10. To that which is objected, that person and essence, since it is one, are either the same by the same unity, or other and other: it must be said that they are neither entirely the same nor entirely other, but the same in reality, not the same in rational account, because, as Augustine says, "God is God by one thing and Father by another," not because between the divinity and paternity there is a difference according to essence or according to being, but according to the rational account of how each is related, because Father is said in relation to another, but essence is not at all.
11. To that which is objected, that production does not belong to a person except by reason of nature: it must be said that production regards the person as in the ratio of subject and principle and object or terminus, and therefore a true production necessarily causes the person to be plurified; but it regards nature as the reason for producing and as that which is communicated through the production; and because in that production everything that is possessed is given, and it is not lost when it is given, therefore although the person is plurified, nevertheless the nature is not multiplied.
12. To that which is objected, that supreme simplicity excludes composition in nature and person: it must be said that supreme simplicity excludes composition from other things and with another; and therefore it cannot stand together with composition either of nature or of person; but the supreme unity of nature excludes only essential diversity, and therefore it is not incompatible with personal plurality, and on account of this the cases are not similar on one side and the other.
13. To that which is objected, that in the divine being there must be either the most perfect distinction, or none: it must be said that distinction is called perfect in two ways: either intensively, or completely. In the first way it need not be posited in God, but in the second way it is; and thus it is there, because a thing is the more perfect the less it departs from unity. Since therefore that plurality does not depart from supreme unity, it follows that it alone is a plurality at once true and most perfect.
14. To the objection that unity and truth reflect back upon themselves: it must be said that this holds true in the singular, and not in the plural. But when truth is compared to plurality, and conversely, this is not singularly but plurally: and therefore there is no necessity of consequence there. For when a true plurality in the divine is spoken of, true says nothing other than the expression of plurality, which is in the supposits: but when conversely a plurified truth is spoken of, a multiplication in divine truth and essence itself is insinuated.
15. To the objection that it is one true thing that the Father generates, and another that the Holy Spirit proceeds: it must be said that if this is understood of the truth of the complex, such as is the truth of a proposition or statement, then there are many truths and many articles. But if one speaks of the truth of the incomplex, which is the truth of the thing: then, because for the Father to generate, and for the Son to be generated, and for the Holy Spirit to proceed is nothing other than for the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit to be, and there is one being in them: the truth is altogether unique according to the thing.
16. To the objection that either it is a repetition of the same unity, or it is not: it must be said that it is a repetition of the same unity, but not concerning the same one, rather concerning another and another, and therefore there is no nugation there nor an aggregation of unities; and therefore there is such a plurification there that there is no diminution of the supreme unity. And to this extent that word of Boethius on the Trinity must be understood, where he says that "God is thus trine, as if one were to say sun, sun, sun"; which is similar by reason of the iteration of that unity, but dissimilar, because the unity of the Trinity is iterated concerning another and another, but the unity of the sun concerns one alone; and therefore there is a real trinity in God, although none in the sun.
17. To the objection that plurality is reducible to unity: it must be said that plurality, which implies a defect from the supreme unity, is compared to that unity as to a principle and cause: and this is reduced to unity by a proper reduction, which is of an effect into its cause, and such plurality is not in the divine being. But plurality, which does not imply a defect from the supreme unity, does not need to be reduced, because it itself is the supreme unity: nevertheless, insofar as there is posited an emanation of the divine persons from the first as from a principle, so also in this way a reduction to that first as to the principle from which they are produced is not repugnant.
18. To the objection that several things in several subjects indicate the highest distinction or diversity: it must be said that although according to extrinsic reasoning a plurality of nature in a plurality of persons seems more repugnant to the highest unity, nevertheless according to reality and intrinsic reasoning a plurality of natures in one supposit, which is constituted from them, is more repugnant, since it is rendered composite and less one, than if in several supposits several natures were found, as is evident in the angelic and human nature. And therefore, because the highest unity is in God, it is posited in a nobler and more excellent way by this, that one nature is posited in several supposits without being multiplied, than if one nature were posited in one person.
19. To the objection that whatever God has he has from himself: it must be said that this is true, because the divine essence cannot be originated from any other; but from this it does not follow that whatever a person has he has from himself. Whence, just as it does not follow: the essence is not produced, therefore the person is not produced — so neither does the aforesaid argument conclude.
20. To the objection that where there is plurality, there is diversity: it must be said that, as is evident from what has been said above, that plurality does not properly introduce diversity which is attended to according to form, substance, and nature. And therefore it diminishes nothing of the highest unity and identity, which consists in this, that the three persons have the highest unity of essence and nature.