3. Again, every knower knows according to the capacity of the knower; but the knowing capacity of the soul of Christ is finite: therefore whatever it knows, it knows as finite and in a finite manner: therefore it in no way comprehends the infinite.
4. Again, everything that comprehends something totally grasps it within itself, and therefore is either greater than it or equal to it; but the soul of Christ is neither greater than the eternal Word nor equal to it: therefore it in no way comprehends it.
5. Again, of everything that the soul comprehends, something greater can be thought, because, when it reaches its boundaries, its thought can still be extended beyond: but nothing greater than the wisdom of God can be thought: therefore it is necessary that the wisdom of God be apprehended by the soul of Christ incomprehensibly.
6. Likewise, the soul of Christ, although it is supremely united to the Word, nevertheless does not enclose the Word within itself with respect to existence, because the Word exists outside it, and the Word is somewhere where the soul of Christ united to it is not: therefore by equal reasoning neither will the intellect of the soul of Christ totally grasp within itself the divine wisdom: therefore it does not comprehend it.
7. Likewise, to comprehend something is to grasp it fully: but to grasp the infinite fully is possible only through an infinite act: but an infinite act cannot exist unless there is an infinite power: nor can power be infinite unless substance is likewise infinite: if therefore the soul of Christ were to comprehend the divine wisdom, since that wisdom is infinite, the soul would be infinite with respect to substance, power, and operation. But this is false and impossible: therefore etc.
8. Likewise, that which comprehends something according to quantity of mass is coextended with it to an equality of extension: therefore that which comprehends something according to the excellence of clarity is equaled to it according to clarity: but it is impossible for the soul of Christ to be equaled to the divine wisdom according to clarity, since that wisdom is pure light, and the soul itself is darkness insofar as it is a creature: therefore it is impossible for the eternal wisdom of God to be comprehended by the soul of Christ.
9. Likewise, eternity is compared to aeviternity as a greater circle to a lesser: but it is impossible for a greater circle to be comprehended by a lesser: therefore it is impossible for an eternal substance to be comprehended by an aeviternal substance. But the wisdom of God is eternal, and the soul of Christ is not eternal but aeviternal: therefore etc.
10. Likewise, that which comprehends something knows it most perfectly: therefore if the soul of Christ comprehends the eternal wisdom, it is necessary that it be supremely wise, and therefore consequently supremely blessed: therefore it is equal to God in blessedness and goodness, and therefore lacks a beginning and an end: therefore it is neither a creature nor a soul. If therefore these are absurdities, and many others which can follow from this, it is impossible for the divine wisdom to be comprehended by the soul of Christ.
CONCLUSION.
The soul of Christ cannot properly comprehend uncreated wisdom.
I respond: For the understanding of the aforesaid, it must be noted that, as was established from the preceding question, for the perfect and certain knowledge of any creature there concurs not only the presence of the eternal light, but also the influence of the eternal light: not only the uncreated Word, but also the word conceived within: not only the eternal wisdom, but also the knowledge impressed upon the soul: not only the truth that causes, but also the truth that informs. Since therefore the soul of Christ and any soul that knows God knows according to the measure of the influence of the Word and of the knowledge inwardly informing the mind: but such a word and knowledge, since it has created being, and thereby also limited being, cannot be equal to the divine wisdom, since that wisdom is in every way infinite: it must be admitted that the uncreated wisdom cannot be comprehended by the soul united to it nor by any other creature whatsoever, insofar as something is said to be comprehended when the one comprehending grasps the whole totally and according to every mode within itself, according to what Augustine says to Paulina, in On Seeing God: "No one ever comprehends the fullness of God, not only with the eyes of the body, but not even with the mind itself: for it is one thing to see, another to comprehend the whole by seeing, since that is seen which is somehow perceived as present; but that is wholly comprehended which is so seen that nothing of it is hidden from the one seeing, or whose limits can be surveyed." But for such a vision it is necessarily required that the one comprehending, according to act, habit, and power, either be equal to the thing comprehended or exceed it: and this can in no way be the case in the soul of Christ, or in any creature in comparison to the eternal wisdom; since the former is infinite, but the latter finite, and therefore the former exceeds the latter beyond all proportion. And this is what Augustine says in the ninth book of On the Trinity, chapter eleven: "Insofar as we know God, we are like him, but not like him to the point of equality, because we do not know him as much as he knows himself." And afterwards:
"When we know God, although we are made better than we were before we knew him, especially when that same knowledge, being pleasing and worthily loved, is a word: that knowledge becomes a certain likeness of God, yet it is inferior, because it exists in an inferior nature: for the mind is a creature, but God is the Creator." Since therefore the soul of Christ cannot, in knowing the eternal Word, beget a word equal to it, it is manifest that it cannot comprehend it, taking comprehension in its proper sense.
Hence the arguments for this position are to be granted.
For the understanding of the objections to the contrary, since they proceed from a threefold path, namely from the immensity of the grace of union, from the simplicity of the Word and the wisdom of God, from the capacity and the quieting of the desire of the knowing soul itself: it must be understood that, although the divine nature and the human nature are distant by the finite and the infinite, they can nevertheless be united, with the property of each nature preserved, in the unity of the hypostasis. Nevertheless, the divine nature itself never becomes finite, nor does the human become infinite. Whence, although God is man and man is God on account of the unity of person and hypostasis, the operations of each nature are nonetheless preserved and unconfused, although they are mutually predicated on account of the communication of idioms.
Again, although the divine Word is simple, it is nonetheless infinite, not by a quantity of mass, but by a quantity of power: because the simpler something is, the more its power is united: and "a power more united is more infinite than a power multiplied": and therefore the divine Word, by the very fact that it is most simple, is also most powerful: and therefore, although it is wholly wherever it is, it is nevertheless never circumscribed nor comprehended by any creature.
Finally, although the intellect and the affection of the rational soul never rest except in God and in the infinite good, this is not because it comprehends that good, but because nothing suffices for the soul unless it exceeds its capacity. Whence it is true that both the affection and the intellect of the rational soul itself are borne toward the infinite good and true, and toward it as infinite; but to be borne toward it can be in six modes, namely by believing, by reasoning, by wondering, by gazing, by exceeding and by comprehending. The first mode is of imperfection and of the way; the last mode is of the highest perfection and is proper to the eternal and infinite Trinity; the second and third modes pertain to the progress of the way; the fourth and fifth to the consummation of the fatherland. For on the way we can contemplate the divine immensity by reasoning and by wondering: but in the fatherland by gazing, when we shall have been made deiform, and by exceeding, when we shall be wholly inebriated: on account of which inebriation Anselm says at the end of the Proslogion that we shall enter more into the divine joy than the divine joy shall enter into our heart.
And since that soul united to the Word is both more made deiform and more inebriated on account of a grace not merely sufficient, but also superexcellent: therefore it gazes upon the divine wisdom and by gazing exceeds into it, although it does not comprehend it. And for this reason wonder has a place not only on the way, but also in the fatherland: not only in the Angels, but also in the soul assumed by God, so that it says: Your knowledge is become wonderful from me; it is strengthened, and I cannot reach unto it as the Gloss expounds concerning the man assumed by the Word, that "he cannot be made equal to Him in wisdom nor in anything else."
Having seen these things, one easily responds to the objections.
1. 2. 3. 4. To that which is first objected from the Gloss, that grace was given to Christ not by measure; and from the authority of Augustine, that that grace is ineffable; and from the authority of Hugh and from that argument which he adduces, that that grace brings it about that man is God; to all these it must be answered that all these things are true and are to be understood according to the concurrence of two natures in one person: from which it follows that on account of the immensity of that person and of that union, the grace is called immense and ineffable, and on account of the unity of the person, God and those things which are of God can be predicated of the man: nevertheless it does not follow from this that the soul itself, or its power and habit, or its act, loses its created being, and consequently its finite and limited character. And therefore it does not follow that a comprehensive act of the eternal wisdom belongs to it, since that act is infinite and proceeds from infinite power.
5. To that which is objected from the word of Bernard concerning that threefold union or unity, it must be said that the case is not similar: because in native and superdignative unity the extremes are proportional, for each is a connatural unity: but in dignative unity it is otherwise, because that unity is of condescension and grace alone; and therefore it is not necessary that there be mutual comprehension on this account.
6. To that which is objected from Isidore, that the Trinity is known to itself alone, etc.; it must be said that he does not say this except on account of the communication of idioms, or on account of the most intimate mode of revelation of his secrets communicated to that soul united to him, as will be more clearly evident in the following question.
7. To that which is objected from Cassiodorus, concerning the inaccessible light, that it is understood by a sound mind above all clarities; it must be said that this is true, taking soundness for perfect deiformity. But from this it does not follow that it is comprehended, because the other clarities are lesser and comprehensible, while that one is greater; and therefore, although it is known more limpidly by the soul than the other clarities, it nevertheless does not follow that it is comprehended.
8. To that which is objected, that the grace of union excels every grace of comprehension; it must be said that this is true: but this is not because the grace of union gives to the soul of Christ itself an infinite power, since it does not take away from it the being of a creature, but because it places it in an infinite hypostasis. Now an operation proceeding from a power is measured according to the greater or lesser power of that power itself: and therefore the grace of union and the grace of comprehension are not of the same genus. On this account, although they are disproportionate, it does not follow from this that the grace of union elicits from the soul an infinite act; just as it does not follow that a line is actually infinite, although it disproportionately exceeds a point.
9. To that which is objected from Augustine, that the soul, because it is simple, therefore, when it knows itself, totally, etc.: it must be said that this is because the soul has a limited simplicity, from which follows finitude and impartibility; and therefore, when it knows itself, it knows itself wholly and totally. But the simplicity of divine wisdom, as was shown above, is conjoined with infinity, and therefore, although it can be reached and apprehended by a creature, it can never be comprehended or circumscribed by a creature.
10. To that which is objected, that this is per se true: that what is simple, when it is reached, is reached as a whole: it must be said that concerning the finite simple this holds true; but concerning the infinite simple, in a certain way it holds true and in a certain way it does not. If it is understood thus, that the whole is reached, that is, not according to part and part, it holds true; but if it is understood that the whole is reached, that is, according to every manner of its fullness and perfection, such that it does not exceed the one comprehending, it is false. And therefore it has been commonly said and from antiquity that although the whole is reached, it is not however reached totally; because whole, since it is a noun, designates a disposition on the part of the subject or object according to itself; but totally, since it is an adverb, designates a disposition of the verb and thereby posits every manner of perfection and equality in the act of the one comprehending with respect to the comprehended, which cannot obtain in the finite with respect to the infinite.