However, with regard to those people who harvest the crop before the omer is sacrificed, they act contrary to the will of the Sages. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The concern is that while working with the grain they might come to eat from it, despite the fact that it is still prohibited. Rabbi Yehuda says: They act in accordance with the will of the Sages. And in that case, Rabbi Yehuda did not issue a decree lest one eat from it. Why, then, does he issue a decree with regard to leaven? Rava said that the prohibition of new grain is different: Since before the omer you permitted one to harvest the crop only by picking it by hand and may not harvest it in the typical manner, he will remember the prohibition and refrain from eating it. That is not the case with regard to leaven.
Abaye said to him: This works out well in explaining Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion with regard to the time when one is picking the grain; however, with regard to the time of grinding and sifting, what can be said? Apparently, it is permitted to perform these acts in a typical manner. Why, then, is there no concern lest one eat the grain at that stage? The Gemara responds: This is not difficult, as one also performs grinding in an atypical manner. One must grind the grain before the sacrificing of the omer with a hand mill, not with a mill powered by an animal or by water. Likewise, sifting is performed atypically, not in the interior of the sifter. Instead, it is performed on top of the sifter. Since all of these actions are performed in an atypical manner, there is no concern lest he come to eat the grain.
The Gemara raises another difficulty: However, with regard to that which we learned in a mishna: One may harvest grain from a field that requires irrigation and from fields in the valleys, as their grain ripens long before the omer is sacrificed, but one may not pile the produce, and the Gemara adds: And we established that this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda; what can be said? The use of the term: One may harvest, in this mishna indicates that the grain was harvested in a typical manner, not by hand.
Rather, Abaye said: This difference between the cases of the omer and leaven is not based on the manner in which one harvests, grinds, or sifts. Instead, the reason for the different rulings is that from new grain, one distances himself, as it is prohibited to eat the new grain all year until the omer is offered. But from leavened bread one does not distance himself, as it is permitted during the rest of the year. Therefore, he is more likely to unwittingly eat leaven.
Rava said: Is the contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda difficult, while the contradiction between one statement of the Rabbis and the other statement of the Rabbis is not difficult? There is also an apparent contradiction between the opinion of the Rabbis, i.e., Rabbi Meir, who rule that the Sages issued a decree with regard to new grain but did not issue a decree with regard to leaven.
Rava explains as follows: The contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda is not difficult, as we resolved it above. The contradiction between one ruling of the Rabbis and the other ruling of the Rabbis is also not difficult: The Rabbis maintain that there is no need to issue a decree prohibiting searching for leaven after leaven is prohibited, as, with regard to one who himself is seeking out leaven to burn it, will he eat from that leaven? However, in the case of new grain, he is processing the grain, preparing it for consumption. Therefore, the concern is that he will come to eat it unwittingly.
Rav Ashi said: The contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda is not difficult, as the difficulty can be resolved in an alternative manner, as we learned in the mishna that the markets of Jerusalem were filled with flour and toasted grain. It is permitted to prepare only these foods before the omer, as they will not be eaten without further preparation. Therefore, there is no concern lest one eat it unwittingly before the omer offering is sacrificed.
The Gemara rejects this interpretation: That statement of Rav Ashi is a mistake, as this suggestion can easily be refuted. That works out well with regard to the status of the grain from the point that the grain was processed into flour or toasted grain and forward, as there is no concern lest one come to eat it. However, with regard to its status initially until it became toasted grain, what can be said? There must have been a certain point when the grain kernels were edible before they were transformed into toasted grain. Why is there no concern that one might come to eat the grain at this earlier stage?
And lest you say that the grain is distinguished by the atypical manner in which it is harvested, in accordance with the earlier statement of Rava, but with regard to the difficulty raised to Rava’s opinion that one may harvest a field that requires irrigation and a field that is in the valleys in the typical manner and we established that statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, what can be said? Rather, the Gemara rejects this explanation and concludes that Rav Ashi’s statement is a mistake.
The above conclusion was that Rabbi Yehuda distinguishes between prohibitions involving substances from which people regularly separate themselves and prohibitions involving substances from which people are not used to keeping their distance. The Gemara asks: And anywhere that one does not distance himself from a prohibition, does Rabbi Yehuda issue a decree that one must keep away from a prohibited item to avoid accidentally using it?
But didn’t we learn in a mishna: A person may not pierce a hole in an eggshell, and fill it with oil, and place it beside a lamp so that the egg will drip additional oil into the lamp and thereby extend the time that it burns? And this is the ruling even if it is not an actual egg but an earthenware tube, from which most people consider it unsuitable to drink. The concern is lest one forget and take the tube and use the oil for some other purpose, and violate the prohibition against extinguishing a flame on Shabbat.
And Rabbi Yehuda permits using a tube in that manner, as he is not concerned lest one remove it. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda does not issue a decree even with regard to an item from which people do not distance themselves, e.g., oil. The Gemara answers: There, due to the stringency of Shabbat, one distances himself, as on Shabbat one is careful to distance himself from a candle or anything placed alongside it.
And the Gemara raised a contradiction between this halakha of Shabbat and another halakha of Shabbat, as it was taught in a baraita: With regard to the rope of a bucket that was severed on Shabbat, where one needs the rope to draw water from a well, he may not tie it with a regular knot, as by Torah law it is prohibited to tie a permanent knot. Rather, he may tie it into a bow. However, Rabbi Yehuda says: One may wrap a money belt [punda] around it or a sash [pesikya], provided that he does not tie it into a bow, lest he tie a proper knot.
This presents a difficulty, as there is a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda, who permits placing a tube of oil beside the lamp, and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda, who prohibits tying a bow to reattach the severed rope of a bucket. There is likewise a difficulty between one statement of the Rabbis, who prohibit placing a tube of oil beside the lamp, and the other ruling of the Rabbis, where they permit tying a bow to reattach the severed rope of a bucket.
The Gemara answers: The apparent contradiction between one statement of the Rabbis and the other statement of the Rabbis is not difficult, as one usage of oil might be confused with another usage of oil. Given that it is permitted to use oil for other purposes, one is apt to utilize this oil as well. However, tying a bow will not be confused with the dissimilar tying of a knot. Consequently, the Rabbis do not issue a decree in that case.
The Gemara continues: Likewise, the contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda is not difficult, as the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda is not because he issues a decree to prohibit tying a bow due to the prohibition against tying a knot. Rather, the reason is more fundamental, because Rabbi Yehuda maintains that a bow itself is a full-fledged knot. According to Rabbi Yehuda, tying a bow is included in the prohibition against tying a knot on Shabbat.
And the Gemara raised a contradiction between one statement of the Rabbis and another statement of the Rabbis, as we learned in a mishna: One may tie a bucket with a sash, to draw water from a well, but one may not do so with a rope, and Rabbi Yehuda permits the use of a rope. Before addressing the aforementioned contradiction, the Gemara asks: The mishna is referring to a rope of what kind? If you say it is referring to a standard rope, does Rabbi Yehuda permit tying a knot in this rope? It is a permanent knot, as in tying the rope to the bucket he certainly comes to negate any other use of the rope. He performs a primary category of prohibited labor by tying a permanent knot.
Rather, it is obvious that the mishna is speaking about a rope used in the work of a weaver [gardi]. The legal status of this rope differs from that of an ordinary rope, as the weaver will certainly not leave his rope attached to a bucket and thereby negate any other use. Consequently, this knot is a temporary one.
The Gemara asks: And did the Rabbis issue a decree prohibiting the rope of a weaver due to a standard rope but they did not issue a decree prohibiting a bow due to a knot? The Gemara explains: Yes, the Rabbis indeed issued a decree prohibiting the rope of a weaver, as one rope may be interchanged with another rope, leading one to mistakenly tie a knot with a different rope. However, a bow is not interchanged with a knot.
The Gemara asks: And anywhere that one distances himself from the prohibition, does Rabbi Yehuda not issue a decree? But wasn’t it taught in a baraita: What should one do if he has an unblemished firstborn kosher animal whose blood circulation is constricted, and it can be healed only through bloodletting? This situation is problematic, as an unblemished firstborn animal is consecrated, and wounding it is prohibited. Even if it dies due to this condition, one may not let its blood at all; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.
And the Rabbis say: One may let the animal’s blood, provided that he does not inflict a blemish on the firstborn animal. In this case Rabbi Yehuda issues a decree with regard to a firstborn animal, despite the fact that its use is generally prohibited and people distance themselves from consecrated items. The Gemara answers: There, in the case of a firstborn animal, since a person is agitated and anxious
about his property, as the priest who is watching the firstborn wants to slaughter it before it dies, as if it dies, eating it would be prohibited. Therefore, we say: If you permit him to let blood in a place that does not cause a blemish in the animal, he will come to do so in a place that causes a blemish in it, to save his animal.
And the Rabbis respond that if that is the case, all the more so should it be permitted to let blood in a manner that will not cause a blemish, for if you do not permit him to take any steps to save the animal at all, he will come to act in a prohibited manner and cause a blemish. If there is a legitimate alternative, he will not cause a blemish in the firstborn.
The Gemara challenges this explanation: And do we say that according to Rabbi Yehuda a person is agitated about his property? But didn’t we learn in a mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: One may not scrape an animal on a Festival with a fine-tooth comb, because in doing so he inflicts a wound, which is prohibited on Festivals? However, one may scratch an animal with a wide-tooth comb, as this does not inflict a wound. And the Rabbis say: One may neither scrape nor even scratch, for if one were permitted to scratch an animal he might come to scrape it as well.
And it was taught in the Tosefta: What is scraping and what is scratching? Scraping is performed with a comb with small teeth and with which one inflicts a wound. Scratching is performed with a comb that has large teeth and with which one does not inflict a wound. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda does not issue a decree to prohibit scratching lest one come to scrape, even though he is agitated over his property.
The Gemara rejects this contention: There, with regard to a firstborn, it is different, for if he leaves it and does nothing the animal will die, and therefore we say that a person is agitated over his property. In his agitated state he will overlook the details of permitted and prohibited actions and violate a prohibition. Here, however, if he leaves his animal and does not comb it, it will merely suffer pain from the stinging insects. In that case we do not say that a person is agitated about his property.
The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yehuda, what is different with regard to leavened bread that he issued a decree lest a person come to eat the prohibited food, and what is different with regard to scraping that he did not issue a comparable decree? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda maintains that unleavened bread might be interchanged with leavened bread, whereas scraping would not be interchanged with scratching. Since one uses a completely different utensil in the performance of the prohibited action, interchanging the two actions is unlikely.
MISHNA: The tanna’im disagree regarding until what time leaven may be eaten and at what time it must be removed on Passover eve. Rabbi Meir says: One may eat leaven the entire fifth hour of the fourteenth of Nisan, and one must burn it immediately afterward at the beginning of the sixth hour. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may eat the entire fourth hour and one places it in abeyance for the entire fifth hour, and one burns it at the beginning of the sixth hour.
And furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda said: Two disqualified loaves of a thanks-offering are placed on the bench in the colonnade in the Temple as an indicator. There was a specially designated place for these loaves in the Temple. As long as the loaves are placed there, the entire nation continues to eat leaven. When one of the loaves was taken away, the people know that the time had come to place the leaven in abeyance, meaning that they neither eat nor burn their leaven. When they were both taken away, the entire nation began burning their leaven.
Rabban Gamliel says that the times are divided differently: Non-sacred foods are eaten the entire fourth hour, and teruma may be eaten during the entire fifth hour. Since it is a mitzva to eat teruma and burning it is prohibited, additional time was allocated for its consumption. And one burns all leaven including teruma at the beginning of the sixth hour.
GEMARA: The Gemara seeks to draw a comparison between this dispute of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda and a dispute between them on a different topic. We learned in a mishna there: If one witness says that an incident occurred on the second day of the month and one other witness says that it happened on the third day of that month, their testimony is valid. This minor contradiction does not invalidate the testimony.
The mishna explains: The reason is that this witness knows about the addition of an extra day to the previous month. Since he knows that the court added a day to the previous month, which lasted thirty days, he testifies that the incident occurred on the second day of the month. And that witness does not know about the addition of an extra day to the previous month, and he therefore thinks that the incident in question occurred on the third of the month.
If one says that the incident occurred on the third day of the month and one says it happened on the fifth, their testimony is void, as there is no way to rationalize this contradiction. Similarly, if one says the incident occurred at two hours of the day and one says it happened at three hours, their testimony is valid, as that discrepancy could be the result of the lack of precision. However, if one says it occurred at three hours and one says it took place at five hours, their testimony is void. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
Rabbi Yehuda says: In the last case, their testimony is valid, as it could be that one is slightly mistaken. However, if one says it happened at five hours and one says at seven hours, everyone agrees that their testimony is void. That is a clear contradiction that cannot be rationalized as a miscalculation, as at five hours of the day the sun is in the east, and at seven hours the sun is already in the west. It is impossible to confuse the fifth hour with the seventh.
Abaye said: When analyzing the matter, you will find that you can say that according to the statement of Rabbi Meir a person does not err at all, as Rabbi Meir assumes that people know the exact time of day. According to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda a person errs up to half an hour. Abaye elaborates: According to the statement of Rabbi Meir, a person does not err at all, and the reason that in the case where one says two hours and one says three the testimony is valid is that the incident actually occurred as the second hour ended and the third hour began. And when this witness said it happened in the second hour he was referring to the end of the second hour. When that witness said the third hour he was referring to the beginning of the third hour. It is possible that both witnesses spoke the truth.
Abaye continues his explanation: According to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, a person errs by half an hour, as when the incident occurred, it occurred at the midpoint of the fourth hour, at three and a half hours of the day. And this witness, who says three hours, means the end of the third hour, and he errs by saying that it occurred half an hour before the incident actually occurred. And that witness, who says five hours, means the beginning of the fifth hour, i.e., the end of the fourth hour, and he errs by saying that it occurred half an hour after the incident actually occurred. Since it is possible that their testimonies do not conflict, their testimony is valid.
Some say a different version of this statement. Abaye said: When analyzing the matter, you will find that you can say that according to Rabbi Meir a person errs a bit, and according to Rabbi Yehuda a person errs by an hour and a bit. Abaye elaborates: According to Rabbi Meir, a person errs a bit, as when the incident occurred, it occurred either at the end of the second hour or at the beginning of the third hour, and one of the two witnesses errs a bit. According to Rabbi Yehuda, a person errs by an hour and a bit, as when the incident occurred, it occurred either at the end of the third hour or at the beginning of the fifth hour,