6. Moreover, nothing is supremely true that can be thought not to exist; therefore, similarly, nothing is supremely necessary that can be believed not to exist; for the necessary presupposes the true; but the Trinity can without doubt be thought not to exist; therefore, etc.
7. Moreover, what is repugnant to evidence is repugnant to certitude, and what is repugnant to certitude is repugnant to necessity; but the Trinity in unity is repugnant to evidence, because this in no way seems intelligible; therefore, it is repugnant to supreme necessity.
8. Moreover, nothing altogether necessary is perfectly praiseworthy; therefore, if the person of the Father necessarily produces the person of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, He is not praiseworthy in any of the aforesaid; but nothing in God is more praiseworthy; therefore, no praise is owed to God. But this is impious to say; therefore, etc.
9. Furthermore, nothing is altogether necessary that is simply voluntary; the production of persons in the divine is simply through will: therefore not through necessity. The major is proved, because necessary things belong naturally, and nature is by its very nature divided against will. The minor is proved: because that is most delightful, acceptable, and joyful: therefore most voluntary.
On the contrary: 1. Everything necessary is immutable, and conversely; but the Trinity stands together with supreme immutability, as is evident from what was just shown: therefore etc.
2. Furthermore, everything that is supremely one is altogether necessary, and conversely: but the Trinity and supreme unity stand together: therefore etc.
3. Furthermore, the production of one person from another is of greater connection than that of splendor and light; but these are necessary: therefore etc.
4. Furthermore, it is impossible for supreme power to be absent from the Omnipotent, and its presence is necessary; but supreme power is in the production of persons: therefore etc.
5. Furthermore, every act that has God as its principle and terminus is necessary in every respect: but the production of a person from a person is of this kind: therefore etc.
6. Furthermore, everything that is indistinct from the supremely necessary is altogether necessary: but the whole Trinity is the divine essence: therefore etc.
CONCLUSION.
The divine being, necessary and most liberal, stands together with the trinity of persons.
I respond: It must be said that the divine being is both necessary and nonetheless most liberal: and the blessed Trinity itself stands together with necessity and will, if they are taken according to a fitting mode. For as was touched upon regarding necessity, not every necessity belongs to the divine being nor indeed to the blessed Trinity, but only that of immutability and independence: similarly, not every mode of willing. For there is an acceding will, that is, one newly arriving: and this is not in God, neither with respect to himself nor with respect to the created, on account of God's immutability and necessity. Again, there is an antecedent will; and this is in God, but not with respect to himself, but with respect to the created, which he precedes by nature and eternity. Third, there is a concomitant and accepting will; and this is in God with respect to himself and with respect to the created: for the divine will approves and accepts every good, whether created or uncreated, whether contingent or necessary.
Therefore, with necessity and will spoken of in a threefold way, the third mode of each belongs to the supreme Trinity.
namely accepting will and the necessity of immutability: will, I say, accepting on account of the supreme charity in the one producing and the supreme goodness in the one produced, which two necessarily enclose within themselves a will of complacency; the necessity however of unchangeability is on account of the indifference of the essence and the independence of the person. For since in the three persons there is an essence altogether indifferent, therefore there is one quiddity or entity, one truth, and consequently one necessity. For since the first person is from itself, it is altogether necessary, and consequently so are the second and third.
Furthermore, since in the three persons the essence is indifferent, the relation distinguishing the trinity does not signify a reference to something outside: and therefore there is no dependence of one person upon another, and so they are equally fixed and standing of themselves: and therefore if one is necessary, so are all. - Therefore these three stand together, as has now been shown, namely trinity, necessity and will: nor is there in them any repugnance, but the highest consonance, just as there are simultaneously consonant the supreme unity, truth and goodness.
For the supreme unity is that which is undivided in many, and this posits trinity: the supreme truth, which is infallible and most certain, and this posits necessity: the supreme goodness, which is lovable and loving, and this posits will. Therefore the supreme unity, truth and goodness necessarily requires that trinity, necessity and will stand together.
Since therefore in the triune God there is simultaneously necessity with will, and will with necessity; hence it is that he is supremely good through essence. Because in him there is supreme delight through will and supreme security through necessity and supreme felicity through both; hence also it is that he is supremely beatifying through influence: because our affection does not rest except in what is supremely lovable by attending to it, and the intellect does not rest except in what is supremely infallible and certain: and consequently we can be beatified only in that which is simultaneously necessary and voluntary, which alone is by nature most delightfully loved, most certainly known, and most securely possessed.
Since therefore the most blessed Trinity is not only blessed, but also beatifying; hence it is that it is supremely consonant with the most noble necessity and in no way repugnant to it; and likewise with the most liberal will.
Whence also the arguments adduced for this position are to be conceded.
1. To that which is first objected to the contrary from the authority of Augustine and Hilary, it must be said that each of those authorities is understood concerning necessity according to the first and second mode, not according to the third, as is apparent from what has been said above.
2. To the objection that the agent which dominates its own action is nobler: it must be said that this is true of an action which is distinguished by a difference from the agent. But concerning that action which, on account of supreme simplicity, is altogether undifferentiated from the agent, the aforesaid proposition neither has nor can have truth, for nothing can dominate itself. Since, therefore, production in the divine persons is through supreme simplicity, in which the producer and its production cannot differ according to a real difference, in such a case the citation of the aforesaid proposition has no place.
3. To the objection that a communication which is from benignity is nobler than one from necessity: it must be said that this is true of that necessity which excludes benignity. But such is not the necessity which is posited in the divine persons. It is also understood of a communication which is of a gift essentially different. But such is not the case in the emanation of the divine persons. And therefore that argument does not conclude, because it includes within itself a twofold defect.
4. To the objection that everything necessary is absolute: it must be said that perfect absoluteness does not exclude an intrinsic relation, because such a relation, since it is to what is undifferentiated in essence, posits no dependence, and accordingly does not conflict with necessity; and such is the relation in the divine persons. But if it excludes a relation, this is with respect to what is outside and to a thing essentially different. Hence, although God is signified by certain names as having a respect to things, that respect on the part of God is posited only according to the mode of understanding, to which a true respect corresponds on the part of created being ; and the aforementioned argument proceeds concerning this respect.
5. To the objection that nothing which is from another can be necessary in the highest degree: it must be said that this holds true when it is from another essentially different, and has a different being than the very being of the one giving. For then it cannot have the full character of necessity, because it depends on another being and another essentially different nature. But this is not so with the divine persons, because the produced person does not differ in essence from the producer, nor does it have a different being. Hence, since it has one being and the same essence and the truth of one essential unity, it follows that it incurs no dependence from this, but he who is produced has altogether the same firm necessity of permanence and necessary firmness as he who produces.