I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing, it should be noted that there is a threefold necessity: one wholly extrinsic, one partly intrinsic and partly extrinsic, and one wholly intrinsic. The wholly extrinsic necessity is that which has its origin from a principle that is outside, with the patient contributing nothing; and this has being in two ways: either with respect to natural operations or with respect to voluntary ones: and thus there is a twofold necessity, namely of compulsion and of violence.
The necessity that is partly from within, partly from without is that which is in some way from an intrinsic principle, looking toward something outside either in the manner of a moving principle or in the manner of a resting terminus: and thus necessity is spoken of in two ways, namely of inevitability and of indigence.
But there is a certain necessity that is wholly intrinsic, which belongs to a thing from its own nature: and this is the necessity of immutability and independence: and such necessity is found in a qualified sense in creatures, but in an unqualified sense it can be found only in the creative essence. For it alone is that which admits of no dependence: but all other things, since they are created, necessarily depend upon it.
But this necessity is necessarily posited in the divine being, because it is in itself and from itself. Because it is in itself, therefore it lacks a composing principle or a sustaining one: therefore it can neither be changed nor fail.
But because from itself, therefore it lacks a producer and creator: therefore it can neither depend nor begin; and through this it has the highest and most perfect necessity, which excludes all mutability and dependence, inevitability and indigence, coercion and violence, which denote a diminished necessity: and conversely it posits the highest permanence and stability, the highest sufficiency and freedom. For because it is through itself, therefore it is permanent and most stable: because indeed for its own sake, therefore most generous and most sufficient: because indeed it is through itself and for its own sake, therefore it is the alpha and the omega: and therefore all other things are from it, and all other things for the sake of it, whether necessary or contingent. For just as all movable things flow from one first immovable being and are reduced to it; so all contingent things flow from the necessary being and are reduced to it. Therefore the necessity of the divine being is the origin and completion of all being, living and understanding; and all things proclaim that the first principle is necessary, whether they be necessary or contingent.
And therefore the arguments must be conceded on this side.
1. To that which is objected, that everything determined to something is finite; it must be said that determination is twofold, namely by restriction, of which kind is that which comes about through the addition of one thing upon another, as a disposition is added upon the incomplete potency of matter: and there is determination by completion, as the supremely good is determined to doing good, because it cannot fail by doing evil. In the first way, determination is repugnant to infinity, but in the second way it is not repugnant; and this determination indeed belongs to necessity, according as it is in God, and not in the first way.
2. To that which is objected, that nothing indifferent to opposites is necessary: it must be said that the divine power and will and action is called indifferent to opposites not by reason of itself in itself, but by reason of indifference in the effect to be produced. Whence that indifference does not posit any changeableness in the divine power: but it posits one and most simple power, omnipotent over all opposites, such that it cannot be restricted to any of them; and this is more consonant with necessity than repugnant to it.
3. To that which is objected, that nothing contingent can be attributed to anything supremely necessary: it must be said that when something is contingently predicated of God, there is enclosed in that predicate both the principal signification and the connotation: and with respect to the principal signification it is nothing other than God, but with respect to the connotation it is an effect: and by reason of the first, to which the predication belongs, it inheres necessarily; but by reason of the second it is said to inhere contingently, and through this, contingency is not posited as being in God, but rather from God. In predications of this kind, the divine being receives within itself no predication that does not include the most complete necessity.
But as to the claim that the whole statement is said to be contingent, namely that God saves Peter: this is because the nature of a conjunctive whole is such that denomination in it is taken from the less noble part, so that a copulative proposition is called false when one of its parts is false, and contingent when one of its parts is contingent. And the reason for this is that it is easier for a thing to be destroyed than constructed; and a positive state must be unmixed with privation and the denomination thereof; but the denomination of privation operates in the contrary manner, because by necessity of the intellect, the understanding of position and positive state is in some way enclosed within its understanding.
4. To that which is objected, that necessity is repugnant to the will as impossibility is to power: it must be said that this is true of that necessity which is from without, such as the necessity of violence and coercion: but of that necessity which is intrinsic, such as the necessity of immutability, it does not hold true, as is apparent from the preceding.
5. To that which is objected, that if the cause is necessary, so is the effect: it must be said that, as Augustine says in the fifth book of the City of God, some causes are only made; others are making and made; and a third kind are making only. By causes that are only made he means natural causes, which are determined to a single course; by causes that are making and made, free choice and the will; and by causes that are making only, divine providence itself. He says that natural causes are made, not making, not because they produce nothing, but because they produce according to what has been implanted in them, not having dominion over their own act, as free choice does, and such causes are uniform in their parts and consistent; and in causes of this kind the aforementioned proposition holds true. But concerning a cause that is making, which indeed is able to produce and not to produce by the same power on account of its dominion over the action and the consequent effect, it does not hold true. For just as such a cause is not changed on account of the mutability and difference of its effects, so neither is it posited to be contingent on account of the contingency in its effects.
6. To that which is objected, that the more indifferent something is, the more common it is: it must be said that there is a twofold commonality, namely by abstraction, and by indetermination. When therefore it is said that the more indifferent something is, the more common it is: this is understood of commonality by indetermination, in which manner we say that there is a single subject of contraries; which is especially true in those cases where one of the two does not have a determinate cause in relation to the subject. But when it adds that the more common something is, the more simple it is; that is understood of commonality by abstraction; whence from this it is not concluded that contingent things posit simplicity; but rather they include mutability, which excludes supreme simplicity: on account of which supreme simplicity cannot be found except in that which is supremely necessary. Because therefore the divine being is most simple; it is necessary that it be not contingent, but necessary.
7. To that which is objected, that everything necessary is knowable, and everything knowable is either a principle of demonstration or concluded through demonstration; it must be said that there is the necessary within a genus, and the necessary outside a genus; and this indeed is twofold: either outside a determinate genus, or outside every genus absolutely . The necessary outside every genus absolutely, therefore, exists in God alone, who is above and beyond every genus of being, because he cannot be in a genus, neither per se nor by appropriation; and such a necessary being precedes and surpasses all demonstration, because it can have absolutely no definition.
When therefore it is said: everything necessary is either a principle of demonstration or demonstrated; it must be said that this is understood of the necessary which belongs to a determinate genus, or which can be appropriated to a determinate genus, as are common conceptions of the mind, which, insofar as they are appropriated, enter into demonstration. Whence that argument does not conclude that the divine being is a necessary thing restricted to a determinate genus.
8. To that which is objected, that the more necessary something is, the more certain it is; it must be said that something is said to be more certain or more known than another in two ways: either absolutely, or with respect to us . The first proposition therefore has truth insofar as it is understood of greater certitude absolutely, but not insofar as it is understood of certitude with respect to us, because those things which are most certain and most luminous in themselves appear obscure to us on account of the defect on the part of the created intellect; and therefore the Philosopher says that "as the eye of the owl is related to light, so is our eye to the most manifest things of nature." Nevertheless, although the divine being according to the fullness of its clarity is hidden from us as long as we are in the state of wayfarers, it is most certain to us and indubitable that God exists, as is manifestly apparent from the preceding questions.
9. To that which is objected, that the necessary is not to be feared, just as neither is the impossible to be desired: it must be said that the necessary in outcome or in effect is not to be dreaded, because dread avails nothing where something must necessarily come to pass. But the necessary according to its intrinsic state, which can without any change in itself render either everlasting glory or everlasting punishment—this, I say, is most greatly to be dreaded, both for the sake of acquiring grace and for the sake of avoiding punishment, because such a necessary being does not exclude the liberality of the will and the justice of equity, as will better appear in the following question.
ARTICLE II.
Whether the Trinity and supreme necessity stand together.
Next it is asked whether the Trinity and supreme necessity stand together. And that they are incompatible appears as follows.
1. Augustine, to Orosius: "The Father begot the Son neither by necessity nor by will"; but what is repugnant to generation is repugnant to the Trinity; necessity is of this kind; therefore, etc.
2. Moreover, an agent that has mastery over its own action is nobler than one that does not; but in the Trinity there can be no production except in the noblest manner; yet that which produces necessarily cannot have mastery over its action; therefore, neither can there be necessary production in divine things.
3. Moreover, a communication that is from benignity is nobler than one that is from necessity; therefore, either in divine things there is no communication of the nature itself, or it is not from necessity; but there cannot be a Trinity without communication; therefore, etc.
4. Moreover, everything necessary is absolute; for that which has a relation to something distinct from itself cannot be altogether necessary, and this is what Avicenna holds; but for the Trinity to exist without respect and relation is impossible; therefore, it is likewise impossible that it should stand together with necessity.
5. Moreover, nothing that is from another can be necessary in the highest degree, because its being and its remaining it has only from elsewhere, and thus it is not necessary in itself; but the Trinity cannot exist without some person therein being not from itself; therefore, it does not stand together with supreme necessity.