MISHNAH: ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine today,’ he is forbidden only until nightfall [The Tanna will not include the night with the day.] . ‘This week’, he is forbidden the entire week; the Sabbath belongs to the past [If he makes a vow not to drink wine this week, he is forbidden until after the coming Sabbath day since the Sabbath is the end of the week.] . ‘This month’, he is forbidden the entire month; the day of the New Moon belongs to the future [If he makes a vow not to drink wine this month he is permitted wine the first day of the New Moon.] . ‘This year’, he is forbidden the entire year; New Year’s Day belongs to the future. ‘This Sabbatical period’, he is forbidden the entire Sabbatical period [The period of 7 years including the next Sabbatical year.] ; the Sabbatical year belongs to the past. But if he said, one day, one week, one month, one year, he is forbidden from day. [If he vows to abstain from wine for one day, he has to abstain for 24 hours from the moment of the vow. One week is counted as 7 times 24 hours from the moment of the vow, a year is from day and hour of the vow to the same day, same hour, of the next year.]
HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine today,’ ” etc. This implies that he is permitted at nightfall [This seems to be obvious from the Mishnah. But in the Babli, 60a, Rav Jeremiah bar Abba requires that a rabbi give permission to drink wine after nightfall. The statement here has to be read as rejection of that opinion.] . Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage? It is not usual that a man should say to another in the evening, I did not eat until evening. Would he say, yesterday [In the evening, he does not refer to the daylight hours as “yesterday”. Therefore, he should be forbidden wine until he goes to sleep.] ? Refer to the following and it does disagree: It is not usual that a man should say to another in the morning, I did not eat in the evening. Would he say, the same day [This is the same argument in the reverse. A person before sunrise will refer to the evening hours of the same night as “yesterday”. Therefore, the evening hours of the preceding day belong to that day in popular conscience.] ? Does the following not disagree? This day from this week, or this week from this day [Since everybody agrees that a week consists of 7 times 24 hours, and it consists of 7 days, it should be obvious that a day in vows should be 24 hours and the distinction made between Mishnaiot 1 and 2 seems to have no basis.] ? What is the difference between “this day” and “today”? That is, following the opinion that in matters of vows one follows common usage. But here, one follows the opinion that in matters of vows one follows biblical usage [Which in the story of Creation defines a day by a night followed by daylight.] . Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, it is the way of people to say to another, bear with me this day [He asks him to work with him during daytime only. There is an acceptation of “day” in the vernacular which refers to daytime only. For this meaning of the root סבר cf. Baba Batra 2:1 (13b line 31).] .
There [Mishnah 7: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine this year,’ he is forbidden the year and [an eventual] intercalary month. ‘Until the beginning of Adar,’ until the beginning of the First Adar. ‘Until the end of Adar,’ until the end of the First Adar.” The main argument is about the first part of the Mishnah.] , we have stated: “Until the beginning of Adar, until the beginning of the First Adar. Until the end of Adar, until the end of the First Adar [Even in an intercalary year, when the Second Adar is added as the 13th month, “Adar” without a qualifier means only the month of First Adar which is part of every year. [Halakhah 7 and the Babli (63a/b), supported by the Tosephta (4:7), qualify this statement to apply only if the person making the vow did not know that the year would have a second Adar. If he knew, the vow would extend to Second Adar.]] .” Does this imply that Nisan is the beginning of the year as far as vows are concerned [Cf. Mishnah Roš Haššanah 1:1. Nisan is biblically counted as the first month and Tishre as the seventh, but in Second Temple practice the year always started in the fall with the first day of Tishre. One does not discuss here the problem of the several calendars of the monarchical period. Since the Mishnah states that “he is forbidden during the year and its intercalary month”, it seems that the year must be counted from Nisan since, if it were counted from Tishre, the intercalary month would be in the middle of the year and it should be obvious that the person imposes a continuous prohibition on himself.] ? Tishre is the beginning of the year as far as vows are concerned. That you should not say, the beginning of Adar should compensate for Ellul and he would be permitted in Ellul [If a person said, I shall not drink wine for a year, it would imply a prohibition for 12 months. But since he said, this year, the prohibition lasts either 12 or 13 months, as the case may be. The statement of the intercalary month is made to underline the difference between “a year” of twelve months and “this year” of possibly 13 months. If somebody says on New Year’s Day of an intercalary year that he will not drink wine for a year, he will in effect be permitted to drink wine on the first of the coming Ellul. But for this year, he has to observe the additional intercalary month without compensation.] ; therefore, it was necessary to say that “he is forbidden it and its intercalary [month]”.
“If he said, one day, one week, one month, one year, one Sabbatical period, he is forbidden from day to day.” From hour to hour [To the same time on the next day (or day of the next week, next month, next year). It then is stated that a baraita parallels the Mishnah, explicitly mentioning “from hour to hour.”] . It was stated, from hour to hour.
[This text is from Ta‘aniot 3:13.] Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Abbahu, in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: On the Sabbath, a person is forbidden to fast until the sixth hour [Since it says (Is. 58:13): “You shall call the Sabbath a delight”, one is forbidden to fast on the Sabbath (except if the Sabbath is preempted by the Day of Atonement). As R. Yose states, the Mishnah in Ta‘aniot (3:13) states that a person who fasted for more than half the day is required to fast the entire day. The day between sunrise and sunset is divided into 12 equal hours with noon being the end of the sixth hour (disregarding the equation of time). At the equinox, these hours are the constant hours, l/24th of a day. Since a person fasting until noon then would have to fast the entire day, he may not fast until noon on the Sabbath.] . Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah states this [Ta‘aniot 3:13, speaking of a fastday proclaimed in a year of draught, position of R. Eliezer. (The anonymous majority requires a full day of a fast for rain if the rain started to fall during daytime.)] : “If they fasted when it started to rain, before noon they should not finish,” because until then it is morning; “after noon they should finish,” since most of the day already was spent in holiness.
The words of Rebbi Joḥanan imply that one may fast for hours [In both Talmudim, not eating is counted as a private fast only if the person fasting undertook the fast by a vow or its equivalent. From the example of R. Joḥanan it follows that the Yerushalmi accepts as valid a vow to fast a certain time, even if the person did eat before and will eat after the fast during daylight. It is possible that R. Jonah held that a fast can be vowed in the middle of the day, on condition that one abstain from food for the remainder of the day. The Babli (Ta‘anit 11b/12a) seems to accept only fasts that cover the entire daylight hours of a day. The only “fast by hours” accepted in the Babli is one where a person did not eat breakfast and in the middle of the day decides to vow to spend the remainder of the day fasting (cf. Maimonides Ta‘aniot 1:13 and its commentaries.)] , for Rebbi Joḥanan said, I shall fast until I finish studying this chapter, until I finish studying this text. The words of Rebbi Jonah imply that one may fast for hours, for Rebbi Jonah was in Tyre when he heard that Rebbi Yose’s son had died. Even though he had eaten cheese and drunk water, he finished that day fasting. The words of Rav imply that one may fast for hours, for Rav said, one may borrow his fast day and pay back [In the Babli, Ta‘anit 12b, this refers only to fasting full days, that one may transfer the obligation of a private fast to another date.] . Samuel said to him, is that a vow [It depends on the terms of the vow. If “a day” of fast was vowed, Samuel will agree with Rav. If “this day” was vowed and the person can no longer stand his hunger, Samuel will send him to a rabbi to dissolve the vow. In the Babli, Ta‘anit 12b, Samuel agrees with Rav in the case the person fasting can no longer stand his hunger. [The Babli, (Ta‘anit 12b, S̄abbat 11a), disallows the statement of Rav in case of a fast to avert the consequences of a bad dream.]] ? If he had vowed to fast but forgot and ate the volume of an olive, he lost his fast day. Rebbi Abba in the name of the rabbis there [In Babylonia.] : That is, if he said simply “a day”. But if he said “this day”, he has to continue fasting until the end. He spoke only of eating; that excludes tasting [Consuming less than the volume of an average olive is not called “eating”.] . Rebbi Abba Ḥasida in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Tasting does not create obligations of benediction [There is no obligation of a benediction for tasting a small amount; cf. Berakhot 6:1, Note 5. A shortened version of the statement is a baraita in the Babli, Berakhot 14a.] , robbery [Taking such a small amount from somebody else is not robbery. (Cf. Demay 3:2, Note 56).] , nor of demay [Even the most scrupulous may taste food from a person suspected of not tithing.] , nor of the interruption of a fast day.
A private person who committed himself for a fast day [By making the vow on the day before (commonly after the afternoon prayer). A common fast is only during daytime.] , eats and drinks after nightfall. But if he said a public fast day [Following the rules of the Day of Atonement which runs from evening to evening (Lev. 23:32).] , he eats and drinks only during daytime. If he made a vow to fast [And indicated the dates of the days he wanted to fast.] and it turned out to fall on Sabbath days or holidays, he is whipped but does not need permission from a Sage [Since festive meals are required on the Sabbath or any holiday of pilgrimage by biblical law, it is sinful to make a vow to break a biblical law (which subjects to vower to punishment) even though the vow is invalid (and does not need invalidation by a rabbi).] . If he made a vow to fast and it turned out to fall on days written in the Scroll of Fasts [The collection of beraitot describing the days on which in Pharisaic practice fasts are forbidden. These include the days before and after holidays, Ḥanukka (a popular holiday having no biblical source since the books of Maccabees are disavowed in Jewish tradition), Purim (a biblical holiday based on the book of Esther which has no status of holiness), and a great number of days recording the ascent of the pharisaic sect to dominance in Jewish public life, in particular Temple practice. These later dates would have lost their significance with the destruction of the Temple. The last event mentioned in the Scroll of Fasts is the revocation of Hadrian’s decrees by Antoninus Pius. This shows that the Scroll of Fasts is tannaїtic; its abolition was an amoraitic problem.] , Rebbi Ḥizqia and Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: One said, he fasts but does not finish, but the other one said, he is whipped but does not need permission from a Sage. That is, you say that before the scroll of fasts was abolished. But when the Scroll of Fasts was abolished, all this was abolished. Rebbi Ḥanania [Probably a scribal error for “R. Ḥanina”.] and Rebbi Joḥanan both say that the Scroll of Fasts was abolished [In the Babli, Roš Haššanah 18b, R. Ḥanina holds that the Scroll of Fasts was abolished, R. Joḥanan that it was not abolished (since usually Rabbis Ḥanina and Joḥanan are opposed to one another).] . Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, the Scroll of Fasts was abolished. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and stating: “It happened that they decreed a fast day at Lod during Ḥanukka. Rebbi Eliezer went and had a haircut, Rebbi Joshua went and took a hot bath. Rebbi Joshua said to them, go and fast for what you fasted.” And you say, the Scroll of Fasts was abolished? Rebbi Abba said, even though you say that the Scroll of Fasts was abolished, Ḥanukka and Purim were not abolished [The Babli agrees,Roš Haššanah 19b.] . The acts of the rabbis imply that the Scroll of Fasts was abolished: Rebbi Jonathan fasted on the day before New Year’s Day. Rebbi Abin fasted on the day before Tabernacles. Rebbi Ze‘ira fasted 300 fast days, and some say 900 fast days and did not care about the Scroll of Fasts. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa told the scribes: If a woman comes to ask you, tell her that one may fast any day except Sabbaths, holidays, New Moons, the intermediary days of holidays, Ḥanukka, and Purim.
MISHNAH: ‘Until Passover’ [“A qônām that I shall not … until Passover”.] , he is forbidden until it comes, ‘until it be’, he is forbidden until it is passed [This follows the vernacular since in popular language “Passover” means “the holiday of unleaved bread” (Nisan 15–21), whereas in biblical language “Passover” is the day of slaughter of the Passover sacrifice (Nisan 14).] . ‘Until before Passover’, Rebbi Meїr says, until it comes, Rebbi Yose says, until it passed [The Halakhah explains that this refers to biblical language; the difference between the two opinions is whether the prohibition ends at nightfall of Nisan 13 or 14.] .
HALAKHAH: “ ‘Until Passover’, he is forbidden,” etc. [A slightly longer parallel to this paragraph is in Qiddušin 3:11. It is difficult to decide which version is original.] Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: The opinion of Rebbi Yose seems to be inverted. There [Qiddušin Mishnah 3:9–10. A father, who has the right to marry off his underage daughter without asking her consent, has two sets of daughters from two wives. He marries off an older daughter (whom the bridegroom has not yet seen) but does not remember which one. Rebbi Meїr says, all his daughters are forbidden to marry except the youngest of the younger group, since any other daughter either is married and forbidden to every man except the one with whom the father contracted, or she is the sister of the married one and forbidden to the man with whom the father contracted. Rebbi Yose holds that all are permitted to other men except the oldest of the older group, who is married to the chosen groom. Similarly, if he married off the younger one, R. Meїr forbids all but the oldest of the older group while R. Joshua declares the youngest of the younger group to be married. It follows that R. Meїr interprets common language to mean the largest possible set whereas R. Yose holds that people always speak as definitely as possible. Therefore, in the Mishnah here, R. Yose should exclude the day of Passover and R. Meїr should include it.] , he says “until all the elder possibilities are exhausted, until all the younger possibilities are exhausted,” and here, he says so? He said to him: Since Ben Azai and Ben Zoma died, the perseverers [Cf. Soṭa9, Note 271.] disappeared; no perseverer was there until Jeremiah appeared. Rebbi Abba, son of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, said, why does he needle him [Cf. Berakhot 2:3, Note 96.] ? Did not Rebbi Eleazar already ask before Rebbi Joḥanan, the opinion of Rebbi Yose seems to be inverted? He said to him, it is not inverted, the Mishnah is inverted, for in the House of Rebbi they stated [The same in the Babli, 61b, in the name of Rav.] : “ ‘Until before Passover’, Rebbi Meїr says, until it passed, Rebbi Yose says, until it comes.” We ask “until before”, and you say so [Who could ever think that “until before” could mean “until after”?] ? He said to him, this is a Nabatean expression, “much [I. e., the festival of unleavened bread; cf. Note 39.] before Passover”. Rebbi Abin said, everybody agrees that he is permitted on Passover [Holidays which are fixed in the calendar.] . Where do they disagree? The day before Passover. One of them says, until it comes, the other until it passed.
MISHNAH: ‘Until the grain harvest, the grape harvest, the olive harvest’, he is forbidden only until their time arrives. That is the principle: Everything that has a fixed time [Holidays which are fixed in the calendar.] , if he said ‘until it arrives’, he is forbidden until it arrives; if he said ‘until it shall be’, he is forbidden until it passed. But everthing that does not have a fixed time [Harvests which depend on the weather.] , whether he said ‘until it arrives’ or ‘until it shall be’, he is forbidden only until it arrives.
HALAKHAH: If one fixed the time for his son’s wedding and said, a qônām that I shall not taste wine until the wedding [The problem really would be if he said “until the wedding takes place”.] , is that as if the time was fixed? Or, since he could move the time to a later date, is it as if the time was not fixed [The question is not answered. In the opinion of R. Nissim Gerondi (Babli 61b), this means an automatic restriction; if he said “until the wedding takes place”, he is forbidden to drink wine at the wedding.] ?
MISHNAH: ‘Until the fig harvest [This is the conclusion of the Halakhah. Biblically, קַיִץ, from קצה “to cut”, is the harvest of any fruit ripening in the summer which is cut from the tree by a knife (and also means “summer”).] , until there be fig harvest’, until people start to bring in baskets. ‘Until the fig harvest is over’, until people fold their knives. ‘Until the grain harvest’, until people start to cut wheat but not barley [Which is harvested in early spring.] ; everything follows the place of the vow, if made on the hills, on the hills, if made in the plain, in the plain.
HALAKHAH: ‘Until the fig harvest, until there be fig harvest’, etc. “baskets”. Baskets of figs or baskets of raisins [Raisins are transported in baskets in contrast to grapes which are harvested into vats, so as not to lose the juice flowing from injured grape berries. (Cf. Babli 61a).] ? Let us hear from this: “Until they fold the knives”. You have to say, knives for figs, not knives for raisins [Raisins do not need knives.] . Let us hear from the following: [This text is from Demay 2:1, Notes 105–107.] A load of raisins came up to Tiberias. Gamliel the twin asked Rebbi Abba bar Zavda. He said to him: All of the Land of Israel does not produce a load of raisins. [In the text of Demay, there follows a rhetorical question: Does the entire Land of Israel not produce a load of raisins?] But so he said to him: No single place in the land of Israel produces a load of raisins [Therefore, the Mishnah must speak of the fig harvest.] .
“Until the grain harvest”. It is written [Ruth 2:23. It is clear from the narrative that there was one continuous harvest activity, the wheat harvest following the barley harvest immediately. Therefore, the Mishnah seems unjustified in denying that “harvest” cannot refer to barley harvest.] , “until the end of the barley harvest and the wheat harvest”. That verse speaks of the South [Bethlehem.] , the Mishnah of Galilee.
If he made a vow “until the fig harvest” in Galilee and descended into the valleys. Even though the fig harvest did start in the valleys, he is forbidden until it starts in Galilee [Tosephta 4:7, Babli (as tannaїtic statement) 63a.] .
MISHNAH: ‘Until the rains, until there be rain,’ until the second rainy spell [A similar statement in Mishnah Ševi‘it 9:7, Note 93. A rainy spell is called רביע “fertilizing” if the total amount of water is one handbreadth for R. Jehudah, 3 for R. Meїr. The time of the expected second rainy spell is given in Ta‘aniot 1:3 (64a, 1. 64), Tosephta Ta‘aniot 1:3, Babli Nedarim 63a, as Marḥešwan 7 for R. Meїr, 17 for R. Jehudah, 23 for R. Yose.] ; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, until the time of the second rainy spell. ‘Until the rains stop’, until the end of the Month of Nisan, the words of Rebbi Meїr; Rebbi Jehudah says, until after Passover [The evening after Nisan 21.] .
HALAKHAH: “ ‘Until the rains,’ ” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: If one said ‘until the rain’, is he forbidden until another rainfall came down [In the Babli, 62b, R. Ze‘ira is quoted to declare that the singular implies that one fertilizing rain only is meant.] ? There [Mishnah S̄eqalim 6:6, Menaḥot 106b.] , we have stated: “One who said, I take upon me [the obligation to bring] wood [A plural.] , should not bring less that two cut logs [For the altar in the Temple. The logs used for the altar had to be prepared so that all branches were cut off and all worms taken out. This is the emphasis on cut logs.] .” Rebbi Yose the important said that Rebbi Abba bar Mamai asked, if he said, I take upon me [the obligation to bring] to bring wood [Singular.] , does he bring one cut log? Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah explains that each one is a separate sacrifice, as we have stated there [Mishnah Yoma 2:5. While for the daily morning sacrifice only one Cohen brought wood to the altar, for the evening sacrifice there were two. R. Eleazar read the Mishnah to imply that each Cohen took only one log to the altar. This would imply that a single log is an acceptable gift to the altar.] : “Two in whose hands are two cut logs.” In order to increase the number of logs [There were four logs brought to the altar, two by each Cohen. This certainly implies that a person vowing “a log” has in fact to bring two, and probably that the person who vows not to taste something until the rains, is forbidden until the second batch of rain showers. (The Babli seems to disagree, 63a).] .
It was stated [Tosephta Ta‘aniot 1:4 (in the Erfurt ms.) The statements are switched in the Vienna ms. and editio princeps. The paragraph is from Ševi‘it 9:7, Notes 98–101.] : “Rebbi Yose said, anything depending on the fertilizing rain [The vow mentions דביעה, the fertilizing aspect.] , until the second fertilizing rain comes. And anything not depending on the fertilizing rain [The vow mentions simply גשם “rain”.] , until the time of the second fertilizing rain. It was stated: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if rain came down for seven days without interruption, that includes the second fertilizing rain [That is enough for two fertilizing periods; quoted in Babli 63a.] .” Why is it called fertilizing? Because it fertilizes the land.
“A qônām wine,” etc. Rebbi Meїr follows his opinion and Rebbi Jehudah follows his opinion, as we have stated there [Mishnah Ta‘aniot 1:2.] : “Until when does one pray for rain? Rebbi Jehudah says, until after Passover; Rebbi Meїr says until the end of the Month of Nisan.”
MISHNAH: ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine this year’, if the year became intercalary he is forbidden it and its intercalary month. ‘Until the start of Adar’, until the first of First Adar; ‘until the end of Adar’, until the end of First Adar [Cf. Halakhah 1, Note 12.] .
HALAKHAH: [This is from Halakhah 1 and refers to Mishnah 7.] Does this imply that Nisan is the beginning of the year as far as vows are concerned [Cf. Mishnah Roš Haššanah 1:1. Nisan is biblically counted as the first month and Tishre as the seventh, but in Second Temple practice the year always started in the fall with the first day of Tishre. One does not discuss here the problem of the several calendars of the monarchical period. Since the Mishnah states that “he is forbidden during the year and its intercalary month”, it seems that the year must be counted from Nisan since, if it were counted from Tishre, the intercalary month would be in the middle of the year and it should be obvious that the person imposes a continuous prohibition on himself.] ? Tishre is is the beginning of the year as far as vows are concerned. That you should not say, the beginning of Adar should compensate for Ellul and he would be permitted in Ellul [If a person said, I shall not drink wine for a year, it would imply a prohibition for 12 months. But since he said, this year, the prohibition lasts either 12 or 13 months, as the case may be. The statement of the intercalary month is made to underline the difference between “a year” of twelve months and “this year” of possibly 13 months. If somebody says on New Year’s Day of an intercalary year that he will not drink wine for a year, he will in effect be permitted to drink wine on the first of the coming Ellul. But for this year, he has to observe the additional intercalary month without compensation.] ; therefore, it was necessary to say that “he is forbidden it and its intercalary [month]”.
Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: That is only if he vowed before they intercalated. But if they intercalated and then he vowed, that is not so [If he knew that there would be a Second Adar and he vowed until the end of Adar, that means the end of the Second Adar. The Babli, 63a/b, differentiates between whether the vower knew that the year would have an intercalary month or whether he did not know (in the absence of a published calendar).] . Is it no different for rent of houses [If the house was let for a year. Does this mean 12 months if at the time of the contract it was not declared that the next year would have 13 months?] ? If one said, the First Adar, and the other one says, the Second Adar, they should split the intercalary month [The parties come before the court in matters of a lease that was not supported by a written contract. The owner claims to have leased the house for 12 months, the renter claims it was for a year. Monetary disputes which cannot be decided because there are no documents are resolved by splitting the difference, Mishnah Baba Meṣi‘a 1:1.] . Come and see, for vows you have no problem but for money matters you have a problem? Rebbi Hila said, that is, if they intercalated and after that he leased. But if he leased and after that they intercalated, that is not so [The standard lease contract for rental property is one year. In the absence of proof to the contrary, one follows the standard contract.] . And in matters of documents one writes First Adar, Second Adar, only that for Second Adar one writes תניין [The Aramaic version; the Babli agrees in the name of R. Jehudah (63a). According to R. Jehudah, a mention of אדר ת̇ is documentary proof of a reference to Second Adar. The latter statement is missing in the Babli.] . Rebbi Jehudah says, for Second Adar one writes ת̇ and that is enough.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Jehudah says, if one said ‘a qônām that I shall not taste wine until Passover has come’, he is forbidden only until the night of Passover since he intended only until the time everybody drinks wine [While the essence of a festival of pilgrimage is the holiday sacrifice which is possible only during daylight hours, the holiday starts in the evening and today “Passover” means the holiday starting with sunset on Nisan 14. Cf. Note 37 and the author’s The Scholar’s Haggadah (Northvale NJ 1995), pp. 185–191.] . If one said, “a qônām that I shall not taste meat until the fast [“Fast” without qualification always refers to the Day of Atonement, from the evening of Tishre 9 to the evening of Tishre 10. Since he is obligated to eat in the later hours of the afternoon of Tishre 9 to prepare for the fast, he intended the vow to terminate then.] ,’ he is forbidden only until the evening before the fast since he intended only until the time everybody eats meat. His son Rebbi Yose said, if one said ‘a qônām that I shall not taste garlic until the Sabbath,’ he is forbidden only until Friday evening, since he intended only until the time everybody eats garlic [Cf. Mishnah 3:10.] . If one says to his friend: A qônām that I shall not have any usufruct from you if you do not come and take for your children a kor [A volume of 30 se’ah, equal to Ezechiel’s bat; 384 liter.] of wheat and two amphoras of wine, he [The recipient can declare that it is as if he had received the amount stipulated and by this free the vower from his vow.] can undo his vow without referring to a Sage by saying, you did that only to honor me, that is my honor. Similarly, if one says to his friend: A qônām that you shall not have any usufruct from me if you do not come and give to my child a kor of wheat and two amphoras of wine. Rebbi Meïr says, he is forbidden until he gives, but the Sages say, this one also can undo his [In this case it is his own vow.] vow without referring to a Sage by saying, it is as if I received it.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The first case also is in dispute [R. Meїr disagrees also in the first case and requires the vow to be fulfilled.] . Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree when it was undetermined. [Most of this text is from Halakhah 3:3, Notes 94–95.] Where do we hold? If each one of them said, because of my honor, everybody agrees that he is forbidden [They cannot agree on the essence of the vow; each one insists it is made in his own honor. In that case, what either one of them says is irrelevant for the other.] . If one of them said, because of my honor, and the other said, I said it in your honor, everybody agrees he is permitted [This is the first case of the Mishnah, and R. Meїr will agree that there is no vow.] . But we hold if it is undetermined [The maker of the vow does not indicate whether he agrees or disagrees with the interpretation of the vow by his friend. Then R. Meїr will hold that what the other party says has no influence on the vower.] . Rebbi says, undetermined is as if [every] one said, because of my honor. But the Sages say, undetermined is as if one said, because of my honor, and the other said, I said it in your honor.
Rebbi Yasa asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Is our Mishnah from Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, since Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, any obstacle that is not from her side does not invalidate the bill of divorce [Mishnah Giṭṭin 7:6. A man gives his wife (who desires a divorce) a bill of divorce under the condition that she nurse his child for two years or that she serve his father for two years. If the child dies in the meantime or his father refuses to be served by her while she did nothing to make him angry, the anonymous majority holds that the condition was not satisfied and the bill of divorce invalid. But Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel holds that if she fulfilled the condition to the best of her ability, the divorce is valid. R. Yasa wanted to say, that Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel also will hold that a vow can be considered fulfilled if the second party refuses to accept the service.] ? He said to him, here it is different because of opening the vow [The Mishnah starts the topic of the next Chapter, the conditions under which a vow can be invalidated. The main condition is that one find “an opening of remorse”, that a person would not have made the vow had he considered certain implications of it. These considerations are irrelevant for bills of divorce.] . Rebbi Yose said, but do we not deal with vows which do not need dissolution by a Sage [The topic discussed here is not that of the next Chapter.] ? Rebbi Jonah said, we deal not only with one who made his vow dependent on something [This goes back to the previous paragraph. One can extend the argument given for the first case of the Mishnah to that of the second case and support the argument of R. Ze‘ira that R. Meїr and the Sages both hold that the two cases are parallel.] . So far it is if he wants to give him something. But in the case that he does not want to give to him [The second case of the Mishnah, since the person from whom the other vowed usufruct is providing the argument that the intention of the vow has been fulfilled. A different interpretation is in the Babli, 24a.] , he can say, I wanted only to examine you; but since I saw that it gives you pain, it is as if I had received.
MISHNAH: If they [His family.] were importuning him to marry his sister’s daughter [Which is considered a good deed; Babli Yebamot 62b/63a, Sanhedrin 76b, based on Is. 58:7.] and he said, a qônām if she ever has any usufruct from me, and similarly, a man who was about to divorce his wife and said, a qônām if my wife ever has any usufruct from me, they may have usufruct from him [The man who is about to divorce his wife cannot deprive her of the payments due to her as consequence of the divorce. He only forbade to himself any future sexual relations with his wife, implying that he could not remarry her after divorce.] since he intended only about matters of marriage.
HALAKHAH: “If they were importuning him to marry his sister’s daughter,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, this is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said [Mishnah 7:3. The state of mind of the vower decides the meaning of his vow.] , “everything refers to the vow.” “And similarly, a man who was about to divorce his wife.” Rebbi Yose said, this is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said [Mishnah 7:3. The state of mind of the vower decides the meaning of his vow.] , “everything refers to the vow.”
MISHNAH: If somebody was importuning his neighbor that he should eat at his place and that one said, a qônām that I shall not enter your house nor taste a drop of cold water from you, he is permitted to enter his house and to drink cold water there since he intended only about eating and drinking.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody was importuning his neighbor that he should eat at his place,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if one brings his neighbor to swear that he will not eat, this one may eat of that neighbor [He may eat at his place after the dinner to which he was invited had passed without his participation. The interpretation is that of S. Lieberman (Tosefta kiFshutah Nedarim p. 464) who follows R. Simḥa of Dwinsk in reading חבר for עבר because of the well-documented collapse of gutturals in Galilean speech. The restriction of the vow to the one intended formal dinner is also explicit in the Tosephta (4:8–9) (even though the scenario there is slightly different) and in Maimonides (Hilkhot Nedarim 8:10). The Babli does not discuss the Mishnah.] .