The Lantern

Breviloquium · Part 18

CCEL

Chapter IX.

On the will and providence of God.

Concerning the will of God, these things must be held: that it is so right that it can in no way be bent; so efficacious that it can in no way be impeded; so one that it nevertheless may be signified in manifold ways.

For the divine will, which is the will of good pleasure, is signified through the will of sign according to five differences of signs, which are precept, prohibition, counsel, fulfillment, and permission: according to which all things whatsoever that happen in the universe are disposed by the will of good pleasure. "For the will of God is the first and highest cause of all forms and motions. For nothing happens visibly and sensibly in this most ample and immense commonwealth, as it were, of the whole creation, that is not either commanded or permitted from the interior, invisible, and intelligible court of the supreme Emperor, according to the ineffable justice of rewards and punishments, graces and retributions."

And because this will, regulated by reason, is called providence: hence it is that all things that happen in the universe are directed and governed by divine providence, which in all things is irreproachable, because it commands, prohibits, or counsels nothing except justly; it does nothing except well; it permits nothing unjustly.

Now the understanding and reason of the foregoing is this. The First Principle, since it is supremely noble, both has a will and has it in a noble manner. Since therefore will of itself bespeaks that according to which in agents acting from purpose the rule of rectitude and the efficacy of operation are attended to, it is necessary that the will in God be most right and most efficacious: most right, because in God will and truth are the same; most efficacious, because in God will and power or might are entirely the same.

And because the divine will cannot lack truth, therefore it is not only right, but also the rule of rectitude. Because indeed it can in no way lack power, therefore it is not only efficacious, but also the font and origin of all efficacy; so that nothing can be accomplished without it, nothing can happen against it, nor is there anything by which it could be impeded.

And because it is most right, no one can be right unless he conforms to it; but no one can conform to it unless that will is made known to him: therefore it was necessary that the divine will, as the rule of rectitude, be made known to us. Now a certain rectitude is of necessity, and this consists in doing the necessary good and avoiding evil; a certain rectitude is of perfection, and this consists in going beyond what is owed: and accordingly it is made known to us through a threefold sign, namely precept, prohibition, and counsel: which indeed signifies that the divine good pleasure accepts as just what is done according to divine precept, what is avoided according to divine prohibition, and what is fulfilled according to divine counsel. These signs indeed are infallible signs of the divine will, insofar as it is the rule of rectitude.

Again, because it is most efficacious, in no way can anyone accomplish anything unless it operates and cooperates; no one can fail or sin unless it justly abandons. And accordingly there are two signs of it, namely fulfillment, which is a sign of the will as effecting: and permission, which is a sign of the will justly abandoning. Now it justly abandons, because it is just that it so govern the things it has established that it does not break the laws it has implanted: and that it so cooperate with the things it has created that it "allows them to act according to their proper motions": and therefore, if it allows free choice, which is turnable to either side, to fall into evil by the law of nature, it does not permit this except justly.

Again, if through grace it goes before and sustains, it does injury to no one; therefore it does not act unjustly nor entirely justly according to the requirement of merits, because merits do not suffice for this: but gratuitously and mercifully and in a certain way justly, insofar as befits its goodness. Therefore when it condemns and reprobates, it operates according to justice: but when it predestines, according to grace and mercy, which does not exclude justice. Because therefore all, insofar as they were of the mass of perdition, deserved to be condemned: therefore more are reprobated than chosen, so that it may be shown that salvation is according to special grace, but damnation according to common justice. Therefore no one can complain about the divine will, because it does all things most rightly; indeed in all things we ought to give thanks and honor the governance of divine providence.

But if anyone should ask why it bestows the gift of grace on one sinner rather than another, here it is necessary to impose silence on human loquacity and to exclaim with the Apostle: O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God, how incomprehensible are his judgments, and unsearchable his ways! For who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor, or who has first given to him, and it shall be repaid to him? For from him and through him and in him are all things. To him be glory forever and ever. Amen.