MISHNAH: If somebody in divorcing his wife says to her: Herewith you are permitted to any man except Mr. X, Rebbi Eliezer permits [He permits the wife to remarry; the Sages prohibit since they reject the possibility of a divorce which permits control of the divorced wife by the former husband.] but the Sages prohibit. What should he do? He should take the document back from her and deliver it again while saying, herewith you are permitted to any man. If he had written the condition [Which restricts the divorcee in the choice of her future husband.] in the document it would be invalid even if he had later erased it.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody in divorcing his wife,” etc. Rebbi Ilai [In the Babli (82b) this is ascribed to R. Yannai. There, the objection is that “she became another man’s” could be interpreted as “she became any other man’s”.] said, the reason of Rebbi Eliezer: “She left his house, went, and became another man’s [Deut. 24:2.] ”, even if he did permit her only to one other man. This argument proves more than the Mishnah [By the mathematical principlequi nimium probat nihil probat, R. Ilai’s argument proves nothing.] ! The Mishnah said if she was permitted to all but forbidden to one other man; the argument is that he forbade her to all but permitted her only to one other man. What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? Death permits and divorce permits. Since death permits only partially [The pool of possible marriage partners available to a widow is smaller than the pool which was available to the same woman before her marriage since she is forbidden any close relatives of her deceased husband.] , so the bill of divorce permits only partially [Since the divorce does not remove the incest prohibitions, it seems possible that the husband can add prohibitions of his own.] . What is the reason of the rabbis? “She left his house, went, and became another man’s”; it brackets marriage and divorce. Since her divorce is without participation of a third party, so her marriage must be without participation of a third party [If the former husband could impose marriage restrictions on his former wife, her remarriage would be subject to the former husband’s edict. This would create a kind of polyandry.] .
[Different versions of the following discussions are in the Babli, 83a/b, Tosephta 7:1–5, Sifry Deut. 269.] After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death [He rejects all the following arguments (as does the Babli, except an argument attributed to R. Eleazar ben Azariah not mentioned in the Yerushalmi.)] . Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] [Missing in the text; to be added from the parallel attributed to R. Jeremiah.] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage [If the prohibited man was the only brother of the deceased husband, the widow should have to marry him but she is prohibited by the former husband’s stipulation. In the Babylonian sources (Note 10) the conclusion is stated explicitly that “this is no cutting loose” (referring to the bill of divorce which in Deut. 24:1 is called “scroll of cutting loose” the wife from the husband’s power. This really refers to the rabbis’ argument, Note 9.)] ? Does it not turn out that he [The first husband would in effect stipulate that his ex-wife cannot fulfill the commandment of the levirate marriage.] stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah [If the uncle married to the niece died childless, the widow clearly is forbidden to marry her own father in levirate. But the possibility of a marriage of the niece to the uncle is one of the doctrines of Pharisaic Judaism, in contrast to the Sadducees (cf. Introduction to Tractate Yebamot.)] . Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him [In fact, the greater part of Tractate Yebamot is devoted to cases where levirate marriage is impossible.] . But here, he forbids to him [The first husband forbids levirate marriage to the brother of the second husband.] ! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer [Mishnah Yebamot 1:1 enumerates 15 categories of women who are forbidden levirate and, in the opinion of the House of Hillel, automatically free their co-wives from levirate. According to R. Eliezer, should one not add the woman who married the brother of a man forbidden to her by divorce stipulation?] ? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him [The first husband forbids levirate marriage to the brother of the second husband.] ! Rebbi Jeremiah [It seems that this has to read “R. Simeon ben Eleazar” (Tosephta 7:5.)] asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade [This is a non sequitur. It seems that one has to read with the Tosephta: “She went and married an unrelated person who then divorced her unconditionally”, i. e., the second husband by his divorce annulled the condition of the first divorce.] ? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited [The condition “except Mr. X” according to R. Eliezer refers only to the next marriage of the divorcee. If the divorcee married according to the stipulation and then the second marriage is dissolved either by divorce or by the husband’s death, the widow or divorcee is free to marry anybody she wishes. The Babli agrees with this interpretation, 83a, which shows that R. Tarphon’s objection cannot be sustained.] . Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage [R. Eliezer, who declares the divorce valid, will insist that the first remarriage satisfy the first husband’s condition.] .
Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody [His argument is the same in the Babylonian sources (Note 10). It is difficult to accept the statement at face value.] . Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim [The situation would be paradoxical in that the divorcee would be forbidden to all Cohanim (Lev. 21:7) except the Cohen to whom she was forbidden since for him she is a widow who is forbidden only to the High Priest. (One might ask why a man would forbid his divorcee to a Cohen since she is forbidden to him anyhow.)] ? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow [The lengthy amplification refers to the prior case that the person whom the divorcee could not marry was a Cohen, forbidden to her in any case.] ? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce [As a married woman she was forbidden to everybody except her husband; as a divorcee she is permitted to most men.] , would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman [This is an involved argument repeating the paradoxical situation described in Note 24.] ? Even him did the divorce touch [The arguments of Notes 24, 27 are to be rejected. A divorcee who cannot be married is still a divorcee; the argument of R. Aqiba is invalid.] . Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden [To the High Priest.] even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect [Forbidden to the rank-and-file Cohen. The sentence is an amplification of the argument of Note 28.] that was permitted by her divorce.
Another argument [In the Babli, 83a, this argument also is attributed to R. Aqiba.] : “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died [In the Babli: “died or divorced her.” This is implied by the sequel here also.] ; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards [The third marriage violates the conditions of the first divorce. If the first divorce is invalidated, the second marriage retroactively becomes adulterous and the children bastards. The argument does not disprove R. Eliezer’s position; it shows that from a practical point of view, that position should not be tolerated.] ?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden [Contrary to what was asserted in the name of R. Eliezer (Note 21), a later divorce or widowhood does not eliminate the conditions of the first divorce.] . Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous [He doubts that anybody can agree that the second husband, who contracted his marriage within the parameters of the first divorce, can become an adulterer without his knowledge by an action of the wife after his death or after a divorce.] ? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated [Even according to the Babli which holds that any expression “on condition that” means “from today, on condition that”, Mr. X is barred from marrying the divorcee as long as he had not slept with her since she is not yet divorced and, therefore, unable to contract any marriage. Therefore, when he goes to bed with the divorcee, it is an adulterous act. But at the moment of penetration, the condition of the divorce is satisfied and the aspect of adultery has disappeared. This is just the opposite of the situation which caused discomfort to R. Shammai. (Rashba, Novellae ad 84a.)] .
Rebbi Joḥanan said [Here starts the discussion of the statement by the Mishnah, that the husband cannot simply annul the condition he had imposed but has to take the bill back and bodily deliver it while declaring his ex-wife free to marry any man she chooses.] , the practice follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said [Chapter 8, Note 27; Babli 78a.] it never is a bill of divorce unless he declares at the moment of delivery: “This is your bill of divorce.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yannai: There is not even a hint of invalidity on her [An imperfect bill of divorce will nevertheless make the woman a divorcee according to the rules of the priesthood. Only a bill which clearly is null and void does not have this consequence (and if the woman became a widow before a corrected version could be delivered to her, she would be able to marry a Cohen.) In Yerushalmi language, the invalid bill implies no “hint of invalidity” for the woman. In Babli terminology (86b), there is “no hint of a bill of divorce” on the document (רִיחַ הַגֵּט אֵין בּוֹ).] . Cahana said, this implies that they did not worry [The Tanna of the Mishnah accepts the statement of R. Yannai that the document delivered with the exclusion of a possible marriage partner is null and void. (In the Babli, 84b, R. Joḥanan in the name of Cahana adopts the position here described as R. Aḥa’s.)] . If they did worry, might he not have said “you are permitted to any man” when it was still in her hand [If the delivery were valid to disqualify the woman from marrying a Cohen, it also should be valid for a full divorce upon a public disclaimer by the husband of the condition imposed.] ? Rebbi Aḥa said, this implies that they did worry [The Tanna of the Mishnah must reject the statement of R. Yannai. The Babli agrees, 84b.] . If they did not worry, could he not divorce by any power he has to divorce [He also rejects the determination of R. Joḥanan that the Mishnah follows R. Simeon ben Eleazar. The fact that the Mishnah requires the husband to retake possession of the bill after the wife already had it in her hand means that the wife already had acquired the bill, became forbidden to a Cohen, and, therefore, a simple statement by the husband would be invalid. (Rashi’s explanation, 84b).] ?
Rebbi Ze‘ira said: Shila bar Binah stated: Anything which is invalid containing a condition if delivered on condition is also invalid [This refers to the last statement in the Mishnah, that the condition written in the bill of divorce invalidates the bill. It is stated as a general principle that any condition, which written in the bill will invalidate it, also invalidates if not written but imposed orally at the time of the delivery. (The Babli, 84b, takes the opposite track: A written condition invalidates if and only if it invalidates if imposed orally. The Babli invalidates any condition formulated using the term “except” but validates every “on condition that”. This is foreign to the Yerushalmi.)] .
MISHNAH: “You are permitted to any man except to my father and your father, to my brother and your brother, to a slave, a Gentile,” or anybody she is unable to contract a preliminary marriage with [An unmarried woman can contract preliminary marriage with any Jewish man except those connections forbidden as incestuous relations which are deadly sins. Marriage is also impossible with Gentiles and slaves. A divorce stipulation which forbids no marriage possible under the law is empty.] , it is valid. “You are permitted to any man except as a widow to the High Priest, a divorcee or one having received ḥalȋṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite girl to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a a bastard or a Gibeonite [All these are subsumed under “holiness prohibitions”, enumerated in Mishnah Yebamot 2:4.] ,” or anybody she could contract a preliminary marriage with even if it is sinful [Including common law “commandment prohibitions,” Mishnah Yebamot 2:4.] , it is invalid [Since for the rabbis who oppose R. Eliezer, any bill of divorce is invalid if it restricts the pool of legal marriage partners of the divorcee.] . The essence [The required text.] of the bill of divorce: You are herewith permitted to any man. Rebbi Jehudah says: This shall be for you from me a divorce scroll and a letter of abandonment, to enable you to marry any man you desire. The essence of the bill of manumission: You are a free person, you are on your own.
HALAKHAH: “The essence of the bill of divorce: You are herewith permitted to any man,” etc. Rebbi Aḥa said: “Cutting off”, the Torah did not choose the term “cutting off” except to refer to a person with whom a marriage is possible [This really refers to Mishnah 2 and explains why the prohibition of impossible relations does not invalidate the bill of divorce. The bill is called “a scroll of cutting off” in Deut. 24:1,3. If marriage was not possible, it cannot be dissolved.] .
Rebbi Mana said: He has to be careful not to say “וְדִין”. [While the usual spelling of “this” is דֵין, in the divorce document the spelling must be defective so it cannot be read as וְדִין “by law” implying that the husband would not consider a divorce unless forced by some law. This would invalidate the divorce. The Babli, 85b, has a long list of similar spelling rules.] Rebbi Mana asked: “You are on your own” [Is that an acceptable formula for a divorce? The obvious negative answer is not given.] ? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one must say: “You are a free person, you are on your own. [In a bill of manumission, both expressions are required. The Mishnah (with a very slight change in wording) supports this by stating both expressions in parallel, not connected by “or”.] ” The Mishnah said so: “You are a free person, you are on your own.”
MISHNAH: Three kinds of bills of divorce are invalid [They are invalid only because they violate customary rules, not because of biblical precepts. The woman is forbidden to remarry on the strength of such a bill, but if she did marry, the second marriage and its offspring are legitimate.] , but if she married, the child is legitimate: If he wrote in his own handwriting but it was not signed by witnesses [The witnesses which validate the divorce are those present at the delivery. For the document itself, one can apply the principle valid for I.O.U’s: “The signature of the debtor is worth 100 witnesses.”] ; it was signed by witnesses but is not dated [According to all opinions, the dating of a bill of divorce is a rabbinic requirement (cf. Chapter 2, Note 32, Chapter 4, Note 64).] ; it is dated but only one witness signed it [Even if the document was in the husband’s handwriting, one witness alone is not sufficient to let the divorcee remarry without trouble.] . These are three invalid kinds of bills of divorce, but if she married, the child is legitimate.
HALAKHAH: “You are permitted to any man,” etc. [The entire Halakhah is copied from Yebamot 3:9, Notes 122-136 (י). It is inserted here at the wrong place since its topic is Mishnah 4, as explained in detail in Yebamot. The text here was copied negligently.] There really is no questionable divorce here. What are questionable qiddušin? As we have stated there: If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, those are questionable qiddušin. And here, if he threw the divorce document to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that is a questionable divorce.
Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ḥalaphta from Haifa: Any who were married on the basis of such a document should not leave [Judicial confirmation of the genuineness of a document does not have to be written immediately below the signatures of the witnesses; it can be anywhere on the document. The Babli, Baba batra 163b, forbids any space between signatures and confirmation, not even one line.] in order not to give a bad reputation to her children. His daughter who was married outside on the basis of such a document should not leave in order to damage her co-wife to her father. Her co-wife who was married outside on the basis of such a document has to leave. His daughter who married his brother [on the basis of such a document has to leave. Her co-wife who was married to his brother] [Necessary text added from Yebamot, missing here.] on the basis of such a document, or even to her father, should not leave.
It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents can be collected only from unincumbered property, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. [But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect. Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed,] [Necessary text added from Yebamot, missing here.] he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership. Rebbi Abina said, because it is invalid And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abin asked, so far, if the old man took the loan [and the old man mortgaged. But if the old man took the loan and the son mortgaged,] [Necessary text added from Yebamot, missing here.] can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun asked, was it not stated: The same holds for bills of divorce? Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid.
“Three kinds of bills of divorce are invalid,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: All in handwriting [The bill can only be used in an emergency if it was in the husband’s handwriting in all three cases.] . Rebbi Eleazar asked: There are witnesses; why do I need handwriting [He questions why the middle case of a signed but undated bill needs to be the husband’s autograph to be valid. He is reported in the same sense in the Babli, 86b.] ? Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: All in handwriting except if its witnesses are with it [Supporting R. Eleazar. A similar statement is in the Babli, 86a/b. Samuel’s opinion, that the husband’s autograph is needed only in the first case, has no parallel in the Yerushalmi.] . Rav Hamnuna said, they testified to their own sin since they agreed to lie by signing on an undated bill of divorce [He supports R. Joḥanan. The witnesses who signed the undated document impeach themselves; their testimony can be accepted only in an emergency.] .
Rebbi Abba bar Hamnuna, Rav Ada bar Aḥa [These names are not known from any other source. It seems that one should read: Rebbi Aḥa, Rav Hamnuna, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa.] in the name of Rav: This is Rebbi Meїr’s [The Babli agrees, 86a.] . Why did you have to say this? Rebbi Mana said, since Rav Huna said in the name of Rav [Chapter 8:5, Note 71.] : “This entire Chapter is Rebbi Meїr’s except for ‘if he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city.’ ” You should not come to say that the first is Rebbi Meїr’s, the second the rabbis’ [One should not think that only Chapter 8, Mishnah 5 ff. follows R. Meїr but all of Chapter 9 follows the rabbis opposing R. Meїr (who are represented by R. Eleazar in Mishnah 9:5) who hold that all bills of divorce are validated by the witnesses to the delivery, not the signatures on the bill.] . Therefore it is necessary to say that this is Rebbi Meїr’s. Rebbi Yose said [The explanation of R. Mana is far-fetched.] , since Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar, that you should not be led to say the same here. Therefore it is necessary to say that this is Rebbi Meїr’s.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Eleazar says, it [One of the irregular bills of divorce mentioned in the preceding Mishnah.] is valid even if there are no signatures of witnesses on it if only he delivered it in the presence of witnesses; and she can use it to collect from encumbered property [The testimony of the witnesses to the delivery will enable the divorcee to request the court to foreclose property if the husband is unwilling or unable to pay her ketubah. Cf. Mishnah 4:3.] . For the witnesses sign on the bill of divorce only for the public good [The public good is that the divorcee is much less likely to become a burden on public charity if her claims on her ex-husband are documented rather than dependent on the testimony of witnesses who may or may not be available to testify.] .
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eleazar says, it is valid even if there are no signatures of witnesses on it,” etc. Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: The words of the Sages: It is invalid. There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan about a Cohen’s wife and he wanted to act on Rebbi Yannai’s statement [He wanted to declare the bill of divorce as nonexistent and permit the divorcee to return to her Cohen husband.] when it was heard that Rav and Samuel disagreed. There came before him [another case] involving an Israel, and he listened to that [He accepted the unsigned bill of divorce as valid and empowered the wife to collect her ketubah.] . Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, in the opinion of everybody it is valid. But did not Rebbi Eleazar say, it is valid [If a name is attached to the statement it proves that it cannot be a unanimous opinion. The opposing, unnamed, rabbis must hold that the bill is invalid.] , and the rabbis say, it is invalid? What is their disagreement? Rebbi Eleazar said, it is valid and she can collect from encumbered property [If the husband is unable to pay her ketubah and if he sold real estate during the marriage, the wife’s lien on that real estate was not broken by the sale and she can foreclose from the buyer.] . The rabbis said, it is invalid and she can collect only from unencumbered property [The bill of divorce is not usable in money matters; the divorcee’s claim does not have the status of a prior mortgage, which can also be enforced against the innocent buyer, but that of an undocumented loan which on the testimony of witnesses can be enforced against the debtor (in this case, the ex-husband) but not against a buyer of real property (who could not have discovered the existence of the debt by a title search.)] .
MISHNAH: If two men sent two identical bills of divorce [Two men, both called X ben Y, living in the same town, divorce their wives, both called Z bat U, living in the same town.] which became mixed up [They were written be the same scribe and entrusted to the same agent.] , one delivers both to both women. Therefore, if one of them was lost, the second became unusable.
HALAKHAH: “If two men sent two identical bills of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose asked before Rebbi Yose: Just as you say that a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce is invalid in the case of two wives [This refers to Halakhah 3:1, where a man has two wives with identical names. If he writes two bills of divorce without specifying to whom it applies, he can divorce neither of his wives, not even if he delivers both bills to both of them.] , similarly two bills of divorce should be invalid for two women. He answered, that is correct. He said to him, but did we not state: “If two men sent two identical bills of divorce and they became mixed up, one delivers both to both women”? There [“There” is here, in the case of Mishnah 9:6.] , each of the bills was written in the name of the respective wife; the mix-up caused the problem. But here [The question raised, which refers to Mishnah 3:1.] , neither one was written as divorce in her name; when it was delivered, could it be considered as divorce in her name from the start?
MISHNAH: If five wrote collectively a bill of divorce [There is only one text; at the point where the names of the persons involed are to be declared, five different couples are mentioned.] , the man A divorces B and C D [The Halakhah will point out that the verb “to divorce” is not repeated.] and the witnesses sign at the end, all are valid and [the bill] shall be delivered to each of them. If one wrote the text separately for each of them and the witnesses sign at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid [Since the witnesses sign at the end of the last text, that text is certified. The other texts are not certified and, therefore, invalid.] .
HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. [A parallel is in S̄ebuot 5:5; the reading there are noted ש.] Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything [If a witness to any contract, including a bill of divorce, signs and appends a greeting and formulates the greeting as a sentence standing alone, his signature cannot be counted as testimony. But if he writes: “and I am greeting”, he makes clear that his signature refers to the entire document. The same statement (R. Abbahu in the name of R. Joḥanan) is in the Babli, 87a.] ; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything [This opinion is not mentioned in the Babli.] . What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan [Referring to the Mishnah. How must a collective bill of divorce be formulated to be valid?] ? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A [This statement is ambiguous since no further details are given about R. Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion. It is obvious from Halakhah 3:1 that a text which mentions men and women separately, “we X and Z divorce our wives Y and U” is biblically invalid since (a) one cannot divorce two women with one statement and (b) it is not clear which woman was married to which man. One has to assume that the text was something like: “we X and Z divorce our wives, X Y and Z U,” with mention of place and date.] . Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately [If the language is “X divorces Y and Z divorces U”, there can be no collective bill of divorce. It still can be written on one sheet but it must spell out in full that X divorces Y and frees her to marry any man she choses, Z divorces U and frees her to marry any man she choses, and each statement has to be separately validated by two witnesses.] . The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening [Mishnah Nedarim 9:7. The quote is incorrect. The Mishnah states that if each vow separately is declared as qorban, it will have to be annulled separately. One has to read: “a qorbān for this one, a qorbān for that one”. This Mishnah supports R. Ze‘ira’s interpretation of R. Joḥanan’s position.] .” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text [And using a separate sentence containing the verb “to divorce” for each couple represents a separate text for each divorce.] for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr [The same statement is in Šebuot 5:5 (36c 1. 4), Babli 38a. It refers to Mishnah Šebuot 5:5: “Give me my wheat, barley, and spelt, (expressed in the plural) which you are holding!” “An oath that I am holding nothing of yours”, he is guilty only once (if he swore falsely). “An oath that I am not holding any wheat, or barley, or spelt (expressed in the plural) of yours”, he is guilty for every statement. Rebbi Meїr says, even if he said “wheat, or barley, or spelt (expressed in the collective singular)”, he is guilty for every statement. In a baraita (Babli Šebuot 38a, Qiddušin 25a; quoted in Yerushalmi Qiddušin 2:1, 62b 1. 76) R. Meїr states that for a general statement in a false oath he is guilty only once, for a detailed statement he is guilty for every particular item. R. Jehudah notes that if a person is sued simultaneously by several people (Mishnah Šebuot 5:3) and he falsely swears that he owes “not to you, nor to you, nor to you”, he is guilty for every single statement. Samuel notes that what is a general statement for one may be a detailed statement for another.] . [Rebbi] [From the text in Šebuot. The Giṭṭin text cannot be correct since the first generation Samuel cannot quote the fourth generation R. Ze‘ira.] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything [Since in the baraita, R. Jehudah is mentioned as differing from R. Meїr, the question arises whether for R. Meїr there is a difference between a denial of a debt “to you, to you, to you” and “to you, and to you, and to you”. In the first case, there might be three denials, in the second case, there is only one. The implications for R. Jehudah would be the opposite.] ? How is this [As the parallel shows, this interjection should be deleted.] ? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there [Mishnah Šebuot 5:5. The omission of תמן “there” in the parallel text is appropriate.] : “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement [Which must have been “wheat, barley, spelt” without connectives.] . How is this [As the parallel shows, this interjection should be deleted.] ? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] [The necessary inserted text is from Šebuot.] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars [Since there are three particulars, he is obligated for three separate purificatioon offerings.] . [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars [It is one connected statement which, if false, constitutes one sin.] .
MISHNAH: If he wrote two bills of divorce side by side and two Hebrew-writing witnesses signed from one column to the next, and two Greek-writing witnesses signed from one column to the next, the one whose witnesses are read with it is valid. If one Hebrew- and one Greek-writing witness are under each of them, reaching from one column to the other, all are invalid [The scribe wrote two bills of divorce in two parallel columns. When the witnesses came to sign, they used the space under both columns. Then only the bill whose witnesses sign directly under it is valid since for the other bill the first witness is at least two lines too far away to be counted. The additional complication is that the Hebrew text starts at the right but the Greek text on the left. For example: bill bill יצחק בן אברהם משה בן עמרם Ενως υἱὸς Σηθ Σημ υἰὸς Νωε In this case, if the first two signatures apply to the bill on the right hand side, that bill is valid. If they applied to the bill at the left, both bills would be invalid since the bill is read from the left but the signatures from the right. If each bill carries two signatures, one to be read from the right, the other from the left: bill bill יצחק בן אברהם Ενως υἱὸς Σηθ משה בן עמרם Σημ υἰὸς Νωε no bill can be read with its signatures and both are invalid. If both Hebrew signatures belong to one bill and both Greek to the other, both bills are still invalid since the second signature is only on the fourth line.] .
HALAKHAH: “If he wrote two bills of divorce side by side,” etc. [There is a parallel in Baba batra 10:1, noted ב. Even though this is evidently from a different edition, the text (except for the last two lines) is close enough to be considered identical. The text is Tosephta 7:11 (Babli Baba batra 162b).] “It is invalid if the witnesses are separated from the text by the width of two lines; less than that it is valid” [The witnesses cannot sign directly after the text since then they would not appear as witnesses. In commercial contracts, the distance cannot be two full lines since then the holder of the document could insert a line of text at the end after the signing. Since a commercial contract is invalid if the witnesses are too far from the text, the same standard is applied for bills of divorce and manumission.] . [A corresponding rule holds for lacunae in the text: Chapter 3:2, Notes 68, 69.] Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An empty space of two lines in a text about one subject [The text in Baba batra reads: “Another subject”. The parallel in 3:2 shows that this is an editorial difference, not a scribal error.] makes invalid in any case. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said: The Mishnah says so: “One Hebrew- and one Greek-writing witness are under each of them, reaching from one column to the other, are all invalid.” Is not Hebrew combined with Greek one item [In Baba batra: “Is Hebrew relative to Greek not another subject?” The text here is preferable since for a single bill on a sheet of paper it is perfectly acceptable to have one witness sign in Hebrew and the other in Greek or Roman letters. The bills are invalid only because the signatures would be separated by more than one line, not because they are in different alphabets (cf. Tosephta ki F shutah Giṭṭin p. 910).] ? Rebbi Mana said, if he started at the end of the second line and ended at the fourth line, it is valid [If the first witness does not start to sign at the start of the second line but towards its end, extending his signature to the third line and forcing the second witness to write his patronymic on the fourth line, the document is valid since it cannot be adulterated.] . [Tosephta 7:11–12; an extended version is quoted in Baba batra.] “How far from the text should the witnesses sign? That they can be read with it, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, one full line. Rebbi Dositheos ben Yannai [In Baba batra erroneously: Dositheos ben Jehudah.] says, the width of the witnesses’ handwriting.” What kind of writing does one use to estimate? Rebbi Yasa ben Rebbi Sabbatai [In Baba batra correctly: R. Yasa in the name of R. Sabbatai.] says, the width of the witnesses’ handwriting [In Baba batra: The largest of the writing of the scribe or one of the witnesses. This seems to be from the editors of Neziqin; the text here implies that the two lines are judged by the larger of the signatures. The Babli, Baba batra 163a, explicitly states that the handwriting of the scribe is irrelevant.] . Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Isaac ben Ḥaqula: Corresponding to לך ולך [The empty line must be large enough as to accomodate separately the height of ל and the bottom of ך. The Babli agrees, Baba batra 163a.] . Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does the signature of Yose ben Yannai have equal weight with the signature of Shaul ben Barukh [It seems that it was acceptable if ב was written for “son of”. In that case, “Yose ben Yannai” had no lengths above and below the line, but “Shaul ben Barukh” had both.] ? He said to him: For that it is needed, that the signature of Yose ben Yannai has equal weight with the signature of Shaul ben Barukh [In judging a document, the actual signatures count, not theoretical distances. It might be that “Yose ben Yannai” uses up more space than “Shaul ben Barukh”.] .
A document which has an erasure or insertion in its main part [Where the parties are identified and the sums of money specified.] is invalid; in the routine matter it is valid; but if it was mentioned later [Reference is made to the erasure or the addition before the last line of text.] it is valid even in the main part. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, one has to mention it at least in the second line before the end of the text. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav: One has to mention the essence of the document with it [In justifying erasure or addition, the purpose has to be stated.] . Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: If one did not mention the essence of the document with it [This sentence is incomplete. The following discussion shows that one has to add: “it is invalid.”] . The argument of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There, Rebbi Ba said in the name of Rav Jeremiah: Disqualified witnesses do not constitute remote testimony since they came only to support the document’s validity [If the first lines after the contract text were filled with the signatures of people invited for reasons other than testimony and the real witnesses sign only later, one validates the document even though the real signatures start more than one line after the text.] . And here, he says so [If the essence of the document is not stated at the acknowledgment of a correction, the document is invalid.] ? There, in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah, here in the name of Rav.
If somebody contests the signature of the witnesses or the signature of the judges [A debtor whose property is attached following a decree of a court in another jurisdiction claims that the document is counterfeit and the signatures of the witnesses and the judges are fake.] . Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: If he wants to certify it from the handwriting of the witnesses it is certified, from the handwriting of the judges it is certified [The creditor can prove the document genuine either by proving the validity of the signatures of the witnesses or that of the judges.] ; I am saying [R. Abba adds that only two signatures have to be verified; they can also be those of one witness and one judge.] that even from one witness and one judge it is certified. If he gave permission to the scribe to write and to the witnesses to sign, Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jeremiah: The witnesses have to write: “This loan is from the first of Nisan but we wrote at a later date.” [The debtor told the scribe and witnesses to execute a document of indebtedness. If it was not written on the same day, the fact has to be noted on the document even though a postdated document is valid (only a predated one is invalid). The Babli, Baba batra 170b, confirms the statement but notes that it is not enforced.] Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: The confirmation of the judges is valid even if it is at some distance [Judicial confirmation of the genuineness of a document does not have to be written immediately below the signatures of the witnesses; it can be anywhere on the document. The Babli, Baba batra 163b, forbids any space between signatures and confirmation, not even one line.] . Rebbi Mana said, is that correct? Could he then not certify from one handwriting [R. Mana’s argument is that of the Babli: If there is an empty space, the creditor could insert text in between and create a fake document with genuine signatures.] ? Rav said: The judges have to write: We certified this in the presence of X and Y. Why? So they can be convicted of perjury [The root זמם, used to describe perjury, really means “to devise (a plot)”. It is used in Deut. 19:16–21 to characterize the perjurer. In Talmudic theory, a wrong testimony is not usually perjured testimony; it is up to the court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Perjury is impossible testimony, i. e., the witnesses pretend to have seen things they could not have seen since they were not present at the place at the time indicated. This leads to the notion that the validity of a document could be tested only if the exact time and place of the signing were indicated in the document.] . But then also on which date, at which time, at which place? A judgment was given before Rav and this was not written [It was executed by the signatures of the judges alone.] . Rebbi Ḥaggai said: The judges have to know the parties. It happened that they falsified [A case of identity theft, where the signatures of the witnesses and the judges were all genuine but the presumed debtor gave a false identity, so that an innocent third party was hit with a decree of payment.] .
MISHNAH: It is valid if some of the text remained and was written in the second column [The scribe folded the sheet so that it formed two columns. He then used both columns for the text. The witnesses then signed at the end. (The Babli, 88a, points out that this is valid only if the parchment or paper was folded, not if the two columns were glued together since they originally might have been parts of two different documents.)] , with the witnesses signing below. If the witnesses signed on top of the page, or at the sides [The signatures are disregarded unless they are affixed at the end of the document, exactly one line from the end of the text.] , or on the other side for a simple document [In contrast to a sealed document.] , it is invalid. If [two bills of divorce] start at the same place [Two bills written on the same sheet, one from the middle to the bottom, the other from the middle to the top. The signatures do not belong to either text.] and the witnesses are in the middle, both are invalid. If the start of one bill is next to the end of the other and the witnesses are at the end, the bill whose witnesses are read with the end is valid. A bill of divorce written in Hebrew with its witnesses signing in Greek, written in Greek with its witnesses signing in Hebrew, or one witness signing in Hebrew and one in Greek [If there is only one document to be certified, it makes no difference if one signature is read from the right and the other from the left.] , or the scribe wrote with one witness, is valid. “X, witness” is valid. “The son of Y, witness” is valid [If the signature was recognizable as that of a certain person, the exact wording of the signature is irrelevant.] . “X the son of Y”, but he did not write “witness”, is valid. If he wrote his or her surname [The family name (in addition to the proper name but without the patronymic), in a society where family names were not common.] , it is valid; that is how the punctilious in Jerusalem used to write.
HALAKHAH: “If some of the text remained,” etc. What does “remained” mean? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Baibon said, e. g., “true, valid, and clear [The expression “remained” implies that most of the text was in the first column. It is now asserted that the document is valid even if only the last line is written in the second column, in which the husband asserts that the contents of the bill conform to his wishes. (The Babylonian formulary has only the words “valid and true”.) Cf. M.A. Friedman, Jewish Marriage in Palestine (Tel Aviv 1980) Vol. 1, p. 478, Note 112.] .”
And what is invalid for a simple document is valid for a “knotted” one if it is on the back [Cf. Chapter 8:12 for the rules of simple and sealed (knotted) documents.] .
[In the ms., Halakhah 10 starts only at 50d, line 12.] Rav said: Judges may sign even if they cannot read, but no witnesses may sign unless they know how to read [If judges sign the document, they only certify that it was presented to them and they attest to the genuineness of the signatures. Therefore, judges who do not know Greek can certify Aramaic signatures on a Greek document. But the witnesses testify to the genuineness of the document and they may be called to testify about its meaning; they are prohibited from signing unless they can read and understand it. In the Babli, Ketubot 109a/b, the rule is attributed to R. Ḥiyya, Rav’s uncle.] . He said, such should come over me [An oath; the speaker invokes all kinds of bad things which should happen to him if he ever did what he denies doing.] if I ever acted thus [He never acted on what he permitted in theory.] . Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Did no Greek document come before Rav that he could confirm it by its signatures [Since Rav exercised jurisdiction only in Babylonia, it is quite possible than no Greek document ever came before him.] ? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “A bill of divorce written in Hebrew with its witnesses signing in Greek, written in Greek with its witnesses signing in Hebrew, or one witness signing in Hebrew and one in Greek, is valid [Does this not mean that the witness signing in Greek did not know Hebrew and vice-versa?] .” He explains that they knew how to read but not how to sign; or if they knew both [languages], they could sign in either one of their choice.
Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion [The Mishnah which lets the witnesses sign in any way they choose, if only their signatures are characteristic for them.] . Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is Rebbi Jehudah’s [Who in Mishnah 3 requires a lengthy text.] . Rebbi Yose said, you should not infer that the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan is that he differs, but he answered him following his argument. Lengthwise [Mishnah 9 speaks of the case that the sheet containing the bill was folded lengthwise, with the two columns then in parallel. This may be ascribed to R. Jehudah who in Mishnah 3 requires that the text be very specific in detailing the divorce. The editio princeps reads instead of לאורכו two words לא רבו and takes it together with the next statement: לא רבו דו אמא: “Was it not his teacher who said”, viz., one supports R. Yose, who is quoted in Chapter 3, Note 66, that his teacher R. Jeremiah quoted his own teacher R. Ze‘ira to the effect that one does not have to worry that two men, both called X ben Y, divorce their wives, both called A bat B, at the same place on the same day. Therefore, one does not have to worry either that a person whose characteristic signature consists only of one word be taken for another person.] . That is what he said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Since pairing is infrequent, there was no pairing. So is the Mishnah: “If the scribe wrote with one witness, is it valid [J. N. Epstein ( מבוא לנוסח המשנה, p. 476–477) notes that in most documents from the Genizah, at the end the scribe appended his own name. The Mishnah admits this declaration as testimony to the genuineness of the document. This is rejected by the Babli, 88a, in the name of R. Jeremiah. Cf. M.A. Friedman, Jewish Marriage in Palestine Vol. 1, p. 489.] . “X” is valid. “The son of Y” is valid [If the signature was recognizable as that of a certain person, the exact wording of the signature is irrelevant.] . “X the son of Y” but he did not write “witness”, is valid [In the revised version, no witness has to declare that he signs as a witness; his signature at the correct place automatically justifies it.] . If he wrote his or her surname, it is invalid [Evrybody, including J. N. Epstein, considers this as a scribal error for “valid”. But it might mean that the family name alone, without a proper name, is invalid.] . Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even if he wrote “he is it [Reading אִינּוֹ for הִנּוֹ. This is acceptable as a signature as long as it was written in a characteristic way that would be difficult to counterfeit, more or less in the tradition of Sephardic rabbinical signatures through the ages.] ”, it is valid. Rebbi Abbahu wrote א. Rav Ḥisda wrote ס. [Probably in a very convoluted manner. In the Babli, 87b, a number of rabbis are mentioned who wrote their names in the form of a picture: R. Ḥanina a palm branch, Rav a beehive, Rabba bar Rav Huna a sail (the latter was imitated in the 18th. Cent. by R. H. Y. D. Azulay.)] Samuel wrote a palm branch.
MISHNAH: A forced bill of divorce among Jews is valid [In a case where the marriage is valid but sinful.] , from Gentiles it is invalid [If the wife’s family pays Gentiles to beat up the husband or the Gentile ruler to jail the husband until he agrees to a divorce (documented in many cases from Medieval Spain), the resulting divorce is invalid.] ; but the Gentiles may whip him and tell him, do what the Jews tell you [If the rabbinic court asks the Gentile court to act on its behalf, the resulting divorce is valid.] .
HALAKHAH: “That is how the punctilious in Jerusalem used to write. A forced bill of divorce among Jews is valid, from Gentiles it is invalid”. [This paragraph is from Yebamot 9:5 (י) Notes 40–46.] Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies from the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalȋṣah in the case of a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him for up to 30 days shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?
Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Jews who forced in the manner of Gentiles make invalid [In the interpretation of Tosaphot (88b s.v. ובגוים, Baba batra 48a s.v. גט) if the forcing was executed under the supervision of a Gentile court or a Gentile ruler.] , even if he says, I shall not feed nor provide. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Gentiles who forced in the manner of Jews are valid, even if he says, I shall not feed nor provide [If the forcing is under the supervision of a rabbinic court, the divorce is valid even if the marriage is completely legitimate because the husband has no right to mistreat his wife in any way.] . Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says this: “Gentiles may tell him [This addition probably is a scribal error.] , whip him, and tell him, do what the Jews tell you to do.” Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Issy [The Babli agrees in the name of Rav (Ketubot 77a). Samuel holds that the husband has to be forced to pay but Rav asserts that one cannot require the wife “to live in the same basket with a snake” and the court has to force a divorce.] : If somebody says: “I shall not feed nor provide”, one forces him to divorce. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Abbahu: Does one force? He said to him, do you still have doubts? If one forces because of a foul smell [Mishnah Ketubot 7:10.] , so much more because of sustenance! Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Yasa came in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody says: “I shall not feed and I shall not provide”, one tells him: Either feed and provide, or divorce.
MISHNAH: If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married [If she had been unmarried, she cannot marry another man without receiving a divorce from the one to whom she is betrothed in the eyes of the public.] ; divorced, she is divorced [And could not marry a Cohen even if previously unmarried.] , except if there was an excuse. What would be an excuse? Mr. X divorced his wife conditionally [And the condition was not satisfied.] , or he threw valuables for preliminary marriage to her and it was doubtful whether it was closer to her than to him [A doubt whether a doubtful marriage was concluded has to be dismissed as irrelevant.] ; that is an excuse.
HALAKHAH: “If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married”. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If lights are burning and people talk [A person can be held married only if there was a marriage celebration and people talk about it. The same opinion is attributed to R. Joḥanan in the Babli, 89a.] . Rebbi Ze‘ira objected before Rebbi Yasa: But did we not state: “If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married; divorced, she is divorced”? Can you say that lights are burning [Since the Mishnah treats divorce as parallel to marriage and usually people do not make divorce parties, no celebration can be required.] ? No, people talk. So here also, people talk [Likewise for marriage, no testimony about festivities is required.] . Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the title was checked and found to be from the mouth of women or minors, the title is abolished [The court cannot act (to require a divorce or to prohibit marriage to a Cohen) unless it is informed by people able to appear as formal witnesses in court.] . Rav said, they permitted only in case of a hearsay witness [Rav disagrees with R. Joḥanan. If a formal proof were required, the Mishnah would be unnecessary. Therefore, only a determination of facts is needed, and women can be asked about facts. He agrees only that if the information was by hearsay and its source cannot be located, it has to be disregarded. In the Babli, 89a, Rav holds that if the source was located but cannot be asked because the informant left, one accepts the rumor as true.] .
MISHNAH: The House of Shammai say, a person should not divorce his wife unless he found her immoral, as it was said [Deut. 24:1.] : “For he found with her a matter of nakedness [If the husband had proof of her infidelity, he would by law be obligated to divorce her (cf. Soṭah 1:1, Notes 13,14). In the absence of proof, the House of Shammai counsel him to divorce her. This probably is also the interpretation to be given to Matth. 19:9 and is the basis of the disapproval of marrying a divorcee expressed in Sifry Deut. 270.] .” But the House of Hillel say, even if she spoiled his dish, as it was said: “For he found with her a bad thing [The Houses of Shammai and Hillel explain the same verse. The House of Shammai read עֶרְוַת דָּבָר as if it were (in rabbinic Hebrew) דְּבַר עֶרְוָה “a matter of nakedness (immorality)”. The House of Hillel read the construct state עֶרְוַת as a modifier of דָּבָר “thing”: an undesirable thing; e.g., being a bad cook.] .” Rebbi Aqiba said, even if he found another more beautiful than her, as it was said: “It will be if she does not appear pleasing in his eyes [Deut. 24:1.] [Even if she is beautiful in an objective way, but not beautiful in his eyes, he may divorce her. In his opinion (adopted in practice), a divorcee may be completely blameless.] , etc.”
HALAKHAH: [Soṭah 1:1, Notes 13,14.] Was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” How can the House of Shammai confirm this [In the Mishnah, the House of Shammai admit only adultery as cause of divorce. In the baraita, they admit all kinds of lewd behavior.] ? Lest you say that one divorced because of immorality is forbidden, for anothercause she would be permitted [Could be remarried by her first husband after having had a second husband.] . Rebbi Shila from Kefar-Tamarta said: The verse is difficult for the House of Shammai: “Her first husband, who had sent her away, cannot afterwards retake her. [Deut. 24:4.] ” Where do we hold? If to forbid her to him, is she not already forbidden to him [If she committed adultery, she is automatically forbidden to her husband, even if she does not remarry. The prohibition to remarry the first husband after a remarriage seems to be unnecessary for the House of Shammai.] ? But we must hold, to burden him with a prohibition [In remarrying her, the first husband would commit two sins in one act (cf. Tosaphot 90a, s.v. מה).] .
It is written [Lev. 15:33. The same argument in the Babli, Šabbat 64b, Sifra Meṣoraʻ Pereq 9(12).] : “And the unwell in her menstruation and the sufferer from gonorrhea in his flow.” The earlier Elders used to say, “she shall be in her menstruation [Lev. 15:19.] ”, she shall not use kohl nor any make-up until she comes into water. Rebbi Aqiba said to them: Is that a reason? If you say so, she makes herself ugly and he starts thinking to divorce her. It turns out that the Elders follow the House of Shammai [Since she cannot be divorced, it does not matter how she looks.] and Rebbi Aqiba the House of Hillel [In the Mishnah, R. Aqiba does not disagree with the House of Hillel; he simply takes their argument to its logical conclusion.] .