9. To that which is objected, that where there is eternity, there is totality: it must be said that the totality which is posited in eternity is not understood according to quantity of mass, but according to quantity of power, in which the notion of magnitude and immensity stands simultaneously with the perfection of simplicity: and therefore it does not follow that where there is totality, there is divisibility: for this does not hold true except of that whole which is truly quantified, in which, because totality signifies true quantity, it necessarily posits part and part.
Or it could be said that whole simultaneously is said there rather according to the notion of perfection than according to the notion of distribution into parts of some integral whole.
10. To that which is objected, that nowhere is continuity of extension found without partibility: it must be said that it is not similar, because extension always signifies part outside of part, and through this corporeality, quantity, and partibility; but duration signifies being that is not interrupted, which indeed is found not only in composites, but also in simples.
11. To that which is objected, that eternity signifies simultaneity: it must be said that simultaneity is not said there by the positing of a gathering together and coexistence of diverse enduring things, but rather by the privation of succession in the continuity of the enduring thing: whence eternity is said to be whole simultaneously, because in it nothing whatsoever succeeds another, not because diverse and various things exist simultaneously in it. Whence simultaneity signifies nothing other than a supreme and simple and undivided presentiality, and this signifies no intrinsic diversity.
12. To that which is objected, that if to be, to be in the future, and to have been are the same in God, then a creature, just as it commeasures itself in its own way with the divine future being, so also with the divine past being: it must be said that the cases are not similar, nor ought one to be inferred from the other. And the reason for this is clear, because, although in God to lack a beginning and to lack an end are the same, in a creature, however, they differ greatly. For since a creature is from nothing, it is essential to it to have a beginning and an inception; but not to have an end and a termination does not conflict with created nature; nor is the opposite of this essential to it, because the appetite of a creature is toward contraries. And on account of this it does not follow that, if it can be assimilated to God according to that which is future being, it can likewise be assimilated according to that which is past being. For just as it does not follow—justice and immensity are the same in God, but a creature can be assimilated to God insofar as He is just, therefore also insofar as He is immense — so also the aforesaid mode of arguing neither concludes nor infers.
13. To that which is objected, that eternity either adds something beyond the now of eternity, or nothing: it must be said that since in eternity there is simultaneity and interminability, or simplicity and immensity, the now of eternity names that duration with respect to simple simultaneity, while eternity names it with respect to interminable immensity. Therefore, just as interminable immensity adds nothing in reality beyond the indivisibility of divine simplicity and simultaneity, but only according to the mode of understanding, so also does eternity add nothing beyond the now of eternity. And just as it does not follow that, because a creature comprehends God as most simple, therefore it comprehends God as immense, so it does not follow that, if something coexists with the now of eternity, it coexists with interminable eternity. For to those things which are the same in God there correspond in the creature various and diverse things, as is evident in goodness and wisdom, in justice and mercy, as was touched upon above.
14. To that which is objected, that although a point is the beginning and middle and terminus of extension, it is impossible to understand extension within it, it must be said that the case is not similar: because, although a point is the beginning of extension, it is nevertheless not the whole essence of extension nor even a constitutive part : but the now is the whole essence of duration, not only in eternal and aeviternal things, but even in the duration of time. And the reason for this is: because extension has all its parts simultaneously, and because "a point is a positioned substance," whence it necessarily implies position in matter: and therefore, since it is indivisible, it cannot be the essence of a whole divisible thing nor a constitutive part, since every part of a continuum is continuous. But it is otherwise with duration, because of duration itself there is never anything except the present and indivisible, even in successive duration. And therefore it is not surprising if in the now the essence of duration can be enclosed, and especially of that duration in which essence and being do not differ, as is the case in eternity.
15. 16. To that which is objected, that the same measure measures the divine being and power and knowledge and foreknowledge; it must be said that this is true by reason of the principal thing signified, but it is not true by reason of the connotation.
And through this the response to the following is clear, which is objected concerning creation: for the intrinsic act is eternal, just as the substance is: but the effect is temporal, because it is a creature.
17. To that which is objected, that it was true before the constitution of the world that the world would exist in the future: it must be said that that proposition, although it is one, nevertheless implies within itself a twofold truth. For if it is said that the world would exist in the future, before the world was made: this is not true except because the world in some way has being in its cause; and with respect to this, that statement is true with eternal truth. Again, for this it does not suffice that the world have being only in its cause; rather, for this proposition to be true, it is required that it at some time have being outside its cause: and because that being, before the world was made, was not yet created but to-be-created: hence it is that with respect to this it was not true with created truth, but with truth to-be-created. And because, when a thing begins to be created, then it ceases to be to-be-created: hence it is that that proposition, which signified a true meaning from eternity, ceases to be true, not on account of a termination in eternity, but on account of a beginning in time, because together with the eternal it gave to understand something temporal.
And through this the response to the foregoing question is clear.
ARTICLE II.
Whether trinity and eternity are compatible.
Next it is asked whether trinity and eternity are compatible. And that they are incompatible is shown as follows.
1. Wherever there is eternity, there is complete simultaneity; but where there is complete simultaneity, there is no order; where there is no order, there is no emanation; where there is no emanation, there can be no personal plurification: therefore from the first, if in the divine being there is supreme and true eternity, it is impossible that there be a true trinity or plurality of persons.
2. Likewise, "a cause is that whose being is followed by another," namely the effect: but it is evident that the effect follows the cause not by reason of diversity, since these can exist simultaneously: therefore by reason of production. Where therefore there is production, there is antecedence and consequence: but where these are, there is no true eternity: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, if three persons are in the Trinity, either they are equally first, or they are not equally first. If equally first: then one is not from another, and consequently they cannot be in the same nature. If however they are not equally first: then neither are they simply and equally coeternal: therefore the same as before.
4. Likewise, every corruption necessarily posits a final terminus, therefore every production or emanation posits an initial one; but there cannot be a trinity without emanation or production: therefore neither without some beginning. But this cannot stand with eternity: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, eternity is interminable duration: therefore if in the divine there is an eternal trinity, then there is also an interminable production or emanation of persons; but an interminable production or emanation is never perfect, because it is never in a state of having been produced: therefore either the trinity is not perfect, or it is not eternal.
6. Likewise, in God being and enduring are entirely the same, therefore having a principle of being and of enduring is the same: but there cannot be a true trinity without some person having there a principle of existing through production: therefore it cannot be without having a principle of enduring. But this is incompatible with eternity: therefore etc.
7. Likewise, a person is not of greater power or actuality than the essence: but the divine essence cannot produce another essence coeternal with itself: therefore neither can a person produce a person; therefore either in the divine essence there is no trinity of persons, or there is not supreme eternity there.
8. Likewise, every being is either created or uncreated; similarly every being is either from itself or from another: but every created being is a being from another: therefore every uncreated being is a being from itself. But everything eternal is uncreated: therefore everything eternal is from itself, and therefore nothing is eternal that is from another. But there cannot be a trinity without some person proceeding from another: therefore where there is trinity, there is no eternity.
9. Again, whenever any power, whether finite or infinite, exerts itself according to the entire totality of its potency in some act, it is impossible that it simultaneously and at once exert itself in another act; but the paternal power in generating entirely exerts the immensity of its whole power, since the Son is as great as the Father: therefore it cannot simultaneously and at once produce another person. If therefore it produces a third, this will be either before or after: but this does not occur in omniform eternity: therefore either there is no trinity in the divine, or there is no true eternity.
10. Again, wherever there is production, there is reception from another; but nothing receives what it already has: therefore if the Son is produced by the Father, he receives being from the Father: therefore he did not previously have that being . But what receives being not previously had receives a beginning of duration: and nothing of this sort is eternal: therefore eternity does not stand together with production, therefore neither with the trinity.
11. Again, eternity denotes the present; whence the eternal is always present according to its proper nature; but emanations in the divine, and especially generation, are more properly indicated through the past tense than through the present, because it is better said always begotten, always born, than to say being begotten and being born: therefore it seems that these two cannot stand together. If therefore there cannot be a trinity without true production, then it does not stand together with eternity.