OF THE WILL AND INTELLECT OF THE DAMNED (NINE ARTICLES)
We must next consider matters pertaining to the will and intellect of the damned. Under this head there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether every act of will in the damned is evil?
(2) Whether they ever repent of the evil they have done?
(3) Whether they would rather not be than be?
(4) Whether they would wish others to be damned?
(5) Whether the wicked hate God?
(6) Whether they can demerit?
(7) Whether they can make use of the knowledge acquired in this life?
(8) Whether they ever think of God?
(9) Whether they see the glory of the blessed?
Whether every act of will in the damned is evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every act of will in the damned is evil. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "the demons desire the good and the best, namely to be, to live, to understand." Since, then, men who are damned are not worse off than the demons, it would seem that they also can have a good will.
Objection 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "evil is altogether involuntary." Therefore if the damned will anything, they will it as something good or apparently good. Now a will that is directly ordered to good is itself good. Therefore the damned can have a good will.
Objection 3: Further, some will be damned who, while in this world, acquired certain habits of virtue, for instance heathens who had civic virtues. Now a will elicits praiseworthy acts by reason of virtuous habits. Therefore there may be praiseworthy acts of the will in some of the damned.
On the contrary, An obstinate will can never be inclined except to evil. Now men who are damned will be obstinate even as the demons [*Cf. FP, Q[64], A[2]]. Further, as the will of the damned is in relation to evil, so is the will of the blessed in regard to good. But the blessed never have an evil will. Neither therefore have the damned any good will.
I answer that, A twofold will may be considered in the damned, namely the deliberate will and the natural will. Their natural will is theirs not of themselves but of the Author of nature, Who gave nature this inclination which we call the natural will. Wherefore since nature remains in them, it follows that the natural will in them can be good. But their deliberate will is theirs of themselves, inasmuch as it is in their power to be inclined by their affections to this or that. This will is in them always evil: and this because they are completely turned away from the last end of a right will, nor can a will be good except it be directed to that same end. Hence even though they will some good, they do not will it well so that one be able to call their will good on that account.
Reply to Objection 1: The words of Dionysius must be understood of the natural will, which is nature's inclination to some particular good. And yet this natural inclination is corrupted by their wickedness, in so far as this good which they desire naturally is desired by them under certain evil circumstances [*Cf. FP, Q[64], A[2], ad 5].
Reply to Objection 2: Evil, as evil, does not move the will, but in so far as it is thought to be good. Yet it comes of their wickedness that they esteem that which is evil as though it were good. Hence their will is evil.
Reply to Objection 3: The habits of civic virtue do not remain in the separated soul, because those virtues perfect us only in the civic life which will not remain after this life. Even though they remained, they would never come into action, being enchained, as it were, by the obstinacy of the mind.
Whether the damned repent of the evil they have done?
Objection 1: It would seem that the damned never repent of the evil they have done. For Bernard says on the Canticle [*Cf. De Consideratione v, 12; De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio ix] that "the damned ever consent to the evil they have done." Therefore they never repent of the sins they have committed.
Objection 2: Further, to wish one had not sinned is a good will. But the damned will never have a good will. Therefore the damned will never wish they had not sinned: and thus the same conclusion follows as above.
Objection 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii), "death is to man what their fall was to the angels." But the angel's will is irrevocable after his fall, so that he cannot withdraw from the choice whereby he previously sinned [*Cf. FP, Q[64], A[2]]. Therefore the damned also cannot repent of the sins committed by them.
Objection 4: Further, the wickedness of the damned in hell will be greater than that of sinners in the world. Now in this world some sinners repent not of the sins they have committed, either through blindness of mind, as heretics, or through obstinacy, as those "who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things" ( Prov. 2:14 ). Therefore, etc.