3. To that which is objected, that whatever nobility is in a creature must be attributed to the Creator: it must be said that there is nobility simpliciter, and there is nobility secundum quid. That, however, which in a creature denotes nobility simpliciter, must properly and truly be attributed to the creative essence; but that which denotes nobility with diminution, it is not fitting to attribute to God. When therefore it is said that greater composition in a creature contributes to the perfection of nobility, as is evident in man: it must be said that this is a diminished nobility, which comes from the aggregation of many things, because what cannot have in itself through one thing it has through many: and therefore such nobility is not to be attributed to the divine esse, which indeed is the most noble at the pinnacle of perfect nobility.
4. To that which is objected, that in ordered forms, the form which has itself by addition is more actual: it must be said that there is actuality in a genus, and there is actuality outside a genus. Actuality, however, in a genus is actuality mixed with potency, which potency indeed is preserved in the nature of the genus and is reduced to act through the superaddition of a distinguishing and specifying difference: and concerning this actuality the aforesaid proposition holds true. — There is also, besides this, actuality outside a genus, which has nothing admixed of potency, and such is pure act; and therefore one need not posit therein one thing added to another, as act is added to pre-existing potency: and such actuality is posited in God: and therefore it does not follow that any addition or composition is posited.
To that which is objected, that the highest good has itself by addition to good: it must be said that it has itself by addition on the part of the intellect, because in the concept of the highest good the concept of good is included: but it does not have itself by addition on the part of the thing: both because created and uncreated good do not share in any common nature; and also because the highest good is of greater simplicity than the common notion itself which is signified by the name good: and also because the highest good exceeds every created good by a disproportionate excess. Whence when good is said of created and uncreated good, this is only by a certain analogy, because all created goodness flows from uncreated goodness as from a first cause: whence the former is posterior and thereby falls short of supreme simplicity; but the latter, as first, by the very fact that it is first, is most simple. Whence, just as the condition of simplicity added upon being, as when I say simple being, does not posit any composition in it: so neither does supremacy in good.
5. To that which is objected, that the properties of the divine esse are unity, truth, goodness: it must be said that truth is called a property of the divine esse because, as far as it is of itself, it denotes a mode of being; but because in the divine esse there is no difference between esse and posse, therefore there is no difference between esse and being thus, because it cannot be thus and otherwise. And on this account, because there esse and the mode of being are the same, therefore there is no composition there; but because the mode of being is a property of the being itself, and not conversely: hence it is that unity, truth and goodness are said to be properties of the divine essence; but essence cannot be called a property of truth or goodness conversely, because it does not name a mode of being, as those do.
6. To that which is objected, that either truth and goodness in God are the same or not: it must be said that, as far as concerns the principal signified or the thing understood through these names, they say the same thing concerning the divine esse, because God is not good by one thing and true by another, but is good by the very same thing by which He is true. But as far as concerns the manner of understanding, according to which the intellect ascends from creatures to the understanding of the Creator: thus there is a difference; because, since uncreated truth and goodness are understood through created truth and goodness, and these in creatures have some manner of difference: therefore these are said to be distinguished in some manner on the part of the manners of understanding, although they are the same on the part of the thing; nor however is there falsity or error in understanding, because these are truly and most perfectly in God, although they are not really diversified among themselves, as in created esse. And this is sufficiently clear, if that which was said at the beginning of the solution about the manifold mode of our consideration is understood.
7. To that which is objected, that acts are diversified through their objects: the response is already clear; because, even though they are the same according to the thing in God, they are nevertheless said to be diversified according to the manner of understanding on our part. Whence, just as to them there corresponds one and another representative property in the vestige of the representing creature, because goodness and truth are not the same in created nature: so there corresponds to it one and another power in the apprehending image, in the intellective and the affective, because both in the vestige and in the image there are certain things through diversity, corresponding nevertheless to certain things in God which have complete identity according to the thing.
8. To the other objection, that either power and wisdom and will say more than any one of these, or nothing: it must be said that explicitly they say something more, but implicitly one of them is enclosed in the other: for there cannot be supreme power where there is not will and wisdom: and therefore, if one is attributed to God without the other, it is attributed diminishedly; not because they are really different, but because by the very fact that they are posited per impossibile to be separated, they are also posited per impossibile to be diversified; and therefore just as they cannot be diversified, so they cannot be separated.
9. To the objection that either power is knowledge, or it is not: it must be said that one can speak of power and knowledge in two ways: either according to the principal signification, or according to the connotation. They are therefore the same according to reality and principal signification, but they differ according to connotation; for it is not the same for something to be knowable and possible to God, just as it is not the same to be known and to be made. Possible designates a thing as it stands in the character of an emanating or emanable thing; knowable, however, as it stands in the character of something present to the intellect of the knower: and since in God there is not one thing by which He is powerful and another by which He is knowing, because both belong to Him by His very self: therefore, although these are diversified in connotation, they are nevertheless the same according to reality.
10. To the objection that will is restrictive of power: it must be said that one can speak of power and will in three ways: either with respect to affect, or with respect to effect, or with respect to relation. In the first way they have identity and equality, because whatever God wills He can will, and whatever He can He wills to be able. In the last way they have inequality, because power is said with respect to possibles, and will with respect to things willed, and there are more possibles than things willed. In the middle way, however, they have equality, namely with respect to effect, because, although power extends to more things than will, nevertheless because God does nothing except what He wills, will and power are said to be equal with respect to effect: and therefore will is said to be restrictive of power, not by reason of that which they are, but by reason of that to which they are compared.
11. To the objection that nothing altogether simple is participated according to more and less: it must be said that something is said to be participated in two ways, namely according to form, as a genus is participated by its species; or according to influence, as a cause is participated by its effects. In the first way the proposition is true: but in this way the divine being is not said to be participated according to more and less, but only in the second way; and this does not posit diversity in the thing participated itself, but in that through which that participation occurs, namely in some created gift.
12. To that which is objected, that nothing altogether simple has multiform operation: it must be said that operation is spoken of both as the work operating and the work operated, or as the active act and the produced effect. In the first way, therefore, the operation of God is the same as God himself, and therefore is not multiplied by reason of itself in itself, but by reason of the produced effect on the part of the creature. In the first way, therefore, the proposition has truth, but in the second it does not: because the simpler something is, the more powerful it is, and through this the more it is the principle of multiform effects.
13. To that which is objected, that nothing altogether simple turns itself simultaneously to disparate and infinite operations: it must be said that something happens to be simple in a twofold way: in one way, in which simplicity excludes immensity; in another way, in which it includes it. Concerning the first, the aforesaid proposition has truth, but concerning the second, not at all, because the infinite, inasmuch as the divine infinite being is most infinitely infinite, can simultaneously turn itself to all things however great and of whatever quality without constraint, since it admits absolutely no limitation.
14. To that which is lastly objected, that nothing altogether simple is multiform in species or in assimilation: it must be said that there is multiformity according to the notion of informing and according to the notion of expressing. In the first way, multiformity belongs to that which has within itself the natures of diverse forms: and thus it cannot stand with supreme simplicity. In the second way, multiformity belongs to that which has in itself the ideas of many forms, and in this way it stands with supreme simplicity. For just as the most simple, by its supreme actuality, has supreme power, by which it can produce all things distinctly and fully: so also supreme truth, by which it can eternally represent all things, as was more fully shown above in the question concerning the eternal reasons.
ARTICLE II.
Whether trinity and supreme simplicity can stand together simultaneously.
Next it is asked concerning this, whether trinity and supreme simplicity can stand together simultaneously. And that they are incompossible is shown by several arguments.
1. An abstract being is simpler than a concrete one: therefore a nature having no supposit is simpler than a nature existing in several hypostases; but trinity posits the existence of a nature in several hypostases: therefore it diminishes from supreme simplicity.
2. Likewise, the same is simpler than the diverse: therefore everything in which there is complete identity is simpler than that in which any diversity however slight is found: but there cannot be trinity without some diversity however slight: therefore it cannot stand with supreme simplicity.
3. Likewise, the common is simpler than the proper, as is evident, because the proper implies in itself the common and something more: but there cannot be a true trinity without the distinct and incommunicable properties of the three persons: therefore it is impossible to posit a trinity without positing in it some departure from supreme simplicity.
4. Again, every absolute is simpler than the relative, because, as Augustine says, "every relative is something, apart from that which is said relatively"; whence the relative includes the absolute; but there cannot be a trinity of persons without a plurality of relations: therefore etc.
5. Again, every defining element is simpler than the defined; but nature falls within the definition of person: therefore nature is always simpler than person: therefore the notion of personality cannot stand together with supreme simplicity. But trinity cannot exist except in persons: therefore trinity is repugnant to supreme simplicity.
6. Again, a part is always simpler than the whole: but unity is a part of trinity, and one person is a part of three persons: therefore if trinity posits true plurality, and true plurality posits true totality, and true totality excludes supreme simplicity: therefore from the first, trinity cannot stand together with supreme simplicity.
7. Again, a point is always simpler than a continuum, therefore also unity than number: therefore the unity of person is simpler than the trinity of persons: but that which has something simpler than itself is not supremely simple: therefore it is impossible for trinity to be compatible with supreme simplicity.
8. Again, either a person is equally simple as the essence, or not. If not: therefore either person does not exist in the divine, or the divine being is not the most simple; but if equally simple as the essence; but the essence, on account of supreme simplicity, does not admit of multiple divine essences: therefore by equal reasoning neither does person.
9. Again, either person adds something above nature according to being and understanding, or according to understanding alone, or according to neither. If in the first way: therefore it is incompatible with supreme simplicity; if in the second way: therefore the understanding is vain and false, to which nothing corresponds in reality; if in the third way: therefore just as nature is not multiplied, so neither is person.