OF THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider the precepts of justice, under which head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?
(2) Of the first precept of the decalogue;
(3) Of the second;
(4) Of the third;
(5) Of the fourth;
(6) Of the other six.
Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?
Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice. For the intention of a lawgiver is "to make the citizens virtuous in respect of every virtue," as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. Wherefore, according to Ethic. v, 1, "the law prescribes about all acts of all virtues." Now the precepts of the decalogue are the first. principles of the whole Divine Law. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue do not pertain to justice alone.
Objection 2: Further, it would seem that to justice belong especially the judicial precepts, which are condivided with the moral precepts, as stated above (FS, Q[99], A[4]). But the precepts of the decalogue are moral precepts, as stated above (FS, Q[100], A[3]). Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice.
Objection 3: Further, the Law contains chiefly precepts about acts of justice regarding the common good, for instance about public officers and the like. But there is no mention of these in the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore it seems that the precepts of the decalogue do not properly belong to justice.
Objection 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue are divided into two tables, corresponding to the love of God and the love of our neighbor, both of which regard the virtue of charity. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue belong to charity rather than to justice.
On the contrary, Seemingly justice is the sole virtue whereby we are directed to another. Now we are directed to another by all the precepts of the decalogue, as is evident if one consider each of them. Therefore all the precepts of the decalogue pertain to justice.
I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are the first principles of the Law: and the natural reason assents to them at once, as to principles that are most evident. Now it is altogether evident that the notion of duty, which is essential to a precept, appears in justice, which is of one towards another. Because in those matters that relate to himself it would seem at a glance that man is master of himself, and that he may do as he likes: whereas in matters that refer to another it appears manifestly that a man is under obligation to render to another that which is his due. Hence the precepts of the decalogue must needs pertain to justice. Wherefore the first three precepts are about acts of religion, which is the chief part of justice; the fourth precept is about acts of piety, which is the second part of justice; and the six remaining are about justice commonly so called, which is observed among equals.
Reply to Objection 1: The intention of the law is to make all men virtuous, but in a certain order, namely, by first of all giving them precepts about those things where the notion of duty is most manifest, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: The judicial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts, in so far as these are directed to one's neighbor, just as the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts in so far as these are directed to God. Hence neither precepts are contained in the decalogue: and yet they are determinations of the precepts of the decalogue, and therefore pertain to justice.
Reply to Objection 3: Things that concern the common good must needs be administered in different ways according to the difference of men. Hence they were to be given a place not among the precepts of the decalogue, but among the judicial precepts.
Reply to Objection 4: The precepts of the decalogue pertain to charity as their end, according to 1 Tim. 1:5, "The end of the commandment is charity": but they belong to justice, inasmuch as they refer immediately to acts of justice.
Whether the first precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed?
Objection 1: It seems that the first precept of the decalogue is unfittingly expressed. For man is more bound to God than to his father in the flesh, according to Heb. 12:9, "How much more shall we [Vulg.: 'shall we not much more'] obey the Father of spirits and live?" Now the precept of piety, whereby man honors his father, is expressed affirmatively in these words: "Honor thy father and thy mother." Much more, therefore, should the first precept of religion, whereby all honor God, be expressed affirmatively, especially as affirmation is naturally prior to negation.
Objection 2: Further, the first precept of the decalogue pertains to religion, as stated above (A[1]). Now religion, since it is one virtue, has one act. Yet in the first precept three acts are forbidden: since we read first: "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me"; secondly, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing"; and thirdly, "Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them." Therefore the first precept is unfittingly expressed.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De decem chord. ix) that "the first precept forbids the sin of superstition." But there are many wicked superstitions besides idolatry, as stated above (Q[92], A[2]). Therefore it was insufficient to forbid idolatry alone.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.
I answer that, It pertains to law to make men good, wherefore it behooved the precepts of the Law to be set in order according to the order of generation, the order, to wit, of man's becoming good. Now two things must be observed in the order of generation. The first is that the first part is the first thing to be established; thus in the generation of an animal the first thing to be formed is the heart, and in building a home the first thing to be set up is the foundation: and in the goodness of the soul the first part is goodness of the will, the result of which is that a man makes good use of every other goodness. Now the goodness of the will depends on its object, which is its end. Wherefore since man was to be directed to virtue by means of the Law, the first thing necessary was, as it were, to lay the foundation of religion, whereby man is duly directed to God, Who is the last end of man's will.