namely as active potency and as passive potency. Active potency toward infinite things exists only in the creative essence, which is actually infinite. But if a potency with respect to infinite things is posited in a creature, it is only a passive potency, which is rooted in something finite, yet has a relation to an infinite active principle, according to what is said in the Book of Causes: "All infinite powers are dependent upon one infinite principle, which is the power of powers." Accordingly, infinite potency in a creature can be understood, known, or comprehended in two ways: either with respect to that upon which it is rooted in the creature—and because that is actually finite, it is therefore comprehensible—or with respect to the active principle outside, which is actually infinite. In the first way, the soul of Christ comprehends all the differences of being, both in genera with respect to species and in species with respect to individuals; in the second way, insofar as it is referred to the infinite active potency, it indeed knows, yet not by way of comprehensive cognition, but of excessive cognition, as was shown above. And through this the response is clear.
15. 16. To the objection concerning the point and concerning the lovable and the knowable, it must be said that it is true that it comprehends every lovable and knowable thing according to the being that it has in its own nature; but according to the being that it has in the infinite first cause, in this way it is said to be knowable and comprehensible only to an infinite power: because, although according to mode it may seem to denote something created, nevertheless according to reality it denotes nothing but the power of the efficient cause, which, since it is infinite, can be comprehended by no finite being.
17. To the objection that the soul of Christ is altogether perfect, and that nothing remained in potency that was not reduced to act: it must be said that this is true of a potency that is altogether reducible to act; but a potency toward infinite things can never be reduced to act according to its totality, but only according to a part. Whence it is impossible that God should bring it about that a continuum is altogether divided into everything into which it can be divided; for this is repugnant to the perfection of the potency of the agent itself and to the completion of the creature, which is naturally constituted to exist in finitude; and such is the potency of the possible intellect.
18. To the objection that if the agent intellect were in act with respect to all things toward which the possible intellect is in potency, then the soul would understand infinite things, etc.: it must be said that the case is not similar:
because, if the agent intellect were in act with respect to infinite things, insofar as it is a power of the soul, then the soul by its own power would extend itself to infinite things. But it is not so in a soul united to eternal wisdom, because that wisdom, even though it extends to infinite things, is not something belonging to the soul itself, but is above the soul; and therefore it does not follow from this that it belongs to the soul itself to know infinitely. Moreover, the possible intellect is proportionate to the agent, but uncreated wisdom is not thus proportionate to the understanding soul itself.
19. 20. 21. To the objection concerning the soul of Christ—whether it can learn anything, and whether it knows any of those things which God is not going to do but can do, and whether it knows only finite things or also infinite things—the response is clear through the distinction made above: because, since the soul of Christ has comprehensive knowledge with respect to all things whatsoever that come to be in the universe, and exceeding knowledge with respect to all things that are contained in the divine art, and since that excess consists in the totality of the knowing power and in the highest intimacy with respect to the mirror that represents, it is necessary that, although the soul of Christ does not comprehend all things that divine wisdom comprehends, yet because it exceeds into all those things, its entire appetite is therefore terminated: so that, just as nothing further can be added to its grace, so nothing further can be added to its wisdom, because as much has been given to it as can be granted to any creature.
From these things, therefore, which have been said and predetermined concerning the wisdom of Christ, both with respect to the divine nature and with respect to the human, there can appear the mode of knowing both in the knowledge of the Creator and in the knowledge of the creature, not only in the state of the fatherland, but also in the state of the way. For, to speak to one point, it must be acknowledged that God knows infinite things—knows, I say, by Himself, not by a likeness; and by a likeness not received from without, but by the very truth itself, expressing and exemplifying all things, in respect of which many likenesses and expressions are spoken of, not on account of multiplicity and distinction in themselves, but according to the rationale of understanding: now these likenesses, or rather eternal reasons, are that from which all certitude of created knowledge flows, both in the soul of Christ and in other created spirits; nor are these alone the reasons of knowing, but together with them also likenesses received from without: according to the state of the way and according to the state of the fatherland, not only is the presence of the eternal light required, but also the influence of the eternal light, not only the uncreated Word, but also the word inwardly conceived; which, since it is finite, neither the soul of Christ nor any other soul can be comprehensive of the eternal Word nor of infinite knowable things, although it must be borne toward them by way of excess: which excess is indeed the ultimate and most noble mode of knowing, which Dionysius praises in all his books, and especially in the book On Mystical Theology. Concerning which also, mystically, almost all of divine Scripture speaks, and concerning which Apocalypse 2: I will give him a stone, and on the stone a new name written, which no one knows except he who receives it: because this mode of knowing one scarcely or never understands unless one has experienced it, nor does one experience it unless one is rooted and grounded in charity, so that one may comprehend with all the Saints what is the length, the breadth, etc.; in which also experiential and true wisdom consists, which is begun on the way and consummated in the fatherland: for the circumlocution of which negations are more fitting than affirmations, and supereminent expressions than positive predications; for the experience of which interior silence avails more than the exterior word. And therefore here an end of words must be had, and the Lord must be entreated, that He may grant us to experience that of which we speak.