Yevamot10

1MISHNAH: A woman’s husband went overseas and some persons [The language of the Mishnah implies that the wife was told (maybe by hearsay), not that she received testimony that would stand up in court. This is clear from the following Mishnaiot and the discussion at the end of Halakhah 2.] came and told her, your husband died. If she remarried [Without having her husband declared dead by a competent court. That a woman may remarry even if her husband’s death is not confirmed by two independent witnesses of sterling character (Deut. 19:15) is a rabbinic institution.] and then the husband returned, she has to leave both husbands [It is clear that she has to leave the second husband since her marriage to him was invalid by biblical standards. As pointed out by both Talmudim, this shows that the rules of the Mishnah are rabbinical.] , she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows [Num. 30:14.] . If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah [If the deceased husband had sons from different wives, before the inheritance is distributed the ketubah of each wife should be given to her sons; only the remainder is distributed among all sons.] . If they died [Before the divorce documents were executed and there are no children.] , the brothers of both of them perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

2HALAKHAH: “A woman’s husband went overseas,” etc. As you say there [Mishnah 3:12, speaking of a bride who was switched in the night of the marriage.] , “these women one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have a child one returns them at once.” Should one not say the same here [What is the difference between the bride who was led into the wrong chamber and the wife given wrong information?] ? There is a difference, since there others deceived them. Did here not also others deceive them? They instituted a fine so that she should investigate carefully [In biblical standards, there is no difference; she should be able to return to the first husband since the second marriage is nonexistent. By rabbinic decree they made the consequences of error so enormous that the presumed widow should investigate the report of her husband’s death very thoroughly.] . Then they should fine her with respect to the second [husband] but not with respect to the first! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery [The wife inadvertently committed adultery with the second husband. If it had been intentional she would be forbidden to both men (Mishnah Soṭah 5:1); inadvertent adultery is not a cause of forced divorce unless the husband is a Cohen. They treated the inadvertent adultery in this case under the rules of the intentional. This argument is not found in the Babli.] . Then she should not need a bill of divorce from him [If the second marriage is treated as adulterous, it is invalid and does not require a divorce.] ! There is a difference since she was married to him in a lawful manner [Since imperfect witnesses, even slaves, are accepted in court in cases involving a disappeared husband (Mishnah 15:4), the second marriage, based on imperfect witnesses, cannot be declared invalid.] . Samuel said, I say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas [The argument is given by Rav Huna, Rav’s student, in the Babli (88b). People would think that the woman entered on her second marriage after receiving a bill of divorce from overseas. If she could return from the second husband to the first without formality, people would think that a marriage may be dissolved without formality.] . Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did we not state [Mishnah 10:7. In the Babli, 88b/89a, the argument is anonymous.] : “If they said to her, your husband has died, she was betrothed and then her husband came, she is permitted to return to him.” If you say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas; should she not be forbidden to return to him [A divorcee may remarry her ex-husband only if she was not married to another man in the meantime, Deut. 24:1–4. The language of the verses makes it clear that this law applies only if the first marriage was consummated. Since, in general, “to take a wife” means to perform a formal betrothal (cf. Chapter 1, Notes 63, 95; Peah 6, Note 46), the prohibition is triggered by formal betrothal to the second husband.] ? But it must follow Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, as Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, from betrothal it is permitted [To remarry one’s divorcee who was divorced from a second husband whose marriage was never consummated. This minority opinion is also quoted in the Babli, 88b, as background of Mishnah 10:7.] . Did Rebbi Yose ben Kipper not agree that if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce that she was not disabled from priesthood? As we have stated [Mishnah 10:7. In the Babli, 88b/89a, the argument is anonymous.] , “even if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce, she was not disabled from priesthood. [The reason is spelled out in the Mishnah, that the betrothal was invalid and the dissolution of a non-marriage does not turn the woman into a divorcee forbidden to priests.] ” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Hila: In order to make clear the prohibition of the first [This is a new explanation of the Mishnah. Even though the second marriage is in fact invalid, the court will require a divorce from the second husband to make clear that the woman is forbidden to return to her first husband.] .

3So far [The penalties spelled out in the Mishnah apply to a married woman who knowingly enters a relationship that might be adulterous.] if she knows that she is a married woman. What if she did not know that she was a married woman? Let us hear from the following: An underage girl who was married off by her father. She was divorced [This clause is a scribal error, induced by the frequent references to a minor who was married off by her father and then divorced. As the text stands, there is no problem at all since by marriage the underage girl is emancipated. If she is divorced as a minor, she becomes “an orphan while her father is living” (Mishnah 13:6) and her subsequent marriage is rabbinically valid. If the clause is deleted, then we assume that the girl was not informed that her father had betrothed her. While the acts of a minor have no standing in law, the fact that she contracted an invalid marriage necessitates a divorce by the reasoning of R. Hila.] and went and married on her own. About this Rebbi Hila said, one states there [In Babylonia. The Babylonian text is quite different (Babli 94b): “For incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman {whose husband had disappeared and} who remarried with the consent of the court; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife.” In all these cases, the marriages would have been valid if the information about the death of husband or wife or absence of a child had been true (explanation of RITBA).] , for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman [Since adultery is included in the chapter (Lev. 18) on incest prohibitions, it is technically considered incestuous.] ; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister [Since a man may marry his deceased wife’s sister (Lev. 18:18).] and his brother’s wife [Who might be married in levirate.] . Is there a difference? There, whether she knows or does not know, here also whether she knows or does not know [This proves only that a formal divorce is needed in all cases. It implies nothing about the material consequences spelled out in the Mishnah. It is to be assumed that the question referred only to the necessity of a divorce which is the subject of the previous discussion.] .

4“Nor usufruct [The husband upon marriage becomes the administrator of the wife’s property; he is indemnified for his care and, e. g., for the obligation to redeem his wife should she be kidnapped, by receiving the usufruct of her properties; cf. Chapter 7, Note 1.] .” Rebbi Avina said, that she cannot recover from him [The second husband.] the usufruct he took. That means [In the (French) text before Tosafot (85a, s. v. אלמנה) “Rebbi Ḥanina said, that means …” The ms. text corresponds to the Sephardic text before R. Isaac Fasi (§116, 28b in the Wilna edition).] , before the first [husband] returned. But if he took after the return of the first, she can recover [Since from the moment of the return of the first husband, the second knew that he had no right to the property.] .

5“And if she took anything one takes it away from her.” That means, if she took something after the first [husband] returned. But if she took before the first returned, just as she cannot take from him so he cannot take from her [In his absence, she naturally administers the estate and takes the usufruct; cf. Nimmuqe Yosef on RIF, Wilna edition 26b.] .

6“Any child from either of the men is a bastard.” One understands that the child is a bastard from the second [husband] [This child is the result of adultery.] . Is it a bastard from the first [The marriage to the first is valid.] ? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, this follows Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says if a man copulates with his wife whom he accuses of infidelity [Num. 5:11–31. If the husband formally accuses his wife of infidelity, she is forbidden to him until she is cleared (Mishnah Soṭah 1:3). R. Aqiba holds that any child conceived in a union which is not unconditionally permitted is a bastard.] the child is a bastard, if a man takes back his divorcee after she had remarried the child is a bastard. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila, according to everybody the child is acceptable [Even according to R. Aqiba, thechild of the first husband is not blemished since the wife did not act with criminal intent. The child of the second husband is a bastard by biblical standards; he or she is forbidden to marry an unblemished partner but permitted a bastard. The child of the first husband is a rabbinic bastard; he or she is forbidden to marry an unblemished partner by rabbinic decree and a bastard by biblical standards. This interpretation is explicitly stated in the Babli, 89b.] ; the status of her bill of divorce is the status of her bastardy. What is the difference between them? If the second one gave her a bill of divorce and then the first one copulated with her. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the child is a bastard following Rebbi Aqiba; in the opinion of Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila, according to everybody the child is acceptable.

7“Neither of them may defile himself for her.” That is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “A man defiles himself for his acceptable wife but he does not defile himself for his disqualified wife. [If either one of the two husbands is a Cohen, he may not defile himself to bury her. The statement ascribed to R. Ḥiyya is anonymous in the Babli (94b), where the rule is derived from Lev. 21:4: “A husband may not defile himself if this desecrates him.”] ”

8Some Tannaim state, she leaves under thirteen disabilities, but some Tannaim state, she leaves under fourteen disabilities. He who says that she leaves under thirteen disabilities takes what she finds and what she earns as one case, but he who says under fourteen disabilities takes each one by itself [In fact, if one takes all disabilities stated in the Mishnah and the next under 13 or 14 categories, one has to take quite a few statements as one category. The Babli does not try to give a number.] .

9Rebbi Jeremiah said, the promiscuous levitic woman still eats tithe [Tithe in the hands of a Levite is totally profane; its consumption does not require any status of holiness.] . One has stated thus: If a levitic woman was kidnapped [And presumed raped.] or if any one barred for her [Whom she could not legally marry.] copulated with her, he [The male illegally having sex with her. In all these cases, the daughter of a Cohen would be disabled for heave.] is not empowered to disable her. One does not suspect even a hint of disability for Levites who were compromised from their mother’s side [Whose father was a Levite or Cohen of questionable standing.] . But did we not state [In Mishnah 1.] : “the daughter of a Levite from tithe”? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that an Israel came upon her and she bore him a son [The status of the mother always follows that of her child; the mother of an Israel is an Israel woman. Cf. Halakhot 7:3–4.] .

10Rebbi Bisna in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: A promiscuous priestly woman may eat tithe [Since any Cohen is also a Levite (Deut. 18:1), he holds that even if a priestly woman loses her priestly status she is still levitic.] . Is that not the Mishnah: “the daughter of a Cohen from heave,” this implies that she eats tithe. It may follow him who says that tithe is not given to Cohanim [In that case, no statement about tithe is implied; cf. Ma‘aśer Šeni 5:9.] . Rebbi Nasa said, the words of the rabbis disagree, since Rebbi Hila, Simeon ben Yosina, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia said: If a Cohen came upon a divorcee, had a son from her, and died. [If the father died] within thirty days [of the son’s birth], the son must redeem himself. After thirty days, the presumption is that his father redeemed him [The children of priests and Levites, as well as priestly or levitic women of good standing, are not redeemed (Num. 3:11–13). If the disabled son of a Cohen has to be redeemed, it follows that with the priestly he also lost the levitic status. This disproves R. Bisna’s statement. In the Babli, Bekhorot 47b, there is a dissenting opinion that even if the father died before 30 days, the son does not have to give his redemption money to a Cohen since his father, being a Cohen, could not be sued for the money by other Cohanim. This does not change the validity of the argument given here.] . If he redeems for others, certainly for his son.

11Had it not already been stated: “she has no ketubah”? [This refers to the statement in the Mishnah that no children of hers, by any of her husbands, do inherit her claim to ketubah if she predeceases the husbands. Since it was stated earlier that she has no claim to any ketubah sum, the statement about her children seems superfluous.] Rebbi Yose ben Jacob said, that you should not say, they fined her but not her heirs. Therefore it was necessary to say, she has no ketubah [That means, the first mention of the ketubah also refers to the claim of the children (explanation of Rav Papa in Babli 91a).] .

12Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour [Mishnah Soṭah 5:1; Sifry Num. 19. Unless she is cleared from the accusation, she may not marry her presumed paramour after being divorced or after her husband’s death] . Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother [If her husband dies childless and her status was not clarified; Mishnah Soṭah 1:2.] , so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother [As explained at the end of this paragraph.] , so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following [Tosephta 14:3.] : “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate [The husband was childless.] and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him [The two parts of this sentence say the same: the co-widow is the brother’s wife.] .” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there [The Tosephta must be Babylonian. Since for the anonymous majority a woman married in incestuous levirate does not need a bill of divorce; she never was a co-wife in the legal sense and her disabilities cannot be transferred to her co-wives.] , as Rebbi Hila said, one states there [In Babylonia. The Babylonian text is quite different (Babli 94b): “For incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman {whose husband had disappeared and} who remarried with the consent of the court; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife.” In all these cases, the marriages would have been valid if the information about the death of husband or wife or absence of a child had been true (explanation of RITBA).] , for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman [Since adultery is included in the chapter (Lev. 18) on incest prohibitions, it is technically considered incestuous.] ; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister [Since a man may marry his deceased wife’s sister (Lev. 18:18).] and his brother’s wife [Who might be married in levirate.] (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) [The text in parentheses is dittography and is missing in Soṭah 1:2.] But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him [This negates R. Judan’s premiss.] because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs [This sentence is figurative speech. It means that in most cases of fines, the heirs are not responsible, so also in this case her disability is not transferred to her co-wives.] . Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him [Since according to the Babylonian rabbis an erroneous levirate does not necessitate a divorce, the wife committed unintentional adultery which does not cause a forced divorce except for Cohanim.] . Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee [A divorcee remarried by her ex-husband after a second marriage. The remarriage is forbidden but not incestuous. The Babli agrees, 11b.] is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives [Of a woman in a forbidden but non-incestuous marriage.] are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house [If the husband died childless, she may be married in levirate.] . Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery [The wife inadvertently committed adultery with the second husband. If it had been intentional she would be forbidden to both men (Mishnah Soṭah 5:1); inadvertent adultery is not a cause of forced divorce unless the husband is a Cohen. They treated the inadvertent adultery in this case under the rules of the intentional. This argument is not found in the Babli.] . Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions [Incestuous relations are declared impure in Lev. 18:24. Adultery is declared impure repeatedly in the law of the suspected wife, Num. 5:11–31. This argument is the only one given in the Babli, 11a.] .

13MISHNAH: Rebbi Yose says, her ketubah is from the property of her first husband [The Tannaïm mentioned in this Mishnah all disagree with Mishnah 1 in some respects. R. Yose must hold that the first husband also must provide for her until she is divorced.] . Rebbi Eleazar says, the first [husband] is entitled to what she finds and earns and may annul her vows [He agrees with R. Yose that she is entitled to ketubah from the first husband; therefore, the husband is entitled to receive her earnings.] . Rebbi Simeon says, copulation [If the first husband dies childless in the case she was permitted to return to him, the levir may take her in regular levirate.] with her or ḥaliṣah with her by a brother of the first [husband] frees her co-wives and a child from him [The first husband. The child from him after his return even if he is not allowed to take her back is never a bastard.] is not a bastard; if she was married without permission [She remarried on the basis of the information by two witnesses that her husband had died without asking the court for a declaration that the husband was dead. Then her second marriage was in error and is non-existent; her adultery was unintentional and does not bar her from returning to an Israel husband. But if the second marriage was contracted under the supervision of the court, it cannot be considered non-existent and she cannot return to her first husband parallel to the remarried divorcee. In any case, any sexual relation she may have with the first husband after the dissolution of the second marriage cannot be incestuous (cf. Notes 64,128).] she is permitted to return to him. If she married by a decision of the court, she must leave but is free from the sacrifice [A purification sacrifice is available only to persons acting carelessly (Lev. 4:2). Her transgression is neither intentional (for which no sacrifice would atone, Num. 15:30–31) nor careless; no guilt is attached to her in the eyes of the earthly or the Heavenly court.] ; without a decision of the court, she must leave but must bring the sacrifice [Not asking the court to investigate the disappearance of her husband is carelessness.] . The power of the court frees her from the sacrifice. If the court instructed her to marry but she misbehaved [By having unmarried sex; in the opinion of the Babli also by entering a forbidden marriage, e. g., a divorcee marrying a Cohen. The Yerushalmi accepts and the Babli rejects the entire Mishnah.] , she must bring a sacrifice since they permitted her only to marry.

14HALAKHAH: “If she married by a decision of the court,” etc. [The origin of this paragraph is in Halakhah 8, about other Mishnaiot.] Rebbi Abba: Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter [Mishnah 3 is a continuation of Mishnah 1, not Mishnah 2.] . What does Rebbi Yose say about the other matters? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose said, anything which disables for others disables for himself; anything which does not disable for others does not disable for himself [Mishnah 10; Tosephta 11:7. Since the second husband by his intercourse disables the wife for her first husband, he disables her for himself and she must be divorced by both of them as is stated in Mishnah 1. But if a woman went overseas and her husband married her single sister on the erroneous news of his wife’s death, since he does not disable the sister for anybody by his invalid marriage he does not disable himself to return to his wife.] .” And Rebbi Abba said, Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. This means that Rebbi Yose does not disagree about the other matters [The only disagreement of R. Yose with the Tanna of Mishnah 1 is that he holds that the wife can collect her ketubah from her first husband.] .

15What does Rebbi Eleazar say about ketubah? If you say that he is entitled to things that come to him in prohibition, then ketubah that came to him in permission certainly [If the first husband has the right to his wife’s earnings as long as he did not divorce her, then certainly he is obligated to pay the ketubah whose obligation he accepted voluntarily when she was permitted to him.] !

16It is reasonable to say that Rebbi Eleazar agrees with Rebbi Yose but Rebbi Yose does not agree with Rebbi Eleazar [In the Babli, 91a, this is the opinion of Rav Huna and is disputed by R. Joḥanan. In Rav Huna’s interpretation, for R. Eleazar the first husband can get his wife’s earnings only on the basis of the marital contract which is the ketubah; R. Yose will hold that the husband gets nothing to induce him to grant a speedy divorce.] ; Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Eleazar agree with Rebbi Simeon but Rebbi Simeon does not agree with Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Eleazar [In the Babli, 91a, this is the opinion of R. Joḥanan and is disputed by Rav Huna. It seems that here only the first statement of R. Simeon is considered (as shown by the next sentence), that if the first husband dies childless before he could divorce his wife, the action of a brother in levirate or ḥalîṣah with her is invalid as marriage act but effective to free the co-wives. The reason given in the Babli is that R. Simeon holds that no rabbinic decree exists in this case after the death of the first husband. The Babli holds that the composition principle in this Mishnah is that direction of agreement is always the same, either the later agree with the former (Rav Huna) or the former agree with the later (R. Joḥanan). This explains the slight deviation in the Mishnah from the chronological principle (R. Simeon is slightly older than R. Eleazar ben Shamua). The Yerushalmi rejects such schematism.] . This means that in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, invalid intercourse frees [Cf. Chapter 5, Notes 96, 98.] .

17[Here starts the discussion of Mishnah 3.] Would it not be reasonable that she should be permitted if she remarried with permission, forbidden if she remarried without permission? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Simeon [imply] that the court made their decision like intentional [relations between] man and woman [Intentional adultery.] , if she remarried without permission [The only case in which she could remarry without permission of the court is that two witnesses testified to the first husband’s death. Since two concurrent witnesses must be believed by biblical standards, her remarriage was an excusable error which can be atoned for by a purification sacrifice.] like erroneous [relations between] man and woman. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no “free” here but “obligated” [He holds that the woman acted in good faith in both cases and that, therefore, her adultery was unintentional in both cases and can be expiated by a purification sacrifice. This is the position of Ze‘iri in the Babli, 92a.] . Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: should it not be an act of instruction? When they instructed that it is permitted to sleep with an [otherwise] married woman [Everybody knows that adultery is biblically prohibited and that it is not in the power of the court to permit it.] . Is that not uprooting a principle [It is agreed that if the supreme court instructs that a biblical commandment is invalidated, no individual has the right to follow that instruction; Horaiot 1:3 (fol. 46a), Babli 4a.] ? When they instructed that she is forbidden for five years, from then on permitted [To declare the husband as dead after five years is within the competence of the court. If the wife remarried after five years, she was behaving correctly.] . Then it should be so if she misbehaved! Misbehaving is like eating fat or blood. When they instructed that fat is permitted and [she ate] blood [“Any fat or blood” is forbidden to eat (Lev. 3:17). However, it is clear from the context that only fat is forbidden which may be burned on the altar (cf., e. g., Lev. 4:8). Therefore, a technical ruling is needed to define which fat of cattle, sheep, or goats qualifies as חלב. If the court rules that certain fat that was considered forbidden is now permitted, a lay person who follows their ruling is excused; the sin is the court’s. But if the layman uses the permission of fat to eat of the permitted fat when it still contains blood, he is guilty since the ruling never included permission to eat “unkoshered” fat. Similarly, a permission to remarry does not include permission of promiscuity whose prohibition has biblical roots that have nothing to do with adultery. The Babli concurs, 92a.] .

18MISHNAH: A woman’s husband and son [The husband’s only child.] went overseas and people came and told her, your husband died and after that your son died [From the last sentence in the Mishnah it follows that there were two separate informations, one about the husband’s death and later one about the son’s.] , and she remarried. After that, they said to her, the sequence was inverted [If the husband had a brother she would need levirate or ḥalîṣah to marry outside the family.] . Then she must leave and the first [Everybody agrees that a child conceived while the first husband was still alive is a bastard.] and the last [Only R. Aqiba holds that a child from a widow remarried without levirate or ḥalīṣah is a bastard.] children are bastards.

19HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing [The two pairs of witnesses mentioned in the Mishnah.] to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there) [The argument in the Halakhah shows that the positions of “rabbis there” and “rabbis here and those there” must be switched.] . If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). [From here to the end of the Halakhah, the text is from Ketubot 2:2.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave [Babli Ketubot 22b; Tosephta 14:1. In the Babli, the position of “the rabbis here” is that of R. Joḥanan only, based on a minor Tanna R. Menaḥem bar Yose.] . There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave [Babli Ketubot 22b; Tosephta 14:1. In the Babli, the position of “the rabbis here” is that of R. Joḥanan only, based on a minor Tanna R. Menaḥem bar Yose.] . In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them [The Babli is a little more explicit. Since a return of the husband is absolute proof that he is alive, the wife will not remarry unless she is absolutely convinced that the witnesses are truthful. But in the case of divorce, if the husband claims that he never divorced her, she can contradict him based on her witnesses.] . Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain [This refers to Mishnah Ketubot2:2: “Rebbi Joshua agrees if somebody says to another person: This field did belong to your father but I bought it from him, one believes him [in the absence of documents] since the mouth which forbade is the mouth which permitted {the person stating that the field was another person’s being the same who states that now it belongs to him}. But if there are witnesses that it belongs to [the second person’s] father and [the first] says I bought it from him, he cannot be believed [without documents]. The situation described in the Yerushalmi is that each party in a court case brings two witnesses; Simeon proves that when his father died the field was still in his possession and Reuben (who is in actual possession) brings two witnesses that the field was not in Simeon’s father’s possession when he died. In that case, we do not say that the case is undecidable on basis of the evidence before the court and, therefore, the field should be split between the parties (position of Symmachos, in Babli Baba meṣi‘a 2b) but that the burden of proof is on the claimant and, therefore, the field remains in the possession of Reuben. The situation discussed in the Babli Ketubot 22b is different: Reuben is in actual possession of the field the number of years which creates a presumption of ownership, but he has no documentation of his acquisition. Simeon brings two witnesses that his father had died in possession of the field. Since squatting is no proof of ownership, the court puts Simeon in possession. Later, Reuben comes again to court with two witnesses who testify that Simeon’s father was not in possession at the time of his death. By the same principle as above, the field remains in the possession of Simeon. The commentators, following the Babli, require to substitute “Simeon” for “Reuben” at all occurrences here and in Ketubot. Such a correction is unwarranted.] . So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession [This refers to Mishnah Ketubot2:2: “Rebbi Joshua agrees if somebody says to another person: This field did belong to your father but I bought it from him, one believes him [in the absence of documents] since the mouth which forbade is the mouth which permitted {the person stating that the field was another person’s being the same who states that now it belongs to him}. But if there are witnesses that it belongs to [the second person’s] father and [the first] says I bought it from him, he cannot be believed [without documents]. The situation described in the Yerushalmi is that each party in a court case brings two witnesses; Simeon proves that when his father died the field was still in his possession and Reuben (who is in actual possession) brings two witnesses that the field was not in Simeon’s father’s possession when he died. In that case, we do not say that the case is undecidable on basis of the evidence before the court and, therefore, the field should be split between the parties (position of Symmachos, in Babli Baba meṣi‘a 2b) but that the burden of proof is on the claimant and, therefore, the field remains in the possession of Reuben. The situation discussed in the Babli Ketubot 22b is different: Reuben is in actual possession of the field the number of years which creates a presumption of ownership, but he has no documentation of his acquisition. Simeon brings two witnesses that his father had died in possession of the field. Since squatting is no proof of ownership, the court puts Simeon in possession. Later, Reuben comes again to court with two witnesses who testify that Simeon’s father was not in possession at the time of his death. By the same principle as above, the field remains in the possession of Simeon. The commentators, following the Babli, require to substitute “Simeon” for “Reuben” at all occurrences here and in Ketubot. Such a correction is unwarranted.] ? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say [Later.] she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

20A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan [His statement that the woman who married on testimony that she was divorced by an absent husband must be divorced by the second husband on contradicting testimony.] : “If two are saying, she was betrothed [As a minor by an absent father. The situation should be the same as in the case of witnesses to the divorce.] , and two are saying, she was not betrothed, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was betrothed and divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case [His statement that the woman who married on testimony that she was divorced by an absent husband must be divorced by the second husband on contradicting testimony.] ? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others would come and identify the man who was betrothed to her [Then the case can be independently investigated and we are no longer dependent on contradictory testimonies.] .

21A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan [His statement that the woman who married on testimony that she was divorced by an absent husband must be divorced by the second husband on contradicting testimony.] : “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure [The kidnappers slept with her. She cannot marry a Cohen.] , she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave [A similar text is Tosephta Ketubot 2:2.] .” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says [The trustworthiness of a person concerning himself is the topic of Mishnaiot Ketubot 1:6–9.] .

22If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat [Cf. Note 91.] . If two would say, X ate fat, and two would say, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice [The sacrifice of expiation for a sin which is only suspected; cf. Bikkurim 2, Note 162.] because of the doubt? Here, he [The second husband who had married the adult girl under the impression that as a minor she had not been betrothed by her father to a man unknown to her.] should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice [Even in the absence of witnesses.] . A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not be married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice [Their disagreement is one of classification, not of differences in practice.] .

23MISHNAH: They came and told her, your son died and after that your husband died, and she was married in levirate. After that, they said to her, the sequence was inverted [The husband had a child at the moment of his death and therefore the levir is forbidden to the widow by an incest prohibition (Lev. 18:16) punishable by divine extirpation (Lev. 21:21), which makes all children of this union bastards, whether conceived before or after the husband’s death.] . Then she must leave and the first [Everybody agrees that a child conceived while the first husband was still alive is a bastard.] and the last [Only R. Aqiba holds that a child from a widow remarried without levirate or ḥalīṣah is a bastard.] children are bastards.

24HALAKHAH: “They came and told her, your son died,” etc. [The same text Giṭṭin, Halakhah 8:6. In both places, the problem discussed is not the one stated in the Mishnah. The parallel discussion in the Babli is 92a/b where there is no mention of the position of R. Jeremiah.] If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave [This is a rabbinic decree since the outside marriage of a woman under obligation of levirate is invalid (Chapter 1, Notes 93, 94); therefore, the widow was not legally married during the levir’s lifetime and how can you leave a nonexisting marriage?] . Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder [Deut. 17:12.] . Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita [Cf. Tosephta 11:8, Giṭṭin 8:6.] supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items [Enumerated in Mishnah 1.] apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law [Cf. Halakhah 4:15.] .” They only said, “there is no bastard from a sister-in-law,” therefore she must leave. And we have stated, “she must leave”. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, she must leave.

25MISHNAH: If they told her, your husband died, and she remarried, and then they told her, he was alive but died, she must leave and the first child [Any child conceived during the first husband’s lifetime.] is a bastard, but the last is not a bastard. If they told her, your husband died; she was betrothed [But she never slept with the prospective second husband.] and after that her husband returned, she is permitted to return to him. Even though the second [husband] gave her a bill of divorce he did not disable her from priesthood. This Rebbi Eleazar ben Matthew explained, “a woman divorced from her husband, [Lev. 21:7, from the list of women prohibited to a priest.] ” and not a woman divorced from a non-husband [Since betrothal of a married woman has no legal standing.] .

26HALAKHAH: “If they told her, your husband died,” etc. “If they told her, your husband died; she was betrothed,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Her only problem would be aspersion on the priesthood, but the court will not tolerate aspersion [The priests, who were very particular about purity of their lineage, might not want to accept the return of a woman for whom one might construe a violation of priestly rules. Even though the courts go along with some of the self-imposed restrictions of Cohanim, such as the prohibition of a toddler convert, this would be one they will reject.] .

27How do you explain these [All Mishnaiot of this chapter which deal with a wife remarried on testimony that her husband had died.] ? With one witness or with two witnesses? If you explain with one witness, then one witness would permit her to the levir [As explained in Chapter 15, a single witness is accepted to free a widow to remarry. But in that case, Mishnah 5 implies that a single witness can lift the incest prohibition of the sister-in-law by permitting her to the levir. This is against our general rules that biblical prohibitions can be lifted only by two credible independent witnesses. In the Babli, 93b, Rav Ḥisda accepts the argument that a single witness may lift the prohibition of the sister-in-law. It is accepted in the Babli that the restrictions enumerated in Mishnah 1 are intended to make sure the presumed widow checks carefully the truthfulness of a single witness.] . If you explain with two witnesses, then it disagrees with Rav since Rav Naḥman bar [Reading בר instead of בשם רבי, from the text in Halakhah 15:4. The last word תני is read with Halakhah 15:4 אתנו = אַתְּ (הִ)נּוֹ “you are him”.] Jacob said in the name of Rav, if she was married by the testimony of two witnesses, even if he returns, she says to him, you are not him.

28From where that no betrothal is valid for a married woman? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “She left his house, went, and became another man’s. [Deut. 24:2.] ” When she leaves his house she may be with another. And from where that no betrothal is valid for incestual relations? Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rav Huna: “She left his house, went, and became another man’s.” Why does the verse say “another”? To exclude the list of incest relations [In the Babli, Qiddušin 88b, this is quoted in the name of R. Yannai; there the argument is rejected as insufficient. Perhaps for “another” one should translate “an outsider”. The Babli always subsumes adultery under incest prohibitions and does not need a separate argument.] .

29MISHNAH: A man’s wife went overseas, they came and told him: your wife died, and he married her sister. If after that his wife returned, she is permitted to return to him. He is permitted [to marry] the relatives of the second, the second is permitted his relatives [Since the marriage to the sister is incestuous (Lev. 18:18) it is non-existent and the restrictions detailed in Mishnah 4:8 do not apply.] . If the first [sister] died, the second one is permitted to him [Following the principles of Mishnah 1, she should be prohibited to her brother-in-law.] . They said to him, your wife died, and he married her sister; if afterwards they said to him that she was still alive but died later, the first child is a bastard, the last is not a bastard [Any child conceived by the sister during the first wife’s lifetime is a bastard as result of an incestuous union.] . If they said to him “your wife died,” and he married her paternal sister [She is a paternal half-sister.] , “she died [This also is known only by the testimony of a single witness.] ” and he married her maternal sister [She is a maternal half-sister of the second wife and unrelated to the first. In this way, the fifth wife is unrelated to the first and third wives.] , “she died” and he married her paternal sister, “she died” and he married her maternal sister, but it turned out that all were alive, the first, third, and fifth are permitted to him and they would release their co-wives [Since they are all legal cowives, if the husband died childless, the levirate or ḥalîṣah of one of them releases all others.] ; the second and fourth are prohibited to him [The marriage of the second is invalid since it is an incestuous relationship with the sister of the first wife; similarly, the fourth is forbidden because of the third. Since the second and fourth wives are not married to the husband, they do not become widows and their actions with respect to the levirs can have no influence on the status of the legally married ones.] and intercourse of any one of these does not release the co-wife. If he has intercourse with the second one after the death of the first, the second and fourth are permitted to him and they would release their co-wives; the third and fifth are prohibited to him and intercourse of any one of these does not release the co-wife [Since both he and his second wife thought that she was actually married to him, if he sleeps with her after the first wife’s death it is with the idea that they are married; therefore, they are married and the situation becomes identical to that of the preceding Mishnah only with even and odd numbers changing places.] .

30HALAKHAH: “If a man’s wife went overseas,”, etc. It is written: “If a man slept with her; [Num. 5:13; written in the paragraph about the wife suspected of unfaithfulness, from where one infers that an adulterous wife is forbidden to her husband. It is implied here that an action of the husband has no influence on her status (but in the paragraph after the next it is pointed out that the husband’s action may forbid him to her). Sifry Num. 7 (an involved argument in the style of the paragraph after the next), a short parallel in the Babli, 95a.] ” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her. There, it also says “replacing your husband,” that excludes rape cases [She is forbidden only if her paramour replaces the husband, i. e., if she sleeps with him voluntarily.] .

31Rebbi Mattaniah said, they made a fence about situations that occur frequently but not about rare situations [He explains why the husband is not forbidden to the two sisters following the principles of Mishnah 1. It was shown in the preceding Halakhah that most of Mishnah 1 is purely rabbinical and has the status of “a fence around the law”. The problem with this argument is that the rule which is relevant here, that the woman is forbidden to both men, is biblical (Sifry Num. 19).] . A man frequently travels overseas; it is infrequent that a woman travels overseas.

32It was stated [A short version of the discussion started here is in the Babli 95a; the very succinct source is in Sifra Qedošim Pereq 9(15)-(18).] : Rebbi Jehudah said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel agree that one who copulates with his mother-in-law disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his wife’s sister; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her [Treating the man’s transgression as equal in consequence to the woman’s. In their opinion, the husband is forced to divorce his wife and pay her all that is due in a divorce which is his fault.] , but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah: “In fire they should burn him and them [Lev. 20:14.] .” Where do we hold? If it is about burning, only one of them is burned [As explained in Sifra, the prohibition (Lev. 18:17) is that of incestuous intercourse; the prescription of the punishment (Lev. 20:14) deals only with the case that a man marries a woman and her mother. The problem is that if one of them is married to him, he cannot possibly marry the other since any act of incestuous betrothal or final marriage is invalid and legally nonexistent. Therefore, while intercourse with mother and daughter is incestuous and forbidden, it is a capital crime only if the man is married to one of them at the time he sleeps with the other. The innocent wife did not commit any crime and, therefore, cannot be punished. Cf. Chapter 11, Note 46.] . So if it cannot be relevant for burning, let it be relevant for prohibition [In Sifra, as in the Yerushalmi, this is R. Aqiba’s position. In the Babli, 95a, this is an amoraic interpretation of R. Simeon ben Laqish reported by R. Ammi.] . So far following Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “In fire they should burn him and them,” him and the second one [In Sifra, “one of them.” He reads the unusual word אתהן (substituting for אותן) as abbreviation of את אחת מהן.] . And the House of Shammai was arguing: Since in a case where a slightly prohibited person copulated with a slightly prohibited person the cause of the prohibition became forbidden, if a strongly prohibited person copulated with a strongly prohibited person, it is only logical that the cause of the prohibition is forbidden [This difficult argument is quoted anonymously in Sifry Num. 7 as argument that her husband’s adulterous relationship with her mother does not prohibit the wife, and explained in detail in Num. Rabba Naśo 9(35) (most probably a Provençal text): “Since in a case where a slightly prohibited person copulated with a slightly prohibited person, this refers to adultery since her prohibition is not permanent (her husband could divorce her), the cause of the prohibition (the husband) became forbidden (he has to divorce his wife), if a strongly prohibited person copulated with a strongly prohibited person, this refers to a man sleeping with his mother-in-law whose prohibition is permanent, it is only logical that the cause of the prohibition (the wife) should forbidden”, the verse says “with her” (cf. Note 134). A simple and short version is in Sifre Zuṭa, Midrash Haggadol Num. 12, ed. Rabbinowitz p. 51.] . Which rule is slight? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the beginning of the chapter [Mishnah 1, the case of careless adultery.] . But this is very strong [There is no stronger sexual prohibition than that of adultery, the only one mentioned in the Ten Commandments.] ! There is a difference since she was permitted to be married to him [If the woman remarried on the testimony of one witness, while she took all the risk, the marriage was permitted under our rules. But the sister of the living wife and the mother-in-law are permanently forbidden.] .

33The elder Rebbi Hoshaia [In the Babli, 95a, this is attributed to the Babylonian Rav Ḥisda.] said, the baraita [The “slight prohibition” referred to in the argument of the House of Shammai in the preceding paragraph.] is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed [The divorcee is forbidden if (Deut. 24:2) “she went and was another’s”. “To be a man’s” is everywhere explained as to be formally betrothed to him (cf. Chapter 1, Note 63).] ? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal [Quoted in the Babli, 11b, by R. Yose ben Kipper in the name of R. Eleazar (ben Shamua), in Sifry Deut. 270 in the name of R. Eleazar ben Azariah. The reason given is the expression (Deut. 24:4) “after she had been defiled” which for the anonymous majority means that a wife divorced for adultery is permanently forbidden to her ex-husband.] . Rebbi Eleazar [One has to read לעזר, the word in the text, ליעזר, refers only to the Tanna R. Eliezer (ben Hyrkanos) who cannot be meant here, being a generation older than R. Simeon. His case is not mentioned in the Babli.] said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her [The intercourse is partially incestuous for R. Simeon and clearly incestuous for the House of Shammai and R. Eleazar ben Arakh as explained at the beginning of Chapters 2 and 5.] . Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her [If the first levir had slept with the widow without bespeaking, she would thereby have become his wife and intercourse with the other levir would be adultery.] ! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her [According to Rabban Gamliel, R. Simeon and the House of Shammai, “bespeaking” acquires absolutely; if the second levir had not slept with the sister-in-law but had “bespoken” her, nothing would have happened, for then it would have been as if somebody became betrothed to an otherwise married woman.] ! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon [In the Babli, 95a, “R. Yose”. The difference in names is important; between R. Yose and R. Jehudah, practice always follows R. Yose (cf. Chapter 4, Note 169) whereas between R. Simeon and R. Jehudah, practice usually follows R. Jehudah (Terumot Chapter 3, Note 25.) The following argument is closely reproduced in the Babli, 95a.] said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men [Except close relatives, if they are unmarried.] . When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her [If a married woman sleeps with a man she is tricked into thinking is her husband and she is in error, she is not punishable and not forbidden to her husband (Soṭah 4:5, Babli Yebamot56b). The case of Mishnah 1 is classified as negligence, not error.] , he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him [He is permitted to his wife.] ? That works for an error. From where if intentional: [Cf. above, Note 134.] The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

34Immi the father of Samuel bar Immi [In the Babli the son has the title “Rebbi”. A third generation Amora of R. Ze‘ira’s academy.] in the name of Rav Jehudah: Practice follows Rebbi Simeon [In the Babli: Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel. It is difficult to understand why practice has to be declared in the Babli since between R. Yose and R. Jehudah it should be clear that practice follows R. Yose. Probably the statement in the Babli is induced by that in the Yerushalmi.] . There came a case before Rebbi Mana and he removed her from him [The man was convicted of incest with his mother-in-law and R. Mana forced him to divorce his wife.] . Does he hold with Rebbi Jehudah? No, she regularly came to him [The mother-in-law regularly visited her daughter; R. Mana felt it was necessary to remove the daughter to keep her mother away from the son-in-law. This is a matter of judgment, not of the strict law. In the Babli, Rav Jehudah had the offender whipped and told him that he would have forced him to divorce if he were not bound by his teacher Samuel’s statement.] .

35[This text is from Halakhah 3, Notes 76–78.] Rebbi Abba: Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. What does Rebbi Yose say about the other matters? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose said, anything which disables for others disables for himself; anything which does not disable for others does not disable for himself.” And Rebbi Abba said, Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter.

36“Rebbi Yose says, anything which disables,” etc. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If his wife’s sister was married, since he disables her for others, he disables her for himself. But his wife’s unmarried sister which he does not disable for others, he does not disable for himself [R. Yose in the Mishnah refers to the preceding Mishnah. If the wife and the sister’s husband went overseas and her husband and sister received erroneous notice that the wife and her brother-in-law both had died, the widowed husband and wife’s sister married, and then the two who were believed to have died returned, since the husband by his relations with the wife’s sister forbade her to her husband, he also forbade his own wife to himself. But if the wife’s sister was unmarried, his wife returns to him.] . As Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she needs a bill of divorce from him [They explain the mechanism by which the wife becomes forbidden to him even though R. Yose agrees to the deduction in the preceding Halakhah that intercourse with the wife’s sister does not disable the wife. In the first case, the wife’s sister must receive a divorce document from him; cf. Note 18. But then the wife becomes the sister of his divorcee and is automatically forbidden to him. In the Babli, 95b, this is only a conjectural explanation of R. Yose’s intention.] .

37“If they said to him “your wife died,” etc. How can that be [How may a man marry five partially related women from one family? Man A has a daughter a1 and a stepdaughter a2 from an earlier marriage. Woman B has a daughter b1 and a stepdaughter b2 from an earlier marriage. They marry and have a daughter c. If an outsider C marries first b2, on her death he may marry her paternal halfsister b1. Then he may marry c, b1’s maternal halfsister, afterwards c’s paternal halfsister a1 and then a1’s maternal halfsister a2. As known, the Yerushalmi is very weak in the grammar of gender; it uses the masculine as nonspecific universal.] ? A man has a daughter and a stepdaughter, a woman has a daughter and a stepdaughter. They married and had a daughter. It starts with the woman’s stepdaughter.

38MISHNAH: [A male] nine years and one day old [Cf. Chapter 3, Note 143, for the status of a male older than 9 years.] disables for the brothers and the brothers disable for him; only that he disables at the beginning and the brothers disable at beginning and end [His action counts only if he acted before any of the adult brothers.] . How is that? [A male] nine years and one day old who copulated with his sister-in-law disabled her for the brothers. If [any one of] the brothers copulated with her, “bespoke” her, divorced her, or performed ḥalîṣah with her, they disabled her for him.

39HALAKHAH: “[A male] nine years and one day old disables,” etc. At the end he does not disable after his “bespeaking” [The Mishnah which declares that the minor’s act counts only if he precedes his adult brothers refers to the legal ceremony of “bespeaking”; but intercourse is a real act which cannot be disregarded under any circumstances and prohibits the widow in all cases.] , but after his intercourse he disables. However he can disable only by one act but they may disable by four acts.

40[This Halakhah is copied from Qiddushin 1:2, fol. 59b/c which has a better and more complete text.] “How is that? [A male] nine years and one day old.” “If he allots her to his son. [Ex. 21:9, speaking about a minor girl sold by her father as a slave with the understanding that her price would count as betrothal gift in case the owner would desire to marry her or would give her to his son. In that case, the betrothal is called “allotment”. If she is not married, she regains her freedom by reaching adulthood at 12 years of age.] ” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to the brothers [The argument is reproduced in Mekhilta deR. Ismael, Masekhta dinziqin 3, Mekhilta deR. Simeon ben Ioḥai Chap. 21 (p. 167); Babli Qiddushin 17b.] . He should be able to allot her to the brothers by an argument de minore ad majus! If he may allot her to his son who may not take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate, should it not be logical that he may allot her to his brother who may take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate [The Babli rejects this argument by noting that levirate presumes the absence of a son.] ? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her [to his son] but may not allot her to the brothers. No. If you would accept the son since he will take [the father’s] place in a field of inheritance [The family estate going back to the distribution of land under Joshua, for which the succession is determined by the rules of Num. 27:6–11.] , what can you say about his brother who will not take his place in a field of inheritance? Would it be reasonable that he may allot her to him? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to the brothers.

41“If he allots her to his son;” he allots her to his son but he may not allot her to his grandson. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: In matters of inheritance you take the grandson like the son but here you do not take the grandson like the son [If the son died before the father, the grandson inherits the son’s part.] ? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if anybody explains this matter, I shall pour him spiced wine [Latin conditum (sc., vinum),“spiced wine”.] . Rebbi Tanḥum [In Qiddushin: R. Naḥum, a third generation Amora, student of Samuel bar Abba. His name fits into the scheme of things but not the fifth generation R. Tanḥum.] answered: In matters of inheritance where the brother can take the place of the son and all others can take the place of the son, the grandson takes the place of the son. [Here, a sentence is missing which appears in the text of Qiddushin: וְכָאן שֶׁלֹּא עָשִׂיתָ אָח כְּבֵן וּשְׁאָר כָּל־הַקְּרוֹבִים כְּבֵן אֵין אַתְּ עוֹשֶׂה בֶן בֵּן כְּבֵן: “but here, where neither the brother nor the other relatives take the role of the son, the grandson does not take the role of the son.”] The rabbis of Caesarea answered: In matters of impurity you consider the brother like the son and all [near] relatives like the son but not the grandson like the son [In the list of close relatives who have to defile themselves for the burial of the deceased (Lev. 21:2–3), the grandson or grandfather is absent. Among Cohanim, the grandson may not defile himself for his grandfather.] . He said, there went the spiced wine.

42“If he allots her to his son;” with [the girl’s] agreement [This is the explicit interpretation of the Babli (Qiddushin 19a) which seems to be valid here also and explains the apparent duplication of the argument in this paragraph.] . Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no agreement here. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said so, the statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah [He holds in a baraita(Qiddushin1:2, fol. 59c; Babli 19a) that the money given to the father does not count as bride money but that the allotment is a legal betrothal since from the moment of betrothal she is no longer a servant. The money with which she is bought is money with which her services are bought for the duration of her servitude. By allotment, the value of the remainder of the money (computed by the remaining days of her servitude) is given as wedding gift. This implies that on the last day of her servitude she can be allotted to master or son only if at least a peruṭah’s worth of servitude is left (if the day’s worth is prorated by hours).] . Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, even if you say the statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, is he not a minor [Who is not called “a man” and cannot legally acquire. The Babli (19a) refers to the case of a levir aged 9 years and 1 day (Mishnah Yebamot 7:4) who by intercourse does acquire preliminarily his sister-in-law by biblical standards, except that his wife cannot be prosecuted for adultery since it is written (Lev. 20:10): “A man who commits adultery with a man’s wife”. This implies that there are cases where a woman can be legally married to a male without being a man’s wife.] ? “If he allots her to his son;” with [the latter’s] agreement. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he allots her to his minor or adult son, with and without the latter’s agreement. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he allots her only to his adult son with the latter’s agreement [In the Yerushalmi, practice should follow R. Joḥanan. In the Babli, R. Joḥanan’s opinion is not mentioned; what is asserted here in the name of R. Simeon ben Laqish is there attributed to the unquestioned authority of R. Yannai, the teacher of both R. Joḥanan and R. Simeon ben Laqish.] .

43“A male nine years and one day old makes [If he marries, the marriage is valid to turn his widow into a woman forbidden to the High Priest and if he divorces her, she becomes forbidden to a common priest.] a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of R. Joḥanan who will explain this for allotments [He restricts the validity of the statement to a girl married by allotment since only in that case is his marriage valid by biblical standards.] it is understandable; since he acquires by allotment he makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish [For him, a minor cannot be allotted a wife; therefore, the marriage must be contracted under rabbinic rules and the author of that baraita cannot accept the statement in the next Mishnah that the widow of a childless minor is not subject to the laws of levirate.] who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated [Mishnah 17.] : “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it [The baraita which opened this paragraph must follow R. Yose ben R. Jehudah while the Mishnah follows the anonymous majority.] comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts [Not signs of adulthood defined as onset of puberty. Quoted in Babli Niddah 46a.] . Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [Greek σημεῖον “sign, marker”.] [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators [During his thirteenth year, when the growth of pubic hair is expected. In the Babli, the statement is attributed to a R. Kruspedai ben Sabbatai.] .

44Rebbi Yose asked: When they [The pubic hairs.] remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward [His difficulty is following R. Yose ben R. Jehudah, not R. Simeon ben Laqish who denies the validity of actions of a minor. His problem is with R. Joḥanan.] ? One understands the case of a widow [If his marriage by allotment is sanctioned by biblical decree, if he dies the widow is a widow by biblical standards and unquestionably forbidden to the High Priest.] . But a divorcee [Even if his marriage, effected by his adult father, is valid, a divorce which needs his conscious action is certainly invalid as long as he is a minor.] ? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.

45Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Rebbi Yose ben Jehudah learned from Aḥaz, as it was stated: Aḥaz produced a child at age nine [He became king at age 20 and ruled for 16 years (2K. 16:2). His son Ḥizqiah became king at age 25 (2K. 18:2). That seems to mean that Ḥizqiah was born when his father was 11 years old. However, since the first year of the reign is only counted from the day of accession to the next New Year’s Day, it is possible that he was born when his father was 10 and was conceived when he was 9. This computation has no parallel in the sources.] , Haran at age six [The computation is detailed in Babli Sanhedrin 69b and is based on two hypotheses, (1) that Sarah, 10 years younger than Abraham, was Abraham’s niece, Haran’s daughter, against the explicit testimony of the biblical text that she was his paternal halfsister, and that (2) Haran was the youngest of Teraḥ’s sons (Gen. 11:27) and at least two years younger than Abraham.] , and Caleb at age ten following him who identifies Caleb ben Ḥeṣron with Caleb ben Yephuneh [This also is detailed in Babli Sanhedrin 69b and is based on the identification of Caleb ben Yephuneh the spy, whose children are enumerated in 1Chr. 4:15, with Caleb ben Ḥeṣron whose descendants are mentioned in 1Chr. 2:18–21. Caleb ben Ḥeṣron is described as the great-grandfather of Beṣalel who built the Tabernacle. {The Babli never mentions the problem of the quite impossible identification of the two Calebs.} Since Caleb ben Yephuneh was 40 years of age in the year after the Exodus (Jos. 14:7) and Beṣalel is called “man” in Ex. 36:4, he was at least 13 years of age, only 27 years younger than his great-grandfather. That means that Caleb, Uri, and Ḥur all were fathers at age 9. If Caleb was father at age 10, then one of his descendants was father at age 8.] .

46MISHNAH: If [a male] nine years and one day old [As explained in Mishnah 18, if he is older than nine full years as long as he did not grow two pubic hairs.] copulated with his sister-in-law and after that his brother, who [also] was nine years and one day old, copulated with her, [the brother] disabled her for [the first levir]. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable [As will be repeated in the Halakhah, the majority holds that intercourse of an almost grown up male is like “bespeaking” of an adult and therefore follows the rules of “bespeaking” which disables but does not fully acquire. For R. Simeon, intercourse of a minor either acquires by biblical standards or it does not acquire at all, but we do not know which assertion holds (Halakhah 3:5). If it acquires, then the sister-in-law is the first levir’s wife and the action of a minor has no legal consequence; if it does not acquire for the first it did not acquire for the second, both are legally minors and their actions as minors cannot influence the status of the widow when the levirs become grownups. The same argument holds for R. Simeon in the cases following.] . If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law, and after that he copulated with her co-wife, he disabled her for himself. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and died, she performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate [Since the widow’s legal status is one of “bespoken” but not fully married, if the levir dies she becomes the widow of two brothers and may not marry in levirate (cf. Halakhah 3:1).] . If he married a woman and died, she is free [Outside of levirate, the marriage of a minor is invalid; the woman is not a widow.] . If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate [In the Babylonian Mishnah, the order of the actions is inverted. The order of the Yerushalmi is more reasonable. The second is a real wife, who can be married in levirate if the husband dies childless. For the majority, the first one is only “bespoken”; she becomes the widow of two brothers and is disqualified from levirate.] . Rebbi Simeon says, he takes in levirate the one he likes and performs ḥalîṣah with the other [For R. Simeon, the first one either was the wife of the deceased or she was not. If she was not, she is the widow of her first husband and can be married in levirate; if she was, she is the widow of her second husband and can be married in levirate. The second certainly can be married in levirate. But only one of the co-widows can be married. In this case, the other is not free since maybe the first one was not a wife.] . It makes no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twenty years old, as long as he did not grow two pubic hairs.

47HALAKHAH: [The text is from Halakhah 5:5, Notes 79–83.] Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like a bill of divorce of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.

48[The text is from Halakhah 3:10, Notes 140–148.] Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one dead [husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, “any one who cannot marry me in levirate, cannot marry my co-wife in levirate.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Eleazar formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis.

49The following is obvious: If a person younger than twenty years of age developed two pubic hairs, he becomes a man retroactively. Older than twenty years of age, he becomes a man from that point into the future [The Babli, 80b and Niddah 47b, disagrees and treats the man who at age 20 has no pubic hair and shows the body characteristics of a castrate as castrated by nature who never will be accepted as a man; otherwise he will be a minor until age 35, half the normal life span. (There is an Amora who disagrees and holds that many cases of impotent men without pubic hair can be treated medically.)] . Where do they disagree? If he is twenty. Samuel said, he becomes a man retroactively. Rav said, he becomes a man from that point into the future [In the Babli, 80a, Rav holds that if he or she are late to grow pubic hair but do so before they reach 20, they retroactively become adult and can be prosecuted for any crimes committed earlier; Samuel holds that they remain underage until they grow pubic hair or reach age 18 when they immediately become adults.] . A baraita disagrees with both of them: The castrate cannot become a rebellious son [Deut. 21:18–21. Since he is called “son” rather than “child”, it is concluded that he must be an adult. The Babli concurs, 80a.] since he has no pubic hair. Should one not warn him, maybe he will develop two pubic hairs within the next three months? Following him who says, one does not accept conditional warnings [The opinion of R. Simeon ben Laqish in the next Chapter; Babli Makkot 16a. In the Babli, that opinion is unopposed.] . Our Mishnah [That the legal status of one 20 years old is not different from one 9 years old if he did not grow two pubic hairs.] disagrees with Samuel: Does it make no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twelve years and one day old, if by then he did not grow two pubic hairs, he becomes a man retroactively? Could you say: If he did grow two pubic hairs between the ages of nine years and one day until twelve years and one day [Even though the text is formulated in the masculine, it must refer to girls since for a boy standard adulthood is at age 13.] , he becomes a man retroactively? Similarly, if he is older than twenty years of age and did not grow two pubic hairs, he becomes a man from that point into the future. How does Samuel handle this? He explains it: soon after he turns twenty [But if he grows pubic hair by his 20th birthday, he retroactively becomes an adult from age 13.] .