Chapter VIII.
On the wisdom of God, predestination, and foreknowledge.
Concerning the wisdom of God, these things must be held: namely, that the divine wisdom itself most clearly knows all things good and evil, past, present, and future, actual and possible, and on this account is incomprehensible to us and infinite; yet in such a way that it is in no way diversified in itself, although it receives diverse names. - For insofar as it is cognitive of all possible things, it is called knowledge or cognition: insofar as it is cognitive of all things that come to pass in the universe, it is called vision: insofar as it is cognitive of all things that are done well, it is called approbation: insofar as it is cognitive of those things that are future, it is called foreknowledge or prevision; insofar as it is cognitive of those things that are to be done by God himself, it is called disposition: insofar as it is cognitive of those things that are to be rewarded, it is called predestination; insofar as it is cognitive of those things that are to be condemned, it is called reprobation.
And because it is not only cognitive, but is also the principle of knowing: therefore, insofar as it is the principle of knowing all things known, it is called light: insofar as it is the principle of knowing things seen and approved, it is called a mirror: insofar as it is the principle of knowing things foreseen and disposed, it is called an exemplar: insofar as it is the principle of knowing things predestined and reprobated, it is called the book of life. - Therefore the book of life regards things as returning; the exemplar, as going forth; the mirror, as proceeding; but light regards all things.
To the exemplar, moreover, pertain idea, word, art, and reason: idea, according to the act of foreseeing; word, according to the act of proposing; art, according to the act of carrying out; reason, according to the act of perfecting, because it adds the intention of an end. - But because all these are one in God, therefore one is frequently taken for another.
And although the divine wisdom receives diverse names by reason of the diversity of things known and connoted, it is nevertheless not diversified according to its intrinsic nature. For it knows contingent things infallibly, mutable things immutably, future things presentially, temporal things eternally, dependent things independently, created things in an uncreated manner, and things other than itself in itself and through itself.
And since it knows contingent things infallibly, freedom and changeability of the will stand together with predestination and foreknowledge.
Now the understanding and reason of the aforesaid is this: since the first principle, by the very fact that it is first and supreme, has knowledge that is at once most simple and most perfect: because most perfect, therefore it knows all things most distinctly under all the conditions that things have or can have; and for this reason it knows future things to be future, and present things to be present; and it knows that good things are to be approved, and evil things to be reprobated: hence it is that it receives diverse names, as has been said above.
But because the perfection of wisdom stands together with supreme simplicity, hence it is that all things other than himself he knows in himself and through himself; from which follows the second point, that he knows created things in an uncreated manner; from which follows the third, that he knows dependent things independently; from which arises the fourth, that he knows temporal things eternally; from which the fifth, that he knows future things presentially; from which the sixth, that he knows mutable things immutably; from which the seventh, that he knows contingent things infallibly.
And thus contingent things, while remaining contingent, are utterly infallible to the divine wisdom, both in contingent things that are subject to nature and in those subject to the freedom of the human will.
Whence whoever wishes to understand this truth, how the freedom of the created will stands together with the infallibility of eternal predestination, let him proceed by resolving from this last point through those seven degrees up to the first, namely that the first principle most perfectly knows all things through himself, which is a most certain truth; from which the rest of the aforementioned points are infallibly concluded by reasoning.
But just as the certitude of divine knowledge stands together with the contingency of things known, because the divine wisdom is at once most simple and most perfect: so unity stands together with the multiformity of reasons and ideas from the same cause. For because it is most perfect, therefore it knows all things and each thing most distinctly and represents all those things most distinctly and most perfectly: and therefore it is said to have reasons and ideas of individual things as likenesses of things most perfectly expressive.
But because it is most simple, therefore all those likenesses are one in it. Whence, just as God by one power produces all things in time according to the complete integrity of things, so by one truth he expresses all things sempiternally. And just as in the most high, omnipotent God there is one active operation in reality, yet there are said to be many productions of things by reason of the plurality of things produced: so there is one truth of one act of intelligence in God, yet there are said to be many likenesses, ideas, and reasons by reason of the plurality of things ideated, whether existing, or future, or possible. Now these reasons or ideas, although they are one truth and light and essence, are nevertheless not said to be one reason or idea. For a reason or idea is spoken of as relative to another according to the mode of understanding. For it names the likeness of the thing known, which really holds on the side of God, although according to the mode of understanding it seems to signify something on the side of the thing ideated.
But if a likeness of this be sought in a creature, it must be said that this is proper to that exemplar: because, as has been said, it is at once simple and infinite and most perfect, which being understood beforehand, the rest become known consequently. For because that exemplar is most simple and most perfect, it is therefore pure act: but because it is infinite and immense, it is therefore beyond every genus. And hence it is that, being one, it can be the expressive likeness of many things.