On the contrary: 1. The Psalm: Your knowledge has become wonderful, etc.; the Gloss: "The assumed man cannot be made equal to the divine substance in substance nor in anything else." Therefore the soul of Christ does not comprehend all things that are comprehended by the eternal wisdom.
2. Furthermore, Augustine, in Book XII of The City of God : "The infinity of numbers cannot be infinite to the knowledge of God, which comprehends it." Therefore, if the soul of Christ comprehends infinite things, infinite things are finite to it; but if infinite things are finite to it, since it itself is finite, they are not infinite; therefore if it comprehends finite things, it does not comprehend infinite things.
3. Furthermore, Hugh, On the Wisdom of the Soul of Christ : "This one thing I affirm without doubt, that there was no other wisdom in the soul of Christ besides the divine, or if there was any other, it was not equal to it." But it is established that there was another, as is apparent from the foregoing. Therefore, since the wisdom that informs, perfects, and disposes the soul can only be created, that wisdom in Christ will not extend to comprehending all things that the uncreated wisdom comprehends.
4. Furthermore, every created thing is disposed in a certain weight, number, and measure. Therefore the soul of Christ and its wisdom have a certain number and measure; therefore it does not extend to infinite things.
5. Furthermore, to comprehend infinite things is an act passing entirely over the immensity of knowable things: but every such act is infinite: and an infinite act proceeds only from an infinite power, nor is there infinite power except in an infinite substance: if therefore the soul of Christ is finite and limited, since it is a creature, it is impossible that it comprehend infinite things.
6. Furthermore, the simpler a substance is, the more things it is capable of knowing; but the soul of Christ is not elevated either by nature or by grace to divine simplicity: therefore it is not elevated to knowing as many things as divine wisdom knows.
7. Furthermore, the wisdom of the Word is immense in clarity and in multiplicity: but the soul of Christ never attains to comprehending the immensity of the eternal light according to its complete clarity: therefore it never attains to knowing its complete multiplicity.
8. Furthermore, although the soul of Christ is united to the essence of the Word, it nevertheless never exists in as many things as the Word itself does: but as essence is related to essence, so knowledge is related to knowledge: therefore it never knows all things that the Word itself knows.
9. Furthermore, knowledge includes power, because to be able to know is to be able to do something; but the soul of Christ is not capable of infinite power, such as the power of creating: therefore by equal reasoning neither is it capable of knowledge extending itself to infinite things.
10. Furthermore, infinity in creatures attests to imperfection: if therefore the wisdom of the soul of Christ is most perfect, then it does not admit infinity either on the part of the knower or on the part of the known or on the part of the mode of knowing.
11. Furthermore, no created thing exceeds another created thing infinitely: but if the soul of Christ were to know infinite things, since other souls know only finite things, it would exceed them infinitely: therefore it would pass beyond the genus of created things. But this is manifestly false: therefore so too is that from which it follows, namely that the soul of Christ is comprehensive of infinite things.
12. Furthermore, everything known is in the knower: therefore if the soul of Christ were actually to comprehend infinite things, infinite things would actually be in the soul of Christ; but it is impossible to posit an actual infinite with respect to a created being: therefore it is impossible that the soul of Christ be comprehensive of infinite things.
CONCLUSION.
The soul of Christ in the Word does not properly comprehend infinite things; yet insofar as the Word is a factive exemplar, it is borne toward it by comprehending: but insofar as it is an expressive exemplar, it is borne toward the same not by comprehending, but by exceeding.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing, it must be noted that one can speak of uncreated wisdom in two ways: either insofar as it is an exemplar that is productive and dispositive, or insofar as it is an exemplar that is expressive or representative. In the first way, there shine forth in the art of divine wisdom those things which are, were, and will be; and these are finite. In the second way, there shine forth all things which God can make and understand; and these indeed are infinite, as was shown in the preceding discussions, and as Augustine expressly says in the twelfth book of the City of God. - The soul of Christ, therefore, is borne toward divine wisdom through cognition in both ways, but differently. For toward it, insofar as it is a productive exemplar, it is borne by comprehending, because those things which are contained and represented in the exemplar as productive and dispositive are finite, and thereby also comprehensible. But toward the exemplar, insofar as it is an expressive or representative exemplar, it is borne not by comprehending, but by exceeding: because, since infinite things are represented in it, they are incomprehensible, namely by a finite substance. And therefore the soul of Christ, since it is a creature and thereby finite, however much it may be united to the Word, does not comprehend infinite things, because it is neither equal to them nor does it exceed them: and therefore it does not in every way grasp them, but rather is grasped, and thereby is not borne toward them by way of comprehension, but rather by way of excess. An excessive mode of knowing, however, I call not one in which the knower exceeds the known, but one in which the knower is borne toward an object that exceeds it in a certain excessive manner, by raising itself above itself. Concerning this mode of knowing, Dionysius speaks in the book On Mystical Theology, and in the seventh chapter of On the Divine Names says thus: "It is necessary to recognize that our intellect has a certain power for understanding, through which it sees intelligible things, but also a union exceeding the nature of the intellect, through which it is conjoined to those things which are beyond itself. According to this, therefore, understanding divine things not according to ourselves, but with our whole selves made wholly outside ourselves and wholly deified; for it is better to be God's and not to be one's own; for thus all things will be credible to those who are with God." - Now this mode of knowing by excess exists both on the way and in the homeland: but on the way partially, whereas in the homeland it exists perfectly in Christ and in the other comprehensors; but in others it exists in a restricted manner, both on the part of the measure of their own grace, and on the part of the divine will, which does not offer itself to just anyone in complete intimacy; but in the soul of Christ it exists most liberally, both because from it he has grace filling his capacity in every way, and because the eternal mirror offers itself to him as manifestable according to complete intimacy.
Now the mode of comprehension and of excess differs in Christ in multiple ways: first, because in the comprehensive mode the knower grasps the known, but in the excessive mode the known grasps the knower. - Second, because in the comprehensive mode the gaze of the intellect is terminated, but in the excessive mode the appetite of the intellect is terminated. - Third, because in comprehension one becomes actually considering all things past, present, and future; but in excess one becomes ready for considering. - Fourth, because from comprehension attained it comes about that one learns nothing anew; but on account of excess it comes about that one can learn nothing; and therefore, although the knowledge of Christ's soul by way of excess can in a certain manner be said to extend to infinite things, nevertheless comprehensive knowledge extends only to finite things. Hence if according to that knowledge the soul of Christ is said to know whatever the Word knows, this is understood of past, present, and future things which in some way pertain to the integrity of the universe itself, which was fully and totally inscribed in the soul of Christ Jesus from the instant of conception. And to that extent that soul is said to have had all knowledge, not because it comprehends all things that the divine wisdom knows, since that wisdom is infinite and cannot be comprehended by a finite power, as was shown above.
Hence the arguments which show this are to be granted, because they conclude what is irrefragably true.
1. 2. 3. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that the soul of Christ comprehends all the divine judgments, and that it has all knowledge just as the Word united to it has: it can be said that those things are said of the assumed man on account of the communication of idioms; or certainly they are said of those things which are, were, and will be, which indeed can be comprehended by the soul of Christ; but it is not true with respect to all things that the divine wisdom understands, since it knows infinite things, as is clear from what has been determined above. - That which is objected, however, that no one can know something that his soul is ignorant of: this holds true when someone knows nothing except through the soul, as is the case with a mere man. But in Christ, who knows not only through the soul but also through the divine nature, that proposition does not hold. And through this the response to the three things first objected is clear.
4. To that which is objected, that for the soul seeing God every creature is narrow: it must be said that this is true of a creature according to the being which it has in its proper genus, but not according to the being which it has in the Art, because that Art is most noble and most perfect, having not narrowness but rather perfection. Hence if the soul were to know the whole universe according to the being which it has in its proper genus, it would not yet be in perfect knowledge and comprehension unless it also knew that Art through which all things are made. And because the soul of Christ most perfectly comprehends all things made in that Art, therefore in it and through it the soul is said to have perfect comprehension.
5. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ is most perfectly united to the Word: it must be said that this is true, yet with the limitation of created nature preserved, which the soul of Christ does not lose, because it does not cease to be a creature, and because to comprehend infinite things is repugnant to the limitation of a creature: hence it is that this cannot be inferred from that union, however perfectly it may be understood.
6. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ simultaneously knows many things, because it knows by one means, and that by equal reasoning it ought to know infinite things: it must be said that the cases are not similar, because multiplicity with simultaneity is not repugnant to the limitation of a creature, but infinity with actuality and simultaneity is entirely repugnant: and therefore it is not an argument from similarity, but from great dissimilarity.
7. To that which is objected, that the eternal Word represents equally: it can be said that this claim is false, because to represent designates an act toward another. But God, although He is uniform in Himself, nevertheless illuminates and manifests in manifold ways, and although He knows infinite things, some of them He approves and some He disapproves, some He disposes to do and some He does not at all, some He shows willingly and some He keeps hidden.
Furthermore, granted that as far as it pertains to Himself He knows all things uniformly, still the argument does not conclude, because "everything received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver and not according to the mode of the thing received": and therefore, since the power that grasps is finite, it is impossible, even if the whole is freely offered to it, that it should grasp and comprehend the whole, but only according to what befits it: as appears by example, if the entire Seine offers itself to one bringing a jar, nevertheless the whole is not contained, but only as much and in the manner that the capacity of the jar extends.
8. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ is more powerful for knowing through the Word united to it than any other soul through a habit given to it: it must be said that this is true, but from this it does not follow that, if a soul comprehends all things to which a habit extends, the soul of Christ therefore knows all things that it knows through the Word itself: because a soul comprehends the habit itself as proportionate to it and in no way exceeding its capacity; but the soul of Christ does not so comprehend the Word united to it, since it exceeds its capacity infinitely.
9. To that which is objected, that it knows the whole, therefore the whole power: it must be said that this argument does not hold, because whole, said of the Word, designates the privation of part and part or the positing of perfection in every mode: but said of power, because power designates a comparison to possibles, it designates a distribution with respect to all possibles: and thus its meaning varies, and therefore the argument does not proceed.