2. Furthermore, Augustine, in the first book of On the Trinity: "The weak gaze of the human mind is not fixed in so excellent a light unless it is cleansed through the justice of faith." Therefore if the light of eternal truth were the reason for knowing all truths, no soul would know truth unless it were purified and holy. But this is false: therefore so too is that from which it follows.
3. Again, in the ninth book of On the Trinity : "The mind itself, just as it gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the senses of the body, so it gathers knowledge of incorporeal things through itself." Therefore, it seems that in knowing it is not necessary that whatever it knows it knows through the eternal reasons.
4. Again, Augustine, in the twelfth book of On the Trinity : "It is to be believed that the nature of the intellectual mind has been so established that, subjected to intelligible things in the natural order by the disposition of the Creator, it sees these things in a certain incorporeal light of its own kind, just as the eye of the flesh sees those things that lie about in this corporeal light." Therefore, it seems that just as the created light of corporeal nature suffices for knowing sensible things, similarly a created spiritual light of the same kind as the cognitive power suffices for intelligible things.
5. Again, Gregory in the Moralia : "When the mind is raised up in contemplation, whatever it perfectly sees is not God." But the reason of knowing is perfectly discerned in certitudinal knowledge; therefore, such a reason is not God nor something in God; therefore, etc.
6. Again, Dionysius, in the Epistle to Caius : "If anyone seeing God understood what he saw, he did not see Him, but something of those things that are among beings and things known; for He Himself is established above intellect and substance." Therefore, in knowing, our mind in the present life does not attain to the uncreated truth.
7. Again, the Philosopher in the third book of On the Soul says that "our understanding is with the continuous and with time." But those eternal reasons are entirely above time; therefore, in understanding, our intellect in no way reaches those reasons.
8. Again, in the same place he says: "Just as in every nature there is something by which it makes all things, and something by which it becomes all things, so also concerning the intellect one must understand that there is an agent intellect and a possible intellect." But these suffice for perfect knowledge; therefore, there is no need for the aid of an eternal reason.
9. Again, experience teaches that "from many sensations one memory arises, from many memories one experience, from many experiences one universal, which is the principle of art and science," because, losing one sense, we lose the knowledge of those things that pertain to that sense. Therefore, certitudinal knowledge in the wayfaring state comes from below, but knowledge in the eternal reasons comes from above; therefore, as long as we are in the state of wayfarers, knowledge through the light of the eternal reasons does not befit us.
10. Again, imaginative cognition does not need a higher light; rather, the power of the imaginative faculty alone suffices for imagining something. Therefore, if the intellect is more powerful than the imagination, much more will it suffice of itself without a higher light for knowing something with certitude.
11. Again, certitudinal knowledge can exist in sense without the certitude of the sempiternal reason; therefore, if the intellect is more powerful than sense, much more will it be able to know and understand with certitude without that light.
12. Moreover, for complete cognition nothing more is required than the knower and the knowable object abstracted and the turning of the one upon the other; but all of this can exist through the power of our intellect without the eternal reason: therefore, etc.
13. Moreover, for whatever things a power can do freely, it does not need extrinsic assistance; but "we understand when we will": therefore, in order that we may know something with certitude, we do not need the light of the eternal reasons.
14. Moreover, the principles of being and of knowing are the same: therefore, if the proper and intrinsic principles of being of creatures themselves are nothing but created, whatever is known is known through created reasons: therefore not through eternal reasons and lights.
15. Moreover, to each knowable object there corresponds a proper reason of knowing in order that certitudinal cognition may be had of it: but those reasons of knowing are not perceived distinctly by any intellect of a wayfarer: therefore nothing can be properly and determinately known in them.
16. Moreover, if whatever is known with certitude is known in the eternal reason; but "that on account of which each thing is so, is itself more so": therefore those eternal reasons are also more known to us; which is manifestly false, since they are most hidden from us.
17. Moreover, it is impossible to see something in a mirror without the mirror itself being seen: therefore, if whatever is known with certitude is seen in those eternal reasons, it is necessary that the first light and eternal reason be seen. But this is false and absurd: therefore so is the first.
18. Moreover, if by those eternal reasons whatever is known with certitude is known: but those reasons are equally certain with respect to contingent things as with respect to necessary things, and with respect to future things as with respect to present things: therefore we would have certitudinal cognition of contingent things just as of necessary things, and of future things just as of present things; which is false: therefore so is the first.
19. Moreover, if we know in the eternal reasons: but the eternal reasons are the highest causes: and wisdom is the cognition of the highest causes: therefore whoever knows anything with certitude is wise. But this is false: therefore, etc.
20. Moreover, if the cognition of the fatherland is cognition through the eternal reasons, in which the Blessed see whatever they see: therefore, if all certitudinal cognition were through those eternal reasons, all who know with certitude would be blessed, and only the Blessed would know with certitude: but this is false.
21. Moreover, if whatever is known is seen in the eternal reasons: since the mirror of the eternal reasons is voluntary, and what is known in a voluntary mirror is known through revelation: therefore whatever is known would accordingly be known in a prophetic manner or by revelation.
22. Furthermore, if whatever is known is known in the eternal reasons, then either it is known in a veiled manner, or without a veil. If in a veiled manner: then nothing is known clearly; if without a veil: then all see God and the eternal exemplar without any enigma. But this is false according to the state of the wayfarer: therefore etc.
Furthermore, objection is raised against the arguments of Augustine as follows:
23. Because if every unchangeable truth is above the soul and thereby eternal and God, then since every truth of a demonstrative principle is unchangeable, every such truth would be God: therefore nothing would be known except God.
24. Furthermore, if every unchangeable truth is the truth of the eternal art, and that truth is but one, then every unchangeable truth would be but one: but concerning any being whatsoever some unchangeable truth can be found, as is evident: for this is an unchangeable truth: if Socrates runs, Socrates moves; therefore according to this all beings would be one.
25. Furthermore, if everything that is God is to be adored with latria, and every unchangeable truth of a principle is God: then every such truth ought to be adored: therefore the truth of this proposition: two and three are five, ought to be adored.