11. 12. To that which is objected: either the whole is hidden, or the whole is manifest, etc.: the response is already clear, because the whole is hidden, and the whole is manifest. For the whole is manifest to the one apprehending, since it does not apprehend according to part and part; the whole also lies hidden with respect to comprehension, because nothing of the Word can be comprehended by the created intellect; for the whole is infinite, and therefore it is simple. And therefore that very thing which is apprehended is not comprehended. Just as the eternal Word, the same and whole and according to the same, is in some creature and is beyond that creature: so it is grasped by some intelligence, and yet is not comprehended by it, because it exceeds it. — And through this the response to the following is clear, in which it is objected that if something were hidden, the intellect would not be blessed: for as has already been said, it is not called incomprehensible on account of the hiddenness of some part, but on account of the immensity of its simplicity.
13. To that which is objected, that just as He is truly infinite, so He is truly simple: it must be said that this is true. — To that which is further objected, that just as incomprehensibility belongs to the infinite, so comprehensibility belongs to the simple: it must be said that this is false. Because the infinite, by the very fact that it is infinite, denotes a disproportionate excess with respect to anything finite; but the simple, by the very fact that it is simple, does not denote adequation or limitation, neither absolutely in itself nor in comparison to another; because, as was shown previously, the most simple, by the very fact that it is most simple, must necessarily be infinite. For since there is a twofold quantity, namely of mass and of power, in the quantity of mass the simple and the infinite are founded upon diverse things, but in the quantity of power they are founded upon the same thing, because the greatness of simplicity contributes to the unification and magnification of power: and therefore on account of supreme simplicity, comprehensibility is not communicated, but rather incomprehensibility and immeasurable power.
14. To that which is objected concerning the point, that if essence and power were the same in it, etc.: it must be said that the eternal Word is not comprehended, neither according to essence nor according to power, by any creature, because both power and essence have an immensity infinitely exceeding every created power. And therefore the comparison with the point does not hold, whose essence is circumscribed.
15. To that which is objected, that nothing less than God can fill the soul: it must be said that this is true, as was touched upon, because the soul is not satisfied by any good that it grasps and comprehends, since nothing of that sort is the highest good; but by a good of such kind and greatness that it grasps and apprehends through vision and affection, and by which it is grasped through supereminence and excess.
16. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ loves as much as it ought: it must be said that this is true; but nevertheless it does not follow from this that it loves God as much as God Himself loves Himself, because the love by which God loves Himself is eternal and immeasurable and coequal with the beloved; but the affection, because it proceeds from Christ's will, cannot be other than finite.
And as to what is said, that the manner of loving God is to love without manner: this is not because that love lacks unity and measure, since that is common to every creature, but that the affection in loving ought not to fix for itself a constraining limit and boundary, but rather in an exceeding manner, with the whole striving of the mind, be carried toward that most powerful goodness.
17. 18. To that which is objected, that the intellect is strengthened in understanding the greatest intelligible, and that its capacity grows in grasping the greater: it must be said that this can be understood in two ways: in one way, that from the fact that it understands the highest intelligible and grasps it, it is more vigorous and more powerful with respect to those things which are below it; and this is true. In another way, so that it be understood that it is still capable of greater light and truth than it has grasped: and this is false, because the capacity of the soul is measured according to the quantity of its power, which is rooted in a finite substance; and therefore it is finite in act and sufficiently completable through a finite deiformity, which, by assimilating it to God according to its every possibility, makes it reach out to the infinite good, and through this gives it perfection and rest. 19. 20. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ attains to the uncreated and most simple, although it is created and composite, therefore by equal reasoning to the infinite, insofar as it is infinite, although it itself is finite: it must be said that the conclusion can be granted, that it attains to the infinite just as to the uncreated and most simple. For just as it does not attain to the infinite by comprehending, but by apprehending and exceeding, so also not to the uncreated and most simple.
It could nevertheless be said that the comparison does not hold on both sides: because to know the simple as simple and the uncreated as uncreated includes nothing other than an assimilation of the knower to the known: but to know the infinite as infinite signifies not only assimilation, but also a certain adequation; for the infinite as infinite names a quantity; and therefore the aforementioned argument does not follow: just as it does not follow that, if a creature can be assimilated to God, on this account it can be made equal to God.
We confess, however, that the soul of Christ is deiform, but not equal to God: and therefore we grant and hold that, although it apprehends the very wisdom united to it clearly and perspicuously, it does not nevertheless totally comprehend it.