10. Again, either whatever belongs to the person belongs to the nature, and conversely, or not. If so: therefore since person is distinguished, nature too would be distinguished, and thus there will not be supreme simplicity there; if not: but affirmation and negation are not true of the same thing and according to the same: therefore according to one thing and another; but that which has this is composite: therefore etc.
11. Again, either one person wholly differs from another, or wholly agrees, or partly agrees and partly differs. If it wholly agrees: therefore it has nothing proper to itself, therefore it is not distinguished: but if it wholly differs: therefore if one is God, the other is not God: if it partly agrees and partly differs: since this is not according to the same, it will be composite.
12. Again, when one person communicates to another, either it communicates to it whatever it has, or not. If not: therefore it gives something of itself and retains something, therefore it is composite and avaricious. If whatever it has: therefore just as it communicates to it its quiddity, so also its personality.
If you say that personhood is not communicable: to the contrary: because it is just as simple as the nature, as you say: therefore just as the nature is communicable, so it seems that the person is also.
13. Furthermore, the property of a person is either something or nothing. If nothing: then it does nothing, and therefore does not distinguish that in which it is. If something, it either is in the essence or not. If it is in the essence: but a property distinguishes that in which it is: therefore the nature and essence are numerically multiplied: which is against the Trinity. If it is not in the essence, but in the person: then something according to reality is in the person that is not in the essence: therefore it is necessary that the property make the person composite.
14. Furthermore, the property of a person is a relation: therefore either it passes over into the substance, as do the other categories, or it does not pass over. If it passes over: then just as the substance is not distinguished nor distinguishes, so neither does the property: therefore there is no Trinity. If it does not pass over: then it signifies something beyond the substance, and therefore detracts from the character of simplicity: if therefore it cannot exist without properties, then it is impossible that it stand together with supreme simplicity.
15. Furthermore, a point, just as it is not composed by its relations, so neither is it really multiplied numerically: if therefore God is simpler than a point, then in no way is there in Him any real distinction.
16. Furthermore, the absolute is prior to the relative: therefore a distinction according to an absolute property is prior to that which is according to a relative one: but the more prior something is, the simpler it is: if therefore a distinction according to absolute properties does not stand together with supreme simplicity, then neither does a distinction according to relative properties.
To the contrary: 1. It happens that we find something simple because it is one in one, and something more simple because it is one in many though multiplied—which is simpler because it is one in many, like a universal, but nevertheless not supremely so, because it is numerically multiplied: therefore if something were one in many and not multiplied, that would be the simplest of all: but this must be attributed to the divine being, which is the simplest of all: therefore the Trinity does not take away the simplicity of the divine essence.
2. Furthermore, a plurality of natures does not conflict with the simplicity of a person, as is evident in Christ: therefore if a diversity of natures contributes more to composition than a plurality of persons, it seems that much more strongly a plurality of persons in no way diminishes the simplicity of the nature: therefore it stands, etc.
3. Furthermore, God can create without any diminishment of His simplicity: therefore if to generate and to spirate is an intrinsic act, much more strongly does He generate and spirate while supreme simplicity remains. But because He generates and spirates, there is a Trinity: therefore, etc.
4. Furthermore, to understand is an act that in no way conflicts with simplicity, but rather attests to and accords with it: but any mind, by understanding itself, generates a likeness of itself, which is called a word distinct from the one generating it: therefore, just as the act of understanding can stand together with supreme simplicity, so also can generation, and by equal reasoning the production of the Holy Spirit: therefore it seems that the entire Trinity stands together with supreme simplicity.
5. Furthermore, as Augustine says in the sixth book of On the Trinity , "in spiritual things the greater and the better are the same"; but in the blessed Trinity each person is supremely good: therefore the three are not something better than one, and therefore neither something greater. But in every composition something added is posited, which is in some way more: therefore that supreme Trinity posits no composition whatsoever: therefore it in no way conflicts with simplicity.
6. Furthermore, supreme simplicity does not exclude but includes supreme perfection; supreme perfection does not exclude but includes plurality: therefore from the first, supreme simplicity does not exclude but includes a plurality of persons: therefore it does not conflict, but most greatly accords.
7. Furthermore, supreme simplicity does not exclude but includes supreme power and virtue, because, as was proved above, the more a virtue is united, the more it is infinite: but supreme and most actual virtue posits the supreme and most perfect communication and production, and this posits the Trinity: therefore the Trinity and supreme simplicity necessarily stand together.
8. Furthermore, light is said of spiritual and corporeal substance, and of created and uncreated spiritual substance according to a certain proportion and analogy; but the production of material splendor diminishes nothing of the simplicity of material light, and the production of spiritual light, such as an intelligence or word from the mind, diminishes nothing of the simplicity of intellectual substance: therefore the production of the eternal Splendor from the Father diminishes nothing of the simplicity of the eternal light.
9. Furthermore, the simplicity of a point and of unity and of any created principle does not exclude but includes a plurality of relations and respects, and in this way it is not a matter of imperfection but of perfection: but every such thing is to be attributed to God: therefore regarding God, supreme simplicity and a plurality of relations do not conflict. But "relation multiplies the Trinity," as Boethius says: therefore etc.
10. Furthermore, where there is no matter and position, there can be no separation: therefore a production abstracting from the notion of position and matter posits no separation: therefore it stands with complete indivision, and therefore with complete simplicity. If therefore by such a production the persons in the Trinity are produced, then the Trinity can stand together with supreme simplicity.
CONCLUSION.
The Trinity of persons does not take away supreme simplicity, nor does supreme simplicity exclude the Trinity.
I respond: It must be said that the first principle is at once triune and most simple, such that neither does trinity remove supreme simplicity, nor does supreme simplicity exclude trinity: and this indeed we hold most certainly through faith.
But in order that we may understand to some extent, two things must be noted here beforehand: first, the diverse modes of personal distinctions, second, the diverse modes of divine attributions.
As to the first, it must be understood that, as Richard says in On the Trinity, a person is distinguished from a person in three modes, namely by origin alone, by quality alone, by origin and quality together. The first mode is in the divine persons, the second in angelic spirits, the third in human beings.
For human beings are distinguished from one another by quality on account of the diversity of accidents and properties by which one individual is discerned from another; and by origin, because one human being is born from another.
But angels, because they differ in substances and formal properties, are distinguished by quality: but because one does not proceed from another, they are not distinguished by origin.