MISHNAH: If a widow is supported by the orphans’ property [The widow who chose to be supported by the estate (as explained in Mishnah 4:12) rather than taking her ketubah.] , she has to work for them but they are not obligated to bury her [If they are not her heirs, she has to keep house for them anyway. The husband whose wife dies before him must bury her since he is the heir of her property. If she died childless after her husband, the heirs of her side of the family have to bury her. Similarly, if she sold her future rights to a ketubah and died after her husband, the speculator who bought her ketubah has to bury her (cf. Note 57 and S. Lieberman, תוספתא כפשוטה כתובות p. 329).] . Her heirs, the heirs of her ketubah, are obligated to bury her.
HALAKHAH: “If a widow is supported by the orphans’ property,” etc. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel [He is the author of the same statement in the Babli, 96a.] , Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: What she finds belongs to herself. If she had sustenance left over? Since her finds belong to her husband, the married woman’s leftover sustenance belongs to her husband [A baraita in the Babli, 65b. (In Nazir 24b it is explained that the husband’s property is the household money which she did not spend on food, rather than actual food she saved when being on a diet. The editing of Nazir seemingly is different from that of most Babli Tractates.)] . Since a widow’s finds belong to herself, her leftover sustenance belongs to herself. Her worn-out clothing belongs to her [A baraita in the Babli, 65b, rejected there.] . Since even a married woman, whose leftover sustenance belongs to her husband, keeps her worn-out clothing to herself, the widow, whose leftover food belongs to herself, her worn-out clothing so much more! There, she needs them for the time of her period. Here also, she needs them for the time of her period [A woman never has worn-out clothes since she always has occasion to wear rags. The Babli rejects this argument since in the absence of her husband she does not need a wardrobe of second rate dresses; she can wear real rags.] .
Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Also she does not perform for them services of intimacy. What are services of intimacy? She rubs their bodies, washes their faces, or mixes their cup [A slightly different list is in the Babli, 96a, also in the name of R. Yose ben Ḥanina. It is understood that the heirs have the right to expect from her all services a wife does for her husband, except those that are preliminaries to sexual relations.] .
One adds to her sustenance: A married woman has no wine [Cf. Chapter 5, Note 251.] , a widow has wine. If a married woman said, my earnings should be counted against my sustenance, one does not listen to her [She keeps all of her earnings and the husband does not have to pay for her (he still has to provide for her lodging.) The Babli emphatically permits such an arrangement by the wife’s initiative (58b, 70a, 82b, 107b; Baba qama 40b; Baba meṣi‘a 49b), i. e., against the husband’s will. Since this is a money matter, the Yerushalmi will accept it in case of mutual agreement.] ; if a widow said, my earnings should be counted against my sustenance, one listens to her [Even against the heirs’ opposition.] .
Rav said, if a dying person said, do not bury me, he is buried as a charge on public charity. Rebbi Immi asked, how could one think that others are provided for by his property and he is buried as a charge on public charity [This is the unanimous opinion of the Babli.] ? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Her heirs, the heirs of her ketubah, are obligated to bury her. [This is an obligation independent of the wishes of the deceased.] ” Explain it, if they inherited real estate [Since usually a ketubah is payable in real estate.] . As it was stated [A similar text in Tosephta 9:3.] : “If he left male and female slaves, mortgages, and movables, anybody [Anybody with a claim sustainable in court, the widow for her ketubah or a creditor.] who takes them first acquires them and [If nothing is left of his estate.] he shall be buried by public charity.” Because he took it first [If the estate already had disappeared before the burial.] . Therefore, if he did not take it first one removes from his hand. Explain it, if he said, bury me [If the deceased had requested a burial before he died, the burial expenses are privileged.] . As Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: If a dead person was buried who had not said “bury me”, even though others came and took [of his property] one removes from their hands. If they took real estate. In fact, what you say, one removes from their hands, if they took real estate. But if they took movables, one does not remove from their hands, if it was a loan by witnesses [In this case, time is of the essence since any one of the witnesses could die anytime. But real estate can be foreclosed only by a regular court procedure.] . But for a documented loan, whether they took real estate or movables one does not [It seems that this is a scribal error and one should read: מוציאין “one does remove”. Since the claim is documented, there is no need for the creditor to resort to self-help.] remove from their hands. For [This is an unnecessary word; R. Abba explains general principles about the legal standing of death-bed requests.] Rebbi Abba, the son of Rav Huna, said [In the Babli (Baba batra 152a, 175a; Giṭṭin 13a, 15a) this is an undisputed statement of Rav Naḥman.] : They made the words of a bedridden person equal to those of a healthy person who wrote and delivered [The legal forms of a valid gift.] . But only if he died from that illness, not if he recovered. And if he was explicit and said, give field X to Y. If he said, give field X to Y [It seems that one has to read: Give field X to Y and Z. It is understood that each one gets half a field but the method of subdivision of the field was not indicated.] ? Is it as if he was explicit or only if he said, the Northern half, the Southern half? [No answer is given since it is clear that the bequest cannot be enforced against the legal heirs; the burden of proof being on the claimants, who would have to prove in court that the method of division is that intended by the donor; this is impossible after the latter’s death.] Rebbi Yudan asked: If he said, burn me by pagan rites and give half of field X to Y. Since they do not burn, do they give? [Since the first half of the request is clearly illegal, can the second half be legal?] Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: A sick person who said, my daughters shall be supported. Would the daughters not be supported anyway [Since daughters’ right to sustenance is a standard condition of the ketubah (Mishnah 4:11), what did the mention of the daughters add to their rights?] ? No, it is necessary, for otherwise would they be supported from pledged real estate or would they be supported from movables [At places where the ketubah could be taken only in real estate, the daughters could be supported only by real estate.] ? Rebbi Yudan [ ] [The words בָּרַח לְנוֹי “he fled to beauty” do not make sense here.] there came a case before Rebbi Yose about a bedridden person who had said, my documents shall be given to X. He said to him, the bedridden can only transfer property which is acquired either by a document or by taking hold [By bodily possession.] . But these are acquired by a document and by taking hold. As it was stated [Tosephta Qiddušin 1:7.] : “A ship is acquired by taking hold in the opinion of everybody. Rebbi Nathan says a ship and documents are acquired by a document and by taking hold. [This last sentence is not in the Tosephta or in the Babli (Baba batra76a); R. Yose’s ruling is rejected by Rav Naḥman (Note 22) who validates the transfer of documents by death-bed declaration.] If he wrote and did not take hold, or took hold without writing [a transfer document] he did not do anything unless he both writes and takes hold.”
MISHNAH: A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage, may sell without court supervision [The woman who becomes a widow before her definitive wedding may have a claim to ketubah; the widow after definitive marriage has a choice of either taking her ketubah or being sustained by the estate. Both Talmudim explain that nobody will want his family’s honor compromised by forcing his widow into court; therefore, it is understood that he wrote the ketubah with the idea that it should be liquidated, if possible, in private.] . Rebbi Simeon says, after definitive marriage she may sell without court supervision; after preliminary marriage, she may sell only under court supervision since she has no sustenance and any person who has no claim to sustenance may sell only under court supervision.
HALAKHAH: “A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage,” etc. Rebbi Simeon is of the opinion that everything depends on sustenance. If he had agreed to sustain her after preliminary marriage, she may sell without court supervision If he had agreed to sustain her after definitive marriage, she may sell only under court supervision [If she is widowed before definitive marriage.] . The words of the Sages? Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person is concerned for his widow’s dignity [That she should not have to appear before an all-male court. This is also R. Joḥanan’s opinion in the Babli, 97b, where it is not the only explanation.] whether after preliminary or after definitive marriage.
Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: The one who renounced her ketubah in favor of the orphans is sustained by them. This is difficult. If there were a woman without ketubah [Cf Mishnah 5:2; it is a matter of dispute whether a woman may donate her ketubah to her husband.] , does she not have claim to sustenance? A woman without ketubah has claim to sustenance [Since she is entitled to sustenance for the work she does in keeping house. The problem could not arise before the husband’s death (hinted at in Babli 53a). Many commentators want to emend the text; these emendations have to be rejected since the text as it stands is quoted in Sefer Ha‘iṭṭur vol. 2, 32d, at Note 23.] . But here is it not enough that she renounced her ketubah in favor of the orphans, that you want to cheat her of her sustenance?
Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav [In the Babli (Ketubot 54a, Giṭṭin25a, Arakhin 22a): Samuel.] : If she requested her ketubah in court [Not if the request is made in private.] , she lost her claim to sustenance [Since the widow is entitled either to be paid her ketubah or to be sustained by the estate.] . Rebbi Yose said, but only from a clear mind; not if forced. As in the case of the widow of Rebbi Eudaimon from Mozva to whom they [The heirs informed her falsely that a rabbi of reputation wanted to marry her.] said, Rebbi Abba bar Cohen wants you. She requested her ketubah and lost her sustenance. After the matter became known [Fraudulent information by an interested party is counted as forced deal for the victim.] , it was brought before Rebbi Yose and she returned to her sustenance.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Zimra: A widow who lived two or three months without asking for sustenance, loses the sustenance of these three months [In the Babli, 97a, “two or three years”.] . That is, if she did not take a loan. But if she took out a loan, she collects. If there is no pledge in her hand. But if she has a pledge in her hand, she collects even if she did not take a loan [Any action she takes earlier to show that she is aware of her claim validates the claim later.] . Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: That is what they said, at the start one sells for sustenance of twelve months but one gives her sustenance for 30 days [If the widow goes to court to sell from the estate’s real estate, it cannot be sold in small portions. One therefore sells to cover her sustenance for twelve months but the moneys are delivered to her in monthly installments since, as explained in the next paragraph, money delivered to the widow for her sustenance cannot be taken back (even if she remarries). In the Babli, 97a, the time frame for which one sells is a matter of dispute.] . If at the end of thirty days they say, we gave, but she says, I did not receive [Who carries the burden of proof? Is it the widow because she is the claimant, or is the ketubah considered as if collected in the widow’s hand and the heirs want to deprive her of it and have to bring proof?] , it would be similar to what Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one took a loan of 12’000 for a year in order to repay one gold denar [Under the Augustan monetary system, a gold denar was worth 25 silver denars. The present statement must have been formulated during the inflation of the Military Anarchy when the debased “silver” denars had even lost their name. In Ma‘aśer Šeni 4:1 (Notes 23, 24) there is mention of an aureus worth 2’000. Cf. D. Sperber, Roman Palestine200–400, Money & Prices, 1974, Chapter II.] per month. It is obvious that he gave for the first month [Since this was due at the beginning of the contract, it may be presumed that payment was made. In this case, the burden of proof is on the recipient.] and did not give for the last [Since nobody can be presumed to pay before due date; if the payor claims to have paid before that day, the burden of proof is on him.] . About the days in between they said, not at the start [While in general in disputes about the fulfillment of contracts the burden of proof is on the claimant, in matters of payments to the widow the burden of proof is on the payor except for the first installment.] .
Rebbi Abbahu quoted in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan [Quoted in the preceding paragraph in the name of R. Yasa, Note 45. אתא here corresponds to גופא in the Babli as back reference.] : At the start one sells for sustenance of twelve months but one gives her sustenance for 30 days. Why should they sell for the sustenance of 12 months? Not to disadvantage the woman [She does not have to run after her sustenance every month.] . Why do they give her sustenance for 30 days? If you said otherwise, you would act in detriment of the orphans, as it was stated [A similar baraita is quoted in the Babli, 96a.] : If a widow took possession even of 1’000 zuz for her sustenance, one does not take it away from her. What could one say to her? “Show [Reading הוי as equivalent of Babylonian חוי.] what is in your hands! [One might think that she can collect for next month’s sustenance only after having accounted for the expenses of the past, reducing next month’s payment by the amount not spent in the preceding.] ” The students of Rebbi Mana said to her, “show what is in your hands.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said to them, since in the end she will have to swear about anything in her hands [If in the end she decides to take her ketubah, she has to deliver an accounting about any estate property in her hands.] , one says to her, let it be so.
MISHNAH: If she sold [She sells her future right to the sum promised her in the ketubah to a speculator who assumes the risk that she might die before her husband and the ketubah become void.] her ketubah entirely or partially, or donated her ketubah to another, entirely or partially, she cannot sell the remainder except under court supervision [This belongs to R. Simeon’s statement from the preceding Mishnah.] . But the Sages say, she may sell even four or five times [She may sell small portions of the ketubah without damaging her powers.] , and may sell for sustenance without court supervision but writes in the document that “I sold for sustenance.” A divorcee may sell only under court supervision [The divorcee can sell her former husband’s property only if he sent her the bill of divorce from far away. In that case, the court supervision is justified to preserve the estate. The Babli explains that the husband does not care if his divorcee has to apply to the court to collect her dues. The Yerushalmi rejects this argument in the second paragraph.] .
HALAKHAH: “If she sold her ketubah entirely or partially,” etc. It was stated [Tosephta 11:1; Babli 96b.] : “She sells and writes ‘this I sold for ketubah’ and ‘this I sold for sustenance,’ the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yose said, she sells and writes non-specifically; in this she is empowered.” If a loan before witnesses [comes due], she says, I sold for sustenance [If the loan was executed after the date of her marriage, she can claim that the real estate is mortgaged to her ketubah. If there is no unincumbered real estate, the creditor is prevented from foreclosing. A verbal loan executed before witnesses cannot be used to foreclose property sold after the loan was made.] . If a loan by contract [comes due], she says, I sold for my ketubah [If no real estate is left in the estate, the creditor cannot foreclose from the buyers if his contract was dated later than her ketubah.] . And even if a loan before witnesses [comes due], she sells for sustenance and turns around and forecloses it for her ketubah; could one not say to her, show your sale [In the first case (Note 62), could not the amount of the sale and its circumstances inform a competent appraiser whether it was for sustenance or ketubah? Since a sale for sustenance is a sale on credit, to be paid over a 12 months’ period, should it not bring a premium price?] ? Explain it, if the object increased in value [And today it is impossible to determine the fair value at the time of sale.] .
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Just as a man is concerned about his widow’s honor so he has to be concerned about his divorcee’s honor [This disagrees with the Mishnah.] , as [From here on, more wordy parallels are in Gen. rabba 17(3), Lev. rabba 34(14); Yalqut Šim‘oni Torah #23, 665, Is. #492; it is hinted at in Tanna dBe Eliahu rabba 27.] Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, “do not hide yourself from your flesh” [Is. 58:7.] , that refers to one’s divorcee. Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s wife [In Gen. rabba she is referred to as his niece, his sister’s daughter, whom to marry is considered meritorious by Pharisees based on Is. 58:7 (but sinful by Sadducees, CD V 7–10).] did mistreat him badly. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah went to him and told him, rabbi, send her away, for she does not treat you with the honor due to you. He said to him, her ketubah is too large for me. He said to him, I shall give you the ketubah and send her away. He gave him the ketubah and he divorced her. She went and married the city treasurer [Musaphia identifies the word טסורא with Greek θησαυριστής “collector”. The parallel words in the Midrashim seem to be corrupted.] . That one lost his property and became blind. She took him around the town and led him. Once they went around the entire town and nobody gave him anything. He said to her, is there not another neighborhood? She said to him, there is the neighborhood of my divorcer; it is beyond my powers to bring you there. He started hitting her. Rebbi Yose the Galilean passed by and heard them demeaning one another in public. He took them, brought them to one of his houses, and provided them with food all the days of their lives, because “do not hide yourself from your flesh”, that refers to one’s divorcee [Here end the parallels.] . Nevertheless they quarelled loudly in the night and her voice was heard saying, the pain she suffered outside her body was easier to bear than that inside her body [She preferred being beaten by her current husband to the mental pain inflicted on her by her ex-husband’s generosity] .
MISHNAH: If a widow’s ketubah was 200 and she sold [She sold her husband’s property not under the supervision of the court.] either the worth of a mina for 200 [She received what was due her.] or the worth of 200 for a mina [It is her fault if she had sold too cheaply; from the estate she received real estate in the valuie of her ketubah. While she was within her rights to sell the property, she could have chosen the process of judicial appraisal which would have shielded her against any claims by the heirs or their guardians.] , her ketubah was paid. If her ketubah was for a mina and she sold the worth of a mina and a denar for a mina, her sale is void [Since she had the right only to sell for the payment of her ketubah, any excess is an unauthorized sale and invalidates the entire transaction.] . Even if she says, I shall return the denar to the heirs, her sale is void [An unauthorized transaction cannot be validated after the fact.] .
HALAKHAH: “If a widow’s ketubah was 200,” etc. We understand worth a mina for 200 [The Babli, 98 ab, does not hold that it is trivial that the widow is not rewarded for getting such a good deal; it concludes that an agent by his office is always required to look for the best possible deal and the widow sells as an agent for the estate.] or worth 200 for a mina. In any case, she made the orphans lose a mina [That she receives only 100 zuz for her ketubah if she sells real estate too cheaply is not a matter of the laws of ketubah but of torts in general; the person who causes damage has to pay for it.] . [If it was worth] a mina [and she sold it] for 200, would the sale not be invalidated as erroneous buy [Lev. 25:14: “If you sell a sale to you neighbor or buy from your neighbor’s hand, do not overcharge one another.” Rabbinic interpretation holds that an overcharge of a sixth, 16/3%, entitles the injured party to rescind the transaction.] ? Explain it that the property increased in value [And the fair value on the date of transaction can no longer be determined.] . Rebbi Abin said, this supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, real estate buys are never under the laws of overcharging. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if the transaction was excessive, it comes under the law of overcharging. The Mishnah [Baba meṣi‘a 4:9.] disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “The following do not fall under the laws of overcharging: Slaves, securities, real estate, and redemptions [Real estate is excluded in Lev. 25:14 since it is not bought “from his hand”; slaves are excluded since they are traded under the rules of real estate; securities are excluded since what one buys “from the neighbor’s hand” is the paper, but what is intended are the rights given by the paper and these are immaterial. The Temple is excluded in its transactions since it is not “a neighbor” (Babli Baba meṣi‘a56b).] .” He explains it, unless it was excessive [He holds that any transaction is void in which the profit margin is 100% of the fair value. Tosaphot (s. v. ,אלמנה 98a) find the same opinion expressed by Rav Naḥman in the Babli, Baba meṣi‘a 57a.] . If he redeemed [He had donated something (other than a sacrificial animal) to the Temple. The redemption rules are based on Lev. 27:11–25.] what was worth a mina by 200, Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is not redeemed, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is redeemed [The standard commentators agree to switch the places of “mina” and “200 zuz”. Since the Yerushalmi never quotes Samuel’s statement in the Babli (Baba meṣi‘a 57a and 7 other instances) that a redemption of dedicated items worth a mina by a peruṭa is valid (i. e., in ratio 19200: 1), there is no reason to assume that there should be any difference in the rulesfor overpaying or underpaying.] . A baralta disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: If he said, this toga instead of this donkey, the latter becomes profane [He substitutes a toga for the dedicated donkey (which is redeemable since it is not a sacrificial animal) and presumably the donkey is worth at least two togas.] . And its end disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is necessary to compute the value [It is a biblical requirement that dedications can be redeemed only after their value has been determined (Lev. 27:12). The presumption is that the statement means not only that the value has to be determined but also that it has to be paid in full.] . Rebbi Yose said, the baraita itself implies that it is necessary to compute the value. Where do they disagree? To bring [a sacrifice to atone for] larceny [Unauthorized use of Temple property is sinful and has to be atoned for by a special sacrifice (Lev. 5:14–16). If the redemption of the donkey was valid, no sacrifice is due for using the donkey even if there remains the additional obligation to make up the difference in price between toga and donkey. If the redemption is invalid because the difference in price between the dedicated and the substitute values is too large, a sacrifice is due. The Babli, Baba meṣi‘a57a/b, is not quite sure to whom to attribute which opinion in this dispute.] . Rebbi Joḥanan said, he has to bring a sacrifice for larceny; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he does not have to bring a sacrifice for larceny.
MISHNAH: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid [This Mishnah is the direct continuation of the preceding one; in most Mishnah mss. it is part of Mishnah 4. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel holds that the sale, about which the heirs claim that the widow sold too cheaply, is valid if the field which would have remained in the heirs’ hands would not have qualified as an independent piece of agricultural real estate. Mishnah Baba batra 1:10 gives minimal measures for different kinds of real estate; if these measures are not reached, the real estate cannot be subdivided. Therefore, if the parcel, which the heirs claim should not have been sold, would be one that could not be sold under the rules of Baba batra, the widow cannot be faulted if she gave it away essentially for free; it is not a case of over- or undercharging.] unless there would have been left a field [for sowing] nine qab [The standard unit for agricultural land is bet se’ah, a plot of land on which in normal practice of extensive agriculture one would sow one se’ah of seed grain, which by tradition is fixed at 2500 square cubits (cf. Peah 2:1, Note 31). One se’ah equals 6 qab; the field of 9 qab then is 3750 square cubits. In the opinion of R. Jehudah, half of this area is a tradeable field.] , and in a garden [A garden is intensively worked, irrigated property. The area for half a qab would then be 2500:12 = 208 1/3 square cubits, and a quarter qab 104 1/6.] half a qab, or following the words of Rebbi Aqiba, a fourth. If her ketubah was 400 zuz [This sentence refers back to Mishnah 4, and is not only Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel’s. If one of several connected transactions is declared invalid, the others are not affected.] and she sold to one person worth 100, to a second 100, to a third 100, and to the last the value of a mina and a denar for a mina, the last transaction is invalid but all others are valid.
HALAKHAH: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid,” etc. That is, if she sold them in four contracts [The Halakhah deals only with the last case mentioned in the Mishnah, that the widow overstepped her authority only in part of the sale of property. If the legal and illegal contracts were executed separately, there is no reason to invalidate the earlier contracts because of the (necessarily last) invalid contract.] . If she sold them in one contract, there is disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as they disagreed [The same text is in Giṭṭin 1:1 (43a 1. 54) גי and Makkot 1:16 (31b 1. 26) מ; it is quoted in Alfasi Makkot 1, #1063 and discussed by his commentators R. Nissim Gerondi and Naḥmanides.] : If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document [His will.] and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other [Relatives are not admitted as witnesses even in civil proceedings.] . Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other [He holds that testimony, even if in writing, is one whole; either it is valid or invalid. If it is invalid in one case, it must be invalid in general.] ; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other [The testimony has to be separated from its application. If the witnesses are known not to be felons, their testimony is valid. In the case of a relative, it is not applicable.] . Rebbi Elazar said, a Mishnah [Makkot 1:12. Deut. 17:6 reads: “By the testimony of two witnesses or three witnesses the guilty person shall be condemned to death; he cannot be condemned by the testimony of a single witness.” The question is raised, if two witnesses are sufficient, why are three mentioned? The answer given in the Mishnah is that since two witnesses are both disqualified if one of them is disqualified (in which case the remaining witness becomes a single witness), a group of three (or 100) witnesses who all testify to exactly the same effect is disqualified if one of them is disqualified. The witnesses signing a document necessarily all testify to exactly the same facts. (Alfassi #1062 notes that the Geonim restrict the Mishnah to criminal cases.)] supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified. From where even 100? The verse [Deut. 17:6.] says, ‘witnesses’”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is as if there was one testimony about one person. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other [Since practice is not decided either way, the legal heirs can successfully attack the validity of the will, and the guardians of the orphans the validity of the entire sale by the widow.] .
MISHNAH: If the judges estimated one sixth too little or too much, their sale is invalid [Since any overcharging of at least one sixth empowers the injured party to annul the transaction.] . Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, their sale is valid [If they followed the rules of public sales detailed in Tractate Arakhin.] ; otherwise, what is the court’s power worth? But if they offered public tender [They made a written public announcement of a public sale and invited tenders and then sold to the highest bidder. The actual bids received are the best estimate of the value of real estate and override expert testimony as to the intrinsic value of the land. Following Rashi, אִיגֶּרֶת בִּיקּוּרֶת is a circular inviting people to visit (בִּיקּוּר) the property and make their offers.] , even if they sold either the worth of a mina for 200 or the worth of 200 for a mina, their sale is valid.
HALAKHAH: “If the judges estimated one sixth too little or too much,” etc. As you say for a private person, in real estate up to one third [R. Joḥanan was reported to say in Halakhah 4 that in real estate the deviation must be 100%. This is interpreted here to mean than the overcharge cannot be more than 100% of the undercharge, 150% vs. 50%, giving a ratio of 3 to 1 (Pnei Mosheh)..] , in movables up to one sixth [Lev. 25:14: “If you sell a sale to you neighbor or buy from your neighbor’s hand, do not overcharge one another.” Rabbinic interpretation holds that an overcharge of a sixth, 16/3%, entitles the injured party to rescind the transaction.] . And similarly, for Temple property, in real estate up to one sixth, in movables up to [one in] twelve [For redemption of property dedicated to the Temple, all terms are halved or doubled to the advantage of the Temple as exemplified in the Mishnah, next Note.] . There [Arakhin 6:1; cf. Tosephta Ketubot 11:3.] , we have stated: “The estimation for orphans is thirty days, the estimation for Temple property sixty days, and one publicly announces mornings and evenings [The court’s herald announces the sale twice daily in public.] .” And why thirty? In order to empower the orphans. Why should they not announce longer? Up to thirty days you empower the orphans, more than that you diminish their power [In less than 30 days one is not sure that all potential buyers hear of the sale; a shorter period would diminish the number of bidders. If the process is drawn out too long, people lose interest and one diminishes the number of buyers.] . Why do you not say that for Temple property? Temple property is different because each offer made is firm [Each offer made to the Temple administration obliges the bidder to act on his bid until he is notified that he was released from his obligation because a higher bid was accepted. The Temple does not have to worry that it would lose bidders in a drawn out process.] . Then they should announce forever! If suffices for the Temple that it should be twice that of a private person. Rebbi Yudan said, since you say that Temple property is different because each offer made is firm, this implies that if they find their estimation they do not continue but close the deal [If the administration had decided on an adequate price, the first bidder meeting this price can immediately be given possession and the public announcements stopped, since the Temple will get its full price. The sixty day period is a possibility, not a necessity.] .
“And one announces mornings and evenings,” at the time when [agricultural] workers go out or come back, and he mentions the field and its description [Babli Arakhin 21b. As explained there, the landlord can then tell his workers to look up the property offered and to report back in the evening.] . Rebbi Yose said, if they do not get their estimated price [After the 30 days of public announcement. (The Babli in the end substitutes 8 weeks of announcement on market days for the 30 days of daily announcement.)] , they can conclude the sale. Is that the Mishnah, “if the judges estimated one sixth too little or too much, their sale is invalid”? Becausethey sold too low or too high, but if they found their estimate they close the deal [Even before the 30 days are up.] . Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: What can you say, we deal with the case that they did not announce in public [The disagreement between the rabbis and Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel is only in the absence of a public tender.] ! From what is said afterwards: “Except if they offered public tender.” What is public tender? Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, announcement [Quoted by Rashi in his commentary to the Mishnah.] .
[This paragraph is also in Megillah 4:4 (75b 1. 22), noted מ, and Sanhedrin 1:3 (19b 1.6), noted ס.The origin is in Sanhedrin since only there one finds the baraita which is explained by Ulla: “The following are not subject to public tender: Slaves, securities, and movables.”] Ulla bar Ismael said, slaves lest they flee, securities and movables lest they be stolen [Since the owner has to be mentioned, thieves would be informed that it is worth while to break into that house.] . Rebbi Abba bar Cohen asked before Rebbi Yose: Does this not imply that a slave is redeemed in front of three people [If a slave was dedicated to the Temple and then redeemed by his owner, this should be a private procedure.] ? He answered him, yes. He said to him, but did we not state [Mishnah Sanhedrin 1:3, determining the number of jurors in judicial cases.] : “Real estate [Real estate dedicated to the Temple and redeemed following the rules of Lev. 27:22–23.] nine persons and a Cohen, and a human [A person who dedicates his own worth and finds it impossible to give the prescribed value; Lev. 27:8. In both cases, the Cohen’s determination has to be made in public; the definition of “public knowledge” is “known by at least 10 people.”] by the same rule”? He answered him, the human here is a free person.
[With slight changes in names this is quoted in the Babli, 100a.] Ḥananiah bar Šelemiah in the name of Rav: A case came before Rebbi, who wanted to act following the rabbis [A case was appealed to him, in which the local court had sold property, deviating more than a sixth from the appraised value. He wanted to annul the sale.] . Rebbi Eleazar ben Proteus, the grandson of Rebbi Eleazar ben Proteus [Who can be dated to the first half of the Second Century.] , said to him: Did you not teach us in your old man’s [For זקיניך as “your father” cf. S. Lieberman, תיקוני ירושלמי Tarbiẓ 4(1933), p. 378.] name, “except if they offered public tender” [In this interpretation, the last sentence of the Mishnah is Rabban Simeon’s and is disputed by the rabbis. This disagrees with the findings above, Note 116. In the Babli, the entire case dealt with a sale without public announcement which Rebbi refrained from annulling.] ? He accepted it; Rebbi changed his mind and acted following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.
MISHNAH: Neither the orphan [The orphaned underage girl who was married off by her mother or brothers, who repudiated her husband before reaching adulthood (cf. Yebamot 1:2, Note 118). By walking out, she (Yebamot Mishnah 13:4). In all Babli mss. and in all Mishnah mss. of the Babylonian tradition, instead of “the orphan” one reads outright הַמְמָאֵנֶת “the repudiating”. Cf. The Babylonian Talmud with Variant Readings, Kethuboth II, p. תיד, Note 59. The Yerushalmi version must have been the original one since the Babli, 100b, discusses whether the Mishnah implies that no minor can claim a ketubah.] , nor the secondarily prohibited [She is her husband’s relative but not a close one; her marriage is valid by biblical standards but considered incestuous by rabbinical rules; Yebamot2:4, Note 67. But since the marriage is valid by biblical standards, her children are not bastards. She is denied a ketubah in order to induce her to refuse the marriage from the start.] , nor the she-ram [The infertile female who lacks secondary female sex characteristics; cf. Yebamot 1:1, Note 65. If she was married underage and failed to become an adult physically, the husband may claim that he entered the marriage thinking that she was fully female and that, therefore, the marriage transaction was in error and invalid.] may claim ketubah, or usufruct [The husband does not have to return the usufruct he had from her dowry during the existence of the marriage.] , or sustenance, or depreciation [He is not responsible to replace depreciated goods brought as her dowry.] . But if he married her from the start as a she-ram, she has claim to her ketubah [Not only ketubah, but all other payments due to the divorcee or widow, since the marriage certainly was valid.] . A widow [married] to the High Priest [The High Priest is forbidden to marry her (Lev. 21:14); she is not forbidden to marry him but she is barred from eating sanctified food and her children are desecrated from the priesthood. By biblical decree, she and her children are desecrated. This is punishment. Her marriage is biblically valid; there is no rabbinic reason to deny her the ketubah and the benefits accruing automatically to a wife.] , a divorcee or one who had received ḥalîṣah to a common priest [He is forbidden to marry her (Lev. 21:7); she is not forbidden to marry him but she is barred from eating sanctified food and her children are desecrated from the priesthood.] , a bastard or Gibeonite girl to an Israel, an Israel girl married to a bastard or Gibeonite [The bastard is forbidden by biblical law to marry an Israelite girl (Deut. 23:3, cf. Yebamot 1:5 Note 176; 4:15 Note 211), the Gibeonite by an old popular tradition ascribed to King David (Yebamot 2:4, Note 72). By Mishnah Qiddušin 3:14, in both cases the children inherit the status of the partner with the lower status.] , have claim to ketubah.
HALAKHAH: “Neither the orphan girl, nor the secondarily prohibited, nor the she-ram,” etc. One understands the secondarily prohibited and the she-ram. The orphan? Does an orphan not have ketubah? Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi J̣oḥanan: Explain it for an orphan who repudiated [The orphaned underage girl who was married off by her mother or brothers, who repudiated her husband before reaching adulthood (cf. Yebamot 1:2, Note 118). By walking out, she (Yebamot Mishnah 13:4). In all Babli mss. and in all Mishnah mss. of the Babylonian tradition, instead of “the orphan” one reads outright הַמְמָאֵנֶת “the repudiating”. Cf. The Babylonian Talmud with Variant Readings, Kethuboth II, p. תיד, Note 59. The Yerushalmi version must have been the original one since the Babli, 100b, discusses whether the Mishnah implies that no minor can claim a ketubah.] . Rebbi Ayvo bar Naggari, Rebbi Immi: Just as they fined her, so they fined him. In which respect? That if he preliminarily married her by [giving her] a pound of gold, he loses it all.
[From here to the end of the Halakhah, this is Halakhah Yebamot 9:4, variant readings noted י, explained there in Notes 31–53.] “No usufruct.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, that he has from her only the usufruct. Rebbi Yose the Sidonian stated before Rebbi Jeremiah, in disgreement with Rebbi Jeremiah: “He has the right to what she finds and earns, and to dissolve her vows.” What means “no usufruct”? That she cannot reclaim from him the usufruct he had [from her property].
Rebbi Yose said: All the time my teacher Rebbi Hila told me, state in your baraita that he inherits from her and defiles himself for her. We have also stated so: A man defiles himself for his qualified wife but does not become defiled for his disqualified wife.
Rebbi Reuben asked before Rebbi Mana: May the slaves of a secondarily forbidden [wife] eat heave? He said to him, be quiet, it is better for you. She eats but her slaves do not eat.
There, we have stated: “A forced bill of divorce is valid in Israel [The heirs informed her falsely that a rabbi of reputation wanted to marry her.] ; it is invalid from Gentiles. [Fraudulent information by an interested party is counted as forced deal for the victim.] ” Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him, up to 30 days he shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?
What is the difference between these and those? Since these are words of the Torah and the words of the Torah [do not] [Missing in Ketubot; considered a scribal error since it is implied by the later quote.] need support, therefore they have ketubah. Those, because they are words of the Sopherim and the words of the Sopherim need support, therefore they do not have ketubah. Some want to say since these are punished together with the child, they did not fine them, therefore they have ketubah. Those, since they are not punished together with the child, they fined them, therefore they do not have ketubah. What is the difference between them? He who remarried his divorced wife after she had remarried. For him who says since these are words of the Torah, and this case is a word of the Torah, therefore she has ketubah. For him who says since these are punished together with the child, this one, since neither she nor the child is punished, therefore, she has no ketubah.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said that Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila say that they differ about sustenance. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may demand sustenance. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, one says to him, divorce her! And you say so? They wanted to say, for him who says they differ about the conditions attached to a ketubah, Rebbi Joḥanan said, she has the ketubah stipulations. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, everybody agrees that she cannot claim support since they even punished her heirs, so much more herself. But for him who says that they differ about sustenance, it follows that they do not differ about the stipulations of a ketubah. They fined her, but did not fine her heirs.