7. Again, where there is eternity, there is interminability, because according to Boethius "eternity is the possession of interminable life"; where there is interminability, there is circularity; but the circular is posterior to the straight, and nothing but what is absolutely first is to be attributed to the divine being: therefore neither is the duration of eternity.
8. Again, according to the order of understanding and the order of nature, the circumference is posterior to the center; but what the circumference is to the center, this is what eternity is to time: therefore time is far more properly to be attributed to God than eternity: therefore if it is unfitting to attribute temporality to God, then also eternity.
9. Again, where there is eternity, there is also totality; which is evident from the definition of Boethius: "Eternity is the whole and simultaneous possession of interminable life"; but where there is totality, there is partibility and divisibility; but this cannot be in God, since He is supreme simplicity: therefore, etc.
10. Again, nowhere is continuity of extension to be found without partibility: therefore nowhere does it happen that continuation of duration is found without true totality, and therefore without divisibility; hence an impartible being does not have the character of duration nor is it said to be whole and simultaneous: therefore, etc.
11. Again, where there is eternity, there is simultaneity, by definition; but where there is simultaneity, there is distinction, because simultaneity implies a relation, and relation implies distinction; but the divine being is altogether without distinction: therefore it is not eternal.
12. Again, if in the divine being there is complete simultaneity, then being, having been, and going to be are simultaneous: but in those things that are simultaneous, what accompanies one of them also accompanies the other: if therefore the aeviternal always accompanies the divine going-to-be, then by equal reason also its having-been: therefore just as it lacks an end, so also a beginning. But this is impossible: therefore it is impossible to posit in God the perfect duration of eternity: therefore it is not to be posited that the divine being is eternal.
13. Again, either eternity adds something beyond the now of eternity, or nothing. If nothing: then whatever coexists with the now of eternity is eternal; but the now of time coexists with the now of eternity: therefore it coexists with all of eternity, therefore it is eternal. If something: then eternity is composite: therefore it does not befit God.
14. Again, although a point is the beginning, middle, and terminus of extension, nevertheless it is impossible for extension to be understood within a point: therefore by equal reason neither can duration be understood within a now: therefore if eternity implies duration, it implies something beyond the now of eternity: therefore it is repugnant to supreme simplicity: therefore it is impossible that it should pertain to God's being, which is most simple.
15. Again, the divine being and the divine power, knowledge, and will or foreknowledge are measured by the same measure; but the divine foreknowledge is not measured by eternity, since God ceases to foreknow certain things: therefore neither is the divine being measurable by eternity.
16. Again, the divine being and operating are measured by the same measure, because in God substance, power, and operation are the same: if therefore the divine being is measured by eternity, then so also is the divine creating: therefore God creates from eternity and eternally, and consequently the creature is eternally created; but this is false: therefore so also is that from which it follows.
17. Again, every truth is measured by time, or by aeviternity, or by eternity; but that the world was to be created was true in God before the constitution of the world; therefore it is measured either by eternity, or by time: not by time, because time did not then exist: therefore by eternity. But this truth ceased to be true: therefore it seems that eternity has a terminus: but the divine being is without terminus: therefore eternity cannot be posited concerning the divine being.
CONCLUSION.
The divine being is eternal, because it is at once simple and infinite.
I respond: It must be said that the divine being is eternal, by the very fact that it is simple and infinite.
For because it is infinite, it lacks beginning and end: for if it had either of these, it would certainly have termination and limitation on that side, and thus would not be of supreme immensity. But because it is simple, it lacks before and after, which necessarily introduce diversity and some composition. Supreme simplicity therefore posits complete simultaneity: while supreme immensity posits complete interminability: and these two joined together constitute eternity. For eternity is nothing other than "the interminable and wholly simultaneous possession of life"; and because in no other is it possible to find these two together, namely immensity and simplicity, except in God alone: therefore the condition of eternity cannot be communicated to any other than God. - Furthermore, because these two are above our imagination and estimation, the duration of eternity can rightly be understood by no one unless all imagination is set aside. Let these two therefore be joined together, so that the duration of the divine being may be understood as most infinite and most simple, and thereby a true permanence, lacking inception and interruption or extension and division or termination, and utterly lacking all succession. And this reasoning necessarily concludes through the two aforesaid conditions joined together, although it may seem contrary to our imagination.
Moreover, a likeness of this can be found in God. For just as God, simple and immense, is wholly in distant places, which places although they are distant from one another, yet existing here and there He is not distant from Himself on account of His supreme unity and simplicity; so the divine being, which is eternal, even though it is in diverse times on account of its immensity: although those times have distance and extension, it itself is nonetheless undistant from itself on account of its supreme simplicity. And just as the divine uncircumscribability has all places present to itself, and is not itself extended through them, although they are truly extended: so the divine eternity has all times present to itself, nor does it itself undergo succession with them, although they truly succeed one another.
In creatures, however, although a complete likeness cannot be found on account of their deficiency, nonetheless something is found with some deficiency, which indeed, with that deficiency circumscribed by the intellect, leads by the hand to understanding eternity in the divine being. Moreover, this can be noticed in some way both in the image and in the vestige. For in the soul, which is the image of God, there is memory of past things, understanding of present things, and foresight of future things; and these indeed are simultaneously in the soul, so that in the soul, which is a spiritual substance, those things which succeed through diverse times are simultaneously gathered together and conjoined: because, however, it is itself limited and receives something from a thing outside, it falls short of that perfect simultaneity. But God receives nothing at all nor is He in any way limited: and therefore all things must be understood as present to Him, and this without beginning and end; and this is to understand eternity.
In time, however, which is the vestige of eternity, there is present, past, and future, so that what was future afterwards becomes present and finally past, because it is rooted upon mutable and fluid being, or upon motion itself. If therefore the present is understood to be rooted upon immutable and fixed being, which has neither beginning nor end, that will be understood as eternal .
And thus, if anyone by right consideration ascends from creatures to the Creator, removing what belongs to incompleteness and retaining what belongs to completeness: he will be able to arrive in some measure at understanding the eternity of the divine being, not however perfectly, as long as we are in the flesh: because while we live here, "our understanding is not without continuity and time," and through this it is greatly distanced from eternity, unless perhaps it is raised higher by a special gift: for as Augustine says, "when we grasp something eternal with the mind, we are not in this world." - It is evident therefore that the divine being is assuredly eternal, and what the necessary reason of this is, and how our consideration can grasp it. And the arguments proving that eternity is in the divine being are to be conceded.
1. 2. To that, therefore, which is objected to the contrary, that eternity is a measure, it must be said that although eternity, according to the mode of understanding, speaks under the notion of measure, according to reality and truth it says nothing other than the being of the divine substance; and just as that being is immeasurable, so also eternity is immeasurable: and therefore it is said to be equal to it, not through co-termination, because the immeasurable has no boundary, but through the privation of mutual excess. - And through this the response is clear to what is objected first and second concerning the notion of measure: because those arguments proceed from a measure that differs from the thing measured, that is bounded and bounds, and on this account exists only with respect to a finite thing; all of which fail with respect to divine eternity, nor nevertheless is it falsely called a measure according to the mode of understanding, inasmuch as it signifies divine being through the mode of duration, which duration indeed, even though it infinitely exceeds every creature, nevertheless with respect to divine being itself is neither exceeded nor exceeds.
3. To that which is objected, that eternity is the lack of a beginning and an end: it must be said that beginning and end, according as they are taken in the notion of eternity, are the same as the initial and final boundary in the duration of a thing; and these boundaries indeed exist only with respect to a thing that begins to be and ceases to be. When therefore I say that God is the beginning and the end, the notion of beginning and end is used equivocally there. Whence there is a twofold defect in that argument: both because God is the beginning and end with respect to things outside, and because He is the beginning and end according to the notion of causing. But when it is said that eternity is the lack of a beginning and an end, beginning and end are taken as within and according to the notion of enduring.
4. To that which is objected, that the lack of these, namely of a beginning and an end, sounds like a defect, since they themselves denote completeness, etc.: it must be said that beginning and end, according as they denote a boundary, even though they seem to denote completeness, they nevertheless denote limitation with deficiency; and therefore conversely, although the lack of these may seem to be a privation according to the mode of understanding, it is nevertheless a true positing on the part of the thing: for a duration that lacks a beginning and an end is so truly real that it has nothing of non-being.
5. To that which is objected, that eternity is the absence of past and future: it must be said that past and future are attributed to something in two ways: either such that it is by way of a disposition of the thing understood, or of the one understanding. Similarly, when something is said to have been in the past, or to be in the future: this can be understood in two ways: either by way of whenness and inherence, or by way of simultaneity and coexistence. When therefore it is said that eternity is the absence of past and future: it must be said that this is true insofar as past and future denote a disposition of the thing which is said to have passed away, such that by measuring it, it left in it a certain affection or disposition which is called when, according to what is said elsewhere, that " when is in everything that began to exist." But when God is said to have been and to be going to be, the past is not there a disposition of the thing understood, but of the one understanding; nor is this said by way of commensuration, whenness, and inherence, but by way of duration, a certain simultaneity, and coexistence. Hence all those expressions have a certain impropriety; for we stammer about eternity through various tenses, because our intellect does not ascend to understanding eternal things unless it is led by the hand through temporal things, as long as we are on the way.
6. To that which is objected, that God is not said to have been in future time, nor to be going to be in past time: it must be said that this is not because there is some succession or variation in the divine being, but on account of the connotation of coexistence in past or future time, in which there is so great a variation that neither can the past be called future, nor can the future be called past. Hence, since He is not said to be future in the past nor past in the future, this is not because to have been and to be going to be denote another being, or another mode of being with respect to the divine being, but only with respect to created being.
7. 8. To that which is objected, that eternity is interminability: it must be said that this does not capture the whole notion of eternity, because it does not only signify interminability, but also simultaneity: and just as by way of interminability it signifies a certain intelligible circumference, lacking beginning and end, so by way of simultaneity it signifies simplicity and indivision after the manner of a center: and these two are posited simultaneously concerning the divine being, because it is at once simple and infinite, and therefore circularity is understood in eternity: nor does it posit posteriority with respect to the straight line, nor even with respect to the center. And through this the response is clear to that which is objected concerning time, that it holds the notion of a center with respect to interminable eternity. For just as the preceding argument, so also this one proceeds from what is insufficient: because it considers eternity only insofar as it is the measure of immense being, when it ought simultaneously to be understood that it is the measure of what is simple and indivisible, which can in no way be found in the measure of time.