QUESTION III.
Whether trinity and supreme simplicity stand together.
Consequently it is asked whether trinity and supreme simplicity stand together; and concerning this two things are asked.
The first is whether the divine being is most simple. Second, whether trinity and supreme simplicity stand together.
ARTICLE I.
Whether the divine being is most simple.
Concerning the first it is proceeded thus and shown that the divine being is most simple.
1. Augustine, Confessions, Book II: "Nothing simpler than you is found": therefore he is simple in the ultimate degree, therefore also in the highest, therefore he is most simple.
2. Likewise, Confessions, Book XIII: "You alone are simple, for whom living is not one thing and living well another": therefore in God being and well-being are the same: but in that in which these are the same, there is no composition, but supreme simplicity: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, everything absolutely first is most simple: but the divine being is of this kind: therefore etc. The major is proved: because the composite is posterior to its components, and the simple is prior to the composite: therefore the cause of the predicate is in the subject in the aforesaid proposition: therefore it is true per se. The minor is manifest, because God is a being from himself, for if he had being from elsewhere, then that would be his God, not he himself. And again, if there is a stopping point and one does not proceed to infinity, it is necessary to posit that some being is the first of all.
4. Likewise, everything absolutely necessary is most simple; but the divine being is absolutely necessary: therefore etc. Avicenna and Algazel prove the major in their Metaphysics; for the absolutely necessary is entirely independent and incorruptible: but every composite depends on its components and into them, as far as its nature is concerned, is resolvable. The minor is manifest, because the nobler part of a contrariety is to be attributed to God: therefore since the absolutely necessary is nobler than the possible or contingent: it seems etc.
5. Likewise, everything most noble is most simple: but the divine being is of this kind: therefore etc. The minor is manifest; the major is proved, because to the most noble the conditions of nobility are to be attributed in the highest degree, otherwise it would not be the most noble: but simplicity is a condition pertaining to nobility, as is evident: therefore it is necessary that it be posited to exist in God entirely in the highest degree.
6. Likewise, everything most powerful is most simple: the divine being is most powerful: therefore etc. The minor is manifest, because he is therefore called God, because he is omnipotent. The major is proved, because "a united power is more infinite," according to what is said in the Book of Causes: therefore the most infinite power is the most united, therefore the most simple: but there is no most simple power unless the substance also be such: therefore etc.
7. Likewise, everything that is whatever it has is most simple; but God is whatever He has; therefore etc. The major is evident, because if there were any composition, neither of those would be the other. The minor is evident through induction and reason: because God has wisdom, therefore either He is wisdom, or He is not, and so with the others, except the relative properties. If He is wisdom, I have my proposition; if not, and He is wise by wisdom, then He is wise by something other than what He Himself is; therefore if He has wisdom from another, He also has perfection from another; therefore He is not God, etc.
8. Likewise, everything most perfect is most simple; but the divine being is of this kind; therefore etc. The minor is manifest, because no condition is more consonant with the divine being than perfection. The major is proved: because that which in its entirety and according to its whole self is perfection is more perfect than that which has in itself something perfectible; but everything composite or composable has in itself something perfectible; therefore it is impossible that something be supremely perfect unless it is also most simple; therefore the same as before.
9. Likewise, everything composite is mutable; therefore, by destruction of the consequent, everything immutable is simple, and what is absolutely immutable is simple in every way; but the divine being is entirely immutable, because it can be changed neither to something better, nor to something equal, nor to something worse, since it is entirely the supreme good; therefore the divine being is most simple.
10. Likewise, the more simple something is, the more it is one; but the divine being is supremely one, as was shown in the preceding; therefore it is necessary that the divine being is absolutely most simple.
To the contrary: 1. Anselm: Whatever belongs to God belongs to Him in the highest degree; but the divine being differs from created being; therefore it differs supremely. But the more differences by which something differs, the more it differs and the more composite it is; therefore it is necessary that the divine being is supremely composite.
2. Likewise, a being entirely abstracted from a supposit is simpler than one that is concrete; but the divine being is not abstracted but concrete with a supposit, because in the divine being there is true deity and a true hypostasis having deity; therefore etc.
If you say that they differ by reason alone: either something real corresponds to that distinction of reason, or nothing; if something, I have my proposition; if nothing, then the whole thing is vain and false.
3. Likewise, what pertains to nobility in a creature is to be attributed also to the Creator; but the more composite a creature is, the more it approaches the condition of nobility, as is evident in man, who is the most perfect of creatures that are in the universe, and who is also the image of God; therefore it seems etc.
4. Again, in ordered forms, the form that is constituted by addition is more actual, as is evident in the form of the genus and the species, since the form of the species is more actual: but what is constituted by addition is composite: therefore composition attests to greater actuality and completeness. Since therefore the divine esse is most actual and most complete: therefore it is most composite.
5. Again, the properties of the divine esse are unity and truth and goodness: therefore either truth is the same as substance, or not. If entirely the same: then truth is no more a property of substance than conversely, which is absurd: if not entirely the same: then it adds something: therefore there is some composition.
6. Again, either truth and goodness are the same, or not. If the same: then a vestige of goodness is a vestige of truth, which is false: but if in some way they differ: then that in which they exist is in some way composite.
If you say that they differ in concept; the question is then asked, what underlies that concept.