MISHNAH: If somebody makes a vow that his wife should not have any usufruct from him [Then he cannot fulfill his obligation to feed, clothe, and house his wife.] , up to thirty days [This can be read to mean that the wife cannot sue for divorce if the husband limits his vow to thirty days. But if his vow is unlimited, the wife can demand an immediate divorce. It might also mean that in no case can the wife sue unless the husband did not provide for her for at least 30 days.] he shall appoint a provider [Who provides for her from his own money and only later is repaid by the husband.] , more than that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel [Who can remarry his divorcee if he found an Elder who dissolves his vow.] , for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah; in the case of the wife of a Cohen [He is given more time to find a way to dissolve his vow since he never could remarry his divorcee, Lev. 21:7.] for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody makes a vow that his wife should not have any usufruct from him,” etc. There [Mishnah 5:8. There, the House of Hillel already force the husband to divorce his wife after one week.] , we have stated: “If somebody by a vow bars his wife from sexual intercourse,” and here you say so? There, he makes a vow to separate her from his body [A vow not to sleep with his wife is essentially a vow to terminate the marriage; a vow concerning money matters is not.] , but here he makes a vow to separate her from his property. But can anybody make a vow not to pay his debt [Why should the vow be valid if it infringes contractual rights of third parties? (Cf. Introduction to Tractate Nedarim.)] ? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, since in the future he will divorce her, pay her the ketubah, and stop her food supply, it is as if there was no debt [The Babli, 70a, notes that the partners in a marriage have the right to separate their incomes: The husband can renounce any benefit from his wife’s work and not pay any of her expenses or the wife can renounce any support from her husband and keep all her earnings. But any of these possibilities presuppose mutual consent.] . Why could she not sit there and wait; if he divorced her everything would be in order, otherwise let him provide her with food [Since in Halakhah 5:8 the obligation of the husband to feed his wife was given a biblical basis, why should the husband’s vow not simply be declared invalid and he be forced to feed his wife by a court order?] ? It follows him who said that the wife’s food is not from words of the Torah [This and the next argument are explained in Ma‘serot 3:1, Notes 11–13. Cf. also the argument of R. Eliezer ben Jacob in Halakhah 5:8 and the last sentence of Chapter 13.] , as it was stated [Tosephta Ševi‘it 5:22.] : The court will not determine food for the wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s [If the husband is away on a trip and the wife needs money to survive, she can sell some of the husband’s property under the supervision of the court. She cannot sell Sabbatical produce since nobody may use such produce to pay his debts (and the wife’s claim is a debt based on the ketubah document.) But if the husband is present, she may eat from his Sabbatical fruit since this fulfills the rabbinic ordinance to support the wife and is not counted as paying a debt.] . Then should she not be considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah [Which is not a defect for a male, cf. Note 137.] ? This proves that she is not considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah.
He could appoint a provider [The Mishnah requires the husband to look for a provider but in fact he cannot appoint one since his vow prohibits him to provide for his wife through an agent. The only way the husband can fulfill his obligation is indicated by Mishnah Nedarim 4:8 (Notes 101,102) quoted here, in that he indicates to a third person that he is ready to repay that person after he has provided for his wife, in a way that the provider could not have recourse to the courts if the husband would not pay.] , as the following: “X is forbidden any profit from me by a vow and I do not know what to do.” Let him appoint a provider [Why can the wife force a divorce if she is provided for?] ! A woman has the right to say, it is impossible for me to be provided for by anybody other than my husband. But did we not state [Mishnah 5:11. That Mishnah and the following give detailed instructions how a wife is provided for by an agent, giving the impression that this refers to a permanent arrangement. Why is this only accepted as very temporary in the Mishnah here?] : “If somebody provides for his wife through a third party.” There, if she accepted it; here, if she did not accept it. If she did not accept it [This clause is an insert by the first corrector. The text is suspect since אִי is Babylonian, for Galilean אִין “if”.] then he should not appoint even for one day! She continues with him for one month, perhaps he will find an opening for his vow [One requires a cooling-down period of one month to give the husband time to regret his vow and seek dissolution of the vow by an Elder.] . Samuel says, if he vowed for thirty days. But if he vowed forever, he shall divorce immediately and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Avina in the name of Rav: Even if he vowed forever, she continues with him for one month, perhaps he will find an opening for his vow [In the Babli, 71a, the positions attributed to Samuel and Rav are switched.] .
Some Tannaïm state: thirty days. Some Tannaïm state: up to thirty days [All ms. sources (Mishnah, Tosephta 7:1, quotes in Yerushalmi and Babli) support the second version.] . He who says thirty days [This is the minimum delay before the wife can go to court; therefore the husband certainly has to provide for 30 days.] supports Rav; he who says up to thirty days [The divorce proceedings should be finished by then and the full ketubah paid.] supports Samuel.
Rebbi Yose said, they [R. Jehudah and R. Meïr, the author of the anonymous Mishnah. In Tosephta 7:1 it is stated: “He should appoint a provider for up to 30 days, and for a Cohen’s wife three months, the words of R. Meïr.” At first glance, this seems to indicate that R. Jehudah permits the court to force the husband to divorce his wife immediately after the end of the second month but R. Meïr only after the end of the third.] differ about wives of Cohanim. “Beyond that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of the second [month] [Scheduling one month for the court proceedings.] . “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of the second [month]. “In the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the third. And a disagreement was stated [In the Tosephta.] , at the end of three [months], the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana said to him, where no disagreement was stated, you introduce a disagreement. But they disagree if he is an Israel. “Beyond that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the second [month]. “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her [In a short month only 29 days, in opposition to R. Meïr who requires 30 days in every case (Babli 71a).] , for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the second. “In the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of three [months]. It was stated thus: At the end of three by everybody’s opinion.
MISHNAH: If somebody causes [The Halakhah will explain how a husband can cause a wife’s vow.] a vow of his wife that she should not taste any kind of fruits has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month [Most mss. of the Babli and the Mishnah read “day” instead of “month”. The reading “month” is found in a number of early medieval authors discussing the Babli.] he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah; in the case of the wife of a Cohen for two [months] he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife,” etc. Can anybody cause somebody else’s vow during his lifetime? It must be that the wife made a vow, the husband heard it, and said to her: If you will eat from such and such, my property will be forbidden to you. If she ate from such and such, why should his property not be forbidden to her [Since she is the cause.] ? Is that not the case from the beginning of the chapter [He forbade his property to her. Why does the anonymous Tanna require a stay of 30 days in the first Mishnah but none in the second?] ? But if his wife made a vow, her husband was informed, and did not dissolve it, following him who says that he put his finger between her teeth [The question whether the husband is responsible for the consequences if he does not dissolve his wife’s vows is in the last paragraph of Nedarim, 11:13, Notes 98–103. The image is that if he puts his finger between her teeth, he has only himself to blame if she bites. R. Meïr and R. Jehudah hold that he put his finger between her teeth; cf. also Babli 71a.] , he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ḥuna said, even he who said that she put his finger between her teeth, and should be divorced without ketubah, will agree [That he has to pay.] in case he provoked her to make the vow.
MISHNAH: If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not adorn herself with one of the kinds [Kinds of perfume. In modern Hebrew, only jewellery would be קישוּט.] has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Yose says, among the poor if he did not give a time limit, among the rich for thirty days.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not adorn herself,” etc. Rav Huna said, so is the Mishnah [J. N. Epstein, מבוא לנוסח המשנה, p. 474–475 conjectures that originally the Mishnah read: “if he set a time limit, he may keep her,” and only Rav Huna changed the text to adapt it to the other Mishnaiot of this series. In any case, all mss. of Mishnah and Babli follow Rav Huna’s reading.] : “Among the poor if he did not give a time limit.” Ulla bar Ismael said, among the poor if he did not give a time limit; but if he gave a time limit even if it were for ten years [In the Babli, 71b, this is R. Joḥanan’s opinion.] it is permitted, for no fox dies if he gets dusty from his lair [This popular saying also occurs in a slightly different version in the Babli, 71b. If the husband himself smells badly, he will not be bothered by his wife’s smells.] . Nathan bar Hoshaiah said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Except holidays [In the Babli, 71b, this is ascribed to Rav Ḥisda.] .
MISHNAH: If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not go to her father’s house, if they live in the same city she does, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. If they live in another city, for one holiday he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not go to her father’s house,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they stated there [In Babylonia.] : If he made her make a vow that she should not wash in the bathhouse [The public thermal bath.] , in walled cities one week, in villages two weeks. That she should not wear shoes [Only sandals.] , in villages three months [Maimonides (Hilkhot Iššut 13:9) reads: Three days.] , in walled cities 24 hours.
Rebbi Joḥanan [In the Babli, 71b, this is said in the name of Rabba bar Ulla with the concurrence of R. Joḥanan.] said, they taught that about the pursueds’ holiday. What is the pursueds’ holiday? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, that is the first holiday [After her final marriage.] when her father drives her to her husband’s house [When it is customary for the newlywed to visit her family and the father sends her back to her husband’s house.] .
MISHNAH: [The entire Mishnah is explained in the Halakhah.] If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not pay condolence visits or go to weddings has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. But if he argues because of another reason, he is in his rights. If he said to her you should tell X what I said to you [This is the text in the Yerushalmi and one Babli mss. In all other Talmud or Mishnah mss.: “What you said to me or what I said to you” (text in the Halakhah) or “what I said to you or you said to me”.] or that she should fill [vessels] and pour them out on garbage heaps, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not pay condolence visits,” etc. [In the Babli, 72a, and Tosephta 7:4: “fine and coarse sieves and portable ovens.”] ”If he made her vow not to lend out fine and coarse sieves, he shall divorce her and pay the ketubah, since he gives her a bad reputation among her [female] neighbors. And so if she made a vow not to lend out fine and coarse sieves, she should leave without ketubah since she gives him a bad reputation among his [male] neighbors.” [Babli, 72a, In Tosephta 7:5: She will die and nobody will care.] ”If he made her vow not to pay condolence visits or go to weddings, he shall divorce her and pay the ketubah, since tomorrow a relative of hers will die and nobody will take notice of her. And so if she made a vow not to pay condolence visits or go to weddings, she should leave without ketubah since tomorrow a relative of his will die and nobody will take notice of him.” [Similar but slightly different texts in Babli, 72a, and Tosephta 7:6 (Eccl. 7:6).] ”Rebbi Meïr is saying in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba: ‘It is better to pay condolence visits than to go to a wedding since the former is the end of every human, and the living should take notice.’ Why does the verse say, ‘and the living should take notice’? But do so they shall: eulogize so they should eulogize, bury so they should bury, accompany [Accompany the coffin to the cemetery.] so they should accompany.”
“If he argues because of another reason, he is in his rights,” because of bad reputation [If he objects only to certain visits where his wife is likely to meet persons of bad reputation who might seduce her.] .
“If he said to her I require that you tell Mr. X what you said to me,” alone, “or I said to you”, alone [Private matters at the time of sex play; Tosephta 7:6. The formulation in the Babli 72a, “shameful matters” is ambiguous.] , “or that she should fill [vessels] and pour them out on garbage heaps, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. [In the Tosephta: Because he does not treat her following the laws of Moses and Israel. The formula for the preliminary marriage is that the woman shall be married to the man “following the laws of Moses and Israel.”] ” There [Babli 72a in the name of Samuel.] , they say, like Er’s action [Which in Jewish tradition was identical to Onan’s sin. He requires her to take contraceptive action; Gen.38:7,9. Cf. Gen. rabba 85(5) where the expression is: He ploughed in the gardens and poured out on the garbage heaps.] , but the rabbis here say, senseless things [In the words of the Babli, 72a, if she pours water out on the garbage heap “her neighbors would consider her insane.”] .
MISHNAH: The following leave without ketubah: Any one violating the laws of Moses or Jews. What is the law of Moses? She feeds him what is not tithed, or makes him sleep with her when she is menstruating, or does not cut ḥallah [In all these cases, she causes him to commit a sin punishable by extirpation. One recommends to the husband to divorce her since “nobody should live with a snake in the same basket” [Babli 72a; Yerushalmi Demai2:2 (Note 129; 22d l. 59)].] , or makes vows which she does not keep. And what is the law of Jews: She leaves home with her hair in disorder [In both Talmudim, this is interpreted that she leaves home with her hair uncovered.] , or spins in public [It seems that it was a common sign of a free woman engaged in prostitution to appear as if spinning in public (in the Babli, 72b, if she is spinning with a rose on her ear), in contrast to slave girls used as prostitutes who were exhibited naked in front of brothels.] , or speaks with everybody [This also could be interpreted as a way of soliciting.] . Abba Saul says, also one who curses his parents in his presence. Rebbi Tarphon says, also the big-voiced. What is the big-voiced? Any who speaks inside her house and her neighbors hear her voice.
HALAKHAH: “The following leave without ketubah,” etc. “What is the big-voiced,” etc. And all with witnesses. “X tithed [The same argument in the Babli, 72a.] , X saw the stains [She said to her husband that she showed her stained underwear to a rabbi who decided that it was not menstrual blood. In the first Century C. E. it was a common usage of Jewish sects to accuse the adherents of other sects of sleeping with menstruating women. Pharisees accused Sadducees and Samaritans because they considered all genital discharges as menstrual (Mishnah Niddah 4:1) and Sadducees accused Pharisees because they do not consider all genital discharges as menstrual (Damascus Document A 5:7). Later practice eliminated the problem by observing both Pharisaic and Sadducee prohibitions. Pharisaic distinctions between pure and impure blood required women to consult rabbis about their discharges. It is not likely that this ever was widespread practice except for wives of Cohanim in whose household impurity had to be reduced to an absolute minimum. The disappearance of priestly purity in the second century C.E. probably put an end to that practice even though the fourth Century Babylonian Rava still claimed full knowledge of all relevant rules.] , X cut her ḥallah [The heave to be taken from bread dough. It was common practice to have a professional baker prepare bread dough for private households and to take ḥallah from it; cf. Mishnah Ḥallah 1:7.] , X permitted her vow.” They checked and found it was not so.
“She feeds him what is not tithed, or makes him sleep with her when she is menstruating, or does not cut ḥallah, or makes vows which she does not keep.” We understand all these because he is involved [In the first three cases, she leads him into sin.] . “She makes vows which she does not keep,” what is his interest in this? He can say, I cannot live with a vowing wife because she buries her children. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Yudan [Giṭṭin 4:3 (45c 1. 63), Šabbat 5b 1. 8; Babli 72a in the name of Rav Naḥman. Šabbat 32b in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Isaac (also thus in one Geniza ms. of Ketubot); in Yalquṭ Šim‘oni Jer. #266 a different verse in the name of R. Nathan (anonymous in the Babli, 72a).] : Children die for the sin of vows, as it is written [Jer. 2:30.] : “For vain [vows] I smote your children.
“With her hair in disorder.” They said that for the courtyard [It is supposed that no house has a direct exit to the street but that a number of houses share a common courtyard from which one leaves to a passageway or a street.] ; so much more for the passageway [A side street which is not a thoroughfare. It may be a dead-end street or not; it is public domain but mainly used by the dwellers of courtyards opening to that side street.] . Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one goes out in her wig [The word was identified by Musaphia as Latin capillitium. But the meaning of that word as given in the dictionaries is not “wig” as asserted by Musaphia but “the hair” (collective). The meaning “false hair, wig” is found in Latin capillamentum. Cf. also the Latin adjective capillatus, -a, -um“having hair, with fine head of hair”. The parallel in the Babli, 72b, has קלתה which Rashi explains as a makeshift head cover formed by an inverted basket, which is declared as forbidden.] , she does not go out with her hair in disorder. That is, to the courtyard; if she does it in the passageway, she goes out with her hair in disorder. There exists a courtyard which is like a passageway and a passageway which is like a courtyard. A courtyard through which outsiders have broken [It has become a shortcut for outsiders.] is like a passageway and a passageway through which no outsiders are breaking [A dead-end street used only by the inhabitants of its houses.] is like a courtyard.
Abba Saul says, also one who curses their child in his parents’ presence [In the Babli, 72b, as Amoraic statement: One who curses his parents before his children.] . Rebbi Tarphon says, also the big-voiced. What is the big-voiced? Samuel says, any who speaks and her women neighbors hear her voice [Therefore, all his marital disagreements are immediately public knowledge.] . Rav says, any one whose voice is heard by other people from bed to bed during intercourse [The same statement is also in the Babli, 72b.] .
[This text seems to be in rather bad shape and the secondary sources are contradictory, Note 79.] Rebbi Ḥanin stated in the name of Rebbi Samuel: Both for women about whom they said that they have ketubah as also those about whom they said they leave without ketubah, as the minor, the secondarily prohibited [Obviously one has to read in the first clause: have no ketubah. Somehow the text should accommodate several kinds of divorces. The minor who is mentioned in this connection is an underage girl married off by her mother or brothers after her father’s death whose marriage has no biblical validity and who can walk out of it without formality (cf. Yebamot 1:2, Note 118). Her repudiation of her husband annuls her marriage and with it her ketubah but it does not touch her property rights; both mortmain (dos aestimata) as also paraphernalia (dos non aestimata) must be returned to her (cf. Yebamot 7:1, Note 1). Secondary prohibitions are rabbinically prohibited unions extending biblical prohibitions, usually for one additional generation (cf. Yebamot 2:4, Note 67). The rabbinate will force the husband to divorce his wife and, in order to scare away women from such marriages, will not enforce any payment of ketubah. But her property rights for mortmain and paraphernalia are not touched (and her children are legitimate.) The she-ram (Yebamot 1:1, Note 65) is a woman exhibiting secondary male sex characterstics. She is presumed to be congenitally infertile; her marriage is considered invalid by biblical standards, and she will have difficulty collecting the ketubah but not recovering her property. The statement as it stands now does not cover women who are divorced following Mishnah 6, who may not be able to recover their property.] , and the she-ram, did they speak about a mina or 200 [zuz]? But even if the ketubah was a thousand denars [Promised by the husband; this does not touch repayment of the dowry.] , she loses [R. Nissim Gerondi (Commentary to Aliasi, 59b in the Wilna edition) reads: נָשִׁים שֶׁאָֽמְרוּ חֲכָמִים אֵין לָהֶן כְּתוּבָּה. כְּגוֹן הַיְתוֹמָה וְהַשְּׁנִייָה וְהָאַייְלוֹנִית. לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא מְנָא מָאתַיִים. אֲבָל כְּתוּבָּה שֶׁלְּאֶלֶף דֵּינָר נוֹטֶלֶת “Women about whom they said that they leave without ketubah, as the underage orphan, the secondarily prohibited, and the she-ram, they spoke only about a mina or 200 [zuz] But if the ketubah was a thousand denars, she takes it.” As the commentators of the Babli explain, the obligatory ketubah must be lost since she leaves without ketubah; but any additional sums are voluntary gifts from the husband. The claim to such a voluntary gift can be lost only by criminal behavior of the wife, not by an inherent defect of the marriage which was known to the husband at the time he made the promise. Naḥmanides (Sefer Hazzekhut, in Alfasi, loc. cit.) reads: תַּנֵּי רִבִּי חָנִין בְּרִבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל. נָשִׁים שֶׁאָֽמְרוּ אֵין לָהֶן כְּתוּבָּה יֵשׁ לָהֶן תּוֹסֶפֶת. וּשֶׁאָֽמְרוּ יוֹצְאוֹת שֶׁלֹּא בִכְתוּבָּה אֵין לָהֶן אֲפִילוּ תוֹסֶפֶת. “Rebbi Ḥanin ben Rebbi Samuel stated: Women about whom they said they have no ketubah, receive the additions; but those about whom they said that they leave without ketubah do not even get the additions.” Women who have no ketubah are those whose marriage was invalid from the start, e. g., the underage orphan, the secondarily prohibited, and the she-ram. They receive the voluntary additions as explained above. Women who leave without ketubah are those who are divorced because of their crimes; they lose also the husband’s voluntary gift since they force the husband to divorce them. Probably one should read in the text: “Rav Ḥanin (known as Rav’s student) in the name of Samuel.” This is consistent with the quote later in the paragraph.] , but she takes her existing rags [Her used clothing; cf. Chapter 5, Notes 224–225.] . But the one who leaves because of a bad reputation loses everything [Including mortmain, the dowry given to the husband as the latter’s property subject to his obligation to return their value in the fixed amount stated in the ketubah document. Nothing is said about paraphernalia, the wife’s separate property which is administered by her husband. The parallel statement of Samuel in the Babli, 101a, agrees that she loses the husband’s additions above the minimal ketubah but is silent about mortmain.] . Can she take her paraphernalia [This means her dowry as addition to the ketubah, including mortmain and paraphernalia in the literal sense.] ? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, she takes. Rebbi Hila said, she does not take. Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yasa, Rebbi Abba bar Cohen mention it in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel: Both women about whom they said that they leave without ketubah, did they speak about the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz]? But even if the ketubah was a thousand denars, she loses [This text does not make too much sense. Probably one should read something similar to the text of Tosephta 7:7: כָּל־אֵילּוּ שֶׁאָֽמְרוּ. יוֹצְאוֹת שֶׁלֹּא בִכְתוּבָּה. לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא מְנָא מָאתַיִים אָלָּא אֲפִילוּ הָֽיְתָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ שֶׁלְּאֶלֶף דֵּינָר מְאַבֶּדֶת אֶת־הַכֹּל וְנוֹטֶלֶת בְּלָאיוֹת שֶׁמּוֹצָא לְפָנֶיהָ. “[Women] about whom they said that they leave without ketubah, they spoke not only about a mina or 200 [zuz], but even if the ketubah was a thousand denars, she loses everything, but she takes her used clothing..” The Tosephta can be quoted in support of R. Hila that she takes anything that clearly is her property at that moment (her personal effects and the paraphernalia proper) but the husband is not required to return her mortmain which has become his property; her claim to it is voided.] . Rebbi Simon said, Rebbi Joḥanan: All the Mishnaiot [All Mishnaiot on the topic why a women should be divorced.] are connected to this baraita. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yasa: About which baraita? Of Rebbi Ḥanin from Samuel [Since this is clearly formulated as Amoraic opinion of a single person, it cannot be the central topic of a whole series of Mishnaiot.] ? He said to him, it is everybody’s opinion. And Rebbi Ḥiyya formulated so [Tosephta 7:7.] : “Women who infringe upon the law lose everything.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina [In the opinion of S. Abramson, the name should be Ze‘ira ben Ḥanina, an Amora contemporary with rabbis Yose and Mana mentioned later in the text. Cf. בירורם ,שרגא אברמסון, Sinai 89 (1981) pp. 118–121.] : If they saw her putting on her underpants [Cf. Soṭah 1:2, Note 115.] and the pedlar leaves her house, the thing is ugly, she should leave [In the Babli, Yebamot 24b–25a, this and the following statements are by R. Ḥiyya (the elder) quoting the authority of Rebbi. In all these cases, where adultery is not proven by two witnesses to the act, one implies that the woman can be divorced without payment of the ketubah since the acts describe a high probability of adultery, which is admissible proof in money matters and does not need prior warning.] . There is slime on her bed, the thing is ugly, she should leave. There is slime on his [The other man’s.] bed, the thing is ugly, she should leave. His sandal is in front of her bed, the thing is ugly, she should leave. Her sandal is in front of his [The other man’s.] bed, the thing is ugly, she should leave. Both leave the same dark place, the thing is ugly, she should leave. They lift one another from the cistern, the thing is ugly, she should leave. Both of them clap on her thighs in the bathhouse [Where everybody is naked. Mishnah 9 implies that the use of public thermal baths was separate by sex; then the reference would be to lesbian relationships which, while not forbidden (cf. Yebamot 8:6, Note 240) are generally classified as undesirable.] , the thing is ugly, she should leave. Ḥanina bar Iqa in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, in all these cases, if she brings an explanation for her behavior she is believed. Rav Ada bar Aḥawa in the name of Rav: A case came before Rebbi and he said, what of it [It seems to mean that Rebbi did not want to see the courts involved as long as the testimony did not amount to a legal proof. Some commentators of the Babli read the sentence as referring to the woman’s explanation, that Rebbi would not accept any explanation except a legal disproof (cf. R. Yosef Ḥabiba, Nimmuqe Yosef, on Alfassi Yebamot,6a in the Wilna edition.)] ? They asked before him [This seems to refer to the person mentioned at the head of this paragraph Note 87.] : Even if they saw him putting his mouth on her mouth? He said, this did happen, that they saw a man [A man other than the husband.] putting his mouth on her mouth. The case came befote Rebbi Yose, who said that she should leave without ketubah. Her relatives appealed the case and said, if she is deviant [A proven adulteress. Since there is no legal proof, she should take the entire ketubah amount if the husband divorces her. A document in which כתובה and פרנה are used interchangeably was published by S, Asaph, Tarbiz 9(1938), #1, p. 25.] , she should leave without ketubah. If she is not deviant, she should take the entire ketubah. Rebbi Mana said to them, bring the ketubah that we may read it. They brought the ketubah and found written in it [About this ketubah text which gives the wife the right to force a divorce in exchange for a predetermined financial reward for the husband, see the details in Note 226, Chapter 5.] : If this X marries this Y as her husband and should no longer desire his company, she shall take half the ketubah sum. Rebbi Abun said, since she agreed that he [A man other than the husband.] should put his mouth on her mouth it is as if she hated him; she has only half the ketubah. She lies in his bosom [For Aramaic חוּבָּה = Hebrew חיק, cf. Targum Yerušalmi Ex. 4:6,7. A less likely explanation would be “hideout”, derived from the Hebrew root חבא “to hide”. In the cases mentioned here, there are witnesses but the parties are fully clothed.] or he lies in her bosom, she is deviant [And may be divorced without claim to the ketubah.] . If they embrace, she is deviant. If they kiss, she is deviant. If the door is locked, she is deviant. If it is blocked [Not locked, but some obstacle would have to be removed before a third party could enter the room.] , that is a problem [The wife has not lost her right to sue for the ketubah amount but the outcome of the suit cannot be guaranteed.] .
MISHNAH: If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no obligation of vows on her and it turned out that she had vows to fulfill, she is not preliminarily married [No conditional contract is valid if the condition is not fulfilled at the moment the contract is activated.] . If he married her definitively without inquiry [Vows were not mentioned at all in the preparations for the preliminary marriage.] and she had vows to fulfill [Of the kind she could expect that the husband would object to.] , she should leave without ketubah. If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no bodily defects and it turned out that she had bodily defects, she is not preliminarily married. If he married her definitively without inquiry and she had bodily defects, she should leave without ketubah; and [This is one of the cases where שֶׁ and וְ have the same meaning.] all defects which disqualify a priest [From Temple service; cf. Lev.21:16–24; Mishnah Bekhorot 7.] disqualify a woman. If she had bodily defects [The preliminarily married groom divorces her because of the defects and refuses to pay the ketubah. Is the burden of proof on the claimant (in this case the bride and her father) or on the person who wants to break the contract (the groom)? Since in money matters the burden of proof is both on the claimant and on the person who disputes the validity of a document, a way has to be found to reconcile the two conflicting rules. This Mishnah presupposes that the ketubah was written at the time of the preliminary marriage.] , as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove that the defects developed after she was preliminarily married and his field was swamped [This agricultural simile is used generally to describe that an accident happened in the buyer’s domain. If somebody buys a field and then finds out that is was recently flooded and became unusable for the current season, it is of the essence that the date of the flood be determined exactly to find out whether it was his bad luck or that he had been sold the field fraudulently. In the latter case he can recover the price paid in court.] ; once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove that she had the defects before the preliminary wedding so that his acquisition was in error [The underlying principle is: There is a prima facie assumption that a defect happened where it was discovered.] , the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, when was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects [Since he is not supposed to marry a woman he had not seen before the marriage.] , and if there is a public bathhouse in his town he has no claim for hidden defects since he checks her out through his female relatives.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no obligation of vows on her,” etc. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house,” etc. We have stated defects. Which vows [The Mishnah stated a criterion for defects which are serious enough for annulment of the marriage. Does there exist a similar criterion for vows? “Vows” without a qualifier are always “vows or oaths of prohibition for the purposes of mortification”; cf. Introduction to Tractate Nedarim. The entire Halakhah from here on is also Halakhah Qiddus̄in2:5. The variant readings are noted ק.] ? Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Yoṣadaq: If she vowed not to eat, or not to drink wine, or not to wear dyed garments [Babli 72b, Tosephta 7:8. These vows either interfere with her ability to cook for her husband or they detract from his standing in the community if his wife appears in undyed woolen or linen garments used only by the poor.] . Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the fine linen garments which come from Bet She‘an have the status of dyed garments [These are bleached white; he asserts that bleaching is the equivalent of dying.] . Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he said to her, “on condition that you have no obligation of vows on you.” But if he said, “on condition that you have no obligation of any vow on you,” then even if she made a vow not to eat carob fruit [In which case nobody should care. A similar argument is ascribed to Rav Pappa in the Babli, 72b.] it is a vow.
[Tosephta 7:8; quoted in Babli 74b; also in Yerushalmi Qiddušin 2:5 (62c l. 66).] “If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” [In the Babli (previous Note) this is quoted as a tannai'tic text.] What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. [The following text has a parallel with different emphasis in the Babli, loc. cit.] Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other. [The reference is to Mishnah Giṭṭin 4:7 where it is stated that a man who divorces his wife because of her vows is never permitted to take her back. This is a rabbinic rule. R. Meïr holds that no remarriage is permitted in case of any vow that needs to be annulled by an Elder (cf. Nedarim Chapter 9). The reason is that one has to avoid a situation in which the divorcee marries another man and for him goes to an Elder to have him annul the vow. If the ex-husband says, “if I had known that her vow will be annulled, I would not have divorced her,” he retroactively would annul the bill of divorce, make his ex-wife a bigamist and bastards of her children from the second husband. Therefore, one has to make clear to him that the divorce is final and irreversible, to prevent him from having second thoughts. But if the cause of the divorce is an invalid vow, the divorce is not caused by the vow and the husband may remarry his divorcee (as long as she did not marry another man). R. Eleazar says that remarriage was forbidden in the second case because of the first one since it is obvious that the husband must be an ignoramus if he divorces his wife because of a vow which every competent scholar will immediately declare as invalid if asked about it (“a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage” because the Sage will declare it invalid at first sight.)] ” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage [This text is clearly elliptic. There does not seem to be a lacuna, but rather the text is a reference to an extensive argument in Giṭṭin 4:7 (and a related text in Qiddušin 2:5):אָמַר רִבִּי לָֽעְזָר. לֹא אָֽסְרוּ זֶה אֶלָּא מִפְּנֵי זֶה. בְּדִין הָיָה שֶׁאֲפִילוּ נֵדֶר שֶׁהוּא צָרִיךְ חֲקִירַת חָכָם יַחֲזִיר. שֶׁהַזָּקֵן עוֹקֵר אֶת הַנֵּדֶר מֵעִיקָּרוֹ מִפְּנֵי מָה אָֽסְרוּ נֵדֶר שֶׁאֵין צָרִיךְ חֲקִירַת חָכָם. מִפְּנֵי נֵדֶר שֶׁהוּא צָרִיךְ חֲקִירַת חָכָם. “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other. It would have been logical that even in the case of a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage he could take her back. For the Elder uproots the vow from the start. Why did they forbid a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage? Because of a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage.”] . Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry [The woman whose preliminary marriage has been declared invalid because of her vows may marry any other man without a divorce from the first.] without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce [This is also quoted in the Babli, loc. cit.] . They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar [Who holds that all these prohibitions are only extreme precautions.] , and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis [This position, rejected here, is the one adopted in the Babli. It seems that the Babli would reject the argument given for the permission to remarry as unreasonable (cf. R. Nissim Gerondi, ad Aliassi 35a.)] . Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce [If she does not go to stay married to the first husband, one does not expect her to try to dissolve her vow for any other man.] . But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder [Having used the vows to escape a marriage chosen for her when adolescent by her father, she might be expected to have the vow annulled as an adult for a man of her choice.] who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce [From her first husband, who in executing the divorce has to forswear any hope ever again to be married to her.] .
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently [The Mishnah does not spell out what the connections are between preliminary and definitive marriage ceremonies. R. Simeon ben Laqish reads the Mishnah as one statement: If he stipulated for the preliminary marriage that the woman should be without vows or blemishes, if his condition is not met he can walk out of his commitment without further obligation. If he goes ahead with the definitive marriage, the marriage is valid and can be dissolved only by a bill of divorce, but his original condition has not been withdrawn and, therefore, he does not have to pay.] . But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah [This case has not been dealt with in the Mishnah; therefore the groom has no legal basis for refusing to pay the ketubah even if one agrees that he can divorce his wife for cause since he cannot be expected to live with a vowing or invalid wife. The Tosephta, 7:9, supports R. Simeon ben Laqish.] . Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah [He holds that the two cases in the Mishnah, referring to preliminary and definitive marriages, are independent of one another. Therefore, anybody who finds his wife encumbered by vows or having bodily defects can divorce her without ketubah, even if the subject was never mentioned at the preliminary marriage.] . Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently [Since the stipulation was not repeated at the definitive marriage, the fact of the definitive marriage retroactively validates the preliminary marriage that would have been invalid if the condition of the bride had been investigated by the groom. Therefore, the stipulation can refer only to money matters, not to the validity of the marriage and the marriage cannot simply be declared nonexistent. In the Babli, 72b/73a, this is the position of Rav, disputed by Samuel. The Babli explains that Rav holds that if a man sleeps with a woman he shows that in his mind he is legally married (and the preliminary marriage is validated retroactively); Samuel does not attribute such pious thoughts to men.] . Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say [If the ketubah was written for the preliminary marriage, does R. Simeon ben Laqish equate the signing of the ketubah document to a definitive marriage as far as money matters go?] ? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if the father proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold [This proves that the Mishnah must assume the preliminary marriage to have been unconditional.] ? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he [made it conditional] [From the parallel in Qiddušin, missing here in ms. and editio princeps.] , could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case [Referring to an unconditional preliminary marriage.] , she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ban Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed [He must have been aware of her bodily defect. The Mishnah treats the cases of vows and defects as completely parallel; one must therefore restrict the statement of R. Simeon ben Laqish to the case that the husband was aware of his wife’s vows when he slept with her for the first time.] .
“And all defects which disqualify a priest disqualify a woman. They added to them for women mouth odor, sweat odor, and a hairless mole. [Tosephta 7:9, quoted in Babli 75a. Mishnah Bekhorot Chapter 6 enumerates the defects which make an animal unfit for the altar. Chapter 7 states that any defect making an animal unfit will disqualify a Cohen from Temple service. In addition, a misshapen head will disqualify a priest, also a bald pate not bordered in the front by a line of hair from ear to ear.] ” Rebbi Ammi bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: They taught this [The mole.] about the skin of the face. But did we not state: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects,” and this is of the visible defects! Explain it if she hid it under her headgear. It was stated: “A mole with hairs is a defect, whether it be large or small, whether it be on the body or on the face. Without a hair it is a defect on the face but not on the body. When has this been said? If it is small. But if it is large, it is a defect whether it be on the body or on the face. How big is large? Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, up to an Italic as [A rather large copper coin, abount an inch in diameter. The baraita is quoted in the Babli, 75a; the following amoraic comment (and reduction in size) has no parallel there.] .” Rebbi Eleazar bar Ḥanina said, for example such a Gordianic denar [Minted by Gordianus III. Really a double denar, an Antoninianus, but whose weight was only ⅓ larger than the simple denars minted by Gordianus I and II. Cf. D. Sperber, Roman Palestine,200–400,Money and Prices, Ramat Gan 1974, pp. 39,226. Since the text here is confirmed by its parallel in Qiddušin, the different readings in הילכות טרפות לבני ארץ ישראל, תלפיות ח 1963, pp. 324–5, do not refer to the text here.] his measure is half an ubiquitous gold piece [This R. Eleazar bar Ḥanina is not mentioned again in the Talmudim. In Qiddušin, the quote is “R. Eleazar in the name of R. Ḥanina”; the latter lived under the last Severan emperors and the early military anarchy. The gold coin is an aureus of Septimius Severus or his successors.] . Rebbi Radifa, Rebbi Jonah: Rebbi Jeremiah asked: A bald woman with a row of hair going from one ear to the other [Which is not a defect for a male, cf. Note 137.] ? They wanted to understand it from the following: “They added to them for women mouth odor, sweat odor, and a hairless mole.” They did not mention baldness. They wanted to conclude that it is not a defect. There came Rebbi Samuel the son of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun: Rebbi Nasa said, it is a defect. It is listed only if it is ugly for both sexes. But something which is beautiful in one sex but ugly in the other, like a bald pate, even though it is a defect it was not listed. You should know that this is so because a beard is beautiful for a man and a defect for a woman, and we did not state: In addition, for a woman a beard. There are breasts which are beautyiful for a woman and a defect for men, and we did not state: In addtion, for a man women’s breasts [No list is complete. In the Babli, oversized woman’s breasts are listed as defect. In Qiddušin, this is the end of the Halakhah.] .
The Mishnah deals with defects which do not spontaneously appear [Defects that do not appear during the natural aging process. Without prior stipulation the husband cannot complain if his wife is not permanently youthful looking. There is a possibility that this paragraph refers to a statement similar to Tosephta 7:10: The Sages agree with R. Meïr (in Mishnah 8) that for defects which usually develop (in Nachmanides’s opinion, birth defects or defects that develop in early childhood) the father has to bring proof even if she is in her husband’s house (even if these are visible defects). In the opinion of the Babli, 77a, epilepsy is a hidden defect if the onset of an attack is preceded by signs which give the girl time to hide herself; it is a public defect if attacks come without warning.] . But about defects which spontaneously appear, the husband has to bring proof and say that he stipulated about them.
MISHNAH: If a man developed defects, one does not force him to divorce [If the wife claims that she cannot live with such a man.] . Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, when has this been said? For minor defects. But for major defects one forces him to divorce.
HALAKHAH: “If a man developed defects,” etc. Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah, “if he had. [In the Babli, 77a, Rav Jehudah reads that the defect “developed (after the marriage)” and Rav’s son Ḥiyya reads “was (in existence at the time of marriage)”.] ” But if they developed newly, one forces him to divorce [This is Rav Jehudah’s conclusion.] . Rebbi Abba bar Cahana in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel [In the Babli, this is a statement of R. Abba bar Jacob in the name of R. Joḥanan, it is rejected by the Babylonian Amoraïm.] . There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah about a kopeaḥ [This is mentioned in Mishnah Bekhorot 7:6 as כיפח (in the Maimonides tradition of the Mishnah and oriental mss. of the Babli collected by R. Beṣalel Ashkenazi) or קיפח. According to Rashi (Bekhorot 45b), he is overly tall but has soft bones so that he cannot walk straight. R. Beṣalel Ashkenazi (Bekhorot 45b, Note י) quotes one opinion that he is an epileptic.] , and he forced him [To divorce his wife upon her demand.] . It turns out that following Rav [I. e., in Rav’s interpretation of the anonymous Tanna in the Mishnah.] if he did not become so, following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel if he became so. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Which [statement of] Rebbi Meïr? The former or the later [The former statement is in Mishnah 9, that one assumes that the defect occured at the place it was detected. The later statement is that of Mishnah 11: a woman may claim that she married because she thought she could stand to live with a man having such a defect but she recognizes now that this is impossible for her.] ? If the former, until she made a condition [If the reference were to Mishnah 9, one would require the woman to stipulate before the marriage that the man be free of defects. In that case, everybody agrees that she can force a divorce.] . If the later, even if he made a condition it is nothing [If he divulged his defect to his fiancee before the marriage, R. Meïr still will not force the woman to stay married if she finds the experience intolerable.] . But this Mishnah turns out following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel [The entire Mishnah 10 is Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel’s. (One usually reads Mishnaiot containing a statement “when has this been said” to be the text of the person who explains). Since he makes a distinction between small and large defects, he must speak of newly developed defects.] ; does “the following one forces to divorce” [follows] the rabbis [Does Mishnah 11 follow the rabbis in Rav’s interpretation, dealing with pre-existing conditons?] ? Let us hear from the following [Tosephta 7:9, Babli 77a; the language of the Tosephta is closer to the Yerushalmi.] : “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if it was a major defect, e. g., blind in one eye, amputated of one of his hands, lame in one of his legs, immediately he shall divorce and pay the ketubah.” This Mishnah turns out following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel [The entire Mishnah 10 is Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel’s. (One usually reads Mishnaiot containing a statement “when has this been said” to be the text of the person who explains). Since he makes a distinction between small and large defects, he must speak of newly developed defects.] ; “the following one forces to divorce” [follows] the rabbis [Since the defects mentioned in the Mishnah are not on Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel’s list.] .
MISHNAH: The following one forces to divorce: Those smitten with boils, the one afflicted with a polyp [Greek πολύπους “many-footed”, a cancerous growth in the nose (according to the Babli, 77a, an evil smelling growth.)] , the dung collector [He collects animal dung to sell to tanners; he smells badly.] , the brass refiner, and the tanner [All these have professions that impregnate them with bad smells which even with a bath cannot be removed.] , whether they were in this before they married or they came to it after they married. For all of these says Rebbi Meïr that, even if he contracted with her [He informed her of his impediment before the marriage.] , she can say “I thought that I could stand it, now I cannot stand it.” But the Sages say, she is forced to stand it except for the one smitten with boils because she causes him consumption [In talmudic medical theory there are kinds of boils for which sexual activity is very detrimental.] . It happened in Sidon that a tanner died [He died childless; his widow can force her levir not to take her in levirate marriage and free her by ḥalîṣah.] who had a brother tanner; there the Sages said, she can say: “I could stand that in your brother, I cannot stand it in you.”
HALAKHAH: “The following one forces to divorce: Those smitten with boils,” etc. “The meqammeṣ.” This is the dung collector; but some say it is the tanner. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the Mishnah implies that this is the dung collector since we have stated: “The meqammeṣ and the tanner.” [The Babli, 77a, explains the problem away that in the opinion of the dissenting Tosephta (7:11) there are different kinds of tanners, smelling differently.] “The brass refiner.” Samuel said, that is the one who smelts brass from its ore [In the Babli, 77a, this is only one opinion; Rav disagrees and holds that he repairs metal pots.] .
It was stated [Tosephta 7:11 [Gen. rabba 41(2)] in this version only the person afflicted with ritan is required to divorce his wife for medical reasons. Another version in the Babli, 77b [Lev. rabba16(1)], requires all sufferers from boils to refrain from sexual activity.] : “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I met an old man, smitten with boils, from Sepphoris. He told me, there are 24 kinds of boils; the worst one, and the one for which a woman is bad, is flowing boils [Usually derived somehow from Greek ῥέω “to flow”.] . Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: With the latter kind, the evil Pharao was smitten [This is anonymous in Gen. rabba41(2).] ; that is what is written [Gen. 12:17.] : “The Eternal smote Pharao and his house with great plagues,” etc. [This is slightly distorted in Gen. rabba 41(2), correct in 52(14). It was read by H. Graetz as mixed Aramaic/Greek/Latin sentence: dĕ-ἐτόλμησεν lĕmagga‘ ba-σῶμα dĕ-matrona; where ἐτόλμησεν is aorist of τολμάω “to dare, to presume”.] Rebbi Berekhia said: Because he dared to touch the matron’s body. There are 24 kinds of cedar [This is added here because of the number 24. In the Babli (Roš Haššanah 23a, Sukkah 37a, Ta‘anit 25b, Baba batra 80b) there are only 10 kinds mentioned, the 10 explained here, with sometimes different and multiple identifications. The original text seems to be in Gen. rabba 15(2): “R. Samuel ben Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: There are 24 kinds of cedar but only 7 are of the best kind.”] , and from all of them the verse mentioned only seven. That is what is written [Is. 41:19.] : “I shall give in the desert cedar, acacia, myrtle, and oil wood [In the Babli identified as the balsamum shrub.] ; I put in the prairie beroš, tidhar, and teaššur together. Beroš is cypress; tidhar is idra [This Aramaic word for a tree has not been identified. In the Babli identified as ساج “teak”.] ;teasššur is the box-tree [Greek πύξινον “box-tree”.] . They added to them [This expression is out of place here; it belongs to the tannaïtic tradition reported in the Babli that there are 10 kinds of cedar, with three added to the seven mentioned by Isaiah.] ’allonim, ‘armonim, and ’almogim. ’Allonim are oaks, ‘armonim plane trees, ’almuggim aloës.