QUESTION I.
On the certitude by which the existence of God is known, and on the faith by which the Trinity of the same is believed.
ARTICLE I. Whether that God exists is an indubitable truth.
It is therefore asked first, whether that God exists is an indubitable truth? And that it is so, is shown by a threefold way. The first is this: every truth impressed upon all minds is an indubitable truth.
The second is this: every truth which every creature proclaims is an indubitable truth.
The third is this: every truth most certain and most evident in itself is an indubitable truth.
Concerning therefore the first way, we proceed thus, and it is shown both by authorities and by arguments that God's existence is impressed upon all rational minds.
1. Damascene, in the first book, chapter three: "The knowledge that God exists is naturally implanted in us."
2. Likewise, Hugh: "God so tempered the knowledge of himself in man, that just as what he wholly is could never be comprehended, so that he is could never be entirely unknown."
3. Likewise, Boethius: "There is implanted in the minds of men a desire for the true and the good"; but the affection for the true good presupposes knowledge of the same: therefore there is impressed upon the minds of men a knowledge of the true good and a desire for what is most desirable. But this good is God: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, Augustine in On the Trinity says in many places that the image consists in mind, knowledge, and love, and that the nature of the image is discerned in the soul by comparison to God: if therefore it is impressed upon the soul by nature to be the image of God, then it has naturally implanted within it a knowledge of God. But the first thing knowable about God is that God exists: therefore this is naturally implanted in the human mind.
5. Likewise, the Philosopher says that "it would be unfitting for us to possess the noblest dispositions and for these to be hidden from us": therefore, since that God exists is the noblest truth, most present to us, it is unfitting for that truth to be hidden from the human intellect.
6. Likewise, the appetite for wisdom is implanted in the minds of men, because the Philosopher says: "All men by nature desire to know"; but the wisdom most to be desired is eternal wisdom: therefore the appetite for that wisdom is most especially implanted in the human mind. But there is no love, as was said before, except of what is in some way known: therefore it is necessary that some knowledge, however slight, of that highest wisdom be impressed upon the human mind. But the first thing to be known is that God himself, or wisdom, exists: therefore, etc.
7. Likewise, the appetite for beatitude is so implanted in us that no one can doubt of another whether he wills to be happy, as Augustine says in many places; but beatitude consists in the highest good, which is God: therefore, if such an appetite cannot exist without some knowledge, it is necessary that the knowledge by which it is known that the highest good, or God, exists be implanted in the soul itself.
8. Likewise, there is implanted in the soul itself an appetite for peace, and so deeply implanted that it is sought even through its contrary, nor can this appetite itself be taken away even from the damned and the demons, as is shown in the nineteenth book of The City of God. If, therefore, the peace of the rational mind exists only in an immutable and eternal being, and appetite presupposes a notion or knowledge: then the knowledge of an immutable and eternal being is implanted in the rational spirit.
9. Likewise, there is implanted in the soul a hatred of falsehood; but all hatred has its origin from love: therefore much more strongly is there implanted in the soul a love of truth, and especially of that truth for which the soul was made. If, therefore, that is the first truth, it necessarily follows that the knowledge of the first truth is implanted in the rational mind.
That a hatred of falsehood is implanted in the human mind is apparent from the fact that no one wishes to be deceived, as Augustine says in the tenth book of the Confessions. — That furthermore hatred is caused by love, Augustine shows in the fourteenth book of The City of God: for no one hates anything except because he loves its opposite.
10. Likewise, there is implanted in the rational soul a knowledge of itself, because the soul is present to itself and is knowable through itself; but God is most present to the soul itself and is knowable through Himself: therefore a knowledge of its God is implanted in the soul itself. If you say that the cases are not similar, because the soul is proportionate to itself, whereas God is not proportionate to the soul in this way; on the contrary: the objection has no force:
because if proportionality were necessarily required for knowledge, the soul would never arrive at the knowledge of God, because it cannot be proportionate to Him, neither through nature nor through grace nor through glory.
By these reasons, therefore, it is shown that the existence of God is indubitable to the human mind, as something naturally implanted in it; for no one doubts except concerning that of which he does not have certain knowledge.
Likewise, this same thing is shown by a second way, as follows: every truth that every creature proclaims is an indubitable truth; but every creature proclaims that God exists: therefore, etc. — That every creature proclaims that God exists is shown from ten conditions and suppositions known through themselves.
11. The first is this: if there is a *posterior being,* there is also a *prior being,* because the posterior exists only from the prior: if, therefore, there is a totality of posterior things, it is necessary that there be a first being. If, therefore, it is necessary to posit that something is prior and posterior among creatures: then the totality of creatures necessarily implies and proclaims a first principle.
12. Likewise, if there is a *being from another,* there is a *being not from another:* because nothing brings itself from *non-being* into *being:* therefore the first reason of bringing forth must necessarily be in a first being that is not brought forth from another. If, therefore, *being from another* is called *created* being, and *being not from another* is called *uncreated* being, which is God: then all the differences of being imply that God exists.
13. Moreover, if there is a possible being, there is a necessary being: because the possible denotes indifference to being and non-being: but nothing indifferent to being and non-being can exist except through something that is wholly determined to being. If, therefore, a necessary being, having nothing whatsoever of possibility toward non-being, is none other than God, while every other thing has something of possibility, every difference of being implies that God exists.
14. Moreover, if there is a relative being, there is an absolute being: because the relative never terminates except at the absolute; but an absolute being depending on nothing cannot be other than that which receives nothing from elsewhere: and this is the first being, while every other being has something of dependence: therefore it is necessary that every difference of being implies that God exists.