18. Likewise, everything that cannot be judged is superior to what can be judged; but the law by which we judge cannot be judged, while our mind can be judged: therefore that by which we know and judge is above our mind. But this is nothing other than the sempiternal truth and reason: therefore etc.
19. Likewise, everything infallible is superior to what is fallible; but the light and truth by which we know with certitude is infallible, while our mind can be deceived: therefore that light and truth is above our mind. But this is eternal light and truth: therefore etc.
20. Likewise, every light of certitude cannot be confined, because it shows itself to all and presents what is knowable under the same certitude; but a light that cannot be confined is necessarily not a created light, but uncreated, because everything created is limited and finite and is multiplied in diverse things: therefore this light must necessarily be uncreated. But by this light we know with certitude: therefore etc.
21. Likewise, everything necessary is interminable, because it can in no way, nor will it ever be able to, be otherwise: but that by which we know with certitude is a necessary truth: therefore it is interminable. But everything of this kind is above every created thing, since every creature has proceeded from nonbeing to being, and as far as it is of itself, is convertible into nonbeing: therefore that by which we know exceeds every created truth, therefore it is uncreated truth.
22. Likewise, everything created, as far as it is of itself, is comprehensible: but the laws of numbers, figures, and demonstrations, since they increase to infinity, are according to the Philosopher incomprehensible by the human intellect: therefore laws of this kind, when they are seen by the human intellect, must necessarily be seen in something that exceeds every created thing. But this is nothing other than God and the eternal reason: therefore etc.
23. Likewise, when the impious man knows justice, he either knows it through its own presence, or through a likeness received from without, or through something that is above: but not through its presence, since it is not present to him; not through a species received from without, since it does not have a likeness abstractable through sense: therefore it is necessary that he know it through something else, which is above his intellect: and by equal reasoning, all other knowable spiritual things which he knows. Therefore if the impious man knows in the eternal reasons, much more so do others.
If you say that he knows it through its effect, it is objected against this: because what is in no way known, one does not know what is effected by it; for if I do not know what a man is, I never know what is done by a man; therefore if a notion of justice is not first had, it will never be known that this or that is done by it. It remains therefore that it is known in the eternal reason.
Similarly it can be argued concerning any intelligible substantial form, and through this concerning all certitudinal cognition.
24. Likewise, just as God is the cause of being, so he is the reason of understanding and the order of living; but God is so the cause of being that nothing can be effected by any cause without his moving the agent by himself and by his eternal power: therefore nothing can be understood without his immediately illuminating the one understanding by his eternal truth.
25. Likewise, no defective being, as far as it is of itself, is known except through a perfect being; but every created truth, as far as it is of itself, is darkness and deficiency: therefore nothing falls upon the intellect except through that supreme truth.
26. Likewise, nothing is rightly and with certitude known unless it is applied to a rule that can in no way be made crooked: but this rule is none other than that which is essentially rectitude itself, and this is nothing other than the truth and the eternal reason: therefore nothing is known with certitude unless it is applied to the eternal rule.
27. Likewise, since the portion of the soul is twofold, superior and inferior, the inferior reason has its origin from the superior, and not conversely; but reason is called superior insofar as it turns toward the eternal laws, and inferior insofar as it is occupied with temporal things; therefore, knowledge of eternal things inheres in the soul prior to and more naturally than knowledge of temporal things; therefore, it is impossible that anything be known by it with certitude unless it is aided by those eternal reasons.
All these aforementioned arguments are drawn from the words of Augustine in various volumes.
Likewise, the same thing is seen also by other arguments.
28. Knowledge of the same sensible object cannot be had by diverse knowers simultaneously and at once except through something common, and by equal reasoning, knowledge of the same intelligible object; but some one truth in no way multiplied can be understood by diverse knowers, just as it can also be enunciated; therefore, it is necessary that it be understood through some one thing in no way multiplied. But one thing in diverse subjects in no way multiplied cannot be anything other than God; therefore, the ground of understanding each thing is truth itself, which is God.
29. Likewise, as the affection is related to the good, so the intellect is related to the true, and as every good is from the highest goodness, so every truth is from the highest truth; but it is impossible that our affection be directed toward a good without in some way attaining the highest goodness; therefore, it is impossible that our intellect know any truth with certitude without in some way attaining the highest truth.
30. Likewise, the true is not known except by truth, and not by just any truth, but by a known truth, and especially by that truth which is most known; but this truth is that which cannot be thought not to exist; but such is not a created truth, but an uncreated one; therefore, whatever is known with certitude is known in the eternal truth and reason.
31. Likewise, the soul is naturally apt to turn toward the intelligible which is outside, toward the intelligible which is within, and toward the intelligible which is above. But the turning toward the intelligible which is outside is minimally simple; toward the intelligible which is within is more simple; toward the intelligible which is above is maximally simple, because that is more intimate to it than it is to itself. But the more simple something is, the more prior it is; therefore, the turning of the soul toward truth itself, which is intimate to it, is naturally prior to the turning toward itself or toward extrinsic truths; therefore, it is impossible that it know anything unless that highest truth is foreknown.
32. Likewise, every being in potency is reduced to act through something actually existing in that genus; but our intellect is in potency, as the intellect in a child; therefore, for it to become actually understanding, it is necessary that this come about through him who is actually knowing all things. But this is none other than the eternal wisdom; therefore, etc.
If you say that it is the agent intellect: then I ask: either the agent intellect actually understands that which the learner is learning, or it does not: if not: then through it one could not be made actually understanding: if so: then either the one who is learning simultaneously understands and is ignorant of the same thing, or the agent intellect is not something of the soul, but above the soul: it remains therefore that whatever the understanding soul apprehends, it apprehends through something that is above the soul. But above the soul there is nothing except God: therefore etc.
If you say that the agent intellect is not called agent because it actually understands, but because it causes understanding; against this: everything that understands is superior to and better than what does not understand: therefore if the agent intellect is not understanding, since it cannot make something better and superior above itself, it will never make itself or another actually understanding: therefore if something becomes actually understanding, it is necessary that it come about through something that is above it. But there is nothing else to posit than the eternal reason and truth: therefore etc.
33. Furthermore, if all creatures were destroyed, with only the rational spirit remaining, there would remain in it the knowledge of the disciplines, such as of numbers and figures: but this is not on account of the true being that they have in it, nor in the universe; therefore it is necessary that it be on account of the being that they have in the supreme Artisan.
34. Furthermore, according to all the Saints, God is said to be the teacher of all knowledge; either therefore because He generally cooperates with every intellect, just as with other creatures, or because He infuses the gift of grace, or because the intellect in knowing attains to Him. If because He generally cooperates: then He would be said to teach the sense just as the intellect: which is absurd. If because He infuses the gift of grace: then all knowledge will be gratuitous or infused, and none therefore acquired or innate: which is most absurd. It remains therefore that this is said because our intellect attains to Him as to the light of minds and the reason for knowing every truth.
But against this it is objected first by authority, then by reason: by authority as follows.
1. In the last chapter of First Timothy it is said of God: Who alone has immortality and dwells in inaccessible light, whom no man has seen, nor can see. But everything by which or in which we know is accessible to the knower: therefore that by which or in which we know cannot be the light of eternal reason or truth.