Gittin1

1MISHNAH: Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from overseas [“Overseas” stands for all places who do not have a rabbinic authority ordained by the Patriarchate in the Land of Israel or the two Academies acting on the authority of the Prince of the Diaspora in Babylonia. If one cannot be sure that all fine points of the rules of bills of divorce were followed, the court must have the possibility of examining the messenger about the details of the writing and signing of the document.] must be able to say: “It was written and signed before me.” Rabban Gamliel says, even somebody who brings from Reqam [Two places “Reqam” are mentioned as border towns in Transjordan in the description of the borders of the Land of Israel; cf. Ševi‘it 6:1, Notes 47, 51.] and Ḥeger [This place has not been identified; it is conjectured to be on the Southern border of the Land of Israel.] ; Rebbi Eliezer says, even from Kefar Ludim to Lydda [Which were close to one another but in different court districts.] ; but the Sages say that the only one who has to be able to say that it was written and signed before him is one who brings from overseas or to overseas. One who brings from one province [While in Biblical Hebrew מדינה means “province”, in Talmudic usage the word often has the late hieroglyphic, and Arabic, meaning of “capital”.] to another overseas has to say that it was written and signed before him; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, even from one district to the next.

2HALAKHAH: “Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from overseas,” etc. This is difficult. If somebody brings a gift document from overseas,would you require him to say, it was written and signed [The form נחתם is that of most Mishnah mss. and of the Babli. The form נתחתם in the Mishnah is that of several Palestinian Mishnah mss.] before me? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce [In the Babli, 2a/2b, it is pointed out that a bill of divorce has to be written for the woman to be divorced since the verse says (Deut. 24:1): “He shall write for her”. While the text of the bill must mention the names of husband and wife, it cannot be ascertained from the text whether the scribe was instructed to write the text specifically for that woman; there must be a live witness available who can be examined about this point. A second opinion notes that the signatures of the witnesses themselves would need confirmation.] . Rebbi Joḥanan said, that is a leniency lest she sit abandoned [In the Babli, 3a, this is an anonymous (unanimous) opinion. As explained in the sequel, if the husband could come later and claim the the bill of divorce was fake, no woman could ever remarry on a bill of divorce written far away for fear that her children from a second husband could retroactively be declared to be bastards; cf. Mishnah Yebamot 10:1.] . Is that a leniency? It is only a restriction, for if he does not say to her, it was written and signed before me, you do not permit her to remarry. Rebbi Yose said, the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was written and signed before me, makes it easy for her at the end. For if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void. Rebbi Mana wanted to say, a protest other than the text of the bill [E. g., if the husband claims that he had attached a condition to the bill not provided for in the bill and that the condition was not satisfied. Since the condition was not presented to the court which oversaw the delivery of the document, it cannot be considered.] . But is a protest about the text of the bill a protest which has no validity [He claims that the entire bill is fake or that there is an intrinsic defect which makes the entire document invalid.] ? Even for a protest which has validity, said Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, since you say that the reason for the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was signed before me, is to make it easy for her at the end, that if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void; this means that there is no difference whether it is a protest not about the text of the bill or about the body of the bill, a protest which has no validity, or a protest which does have validity [Since there was a witness who was cross-examined about the validity of the bill, the husband cannot be admitted to testify since when he claims to be still the husband of his divorcee he declares himself a relative by marriage who is barred from acting as a witness for or against his wife.] ! But should you worry that maybe be gave the bill to disqualified witnesses to sign [The messenger who delivers the bill might not know that the witnesses either were relatives of one of the parties or convicted felons; their signatures would invalidate the document.] ? Rebbi Abun said, he is not suspect to damage her before Heaven [For if both the local court and the wife act in good faith, Heaven will absolve her but he has sinned. Cf. Yebamot 15:4, Notes 92–93.] . Before the court he is suspect to damage her. But since he knows that if he comes and protests his protest is void, he will choose qualified witnesses to sign.

3If [the bill of divorce] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the husband’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the divorce [The question presupposes that one follows R. Joḥanan’s opinion in the preceding paragraph. The messenger who delivers the bill of divorce is a single witness who cannot validate a monetary claim. But since by tradition he has the power to validate a bill of divorce and the delivery of the bill implies authorization of the divorcee to collect her ketubah, it follows that in matters of bills of divorce the single messenger has the power to validate money claims as long as they are included in or dependent upon the bill of divorce.] ? Or, since his protest is void [only] about the divorce, is it valid about the gift [Since annulment of the special gift from the husband to his divorcee will not hinder her from remarrying, there seems to be no special reason why a single witness should make a money claim definitive.] ? We have stated later: “Bills of divorce for wives and documents of manumission are equal in the rules of carrying and bringing.” If [the document of manumission] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the master’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the manumission? Or since his protest is void [only] about the manumission, is it valid about the gift [If the document of manumission was accepted by the local court at the point of delivery, the slave upon immersion in a miqweh became a full Jew. A Jew cannot be enslaved by a fellow Jew (Lev. 25:42). The reason why the master’s protest is void has nothing to do with monetary claims; there seems to be no reason why the master cannot disclaim the gift.] ? If somebody signed all his property over to his slave [This seems to have been a common occurrence in Roman society.] , you say that the gift is the document of manumission [The essence of freedom is that a person is master of himself; the gift document transfers mastership of the slave to himself.] . How do you treat this? Is it a document of manumission and his protest is void or is it a gift and his protest is valid? This can be compared to the following: [The following is from Ketubot 11:5, explained in Notes 97–102, and Makkot 1:16. The variant readings are given in Ketubot. The messenger who delivers the document of manumission, which in this case is a document about money matters, is believed as if he were a group of two in regard of the manumission but is disqualified for the money part. All the questions asked up to this point can be answered if one decides whether to follow R. Joḥanan or R. Simeon ben Laqish.] If somebody signed all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Immi [In Ketubot: R. Yasa. Since rabbis Yasa (Assi) and Immi (Ammi) form a permanent pair in the Babli, there is no real difference in the attributions.] : Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a testimony about one person; as testimony it is totally invalid if it is partially invalid. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

4Only if he says, it was written before me during the day and signed during the day [“The day” means the day written as date in the document. Mishnah 2:2 notes that a pre-dated bill of divorce is invalid like all pre-dated documents. The bill may have been written in the night and signed the following day since the rabbinic day is counted from sundown to sundown; it cannot have been written during daytime and signed the following night since that would make it pre-dated.] ; only if he says, it was written before me especially for her and signed expressly for her [The messenger must have heard the husband tell the scribe to write a bill of divorce for his wife, mentioning her by name. The Babli agrees, 3a.] . It was asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does he have to know the names of the witnesses at the moment of their signing? He said to them, did the Gentiles Luciani sign it [If the names sound Roman, it does not mean anything. In the Babli, 11b, R. Joḥanan notes that if a Gentile name is known to be used by Jews, the matter does not have to be investigated. Examples given in the Babli are Λύκος “wolf”, a frequent substitute for Benjamin (Gen. 49:27), and Λίς “lion” (in epic poetry, cf. Semitic ליש), a substitute for Jehudah (Gen. 49:9). Cf. E. and H. Guggenheimer, Jewish Family Names and their Origins: An Etymological Dictionary (Ktav, 1992; German edition Etymologisches Wörterbuch der jüdischen Familiennamen, Saur 1996), Introduction: Sobriquets, Animal Names.] ? And you say so? A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “All bills of divorce coming from overseas are valid even if their names sound Gentile since Jews outside the Land of Israel bear Gentile names. [Babli 11b, Tosephta 6:4.] ” He said only, outside the Land; therefore not in the Land of Israel [It should not be assumed that Jewish people with Gentile names cannot sign a bill of divorce in the Land of Israel; there are a number of rabbis with Gentile names such as Eudaimon, Pappos, Antigonos. But in case such a name appears, an inquiry has to be made about the identity of the witness, wheras in documents coming from outside the Land, all names are accepted without inquiry.] . What about this? Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Issi: unless he writes, at a Jewish place [Greek Ὶουδαϊκός, -ή, -όν “Jewish”. If the names of the witnesses are Gentile, some indication of this being a purely Jewish document is needed since all documents executed in a Gentile court are valid except bills of divorce.] . If there is no Jewish place, in the synagogue. If there is no synagogue, he assembles there ten people [All of whom have to sign as witnesses even if most of them are related to the couple, if only two of the witnesses are acceptable in law; it is to be assumed that not all of their names will be characteristically Gentile. Cf. Tosephta 7:11; M. A. Friedman, Jewish Marriage in Palestine, Vol. 1, p. 489.] . Rebbi Abun said, it would be better to certify the signatures [After the document was duly signed, the local court could append a certification that the witnesses were known to the court and in good standing. Such a certification would have to be accepted by every rabbinic court anywhere (Mishnah 1:3).] than to assemble there ten people. What about this? Even in a Jewish store [The document must mention the place where it was written. One might add that it was written in a Jewish store to emphasize the Jewish character of the document, implicitly validating the Gentile-sounding signatures.] .

5If he did not say: “it was written and signed before me”? Should not an Amora have asked this question? He said to him [It is unclear to whom this refers; the text seems defective.] , that is what Rabin ben Rav said: If he brought a bill of divorce, gave it to her, but did not tell her: “It was written and signed before me” [Is the bill of divorce invalid in this case? In the Babli, 5b, Rabin bar Rav Ḥisda brought a bill of divorce before R. Joḥanan, who instructed him to deliver the bill in the presence of two witnesses and to make the required declaration. The question here can be interpreted to mean that Rabin asked whether the formality was really necessary in view of the fact, reported in the next paragraph, that R. Joshua ben Levi, of the generation of R. Joḥanan’s teachers, did not require the declaration. In the Babli, which is edited according to strict historical principles, R. Joshua ben Levi is mentioned before R. Joḥanan.] ? There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said to him [The messenger who had delivered the bill of divorce without making the required declaration.] , take it from her and say in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me. [It is understood that the Mishnah requires the declaration to be made either in the presence of two witnesses or at the local court. Tosephta 2:1 permits the declaration to be made “even after three years” if the bill of divorce can be returned to the messenger.] ” Does Rebbi Joḥanan follow Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said [Tosephta 6:1; a different version Babli 78a, 84b. The statement refers to Mishnah 8:2: “If he said to her, take this bond, or she took it out from his belt, and when she read it she realized that it was her bill of divorce, it is not a bill of divorce unless he says to her: This is your bill of divorce.” The reason is that Deut. 24:1 requires that in a divorce the husband deliver the bill into the wife’s hand. The question arises whether the required declaration is valid after the bill is already in the wife’s hand. In the Babli 78a, Rebbi is quoted as holding that the bill is invalid unless given as a bill of divorce; R. Simeon ben Eleazar permits the husband to reclaim the bill from his wife and deliver it a second time accompanied by the required declaration. In the Tosephta, Rebbi is reported not to require the declaration, R. Simeon ben Eleazar requires that the declaration accompany the delivery. The language of the Tosephta is that of the Yerushalmi; it is not clear whether R. Simeon ben Eleazar permits taking the document back.] , it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce? Can the position of Rebbi Joḥanan be derived from Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar? Would Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar agree that if he told her at the moment of delivery that it was her bill of divorce it would not be a bill of divorce [The answer to this rhetorical question clearly is no; the only condition imposed by R. Simeon ben Eleazar is that the wife be informed of the nature of the document at the moment of delivery.] ? But here, even if he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” But Rebbi Joḥanan might hold that a woman cannot be believed if she says, I received a bill of divorce from my husband’s agents [Therefore, the delivery of the document characterized as a bill of divorce must be made before two witnesses in good standing. It seems that in his case, the document was delivered in private; the main reason of R. Joḥanan was not the recitation of the formula but the delivery in front of witnesses.] . But we did state [Mishnah 2:7. If the husband delivers the document to her on condition that it should not become effective until she presents it to the court which has to preside over the payment of her ketubah, she can bring it herself and declare before the court that “it was written and signed before me.”] : “The wife herself can bring her bill of divorce.” Would you not have to be afraid that she might have received the bill from a representative of the husband [Why should she be believed if she brings the document from abroad when she is not believed if the document is delivered to her in private? It is implied here that the act which makes the document valid is its signing by two reliable witnesses, not its delivery.] ? How is it? The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan is to make her known as divorcee in front of two [witnesses] [He holds that the requirement of the declaration mentioned in the Mishnah is prescriptive but its omission does not invalidate the divorce.] .

6A case came before Rebbi Joshua ben Levi [In the Babli, 5b, it was R. Simeon bar Abba, a recognized scholar, who brought the document.] . He said to him, it is unnecessary. The opinion of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi seems inverted. There, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce [In the Babli, 2a/2b, it is pointed out that a bill of divorce has to be written for the woman to be divorced since the verse says (Deut. 24:1): “He shall write for her”. While the text of the bill must mention the names of husband and wife, it cannot be ascertained from the text whether the scribe was instructed to write the text specifically for that woman; there must be a live witness available who can be examined about this point. A second opinion notes that the signatures of the witnesses themselves would need confirmation.] , but here, he says so? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: What you said was in earlier times when no Fellows [Here, “Fellow” does not have the technical meaning of “person who observes the rules of food purity” but means “person learned in the law.”] were found outside the Land, but now that there are Fellows found outside the Land, they are competent [In the Babli, this is R. Joshua ben Levi’s explanation given to R. Simeon bar Abba the Babylonian.] . But did we not state, “and one who brings there [In the Mishnah, the duty to declare that the document was written in the presence of the messenger is extended to bills of divorce written in the Land and delivered abroad.] ”? And even if you say that no Fellows are found outside the Land, are we not found in the Land of Israel? In order not to make a distinction in the bills of divorce from outside the Land [There otherwise would be no reason to require a declaration for bills originating in the Land.] . But then one who brings from overseas should not have to say: “It was written before me and signed before me.” Not to make a distinction in the bills of divorce in the Land of Israel. What about it? One is restrictive in a simple case because of the complicated one and one is not permissive in the complicated because of the easy one [It is preferable to require a declaration for documents originating in Palestine (the easy case) rather than to eliminate the declaration for documents originating outside the Land (the complicated case).] . Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Simeon bar Abba: This [The statement that the declaration was unnecessary.] of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, if it was done. But from the start even Rebbi Joshua ben Levi agrees [In that, R. Joshua ben Levi agrees with R. Joḥanan. The Babli, 5b, disagrees since in its version R. Simeon bar Abba asked R. Joshua ben Levi whether he had to make the declaration when delivering the bill of divorce.] .

7Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Abba bar Ḥana: Two who brought a bill of divorce do not have to declare: It was written before us and signed before us [In the Babli, 5a, this opinion is attributed to Rav Huna, Rav’s student.] . Rebbi Yose ben Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They have to [In the Babli, 16a/b, he is quoted in the opposite sense.] . He himself who brought the bill of divorce does not have to deliver the bill in the presence of two [witnesses] [In the Babli, a fundamental question is whether a bill of divorce is validated by the signatories of the bill or the witnesses to the delivery. The first opinion is attributed in the Babli to R. Meïr; it is generally accepted in the Yerushalmi. The second opinion is R. Eleazar’s in both Talmudim (Mishnah 9:4). The Babli considers R. Eleazar the dominant author in matters of divorce; the Yerushalmi considers his a minority opinion. Accordingly, the Yerushalmi permits private delivery from husband to wife. Nevertheless, since marriage is a public affair, the divorcee cannot remarry unless her divorce is made public. The husband therefore has to publicly declare her a divorcee after his private delivery.] in order to declare her a divorcee in the presence of two. “If he gave her the bill [In the presence of witnesses.] , took it from her, and threw it into the sea or into a river [Where it cannot be retrieved.] . If later he says to her that it was an empty papyrus or a paid bond, he cannot be believed to disqualify her.” [Tosephta 6:2, quoted in Babli 19b.] Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he [Since the preceding sentence deals with the husband, the question is whether it extends to everybody else.] cannot disqualify her, who can? He said to him, since she was declared a divorcee in the presence of two [witnesses], he cannot be believed to disqualify her [Since there are two witnesses to the delivery, the divorce could be put in doubt only by a proof that the witnesses are false. In the interpretation of the Babli, 55a, the divorce is valid if the witnesses knew that the document was a bill of divorce, but the wife did not. It is possible to read the Yerushalmi 5:5 in the same sense.] . If he gave her a bill of divorce which was found to be invalid, they [The court supervising the divorce. A forced divorce is valid if forced and executed by a rabbinic court, Mishnah 9:10. However, the power of a court to force divorces is severely circumscribed, Halakhah 9:10. In a case of forced divorce, it has to be ascertained whether the court remained within the limits of his authority. It seems clear that the court has the authority to force a divorce if the giver of the invalid bill was a Cohen since even an invalid divorce forbids the wife to return to her priestly husband; but without a valid divorce she cannot marry any other man or collect the sums due her.] forced him to give her a replacement. This case came before the rabbis and they declared it valid. Did we not say, he cannot be believed to disqualify her? There, the flaw was not proved; here the flaw was proved [The husband cannot invalidate a bill of divorce which is not available for inspection; the court can invalidate a document in its possession.] . As the following: Ḥinena, the son of Rebbi Asi, was a medical doctor and threw a bill of divorce to his wife [Under certain circumstances, a bill of divorce can be delivered by depositing it in the wife’s domain, Chapter 8.] . She cried. Her neighbor came, grabbed it from her, and gave her an empty papyrus. The case came before the rabbis and they took it into account [She was “divorced and not divorced.” Since the document is not available for inspection, it cannot be declared invalid. Since the delivery was irregular, it cannot be declared valid. The husband has to be forced to deliver a second bill.] . But did not Rebbi Yasa say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If the designation was checked and found to be based on [the testimony of] women or children, the designation is invalid [Halakhah 9:11. The Mishnah states that if a woman is generally said to have received a bill of divorce, one can accept the divorce as a fact. R. Joḥanan notes that if an investigation reveals that nobody who might appear as a formal witness in criminal cases is the source of the opinion, one has to disregard the “general knowledge” of the population. If it is known that she received a document from her husband, it does not necessarily mean that it was a bill of divorce. In the Babli, 89a, it is a matter of dispute between Babylonian authorities whether a “general opinion” must be traced to a person who might appear as witness in good standing before a criminal court.] ? There, the designation was not mentioned. But here the name “bill of divorce” was mentioned. And some want to say, if he asserted that it was a valid bill of divorce [The husband himself is the source of the rumor. If he is a person of good standing, Mishnah 9:11 requires that his information be trusted. According to this interpretation, the wife is divorced and does not need a second bill in order to collect her ketubah and remarry.] , but she cried, her neighbor came, grabbed it from her, and gave her an empty papyrus.

8Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he wrote it in the Land of Israel, signed it outside the Land, went to deliver it to her outside the Land but did not find her outside the Land, returned and found her in the Land of Israel. He must say, “it was written and signed before me,” because he wrote it in the Land of Israel and signed it outside the Land But if it was written and signed in the Land of Israel, he went to deliver it to her outside the Land but did not find her outside the Land, he need not say, “it was written and signed before me.” [This seems to refer to a tannaïtic statement similar to Tosephta 2:2: “If he wrote it in the Land and had it signed outside the Land, one has to say ‘it was written and signed before me.’ If it was written outside the Land but signed in the Land, one does not have to say ‘it was written and signed before me.’ ” Since a document must be signed on the date indicated in it, writing and signing must take place at a border point.] If he gave her bill of divorce to her when she said, my courtyard at Acco [The border of the Land of Israel passes through Acco, cf. Halakhah 2 and Ševi‘it 6:1, Note 30. The bill of divorce was presented to her in the Israeli part of Acco, but she desired it to be deposited in her courtyard which was outside the Land. A bill of divorce can be legally delivered by being deposited in a house or walled courtyard which is the woman’s property (even if it was part of her dowry, which becomes the husband’s property but reverts to her at the moment of divorce.)] shall acquire it for me, Rebbi Ḥinena said, it is as if she had a long arm. If she had a long arm, she stretched it out and took it from there, does he not have to say “it was written and signed before me” [Because the delivery took place outside the Land.] ? Rebbi Abba said, who would deny it [R. Ḥinena’s statement is trivial; the nontrivial part is that a delivery in a courtyard is valid even if the wife is far away at the moment of delivery; cf. Rashba, Novellae to Giṭṭin 77b. In the Babli, 77b, delivery from a distance is a matter of contention and prohibited by Ulla; there nobody accepts the notion of an “extended arm.”] ?

9Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: If a man and his wife held on to a bill of divorce; she says, I acquired it, but he says, you did not acquire [He demands some money from her before he is willing to give her a divorce.] . Does this refer to the disagreement between Rebbi and Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel? Since they disagreed [Baba Meṣiʻa 1:1, Babli Baba Meṣiʻa 7a.] : If creditor and borrower both hold on to the bond; the creditor says it is mine; I had lost it. The borrower says, it is mine because I paid it off. The document should be verified by its signatories, the words of Rebbi [In the interpretation of the Babli, a private bond is valid only if its signatures have been notarized in court. Rebbi permits late notarizing, so the creditor can claim half.] . Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, they should split [Following Symmachos that “money in doubt shall be split,” Mishnah Baba Meṣiʻa 1:1; cf. Ketubot 2, Note 9, 10, Note 62.] . Rebbi Eleazar said, everything depends on who actually holds the signatures of the witnesses [Since only the signatures validate the document.] . Where do they disagree? If it was written lengthwise [In computer printers this is called “landscape format”. The writing parallels the long side of the paper; it is possible for both parties to hold on to part of the lines used for signatures.] and both hold part of the signatures of the witnesses. He said to him, it is everybody’s opinion that it is not a bill of divorce if all is in her hand but a thread is in his hand, for it is written: “He shall deliver it into her hand,” not unless all be in her hand [In the Babli, 78b Rav Ḥisda formulates: If the bill is in her hands and a thread is in his hand: if he can draw it back to himself, she is not divorced, otherwise she is divorced. The Babli bases its ruling on the meaning of the word כריתות “divorce” which requires complete physical separation.] .

10Rebbi Eliezer objected to the rabbis: Just as you hold that one who brings a bill of divorce from one province to another overseas has to say, “it was written and signed before me,” so I hold that one who brings a bill of divorce from one province to another in the Land of Israel has to say, “it was written and signed before me.” Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi said, it happened that one brought a bill of divorce from the harbor of Caesarea [He delivered it in the city of Caesarea maritima, formerly called Straton’s Tower, which was not part of the Land of Israel; cf. Ševiʻit 6:1, Note 32.] . The case came before Rebbi Abbahu who said yes, he has to say that it was written and signed before him. But is the harbor of Caesarea not part of Caesarea? Rebbi Abin said, it was from a departing ship, and it was stated thus: One who brings a bill of divorce from a ship is like one who brings from outside the Land and has to say that it was written and signed before him [In the Babli, 7b, there are baraitot quoted either that the declaration is needed or not needed, but there the reference is to a person who brings a bill of divorce in a ship connecting places in the Land, rather than from a ship sailing overseas.] .

11If there was one district which was subdivided into two, one does not have to say it was written and signed before me. Similarly if two were combined to form one.

12MISHNAH: Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam [Two places “Reqam” are mentioned as border towns in Transjordan in the description of the borders of the Land of Israel; cf. Ševi‘it 6:1, Notes 47, 51.] to the East and Reqam belongs to the East, from Ascalon to the South and Ascalon belongs to the South, from Acco to the North and Acco belongs to the North [The list in this Mishnah mentions border towns from where the messenger has to affirm that the document was written and signed in his presence. The basic reference is the Baraita on the borders of the Land of Israel, Sevi'it 6:1, Notes 32-51.] . Rebbi Meïr says, Acco belongs to the Land of Israel in matters of bills of divorce [He agrees that in matters of ritual purity and Sabbatical laws, most of Acco is outside the Land.] .

13HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan told the people of Sepphoris: You say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan [This name is obviously incorrect; it is impossible to determine what was in its place or whether the name should simply be deleted.] , even a person who brings a bill of divorce from Babylonia does not have to say “it was written and signed before me.” But I am saying that it is necessary, for there is a Mishnah: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East and Reqam belongs to the East.” And even if you say that they disagree with Rebbi Jehudah and say that Reqam does not belong to the East, what about from Babylonia to here [In the Babli, 6a, the argument is attributed to R. Jeremiah.] ? Rav said, we consider ourselves as in the Land of Israel in the matter of bills of divorce. But Samuel said, even from one city quarter to another [In the Babli, 6a, Rav is quoted as he is here; Samuel says that Babylonia is like any other place outside the Land, Rav Sheshet requires confirmation from one city quarter to another and Rav Ḥisda requires an attestation in all cases in which the witnesses are unknown to the court in whose district the bill is delivered.] . He asked before him to change his opinion [Samuel convinced Rav that he should change his opinion.] , when Cahana told him, what would we do with the earlier cases of women who remarried [Cahana pointed out that if Rav changed his practice, he would attach a presumption of illegitimacy to any children of women who had remarried according to his previous standard.] ? He said to him, what do you have in your hand? For he was of Rebbi’s opinion as it was stated: If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas which was neither written nor signed in his presence, she has to leave under the thirteen penalties [All the disabilities enumerated in Mishnaiot 8:5 about a woman remarrying after an invalid divorce, and Yebamot 10:1 regarding a woman who remarried thinking that her husband was dead when he was alive and later returned.] , the words of Rebbi. But the Sages did not agree in this matter [Since the absence of the provision about writing and signing does not invalidate the bill, cf. Notes 32 ff.] .

14Everybody agrees that if [the husband] comes and protests, his protest is invalid [In the Babli, 3a, this is an anonymous (unanimous) opinion. As explained in the sequel, if the husband could come later and claim the the bill of divorce was fake, no woman could ever remarry on a bill of divorce written far away for fear that her children from a second husband could retroactively be declared to be bastards; cf. Mishnah Yebamot 10:1.] [Since there was a witness who was cross-examined about the validity of the bill, the husband cannot be admitted to testify since when he claims to be still the husband of his divorcee he declares himself a relative by marriage who is barred from acting as a witness for or against his wife.] . That is, if he protested after she remarried. If he protested before she remarried and then she remarried [Should one require that she not remarry before the matter has been decided by the local court?] ? Let us hear from the following [The same story is in the Babli, 6b.] : It happened that somebody brought a bill of divorce before Rebbi Ismael. He asked him, from where are you? He answered, from Kefar Simai [Probably Kafr Sumeïa on the road from Acco to Safed, in the border region described in Ševi‘it 6:1. In the Tosephta, 1:3, the place is mentioned as ססי or סאסאי.] in the region of Acco. He said to him, then you have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence;” you do not need witnesses [The signatures on the bill do not have to be notarized by the court, which would have been difficult in the court of R. Ismael in the far South on the border of Idumea.] . After [that person] left, Rebbi Ilai said to him, my teacher, is not Kefar Simai in the Land of Israel, closer to Sepphoris than to Acco? He answered, since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands. What means “since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands”? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that if [the husband] came and protested, his protest would be invalid. But does a person who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel for delivery in the Land of Israel have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence”? Therefore, there cannot be any difference whether he protested after she remarried or before she remarried and then she remarried [It does not depend on the declaration by the messenger; no bill of divorce delivered under the supervision of a court can be attacked.] .

15Rebbi Jacob bar Ada, Bar Athlay in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Practice follows Rebbi Meïr in matters of bills of divorce [This opinion is not mentioned in the Babli.] . Rebbi Ze‘ira was looking at him [Disapproving.] . He asked him, why do you look at me? Was it not said that practice follows the lenient opinion in rabbinic matters? They thought, that is a single opinion against a single opinion, but not a single opinion against the Sages, and here even a single opinion against the Sages [They hold that Acco is split in matters of divorce as it is split in matters of impurity, as explained later in the Halakhah.] .

16Rebbi Ḥiyya [bar] Abba said: If one sold a slave into Acco, the latter was set free [In the Babli, 8a, he is quoted pointing out that R. Meïr declares all of Acco to be of the Land only for bills of divorce; therefore not for the laws of slaves. It is forbidden to sell slaves from the Land to places outside the land; any such sale frees the slave.] . Rebbi Ismael, the father of Rebbi Yudan, asked: Even from Acco to Acco? [From here to the end of the Halakhah, the text is from Ševi‘it 6:1, explained there in Notes 23–30. Variant readings from there are noted ש. All indications are that the text in Sevi‘it is the original.] This follows what Rebbi Aḥa bar Jacob said in the name of Rebbi Immi: From two actions of Rebbi we learn that Acco is partly of the Land of Israel and partly outside the Land. Rebbi was in Acco when he saw them eating clean bread; he asked them, how did you knead [the dough]? They said to him, a student came here and instructed us that egg water does not prepare. We are boiling eggs and use their water to knead. They thought he was talking about cooking water of eggs when he spoke only of the eggs themselves. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said, at that moment they decreed that a student may not render decisions. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: If a student gives instructions even according to practice, his instructions are no instructions.

17It was stated: A student who gave instructions about practice in front of his teacher has committed a deadly sin. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: Nadab and Abihu died only because they determined practice in the presence of their teacher Moses. It happened that a student gave instructions about practice in front of his teacher Rebbi Eliezer. The latter said to his wife Imma Shalom: That one will not live out his week. The week was not completed when he died. His students said to him: Rebbi, you are a prophet. He said to them (Amos 7:14) “I am neither a prophet nor the disciple of a prophet” but I have received a tradition that any student who gives instructions about practice in front of his teacher has committed a deadly sin. It was stated: A student is forbidden to give instructions about practice during the lifetime of his teacher unless he be at a distance of at least 12 mil from him, [the breadth of] the camp of Israel. What is the reason? (Num. 33:49) “They encamped along the Jordan from Bet Hayyešimot to Abel Haššiṭṭim in the plains of Moab”; how far is this? Twelve mil. Like this: Rebbi Tanḥum ben Jeremiah was in Ḥefer; they asked him and he gave instructions about practice. They said to him, did the Rabbi not teach us that a student may not give instructions about practice during the lifetime of his teacher unless he be at a distance of at least 12 mil from him, [the breadth of] the camp of Israel; and your teacher Rebbi Ḥana sits at Sepphoris! He said to them, so it should come over me that I did not know! From that moment on he did no longer give instructions.

18Rebbi was in Acco when he saw a man on the rock. He said to him, “are you not the son of the Cohen X, was your father not a Cohen?” He said to him, “the eyes of my father were high, but he married a woman unfit for him and profaned this man.”

19The villages in the territory of Sepphoris close to Acco, the villages in the territory of Acco close to Sepphoris, what do you do with them? Like Acco, like Sepphoris [If practice follows R. Meïr, it does not make any difference in the rules of bills of divorce. Therefore, no answer is needed.] ?

20MISHNAH: Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel does not have to say: “It was written and signed before me.” If the document is contested, it should be confirmed by its signers [The court at the place of origin can confirm that the signatures are genuine. A document bearing two certified signatures cannot be attacked. Since courts in the Land of Israel are usually competent, a bill of divorce which is not contested does not have to be certified.] . If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and is unable to say: “it was written and signed before me,” it should be confirmed by its signers. Bills of divorce and slaves’ bills of manumission are equal in [the requirement] about those who carry and bring [They have to be written and signed before the messenger when executed or delivered outside the Land, or have to be confirmed by a court before being delivered to a messenger.] . This is one of the aspects in which bills of divorce, have the same rules as bills of manumission [This is an introduction to a series of Mishnaiot on the same subject. Since the slave of a Jew becomes a full member of the Jewish endogamous society upon his manumisson, strict rules are justified.] .

21HALAKHAH: “Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel,” etc. Who protests? Rav Ḥisda said, the husband protests [It is the position of the Babli, 9a, that in the absence of witnesses to fraud only the husband has standing to question the validity of a bill of divorce. Tosaphot 9a, s.v. אלא, read R. Yose’s statement in the argument of the Babli; this does not seem to be justified.] . Rebbi Yose said, the buyers protest, lest she repossess from them [If the husband had real estate at the place of his wife which he sold and then sent a bill of divorce to his wife from far away without the payment due her upon divorce, the divorcee can reclaim any real estate sold after the date of her definitive marriage up to the value of the ketubah payment due her.] . Rebbi asked: So far a protest which does not concern the text of the bill [E. g., if the husband claims that he had attached a condition to the bill not provided for in the bill and that the condition was not satisfied. Since the condition was not presented to the court which oversaw the delivery of the document, it cannot be considered.] . A protest which concerns the text of the bill [He claims that the entire bill is fake or that there is an intrinsic defect which makes the entire document invalid.] is in dispute between Rebbi Joḥanan and the rabbis there [Their dispute is in Yebamot 10:4 (Notes 97–102) and Ketubot 2:2. The Babylonian rabbis hold that a document whose signatures have been notarized as genuine by a court cannot be attacked.] . In the opinion of the rabbis there, there is no difference to a protest concerning or not concerning the body of the bill. [A clause is missing here: “In the opinion of R. Joḥanan”.] A protest not concerning the text of the bill is void, a protest concerning the text of the bill is valid [A claim that a document is forged must always be investigated.] .

22As it was stated [Tosephta 1:1.] : “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas which was not written and signed in his presence, he returns the bill to its place of origin, presents it to a court and has its signatures notarized. Then he does not have so say, ‘it was written and signed before me’, but he says, ‘I am deputized by the court.’ ”

23MISHNAH: Any document signed by a Samaritan is invalid [Since Samaritans, as a Sadducee sect, explain Lev. 19:14 to mean that it is forbidden to put a stone in the path of a blind man, but not, as Pharisees do, as a prohibition to do damage to the inadvertent, there is no biblical prohibition for a Samaritan to sign false monetary documents as long as he does not swear or appears as witness in a court. The literal interpretation of Lev. 19:14 in Philo (The Special Laws IV, xxxviii, 198) is probably sufficient to characterize him as Alexandrian Sadducee. Bills of divorce or manumission become valid only by the signature of the witnesses (in contrast to a bond, where “the debtor’s signature is worth a hundred witnesses”); the Samaritan himself would be the guilty party in an adulterous remarriage by the wife served with a fake bill of divorce or the marriage of a slave with a free Jewish woman, forbidden to him as long as he is a slave. Since “those rules which they keep (including marriage taboos), the Samaritans keep more strictly than do the rabbinic Jews” (Babli 10a, Yerushalmi Pesaḥim 1:1, 27b 1. 58), there is no reason to disqualify Samaritans from witnessing documents regarding marriage.] , except bills of divorce and bills of manumission. It happened that they brought before Rabban Gamliel at Kefar Othnay [Kafr ‘Uthnay, a village near Megiddo on the Southern border of Jewish Galilee (Mishnah 7:7). While the Mishnah speaks only of a Samaritan witness, Rabban Gamliel accepted two Samaritans.] a bill of divorce whose witnesses were Samaritans and he declared it valid. All documents confirmed by a Gentile recorder’s office [The Gentile court usually is ערכי, Greek τὰ ἀρχεῖα “public records, archives.” For ערכאות compare τὸ ἀρχεῖον “town hall”.] are valid, even if they are signed by Gentiles [While Gentiles cannot be required to be honest, Gentile courts can be trusted to be jealous of their reputation.] , except bills of divorce and bills of manumission [The Gentile court is unable to determine who can or cannot marry in Jewish law.] . Rebbi Simeon says, all are valid [If executed by Jews and notarized by a Gentile court.] ; they said it only when they were made by private persons.

24HALAKHAH: “Any document signed by a Samaritan is invalid,” etc. They are suspected about money; about money they were disqualified.They are not suspected about incest and adultery. And testimony in capital criminal cases has the same status as testimony about incest and adultery. Then even if both of them are Samaritans [Why does the Mishnah mention only a single Samaritan witness?] ? There is a difference, for they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce [If both witnesses are Samaritans, one has to assume that the scribe also was Samaritan and that the rabbinic rules of writing a bill of divorce were not followed. A bill of divorce can be written only on the explicit demand of the husband; an infraction of this rule cannot be discovered by examination of the bill.] . Then even one Samaritan witness should be disqualified! Rebbi Abin said, explain it if a Jew signed last [He would not sign if the bill was invalid. The Babli, 10a, considers this to be R. Eleazar’s authoritative opinion (cf. Note 51).] . Rebbi Yose said, that is according to the opinion that the witnesses may sign separately, not in the presence of each other. But according to him who says that witnesses may sign only in the presence of each other [Accepted in the Babli, 10b, for bills of divorce and manumission only.] , it is valid even if the Samaritan signed last.

25If a bond was signed by four witnesses and it turned out that the first two were relatives or disqualified, it is valid and is confirmed by the remaining testimony [A similar text (5 signatures, 3 of them invalid) is in Tosephta 7:11 and Babli Baba batra 162b. In the text here, “disqualified” are people who cannot be admitted to be witnesses in money matters, such as Samaritans, gamblers, and fences. Relatives of either lender or borrower are disqualified for the particular document in question. Two of the signatures must belong to witnesses who can certify the document in court.] . Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: This follows him who says that witnesses sign only in the presence of each other. But following him who says that witnesses may sign without being in the presence of each other, even if the Jew signed last it is invalid [This refers to the problem discussed in the preceding paragraph about a bill signed by a Samaritan and a Jew.] . And would it not be remote testimony [Tosephta 7:11 notes that a document whose signatures are so far removed from the text of the document that a sentence could have been added between text and signatures is invalid; it might be that there was a different text and the witnesses signed to that. In practice, this means that exactly one line must be empty between the text and the first signatures. If the qualified witnesses signed two lines below the text, it is admissible to have two unqualified witnesses sign on the line above to fill in the space between the document text and the signatures of the witnesses.] ? That one cannot say since Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah [This means, R. Yasa in the name of Rav Jeremiah (who in the Yerushalmi frequently has the title of Rebbi, as a Babylonian authority predating the creation of the Title of “Rav”). In Halakhah 9:8: R. Abba in the name of Rav Jeremiah. Note the pure Babylonian Aramaic spelling דקאמר.] that disqualified witnesses do not constitute remote testimony since they came only to support the document’s validity [In the Babli, 18b, invalid signatures do not diminish the validity of a document if the signatories were invited to sign for any reason other than being witnesses. This probably is understood here also. In particular, it was customary to have relatives sign on all marriage documents. In Baba batra 162b, the statement of R. Yasa is quoted in the name of Ḥizqiah. Cf. also Halakhot 8:12, 9:8.] .

26Why are Samaritans disqualified [Why does one not intermarry with Samaritans?] ? Rebbi Joḥanan said, because they are lions’ proselytes [The originally Gentile part of the population of Samaria adopted the worship “of the local god” because they were attacked by lions, 2K. 17:24–41. In the Babli, Qiddušin 75b, this is identified as the teaching of R. Ismael.] . But if somebody converted not for Heaven’s sake and then converted for Heaven’s sake, does one not accept him [That argument may have had validity in the first few generations after the destruction of Samaria, but in talmudic times the Samaritans had been monotheists for at least 700 years.] ? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Eleazar [In Jebamot 7:6 (Note 129), “R. Ismael”. In the Babli, loc.cit., identified as teaching of R. Aqiba.] : Because the child is a bastard if a Gentile or a slave have intercourse with a Jewish woman [Assuming that the deportees from Cutha and Media who were resettled in Samaria were mostly male. When they intermarried with local Jewish women, in this opinion the children were all bastards.] . But did not Rebbi Aqiba say, they are genuine proselytes [Even if the preceding opinion were generally accepted, which it is not, it would be irrelevant concerning Samaritans. Agreed to in the Babli, loc.cit.] ? Because they require levirate marriage from the preliminarily married and free the definitively married [Jebamot 1, Notes 192–196. Pharisaic tradition frees the preliminarily married woman and obligates the definitively married one. The Samaritan ruling had its partisans among the rabbinic school of Shammai (Jebamot 1:6, Note 193.)] . But do not the rabbis say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law [Even if a childless widow flouts the rules and marries an unrelated man without ḥalîṣah, the child is not a bastard and can marry in the congregation (Mishnah Jebamot 4:15). Therefore even a Samaritan who is the offspring of a rabbinically forbidden marriage should be an acceptable marriage partner.] ? Because they are not conversant with the fine points in writing bills of divorce [There could be women divorced according to Samaritan rules who would not be considered divorced by rabbinic rules and, therefore, their children in a second marriage would be bastards not eligible for marriage with Jews.] . But does not Rabban Gamliel accept their bills of divorce [Kafr ‘Uthnay, a village near Megiddo on the Southern border of Jewish Galilee (Mishnah 7:7). While the Mishnah speaks only of a Samaritan witness, Rabban Gamliel accepted two Samaritans.] ? Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because they intermingled with the priests of the High Places: “He chose priests from the borderline of the people, [1K. 12:31. The root קצה “to be distant, of the elite” of מקצת is identified with קוץ, קצץ “to cut, to chop off”, one of whose derivatives is קוֹץ “thorn”. (The same explanation is in the Babli, loc.cit., of R. Joḥanan following R. Ismael.) In any case, there is no reason to exclude marriages with Samaritans other than general convention; but cf. Demay 3:4, Note 98.] ”. Rebbi Ila said, from the “thorns” of the people, i. e., from the disqualified of the people.

27Rebbi Aḥa [Later in the paragraph he is quoted as R. Jacob bar Aḥa. The latter attribution is correct since R. Jacob bar Aḥa was one of the teachers of R. Ze‘ira quoted later, while R. Aḥa lived after R. Ze‘ira.] said, the acts of a Gentile court are public knowledge [If a document of indebtedness is not valid as a court document, it will be valid as being witnessed in public.] . Then even if both [witnesses] are Samaritan? Did one not say that they are not conversant with the fine points in writing bills of divorce [There could be women divorced according to Samaritan rules who would not be considered divorced by rabbinic rules and, therefore, their children in a second marriage would be bastards not eligible for marriage with Jews.] ? But Rebbi Simeon validates their bills of divorce! Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: It turns out that Rebbi Simeon agrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Just as Rebbi Eleazar said, even if no witnesses signed on it, it is valid [Mishnah 9:4. R. Eleazar (the Tanna, ben Shamua‘) holds that the essence of divorce is the delivery of the bill of divorce to the wife (Deut. 24:1). Therefore, he requires that the delivery be certified by two witnesses in good standing. They have to verify that the document contains the language which makes it a bill of divorce from the specified husband to the specified wife and that it was delivered into the hands of the wife either by the husband or by his duly appointed agent. Any signatures on the document are irrelevant. By contrast, R. Meïr holds that a bill of divorce not certified by two witnesses is invalid.] , so Rebbi Simeon said, even if no witnesses signed on it, it is valid. But then even if it was made by private persons [Why does R. Simeon in the Mishnah invalidate bills of divorce signed by Gentiles not in a court of law?] ? This shows that it was necessary that Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the acts of a Gentile court are public knowledge. A bond [A document of indebtedness, containing a mortgage clause.] was executed in Bet Shean [A Gentile city in Mishnaic times.] , whose witnesses were Gentiles. Rebbi Yose says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish [ריש לקיש is the Babylonian version of ר׳ שמעון בן לקיש.] disagree, one said it is invalid, the other said it is valid. Rebbi Abbahu explained: Rebbi Joḥanan said it is invalid, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said it is valid. What is Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s reason? That a Jew should not lose money [That the creditor should be able to enforce the terms of the loan in a rabbinic court.] . But if that one would not lose money, the other would lose money [Any gain of the lender is a loss for the borrower if both parties to the bond were Jewish.] ! Rebbi Yudan said, it must be in order not to close the door before people, for tomorrow one would look to borrow but does not succeed [If mortgages could not be foreclosed, nobody would lend money and all economic activity would come to a standstill. Therefore, R. Joḥanan’s opinion cannot be considered even though he can point to Ps. 144:8,11 invalidating Gentile witnesses.] .

28MISHNAH: If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife or this document of manumission to my slave,” if he wants to change his mind in either case he can retract [Before the delivery of the bill or the document. The husband can appoint an agent for delivery of the document; he cannot appoint the agent as receiver of the document on behalf of wife or slave, as explained in the Mishnah.] , the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, only for women’s bills of divorce [It is held that any divorce other than one which the wife can enforce in court is to the wife’s detriment.] but not for slaves’ documents of manumission [The Sages hold that for a slave the benefits of freedom (and with it the status of a full Jew) always outweigh any possible material detriment attached to manumission.] because one may bestow benefit on a person in his absence but put a detriment on him only in his presence; for if one chooses not to sustain his slave, he has the right not to do so, but not to sustain his wife he has no right. He said to them, but he [If the husband or owner is a Cohen, all members of his household share in his sanctified food; unless the household members are born of priestly status they lose the access to sanctified food the moment they leave his household. In contrast to Roman law, a freedman is not part of his patron’s familia.] disqualifies his slave for heave the same way he disqualifies his wife! They answered him, because he is his property [The slave’s ability to eat heave is not intrinsic; it is derivative from his servile status. The slave can eat heave even if his master, the Cohen, refuses to support him.] . If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife or this document of manumission to my slave” and dies, they shall not be delivered after his death [The Sages who do not permit retraction of a document of manumission agree that both divorce and manumission become effective only at the moment of delivery of the document into the hands of the recipient by the agent representing his employer. But a dead person can neither divorce nor manumit. In Chapter 7 it is explained how a terminally ill childless person can divorce his wife to spare her (or prevent her from entering) a levirate marriage to his brother without divorcing her in case he recovers from his sickness.] ; “give this mina to Mr. X” and dies, they shall deliver it after his death [If the gift was given when the giver was aware of his impending death, the heirs are bound to respect the wishes of the deceased.] .

29HALAKHAH: If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife,” etc. Elsewhere you say that “give” means “bring”, but here you say that “give” means “acquire” [If the messenger was appointed only as an agent for delivery, there would be no question that the sender has the right to retract his instructions. It does not seem reasonable to assume that a charge to deliver something lets the addressee acquire an interest in the document to be delivered at the moment it is given to the agent since “a person’s agent represents him in every respect” [Qiddušin 2:1 (62a 1.41), Babli 43a]. Since a person can do what he wishes with a document still in his possession, why can he not do the same with the document in his agent’s hand?] ! So is [It is not so, but must be interpreted in this way. In the Babli, 11b, R. Jeremiah is reported to hold that “give to” really means “accept for”.] the Mishnah: “Acquire this bill of divorce for my wife; acquire this document of manumission for my slave.” The formulation [לשם is dialectal version of לשן, Aramaic equivalent of Hebrew לשון, cf. S. Lieberman, לשם לשן Tarbiz 6 (1935), p. 235; J. N. Epstein, מבוא לנסח המשנה, Jerusalem-Tel Aviv 1964, p. 475.] of the Mishnah says so: “Because one may bestow benefit on a person in his absence [This argument would be futile if the owner had not bestowed freedom on his slave by handing the document to the messenger. Therefore, the rule of the Mishnah applies only if the owner had given some indication that the messenger also acted as the slave’s agent.] but put a detriment on a person only in his presence.” Rebbi Meïr says, it is a detriment for either of them, but the Sages say it is a benefit for the slave but a detriment for the wife. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if he was the slave of a rich person, would it not be a detriment for the slave [Who as a free man probably never would eat as well as he did as a slave.] ? The colleagues said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if she was the wife of a man suffering from boils [In which case the wife can force a divorce, Mishnah Ketubot 7:10.] , would it not be a benefit for the woman? You have only the following: If one sells his slave without the latter’s knowledge, is the sale of the slave not valid [Therefore, the slave can be manumitted without his consent and the owner can appoint the messenger as the slave’s agent without that latter’s knowledge.] ? If one divorces his wife without her knowledge, is the divorce valid [Nobody can represent the wife without her consent; even if the husband would appoint a person to be his wife’s agent, the appointment would be invalid and the delivery of the bill of divorce by the agent to the wife would be illegal.] because she [That is the ms. version, copied in editio princeps. But it seems preferable to follow the commentators and read this clause as a quote from the Mishnah מִפּנֵי שֶׁהוּא קִנְייָנוֹ “because he (the slave) is his property”, asking what is the relevance of this fact to the problem in hand, i. e., whether manumission is a benefit or a detriment to the slave.] was acquired by him? Rebbi Abin said, he is his property but he disqualifies him for heave [Since the Cohen owner can sell his slave to an Israel any time he wishes, the slave has no intrinsic right to heave that would be eliminated by the document of manumission. This explanation is given in the Babli, 13a, in the name of Rava (Rav Abba bar Rav Josef bar Ḥama).] .

30[This baraita also appears in Baba Batra 8:9, 16c.] “If somebody says, I freed my slave Ṭabi [For Ṭabi (m.), Ṭabitha (f.) as names of slaves cf. Niddah 1:5, Note 103.] , I shall free him, he is free, he acquired [The slave acquired the right to be freed.] .” Rebbi Inaia [In Baba Batra: R. Ḥiyya.] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But only by a document [The slave cannot acquire freedom by the simple declaration of his owner; he only can acquire the right to a document of manumission.] . “He should be freed [The owner said that the slave should be freed, but did not say it in the context of a last will and testament. The Sages hold that this is a not binding promise; Rebbi holds that this kind of promise is binding.] , Rebbi says, he acquired, but for the Sages he did not acquire. Give this document of manumission, and he died, Rebbi says, he did not acquire but the Sages say, he did acquire; one forces the heirs to fulfill the instructions of the deceased.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree [In the case of the owner who gave instructions to write a document for his slave.] if he did not specify. How do we hold? If he said, “free him”, Rebbi will agree [Since the heirs are required to follow the wishes of the testator, they have to free the slave.] . If he said, “write and deliver,” the Sages will agree [This is the case of the Mishnah; if the owner instructed to write the document and deliver it in his name, the instruction becomes void at his death.] . But we deal with the case that he said “give”. Rebbi says, one who says “give” is like one who said “write and deliver,” but the Sages say, one who says “give” is like one who said “free him”.

31[Tosephta Baba Batra 8:1; Yerushalmi Baba Batra 8:8 16b; Babli Baba Batra 138a, Ḥulin 39b, Keritut 24b.] “If somebody said that all his property should be given to X, a Cohen, and [the estate] contained slaves, even if [the Cohen] said ‘I cannot have them’ they eat heave [Since the transfer of possession is automatic, the slaves belong to the Cohen until he disposes of them.] . Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘I cannot have them’, the heirs [The legal heirs who would have inherited in the absence of a will.] acquired them.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if he [The recipient.] did not specify. How do we hold? If he accepted at the first moment, Rabban Gamliel will agree [If the Cohen was owner of the slaves for one moment, he cannot dispose of them except by sale or manumission.] . If he did refuse at the first moment, the rabbis will agree [Nobody is forced to accept a bequest against his will.] . But we deal with the case that he did not specify. Rebbi says, nobody says ‘it is impossible’ unless he had accepted [And had time to inspect what he received.] . Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘it is impossible’, the end is proof for the start [Since he was noncommittal at the start, his later rejection has retroactive power. The same explanation is given in the Babli in the name of R. Joḥanan.] .

32“If somebody says, give this mina to X because I owe it to him, bring this mina to X for the pledge which he has from me, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so but he himself is responsible until X receives his due [While the agent can accept the payment for the creditor (which is to the creditor’s benefit), the debt is not paid until the creditor receives it; without the creditor’s instructions the responsibility for the money cannot be transferred to the creditor since that would be a detriment; Tosephta 1:6. In the Babli 14a, Samuel disputes the ruling and holds that there is no acquisition without consent; the possibility of a detriment invalidates the benefit.] .” Rebbi Ila said, a gift is like a debt. [Tosephta 1:7.] “Give this mina to X, bring this mina to X, give this gift document to X, if he wants to change his mind he can(not) [“Not” is in the ms. but not in the Tosephta. All Medieval authors who quote this Yerushalmi mention it in the version of the Tosephta: Sefer Miṣwot Gadol 2, 161d, #82; Rashba ad 14a, Tosaphot haRosh ad 13a, s.v. והוא (col. 99 in the edition of H. B. Ravitz, Jerusalem 2004). Aviezri (Eliezer ben Joel, Ravia) is quoted in Mordechai Giṭṭin 532 as having seen in one Tosephta ms. the reading “cannot”; he rejects that since then the Tosephta could have been formulated together with the following one. This argument is accepted by S. Lieberman, Tosefta ki-Fshutah Giṭṭin p. 793, but it does not seem conclusive since the treatment of the case that the recipient died is different in the two cases. Therefore, the reading לא should be provided with a question mark but cannot be rejected out of hand.] do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should return it to the sender [Not deliver to the recipient’s heirs since it was not intended for them.] , and if that one had died he should give it to the latter’s heirs.” [Tosephta 1:8.] “Acquire this mina for X, accept this mina for X, acquire this gift document for X, accept this gift document for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should deliver it to his heirs. But if he acquired after [X’s] death [If it turned out that the recipient was already dead at the time the messenger was intended to become an agent for him, there was no transaction since nobody can become an agent for a dead person. The messenger was not appointed as agent for the deceased’s estate.] he should return it to the sender since nobody can acquire documents after his death.” [If it turned out that the recipient was already dead at the time the messenger was intended to become an agent for him, there was no transaction since nobody can become an agent for a dead person. The messenger was not appointed as agent for the deceased’s estate.] “If somebody says, this mina is for X, take this mina for X, this mina shall be in your hand for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so” because if somebody acquires for another person it cannot be changed.

33[A parallel, in somewhat better shape, is in Qiddušin 3:3, 64b 1. 37. The readings of the Leiden ms. are given by ק, those of one half line in a Geniza fragment (Qiddušin) by ג,] Explanation: Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Yose ben Kipper descended [“To descend” everywhere means: To travel from Galilee to Babylonia.] to collect there for a colleague [In the parallel story in the Babli, 14a/b, R. Aḥai ben R. Joshia asked them to bring him a silver vessel which was owed to him in Nahardea. According to the story in Qiddušin, they went to collect money for the Galilean Academy.] when they were slandered [After they had collected the debt, a rumor was spread that they were dishonest.] . They [The debtors, afraid of losing their money, being responsible if it was stolen by the messengers.] came and wanted to take it back from them. They answered, we already acquired it [Since we are empowered by the creditor, the money became the creditor’s the moment it was given to us.] . They [The debtors, afraid of losing their money, being responsible if it was stolen by the messengers.] said, we wish for you to accept it in good faith [They wanted a declaration by the rabbis that they would be responsible for any loss in transit.] ; they answered, we are unpaid trustees [An unpaid trustee is only responsible for losses incurred because of his negligence but not for losses through robbery or other events beyond his control (Mishnah Baba Meṣi‘a 7:8).] . They [The debtors, afraid of losing their money, being responsible if it was stolen by the messengers.] approached Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai who told them, there it is, all of it [He returned the money, against the rules.] . They [The debtors, afraid of losing their money, being responsible if it was stolen by the messengers.] took Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, whipped him with ropes, and took it [The part of the money which he had.] from him. When they returned here, he [R. Yose ben Kipper went to complain to R. Yannai.] went to his father and told him, look what your son did to me! He asked him, what did he do to you? He answered, if he had taken my position, they could not have taken anything from us. He asked him [R. Yannai interrogated his son Dositheos.] , why did you act in such a way? He said, I saw that they were a unanimous court, [They had made up their minds; it was impossible to argue with them.] their hats were a cubit wide [Perhaps wide-rimmed hats were the uniform of violent people.] , they were directing blows, my brother Yose was bound [Following the text in Qiddušin. It seems that the word פטרוי, which in other contexts means “they freed him”, is a scribal corruption and should be removed from the dictionaries. Before correction, the scribe wrote ופרכוי “and they forced him”, which may be correct.] and the whip ascended and descended. I said, does my father have another Dositheos [He was afraid for his life; this justifies his breaking the rules.] ? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, you say that for somebody who cannot give a warranty in good faith. But if somebody gives a warranty in good faith, one takes from this one and gives to the other [If the messenger is empowered to sign a receipt for the money which shields the debtor from any claim of the creditor’s under any circumstances, he cannot ask the money back.] .

34If somebody forgave a bond to another person. Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mamal: one said it is forgiven [An oral declaration by which the creditor engages himself not to claim a debt is valid without any act of acquisition by the debtor. This is the decision of Šulḥan ‘Arukh Ḥošen Mišpaṭ Chapter 12 §8, based on inferences from the Babli.] ; the other said it is not forgiven unless he handed over the bond [The debtor has to take possession of the bond directly or by an indirect act of acquisition.] .

35“ ‘Give this mina to X,’ then he died. If the heirs want to hinder [the delivery] they are powerless. It is unnecessary to say that it is so if he said, acquire for him, if he said, accept by my orders. [In a slightly different wording, this is Tosephta 1:9.] ” Rebbi Abba barMamal said, this baraita refers to a sick person. If he is sick, does he not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him? Rebbi Mana said, I confirmed this by what Rebbi Abba bar Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: They treated verbal instructions by a sick person as if they were written and delivered [In the Babli (13a, 15a, Baba Batra 121a, 175a) this is a statement of Rav Naḥman, universally accepted. Cf. Ketubot 11:1, Note 22.] . But only if he died from that sickness, not if he recovered, he did not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him.

36“ ‘Give this mina to Mr. X’ and he dies, they shall deliver it after his death” [If the gift was given when the giver was aware of his impending death, the heirs are bound to respect the wishes of the deceased.] [The last clause of the Mishnah is essentially identical with the Tosephta discussed in the preceding paragraph.] . Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: The Mishnah refers to a sick person.