Philocalia · The Philocalia of Origen8

1CHAP. XVI. ---- Concerning those who slander Christianity on account of the heresies in the Church. Book III. against Celsus.

21. Then, as if he would like to blame the Word for the evils of heresy associated with Christianity, he reproaches us, saying, "Having grown in numbers and being widely dispersed, they are further split and divided; every body wants to have his own party." And again he says, "Being too numerous to keep together, they refute one another; they share, so to speak, if they do share it, the |78 one name, the only thing that in spite of their divisions they are ashamed to give up; as for the rest they are all one here, one there." In reply, we will say that you never find different sects in any department of thought unless the principle involved is one of grave importance and practical use. Take the science of Medicine. It is useful and necessary to the human race, and the questions which arise as to the healing of the body are many. This is why, as is admitted, there are several sects among the Greeks, and I suppose among Barbarians also, as many as profess to practise the healing art. Let us take another illustration, Philosophy, inasmuch as it professes the pursuit of truth and the knowledge of realities, suggests the proper mode of life, and endeavours to teach things profitable to our race. But the points in question involve much diversity of opinion, and this is why there arose such an incredible number of philosophic sects of more or less distinction. Nay, even Judaism had a pretext for the rise of sects, through the varied interpretation of the writings of Moses and the words of the Prophets. Similarly, because Christianity appeared, not only to the low-minded, as Celsus says, but also to many learned Greeks, to be a matter of grave importance, sects of necessity arose, and not altogether through factiousness or contentiousness, but because so many even of the literary class were anxious to understand the meaning of Christianity. In consequence of this, because scholars differently interpreted what were believed on all sides to be Divine utterances, sects sprang up bearing the names of thinkers who had a reverent regard for the origin of the Word, but somehow or other through specious and plausible reasoning were brought into conflict with one another. But no man of sense would shun the science of Medicine because of its different sects; nor would a man of proper aims make the many sects of philosophy a pretext for hating it; and, similarly, we must not condemn the sacred books of Moses and the Prophets on account of the Jewish sects. |79

32. If all this hangs together, may we not offer a similar apology for the sects of Christianity? What Paul says concerning them seems to me truly marvellous: "There must be also sects among you, that they which are approved may be made manifest among you." For as a man "approved" in the science of Medicine is he who is familiar with the practice of many different sects, and having fairly considered their claims, has chosen the best; and as the advanced student of Philosophy who, having an extensive knowledge of his subject, is familiar with its details, and therefore gives his adhesion to the stronger reasoning, may be called "approved"; so, I would say, he who carefully examines the sects of Judaism and Christianity becomes the wisest Christian. But any one who blames the Word on account of our sects would also blame the teaching of Socrates, because from the study of that Philosopher many different schools of thought have arisen. Nay, a man might blame even the doctrines of Plato because Aristotle gave up the study of him and took a line of his own, a point to which we have already referred. But Celsus seems to me to have become acquainted with certain sects which do not even share the name of Jesus with us. Rumours may have reached him of the Ophites and Cainites, or the holders of some other opinion altogether alien to the teaching of Jesus. But Christian doctrine is not in the least to be blamed for this.

43. Granting that there are some amongst us Christians who do not allow that our God is the same as the God of the Jews, it by no means follows that they are to be blamed who prove from the same Scriptures that one and the same God is God of the Jews and of the Gentiles; Paul plainly shows this, when, after leaving the Jewish religion and embracing Christianity, he says, "I thank God, whom I serve from my forefathers in a pure conscience." Let us grant, too, that there is a third class composed of those who call some persons |80 psychical and others spiritual (I suppose Celsus means the Valentinians); but what have we who belong to the Church to do with that? We are the accusers of those who introduce the doctrine of natures so constituted that they must be saved, or must perish. Let it further be granted that there are certain persons who also profess to be Gnostics, like the Epicureans who call themselves Philosophers; our answer is that men who destroy a belief in Providence could not really be Philosophers, nor can they be Christians who foist upon us these monstrous fictions so distasteful to the followers of Jesus.

54. Celsus goes on to say, "And they even say the most shameful things of one another; they would not make the least concession in the interests of harmony; for they utterly detest one another." In reply, even in Philosophy, as we have already said, rival sects may be found, and so it is in Medicine. We, however, following the Word of Jesus, and having made it our study to think and speak and do whatever He has said, being reviled, bless: being persecuted, we endure: being defamed, we entreat; and we would not say shameful things of those whose views differ from our own; but we would do all in our power to raise them to a higher level through persevering loyalty to the Creator alone, and by acting as men who will one day be judged. But if the heterodox will not be persuaded, we have our rule for dealing with them. "A man that is heretical after a first and second admonition refuse, knowing that such a one is perverted and sinneth, being self-condemned." And again, men who understand the words, "Blessed are the peacemakers," and "Blessed are the meek," would not utterly detest opponents who debase Christianity. |81

6CHAP. XVII. ---- A reply to certain philosophers who say that it makes no difference whether we call Him Who is God over All by the name Zeus, current among the Greeks, or by that which is used by Indians, for instance, or. Egyptians. Books I . and V. against Celsus.

71. Celsus then says, "The goatherds and shepherds acknowledged one god, whether they call him the Most High, or Adonai, or the God of Heaven, or Sabaoth, or gave him some local designation to suit their fancy; beyond this they know nothing." And he afterwards says, "It makes no difference whether we call the Supreme God by the name Zeus, which is current among the Greeks, or by some Indian name, for instance, or Egyptian name." Now in answer to this we must remark that here we come upon a deep and mysterious subject, the nature of names. Shall we say, as Aristotle thinks, that names are arbitrarily given? or, with the Stoics, that they are natural, the first articulate sounds being imitative of what the names denote, so that they also acquaint us with certain principles of etymology? or, as Epicurus teaches, differing herein from the Stoics, are they "natural," in the sense that primitive men broke into speech which varied according to their circumstances? If, then, in our leading argument, we are able to show the nature of powerful names, some of which arc used by the wise men of Egypt, or by the learned Magi of Persia, or by the philosophic Brahmans |82 of India, or by the Samaneans, and so in every nation; and if we succeed in making out that what is called Magic is not, as the Epicureans and Aristotelians suppose, incoherent from beginning to end, but, as the experts prove, is a well-compacted system, with words known to extremely few,----if, I say, we get as far as this, we shall maintain that the name Sabaoth, and Adonai, and whatever others are by Hebrew tradition regarded with great reverence, are not applicable to ordinary created things, but to a mysterious science of things Divine, related to the Creator of the universe. It follows that these names when uttered in their proper connection, and other names current in Egyptian of certain demons with particular powers only, and others in the Persian language of other spiritual beings, and so in every nation, can be applied to certain purposes. And thus it will be found that the demons to whom have been assigned different parts of the earth bear names according to the dialect of the place and nation. Any one, therefore, who has a nobler, even though it be but a slender, conception of these things, will take care to apply different names to different things, lest he fare no better than they who erroneously give the name of God to lifeless matter, or degrade the title "the good" by severing it from the First Cause, or from virtue and honour, and apply it to blind Plutus, and to the proportions of flesh and blood and bones required for health and strength, or to what is counted noble birth.

82. And perhaps it is no less dangerous to degrade the name of God, or the title "good," to improper objects, than it is to change the names of God to suit some secret doctrine, and apply the names of the better to the worse, and of the worse to the better. I do not dwell on the fact that when we hear of Zeus it is implied that he was |83 the son of Cronos and Rhea, and the husband of Rhea, and the brother of Poseidon, and the father of Athene and Artemis, and that he had intercourse with his daughter Persephone; or that when we hear Apollo's name, we remember that he was the son of Leto and Zeus, and the brother of Artemis, and the half-brother of Hermes; not to mention all the other wonderful stories told us by the wise men whom Celsus approves, who are the authors of these opinions, and by the ancient theologians of Greece. Is it not unreasonable that Zeus should be his proper name, and yet that he should not have Cronos for his father and Rhea for his mother? And we must treat all the other so-called gods the same way. But the charge by no means attaches to those who, in accordance with some mysterious doctrine, apply the name Sabaoth, or Adonai, or any of the other names, to the (true) God. As soon as a man can philosophically explain the mysteries of names, he will make many discoveries respecting those given to the Angels of God, one of whom is called Michael, another Gabriel, another Raphael, the names being suitable to the service they render according to the will of the God of the whole universe. Our Jesus, too, keeps to the same philosophy of names; for His name has already been clearly proved to drive out countless demons from souls and bodies, powerfully working in the sufferers from whom the demons were expelled. And, treating of names, we must further observe that they who are familiar with the use of charms tell us that if we pronounce the same charm in its own language, it is possible to effect what the charm professes to do; but that if we change it into another tongue, no matter what, it may be found feeble and quite ineffective. The power of producing a certain effect is not therefore to be attributed to the actual meaning of the charm, but to the qualities and peculiarities of the sounds. We shall therefore on such lines as these defend the Christians for striving even unto death that they may not call God by the name Zeus, nor give Him a name in another tongue. For |84 Christians in their confessions either employ the usual name God, without further definition, or they add, "The Maker of all things," "The Creator of heaven and earth "----He Who to benefit mankind sent down such and such wise men, with whose names the name of God conjoined bestows a certain wonder-working power among men. Much more might be said on the subject of names as against those who think that the use of them is a matter of indifference, And if Plato is much admired for saying in Philebus, " My awe, Protarchus, in naming the gods is considerable," for Philebus, who was arguing with Socrates, said that the true name of Aphrodite was Pleasure, ought we not much rather to approve the piety of Christians, inasmuch as there is not one of the names handed down in mythology which they apply to the Maker of the world?

9And in Book V., treating of the same subject, he says:

103. But since Celsus thinks it makes no difference whether we call the Most High Jupiter, or Zen, or Adonoeus, or Sabaoth, or Amon, as the Egyptians do, or Pappaeus like the Scythians, let us briefly discuss these points, and remind the reader of what was said above on this great question, when the language of Celsus invited us to the argument. We repeat, then, that the nature of names does not, as Aristotle thinks, depend on the arbitrary rules of those who give them. For the languages of men do not even originate with men, as is clear to those who can give attention to the nature of charms variously appropriated by the authors of the languages, according as the languages differ and the names are differently pronounced. We have already briefly discussed this, and have maintained that though they have a natural power in a given language, if they are translated into another language they lose the effect which they had in their own proper expression. And we find that the same peculiarity applies to man. Suppose some one to be called from birth by a Greek name; if we change the name into Egyptian, or Roman, or some other language, we could not make him do or suffer what he would if he were called |85 by his original name. Nor even if we were to translate into Greek a name which was Roman to begin with, could we do what the charm professes to do if it keeps to the man's first name! Now, if what we have said respecting human names is true, what ought we to think of names which are some way or other traced up to the Divine nature? For instance, some new power is transferred to the Greek from the name Abraham, something is signified by the name Isaac, and something shown by the title Jacob; and if a man were to call upon or swear by the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, he would produce some effect, either through the nature of the names or their power, for even demons are vanquished and become subject to a man who uses this language. But if one were to say, "The God of the elect father of the sound," and "the God of laughter," and "the God of the tripper up," the name thus used is as ineffective as any other ordinary name. Similarly, if we change the name Israel into Greek or some other language, we shall effect nothing; but if we keep it as it is, and use it in conjunction with such expressions as the learned think should be associated with it, there will be some result from the use of such language according with the professions of those who employ such invocations. And we shall say the same respecting the name Sabaoth, which is often found in charms, viz. that if we change the name into "The Lord of Hosts," or "Lord of Armies," or "Almighty" (for the interpreters take it differently), we shall effect nothing; but if we keep to its proper pronunciation, we shall, so the learned say, produce some effect, and the same holds good of Adonai. Now, if neither "Sabaoth" nor "Adonai," when changed into what they appear to signify in Greek, produces any effect, how much less could they be efficacious among men who think it makes no difference whether we |86 call the Supreme God Jupiter, or Zen, or Adonai, or Sabaoth!

115. Well, then, Moses and the prophets understanding these things and the corresponding mysteries, forbade any one who practised prayer to the Supreme God alone to take the name of other gods upon his lips, or remember them in a heart taught to be pure from all foolishness in thought or speech. And this is why we would rather endure every outrage than confess that Jupiter is God. For we do not suppose Jupiter and Sabaoth to be the same, nor do we regard Jupiter as at all Divine, but we think that some demon, friendly neither to man nor to the true God, rejoices in the name. And even if the Egyptians should offer Amon to us with threats of death, we will die rather than call Amon God, for the name is probably used in some Egyptian charms which invoke the demon. The Scythians may say that Pappaeus is "the Supreme God," but we shall not be persuaded; for though they employ the solemn title of "Supreme God," it is only in a sense which pleases the demon to whom was allotted the Scythian desert with the Scythian race and language, not because Pappaeus is a proper name for God. Any one, however, who gives God His name in the Scythian language, or the Egyptian, or the language in which he has been brought up, will not commit sin.

126. We do not even like to call the sun Apollo, or the moon Diana; but worshipping the Creator with a pure worship, and praising His beauteous works, we do not pollute Divine things even so far as a name goes. We agree with what Plato says in the Philebus; he would not have Pleasure called a goddess: "So great is my awe, Protarchus, in naming the gods." We, too, really have such awe in naming God and His beauteous works, that we will not accept any fable even as allegory, which might injure the young.

13CHAP. XVIII. ---- A reply to those Greek philosophers who profess to know everything, and blame the simple faith of the man of Christians; and complain that they prefer folly to wisdom in life; moreover, that no wise or educated |87 man has become a disciple of Jesus ; but boatmen and tax-gatherers of the lowest class, they say, get fools and blockheads, slaves, weak women and children, to submit themselves to the Gospel. Books I. and III. against Celsus.

141. He next urges us in forming our opinions to make reason our guide and follow it, because whoever gives his assent in other terms is sure to be misled; and he likens men who have an unreasoning faith to begging priests of Cybele and to soothsayers, Mithrae and Sabadians, or any other sort one comes upon, phantom envoys of Hecate or some other demon, or demons. For as among them detestable men are frequently found trading upon the ignorance of the simple, and leading them any way they choose, so, Celsus says, it is with Christians. He tells us that certain teachers who will neither give nor receive an account of what they believe employ the formula, "Don't ask why, but believe," and another, "Thy faith shall save thee"; and these teachers, he adds, maintain that "worldly wisdom is a bad thing, and foolishness a good thing." This is our answer. If all men could give up the active pursuits of life and apply themselves to philosophy, that would be the only course for any man to take; for in Christianity, not to speak offensively, there will be found no less inquiry than elsewhere; we have our careful investigation of the articles of the Faith, and our explanation of the dark sayings of the Prophets, the parables in the Gospels, and countless other figurative events or enactments. But if this course is impracticable, whether on account of the stress of life, or because of human infirmity, for very few are eager to reason, what better plan for benefiting the many could be devised than that which was delivered by Jesus to the Gentiles? And as regards the greater |88 number of believers, who have escaped from the deep mire of wickedness in which they formerly wallowed, which, we ask, is really best----that with unreasoning faith they should be reformed characters, because they believe that men are punished for sin and rewarded for good works, or that we should not allow their conversion on the strength of mere faith, but wait for their deliberate investigation of the reasons for belief? It is clear that nearly all will be excluded from the benefits which the others have received through simply believing; the many will continue to lead abandoned lives. Whatever else then goes to prove that the love towards man which marked the entry of the Word into human affairs was not undesigned by God, this must be included. A religious man will not suppose that even a physician of the body, who restores many sick to health, comes into cities or nations independently of God;. for without God's help nothing comes to men. But if the physician who cures the bodies of many sufferers, or partially benefits them, does not cure without God's help, how much rather is this true of Him who heals the souls of many, converts them, does them good, attaches them to the Supreme God, and teaches them in all their doings to make His good pleasure their aim, and to shun whatever is in the least displeasing to Him in word, or deed, or thought?

152. So then, since our opponents are for ever talking about our faith, we have to tell them that we allow it on the ground that it is a good thing for the many, and we confess that we teach those who cannot forsake everything else and investigate the evidence, to believe even without reasoning; and our opponents, though they would not confess so much, do the same. Could any man who has been drawn to Philosophy and has dashed into some philosophic sect, either at random, or because he has had access to some particular teacher, get thus far any other way than by believing that sect to be the best? For it is not by waiting to hear the arguments of all the philosophers and of the different sects, and by learning how some may be upset and others established, that a man chooses to be a Stoic, or a follower of Plato, or a |89 Peripatetic, or an Epicurean, or to belong to any other philosophic school; but it is by an unreasoning impulse, though they will not admit the fact, that they come, for instance, to forsake the others and adopt Stoicism: rejecting Plato's doctrine as less dignified than that of the others, or the Peripatetic system because it is more human, and more readily than others admits the blessings of mankind. And there are some who in their alarm at the faintest approach to the doctrine of Providence, arguing from what on earth befalls both bad and good, rashly conclude that there is no Providence, and take the view of Epicurus and Celsus.

163. Since, then, as reason teaches, we must believe some one who has founded a sect, Greek or Barbarian, should we not much rather believe the Supreme God, and Him who teaches that we ought to worship God only, and overlook all else, as either non-existent, or as existing and worthy of honour, but not of reverence and adoration? As regards these points, if a man not only believes, but also views them in the light of reason, he will let it be known what proofs he comes upon, and discovers through thorough inquiry. It is surely more reasonable, since all things human depend on faith, to believe God rather than them. Does any man go on a voyage, or marry, or beget children, or sow the land, unless he believes that all will turn out for the best, though the opposite is possible, and sometimes does happen? In spite of possible disappointment, the belief in a prosperous issue and that they will realise their wishes, makes all men venture even where there is uncertainty, and the result may be other than they hope. Now, if in every undertaking where the result is uncertain the hope and belief in a successful result is the stay of life, shall not a man with much better reason than if he sailed the sea, or sowed the land, or married a wife, or engaged in any other human affairs, have this faith, and believe in the God Who made all these things, and in Him Who, with surpassing wisdom and Divine magnanimity, ventured to present this doctrine to all mankind, in the face of great dangers and of what was considered a |90 shameful death, which sufferings He endured for man, teaching His earliest adherents to boldly traverse the whole world in peril at every step and with the constant expectation of death, in order to promote the salvation of men?

174. Let the impugner of the faith of Christians tell us by what demonstrative proofs he was driven to admit the occurrence of numerous conflagrations and deluges, and upon what grounds he maintains that the last deluge was in the time of Deucalion, and the last conflagration in the time of Phaethon. If he adduces the dialogues of Plato on these subjects, we will tell him that we, too, are at liberty to believe that a Divine Spirit abode in the pure and pious soul of Moses, who soared above all things created and clung to the Maker of the universe, and gave clearer views of the things of God than Plato or the Greek and Barbarian philosophers. And if Celsus demands our reasons for such a faith, let him first give us the grounds of his unproved opinions, and we will at once make good our position.

185. Celsus is welcome to the teachers of fabulous conflagrations and deluges. According to him they were the wisest of the Egyptians, and traces of their wisdom may be seen in the worship of irrational creatures, and in the arguments to show that such a worship of God, though partly lost and mysterious, is quite reasonable. If the Egyptians boast of their animal worship and explain the principles of their religion, they are wise; but if a man, assenting to the Judaic law and acknowledging the lawgiver, refers everything to the only God, the Maker of the universe, he is accounted by Celsus and his followers inferior to him who degrades the Godhead to the level not only of rational and mortal creatures, but of irrational creatures, thus going beyond the fabulous transmigration of souls, according to which a soul falls from the vaults of heaven and descends to irrational creatures, not only such as are tamed, but even the most savage. And if Egyptians tell these mythic tales, they are believed to have been philosophers with their riddles and mysteries; but if Moses writes histories for a whole nation, and |91 bequeaths laws to the people, his words are regarded as empty fables, incapable of even an allegorical interpretation. For this is the opinion of Celsus and the Epicureans.

196. Then, in express terms, Celsus says, "If they will be good enough to answer me, not as if I were a novice, for I know all about it," and so on. In reply to this claim to know "all about it," which is an astounding piece of swagger, we must observe that if he had read the Scriptures, above all, the prophetical writings, which we admit are full of dark sayings and things obscure to the many, and if he had studied the parables in the Gospels, and the texts of Scripture containing the Law and the history of the Jewish people, and the utterances of the Apostles, and, reading with a fair and open mind, had wished to get at the meaning, he would not have been so bold as to say, "I know all about it." Not even we who spend ourselves upon these studies would claim to know "all about it," for truth is dear to us. Not one of us will say "I know all that Epicurus taught," nor will boast that he knows the whole of Plato; the truth being that there are numerous points as to which even the expounders of the doctrines are not agreed. Who would be so bold as to say, "I know all about the Stoic or Peripatetic philosophy "? though it might happen that hearing some illiterate blockheads, unconscious of their own ignorance, boasting of their universal knowledge, a man might on the authority of such teachers suppose that he himself knew everything. Celsus seems to me to have acted much the same as if a traveller in Egypt (where those who are familiar with the national literature indulge in many speculations on what are regarded as Divine institutions, but the unlearned are greatly elated when they hear certain myths without understanding the principles involved) were to think he was acquainted with all the wisdom of the Egyptians, though, in fact, he was a disciple of the ignorant, and never came into touch with any of the priests, nor was taught the mysterious doctrines of the Egyptians by one of them. And what I have said about the Egyptians, wise and ignorant, holds good, as we may |92 see, of the Persians. They have their mysteries, celebrated by the learned on principles of reason, but taken symbolically by the masses and ordinary people. And the same applies to the Syrians and Indians, and all who have myths and literature.

207. Celsus, moreover, makes many Christians say, "Wordly wisdom is a bad thing, and foolishness a good thing." We must therefore observe that he slanders the Word, for he does not give Paul's exact words, which run thus: "If any man thinketh that he is wise among you in this world, let him become a fool that he may be wise. For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God." The Apostle does not say without qualification, " Wisdom is foolishness with God," but " the wisdom of this world" Again, he does not say, "If any man among you thinketh that he is wise, let him become a fool absolutely," but "let him become a fool in this world, that he may become wise." Well, then, by "the wisdom of the world" we mean all false philosophy, which, according to the Scripture, is being brought to nought; and we call foolishness a good thing, not absolutely, but when a man becomes a fool to this world. It is the same as if we were to say that a Platonist who believes in the immortality of the soul and what is said about its transmigration, is foolish in the eyes of the Stoics who give no quarter to these opinions; or in the eyes of the Peripatetics who are always talking about the inanities of Plato; or in the eyes of the Epicureans who charge with superstition those who introduce a Providence and set God over all things. And, further, that even, according to the Word itself, it is much better to assent to our doctrines on grounds of reason and wisdom, than on the strength of the bare faith of which we have spoken; and that, under certain circumstances the Word even intended this, so as not to leave men altogether unprofitable, is shown by Paul, the true disciple of |93 Jesus, when he says, "For seeing that in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom knew not God, it was God's good pleasure through the foolishness of the preaching to save them that believe." This clearly shows that God should have been known in the wisdom of God. And since this did not come to pass, God, as by a second expedient, was pleased to save believers, not by foolishness absolutely, but by foolishness so far as related to preaching. For the preaching of Jesus Christ as crucified is "foolishness of preaching." Paul is conscious of this when he says, "But we preach Jesus Christ crucified, unto Jews a stumbling-block, and unto Gentiles foolishness; but unto them that are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God."

21And towards the end of the same book, Book I., respecting the statement that no wise or educated man has been a disciple of Jesus, there is the following:----

228. It is clear to those who are capable of investigating the history of the Apostles with intelligence and candour that it was by Divine power they taught Christianity, and succeeded in bringing men into subjection to the Word of God. For it was not their powerful speaking, or that they offered the Gospel, in accordance with the rules of Greek dialectics or rhetoric, which won over their hearers. But it seems to me that if Jesus had chosen certain men in general esteem for their wisdom, who could think and speak so as to please the many, and had employed them as ministers of the doctrine, He might reasonably have been suspected of having been preached by a school like the leaders of some philosophical sect; and in that case the promise that the Word should be Divine would not have been clear, inasmuch as the Word and the preaching was in persuasive words of that wisdom which is shown in style and composition; and Christian faith, like the faith of the Philosophers of the world in their doctrines, would |94 have been in the wisdom of men and not in the power of God. But who, when he sees fishermen and tax-gatherers, men without even the rudiments of learning (the Gospel so describes them, and Celsus credits them with speaking the truth about their own ignorance), not only dealing boldly with the Jews as regards the Faith in Jesus, but also preaching Him in other nations, and with success, would not ask how they came to have this convincing power? for it is no ordinary power. And who would not say that by a certain Divine power in His Apostles Jesus fulfilled the promise, "Come ye after me, and I will make you fishers of men "? It is such a power as this which Paul, as we have said before, describes when he says, "And my speech and my preaching were not in persuasive words of wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power: that your faith should not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God." For as we read in the Prophets who foretell the preaching of the Gospel, "The Lord gave a word to those who bring good tidings with great power, the King of the powers of the Beloved," in order that the prophecy may be fulfilled which says, "His word shall run very swiftly." And in fact we see that "The sound of the apostles of Jesus Christ went out into every land, and their words unto the end of the world." Thus it is that when men hear the Word proclaimed with power they are filled with power, and they manifest it both by their dispositions and their lives, and by contending earnestly for the truth even unto death; but some speakers are mere windbags even though they profess to believe in God through Jesus, for not being Divinely enabled they only seem to be subject to the Word of God. I have already mentioned a saying of our Saviour in the Gospels, but I will none the less make use of it now, for it is appropriate, by way of showing how our Saviour's foreknowledge of the preaching of the Gospel is |95 most Divinely manifested, and also how the Word without teachers prevails over those who yield to the persuasiveness of Divine power: "The harvest truly is great, but the labourers are few. Pray ye, therefore, the Lord of the harvest, that he send forth labourers into the harvest."

239. And whereas Celsus speaks of infamous men, and calls the Apostles of Jesus villainous tax-gatherers and sailors, we will say respecting this, that in order to find fault with the Word he appears to believe the Scriptures wherever he chooses; but to disbelieve the Gospels so that he may not have to accept the manifestations of Deity proclaimed in those same books; for any one who sees how the writers cling to truth in describing minor matters cannot help believing them when they treat of things more Divine. It is indeed written in the Catholic Epistle of Barnabas, from which Celsus probably took his description of the Apostles as "infamous" and "villainous," that "Jesus Christ chose for His own apostles those who were notoriously lawless men." And in the Gospel according to Luke, Peter says to Jesus, "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord." Nay more, Paul (though he afterwards became an Apostle of Jesus) says in his Epistle to Timothy, "Faithful is the saying and worthy of all acceptation, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners; of whom I am chief." Is there, then, any absurdity in believing that Jesus, because He wished to show mankind His wondrous skill in healing souls, chose "infamous" and "villainous" men, and brought them to such a pitch of excellence, that they were a pattern of the purest life to those who through them were led to submit to the Gospel of Christ?

2410. If we are going to make their past a reproach to men who have changed their lives, it is time for us to attack Phaedo even though he is now the Philosopher: for, as history relates, Socrates took him out of a house of ill-fame and interested him in philosophy. We shall also make the profligacy of Polemon, the successor of Xenocrates, a reproach to philosophy; whereas we ought to give |96 philosophy credit thus far, that reason when used by those gifted with persuasive power can rescue from such vices those who had been overcome by them. The Greeks have one Phaedo, I do not know of another, and one Polemon, who after a dissolute and utter detestable life changed and became philosophers; while with Jesus there were not only the Twelve at the time we speak of, but always many more, such as having become a joyous band of temperate livers, say concerning their former lives: "For we also were aforetime foolish, disobedient, deceived, serving divers lusts and pleasures, living in malice and envy, hateful, hating one another. But when the kindness of God our Saviour, and his love toward men, appeared through the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost which he poured out upon us," we became what we are. For "God sent forth his word, and healed them, and delivered them from their destructions," as the prophet taught in the Psalms. And I would further remark, that Chrysippus in his treatise on the Healing of the Passions, his object being to check the passions of men's souls, though he does not pledge himself to the truth of any particular doctrine, endeavours to apply his remedy according to the principles of the sect to which they belong who have been mastered by their passions; and he says that if pleasure be the (philosophic) end, we must through pleasure cure the passions; and even if, according to some, there are three kinds of blessings, we must none the less, according to this doctrine, similarly rid men from the tyranny of the passions. But the accusers of Christianity do not see how the passions of multitudes are calmed, and the surging waves of wickedness laid to rest, nor do they regard the numbers of those whose savage characters are tamed by means of the Word. And if they find this public benefit to be a fact, they ought to confess their gratitude to the Word for having by a new method delivered men from many vices; and they ought to bear witness to it, that whether it be the truth or not, it has at all events profited mankind. |97

2511. Jesus, teaching His disciples not to be rash, said to them, "When they persecute you in this city, flee into the next; and if they persecute you in the next, flee again into another"; and He not only taught, but was an example of a well-regulated life, in which dangers are never encountered without an object, unseasonably, or unreasonably. This, again, Celsus mischievously perverts, and makes his Jew say to Jesus, "You run away to all sorts of places with your disciples."

2612. "What need was there for you while still an infant to be carried off into Egypt, so that you might not have your throat cut? For it was not likely that a god should be afraid of death?" and so on. But inasmuch as we believe Jesus, when He Himself says concerning His Divinity, "I am the way, the truth, and the life," or anything similar; and as we also believe Him when, referring to His having a human body, He says,"But now ye seek to kill me, a man that hath told you the truth," we maintain that He was something compound. And inasmuch as it was His purpose during His sojourn on earth to live the life of a man, it was right that He should not unseasonably expose Himself to death. So, too, it was necessary that He should be taken away by His parents who were guided by one of God's angels.

2713. Is there any absurdity in supposing that, having once become Man, His human life was so ordered that He shunned dangers? not that it was otherwise impossible to attain His object, but because it was fitting to leave room for ways and means in securing His safety. And it was surely better for the child Jesus to escape from Herod's plot and sojourn with His parents in Egypt until the death of the conspirator, than for Providence watching over Jesus to hinder the will of Herod when he purposed to kill the child, or to associate with Jesus dark Pluto's helm, of which the poets speak, or anything of the kind, or to smite those who came to destroy Him, as the men of Sodom were |98 smitten. If it had been perfectly clear that some very extraordinary help was given to Him, this would not have furthered His desire to teach, as a man approved by God, that He had something more Divine within the visible man, which "something" was properly the Son of God, God the Word, the power of God and the wisdom of God, He that is called Christ. But this is not the time to discuss the compound nature, and the parts of which Jesus, who became a man, was composed; that is a separate topic, and, if I may so speak, one suitable for investigation by believers.

2814. And the story of Aristotle has points of resemblance to the slanderous charge against Jesus and His disciples. When Aristotle saw that a court was going to be got together to try him for impiety, on account of certain of his philosophical opinions which the Athenians considered impious, he left Athens and stayed in Chalcis, defending himself to his friends by saying, "Let us leave Athens, so that we may not give the Athenians any occasion for incurring the guilt they did over Socrates, and that they may not a second time sin against Philosophy."

2915. And in Book III. of the same treatise against Celsus he says this:----

30Then Celsus goes on to quote what is said against the teaching of Jesus by a very small number of persons who are considered Christians, not the most intelligent, as he supposes, but the most ignorant, and tells us "that such rules as these are laid down by them: Let no educated person come, no one wise, no one prudent; for education, wisdom, and prudence are with us regarded as bad things. But if any one is unlearned, if any one is without understanding, or uneducated, or a mere child, let him come boldly. Now the fact that they confess these persons to be worthy of their God, shows that they wish and are able to convince none but fools, low-born people, blockheads, slaves, weak women, and children." This is our reply. When Jesus was teaching self-control He said, "Every |99 one that looketh upon a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart." Now, suppose a man saw some few persons, out of so many, who are considered to be Christians, living undisciplined lives, he would with very good reason accuse them of living contrary to the teaching of Jesus; but he would be most unreasonable if he were to charge the Gospel with their offence. Just so, if Christian doctrine as much as any other is found to invite men to wisdom, they must be blamed who rest satisfied with their own ignorance, and who say, not what Celsus relates (for though some are ignorant and unlearned, they do not use such shameless language), but other things which, though far less important, are nevertheless calculated to turn believers from the practice of wisdom.

3116. That the Word means us to be wise, we may prove even from the old Jewish Scriptures, which we use as well as the Jews, and no less also from those which were written after Jesus came, and are believed in the churches to be Divine. In the 50th Psalm David in his prayer to God is reported to have said, "Thou hast showed me the secret and hidden things of thy wisdom." And any reader of the Psalms may find the book full of many wise doctrines. And Solomon, because he asked for wisdom, received it; and the proofs of his wisdom may be seen in his works, which contain much thought in few words, and in which you may discover many praises of wisdom and many admonitions as to the necessity of embracing it. Solomon was in fact so wise that "the Queen of Sheba having heard of his name and the name of the Lord came to prove him with hard questions, and she communed with him of all that was in her heart. And Solomon told her all her questions: there was not anything overlooked by the king, which he told her not. And the Queen of Sheba saw all the understanding of Solomon, and all that belonged to him; and there was no more spirit in her. And she said to the king, It was a true report that I |100 heard in mine own land of thee and of thy understanding. Howbeit I believed not the words, until I came, and mine eyes had seen it: and, behold, the half was not told me: thy wisdom and riches exceed all the report which I heard." Again, it is written concerning the same Solomon, "And God gave Solomon wisdom and understanding exceeding much, and largeness of heart, even as the sand that is on the seashore. And Solomon's wisdom excelled the understanding of all the ancients and all the understanding of Egypt; and he was wiser than all men," and so on. And so desirous is the Word that there should be wise men among believers, that to exercise the intelligence of the hearers it has expressed some things .in enigmas, some in what are called dark sayings, others through parables, and others through difficult questions. And one of the prophets, Hosea, in his concluding words, exclaims, "Who is wise, and he shall understand these things? prudent, and he shall know them?" Daniel, too, and his companions in captivity made such progress in all the learning cultivated by the wise men about the King of Babylon, that they were proved to be ten times better than them all. And in Ezekiel it is said to the Prince of Tyre, who prided himself upon his wisdom, "Surely thou art not wiser than Daniel? Every secret was not shown thee."

3217. And if you come to the books written after the time of Jesus, you will find the crowds of believers who heard the parables regarded as "without," and worthy only of the popular arguments, but the disciples learning in private the interpretation of the parables; for Jesus privately expounded everything to His own disciples, thus honouring those who claimed His wisdom more than He did the crowds. And He promises those who believe on Him that He will send wise men and scribes, saying, "Behold, I send unto you wise men and scribes: and some of them shall they kill and crucify." And Paul |101 in his list of the gifts of God's grace, placed first the word of wisdom, and second, as inferior to it, the word of knowledge, and third, still lower I suppose, he placed faith. And inasmuch as he honoured the Word above marvellous acts, for this reason he places workings of miracles and gifts of healing below the gifts of the Word. And in the Acts of the Apostles Stephen testifies to the great learning of Moses, taking his proofs altogether from such ancient writings as were not generally known. For he says, "And Moses was instructed in all the wisdom of the Egyptians." And this is why Moses was suspected in his miracles; they thought he might work them not because, as he professed, he came from God, but because of the learning of the Egyptians in which he was skilled, The king, because he thus suspected him, summoned the enchanters of the Egyptians, and the wise men, and the sorcerers; and they were proved to be as nothing in comparison with the wisdom in Moses, which surpassed all the wisdom of the Egyptians.

3318. But what Paul writes in the first Epistle to the Corinthians, where he addresses them as Greeks priding themselves on their Grecian wisdom, has probably moved some to think that the Word does not want the wise. If any one so thinks, let me tell him that as the Word reflects on bad men, and says that they are not wise in things spiritual, invisible, and eternal, but because they concern themselves with things of sense only, and make them all in all, they are wise men of the world: so also, inasmuch as there are many doctrines, some of which give support to theories of matter and corporeal substances, and allege that all subsistences to begin with were corporeal, and that there is nothing else beside them, whether it be called "invisible" or "incorporeal," the Word says that this is wisdom of the world which is being brought to nought and stultified, and that it is wisdom of this present life. On the other hand, there are doctrines which translate the soul from earthly affairs to the blessedness |102 of communion with God and to the kingdom which bears His name, and teaches the soul to despise all things sensible and visible as being temporal, but to press on to the things invisible and to keep in view the things that are not seen----and these doctrines the Word says are the wisdom of God. Paul, with his love of truth, speaking of certain wise men of the Greeks and the truth they hold, says that, "Knowing God, they glorified him, not as God, neither gave thanks"; and he tells us that they had not this knowledge without God's help. "For," he says, "God manifested it unto them." I suppose he is darkly hinting at those who rise from things visible to the things intelligible, when he writes that "The invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity; so that they may be without excuse: because that, knowing God, they glorified him not as God, neither gave thanks."

3419. Then there is the passage, "For behold your calling, brethren, how that not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called: but God chose the foolish things of the world, that he might put to shame them that are wise; and God chose the base things of the world, and the things that are despised, and the things that are not, that he might bring to nought the things that are: that no flesh should glory before him." Some have perhaps been moved through this to suppose that no one educated, or wise, or prudent embraces the Word. We would point out to such an one that the words are not, " No wise man after the flesh," but " Not many wise men after the flesh." And it is plain that in the character sketch of those who are called Bishops, when Paul described what manner of man the bishop ought to be, he gave the teacher his proper place: for he says the bishop "must be able also to convict the gainsayers, so that he may stop the mouth of vain talkers and deceivers." And as the Apostle in choosing a man |103 for the office of a bishop prefers one who is the husband of one wife rather than him who has been twice married, and the blameless man rather than him who has been overtaken in a fault, and the temperate man rather than the opposite, and the soberminded man rather than him who is not soberminded, and the orderly man rather than him who is ever so little disorderly: so he wishes the man specially qualified for the office of a bishop to be apt to teach, and able to stop the mouths of the gainsayers. How, then, can Celsus with any show of reason accuse us of saying, "Let no one educated come, no one wise, no one prudent." By all means let any educated, wise, or prudent man come if he wishes to: but if a man be ignorant, and unintelligent, and uneducated, and childish, he will be no less welcome. For the Word promises to heal such if they come, making them all worthy of God.

3520. And it is another falsehood that "the teachers of the Divine Word wish to persuade only silly, ill-bred people, blockheads, and slaves, and weak women, and children," though the Word calls even those that it may do them good. But it also calls such as are very different from them, for Christ is the Saviour of all men, specially of them that believe, whether they be men of understanding, or more simple folk, and "He is the propitiation with the Father for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the whole world." After what we have said it is too much to expect us to reply to such questions as these, which Celsus puts: "Why is it a very bad thing for a man to have been educated, and to have studied the best arguments, and both to be and seem wise? How does this hinder a man from knowing God? Can it possibly be anything but a help and a means whereby a man may more readily reach the truth?" A real education is not a bad thing, for education is a path to virtue; but not even the wise men of Greece will tell us that the holders of erroneous opinions are to be reckoned among the "educated." According to our Word, a knowledge of wickedness is not wisdom; and, if I may use the term, |104 there is a knowledge of wickedness in the holders of false opinions, and in those who have been deceived by fallacious arguments. I should therefore say that they are more ignorant than wise. Further, who would not confess that it is a good thing to have studied the best arguments? Shall we, however, call any arguments the "best," except those which are true and which urge men to the pursuit of virtue? Again, it is a good thing to be wise, though not, as Celsus says, to seem so; and to have been educated, and to have studied the best arguments, and to be a man of understanding is certainly no hindrance but a help in knowing God. And it is more fitting for us than for Celsus to say this, particularly if he is proved to be an Epicurean.

3621. Let us see what he says next. "Why, we surely see even the men in the market-places parading their infamous opinions and collecting a crowd, though they would never come near a gathering of sensible people, and would never dare to show their real sentiments among them; but wherever they catch sight of striplings, or a herd of slaves, or a set of fools, away they go and show off." Now observe, I pray you, how herein he slanders us by comparing us to the men in the market-places who parade their infamous opinions and collect a crowd. What infamous opinions, then, do we parade? or how are we like them, when by readings and explanations of what we read we invite men to the worship of the God of the universe, and to the cultivation of the virtues connected with that worship, but dissuade them from the contempt of the Divine Being, and from the practice of all that is contrary to sound doctrine? The Philosophers, I take it, would gladly get together so many hearers of their discourses which invite men to a virtuous life, as has been notably the case with certain of the Cynics, who publicly converse with such hearers as happen to be by. Will it then be said that these Philosophers, because they do not gather an audience of what are considered educated people, |105 but invite the common people to assemble, are like the men in the market-places who parade their infamous opinions and collect a crowd? The truth is that neither Celsus, nor any one who agrees with him, finds fault with teachers who follow the course which humanity dictates, and address their arguments to the ignorant masses as well as to other people.

3722. If the Philosophers are not to be blamed for doing this, let us see whether Christians do not more than they, and to better purpose, endeavour to win multitudes to the love of the beautiful and good. The Philosophers who discourse in public make no distinctions in their choice of hearers; any one who likes stands and listens. But Christian teachers, so far as they can, first make trial of the souls of those who wish to hear them, and rejoice over them in private; then, when the hearers appear sufficiently earnest in their desire to lead a good life, they introduce them to the public assembly, having made a private list of those who are novices and catechumens, and have not as yet received the Sacrament of their cleansing, and another list of those who, as far as possible, show their determination to adopt Christianity to the exclusion of all else; and with these are associated certain officers appointed to inquire carefully into the lives and conduct of the candidates, so that they may prevent such as are guilty of infamous practices from coming to the public assembly, but may heartily welcome such as are different from these, and may day by day do them good. And they have a similar method in dealing with those who fall into sin, particularly such as are licentious, whom they, who, according to Celsus, resemble the market-place orators parading their infamous opinions, expel from the public assembly. The venerable school of the Pythagoreans used to set up kenotaphs to those who abandoned that philosophy, reckoning them as dead. But our Christian teachers |106 lament as dead, inasmuch as they are lost and dead to God, those who have been overcome by lasciviousness, or some other disgusting wickedness; and regarding them as risen from the dead if they manifest a considerable change, they afterwards receive them, though a longer interval is required than in the case of catechumens; they choose, however, to no office and administration in the Church of God those who soon lapsed after submitting to the Gospel.

3823. Now Celsus says that these men to whom he compares us, the men in the market-places parading their infamous opinions and collecting a crowd, would never think of coming near a company of sensible people, nor venture to show their real sentiments among them: "but wherever they see striplings, or a herd of slaves, and a set of fools, away they go and show off." When he thus abuses us he is exactly like the low women who delight in slandering one another. For we do all we can to get an audience of sensible men, and we then venture in our public discourses to bring forth what is best and most Divine, when we have a number of intelligent hearers, but we conceal and pass over in silence the deeper truths, when we see that those who assemble are the simpler sort of people, and require such teaching as is metaphorically called "milk." For Paul, writing to the Corinthians, Greeks whose morals were not yet cleansed, says, "I fed you with milk, not with meat: for ye were not able to bear it: nay, not even now are ye able; for ye are yet carnal; for whereas there is among you jealousy and strife, are ye not carnal, and walk after the manner of men?" And the same Paul, knowing that some things are food for the more mature soul, and that others being suitable for beginners are like "milk," says, "Ye have become such as have need of milk, not of solid food. For every one that partaketh of milk is without experience of the word of righteousness; For he is a babe. |107 But solid food is for full-grown men, even those who by reason of use have their senses exercised to discern good and evil." Now, let me ask, could men who believe this to be well spoken suppose that the beauties of the Word should never be declared to an assembly of sensible men, but that "wherever they see striplings, and a herd of slaves, and a set of fools," there "they should produce the Divine and hallowed truths, and before such an audience show off in handling them?" On the contrary, it is clear to any one who examines the whole drift of our Scriptures, that Celsus, like the ignorant masses, is moved by hatred against the family of Christ when he makes such false and unwarranted statements.

3924. We own to a desire to instruct all with the Word of God, whatever Celsus may wish, so as to give the striplings such exhortation as is suitable for them, and show slaves how they may be ennobled by the Word if they recover a free mind. And our advocates of Christianity emphatically declare that they are debtors to Greeks and Barbarians, to the wise and to the foolish; for they do not deny that they are bound to cure the souls even of the foolish, so that, as far as they can, laying aside their ignorance they may earnestly seek wisdom, and may give heed to Solomon's words, "Ye fools, be of an understanding heart"; and, "Let him who is most foolish among you turn aside unto me"; and those who are without understanding Wisdom exhorts thus, "Come, eat ye of my bread, and drink of the wine which I have mingled. Forsake folly that ye may live, and correct understanding in knowledge." I should also like to ask in reply to what Celsus states, for the point is important, whether the teachers of philosophy do not invite striplings to come and hear them? And do they not urge young men to give up a low life and turn to something better? How does Celsus make out that they do not wish slaves to take up Philosophy? Are we going to blame Philosophers for encouraging slaves to turn and lead a virtuous life, as Pythagoras did Zamolxis, and Zeno did Persaeus, or as they did who very recently won |108 Epictetus to the side of Philosophy? May you, ye Greeks, invite striplings, and slaves, and fools, to embrace Philosophy? and if we do so, will ye not allow our motive to be love for man, seeing that we wish with the healing virtue of the Word to cure every rational nature and make it fit for God, the Creator of all things?

4025. When Celsus, distracted at the numbers of those who flock to hear the Word, alleges that no sensible person obeys the Word, he acts like a man who alleges that because so many ignorant persons submit to the laws, no sensible person obeys Solon, for instance, or Lycurgus, or Zaleucus, or any other lawgiver, particularly if by "sensible" he means in respect of virtue. For as the law-givers, providing for the masses according to their views of what was best, have given them proper guidance and laws on all sides: so God when He gives the law in Jesus Christ to all men every where, leads those who are not "sensible" as well as others, so far as such men can be led, on to the better life. Paul knew this when he said, "God chose the foolish things of the world, that he might put to shame them that are wise; and, speaking generally, he calls all those "wise" who seem to be proficient in learning but have fallen into godless polytheism; for "Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God for the likeness of an image of corruptible man, and of birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things."

4126. Celsus blames the Christian teacher as if he specially looked for ignoramuses. In reply we would ask, What ignoramuses do you mean? For, strictly speaking, any inferior man is an ignoramus. Well, then, if by ignoramuses you mean inferior people, do you when you |109 try to attract men to Philosophy seek to attract inferior people or the cultured? Certainly not the cultured, for they are already acquainted with Philosophy. Inferior people, then. But inferior people, as we have seen, are ignoramuses; and your aim is to win many such inferior people to Philosophy; it follows that you, too, look for ignoramuses. But I, even if I do seek those who are thus called "ignoramuses," am like a humane physician who looks for the sick that he may bring them the help they need, and may restore them to health and strength. If, however, by "ignoramuses" you mean those who are not only not clever, but are portentously stupid people, my answer is that I do my best to benefit these also, though I should not like the great body of Christians to consist of them. By way of preference I look for men of some cleverness and acuteness, inasmuch as they are able to trace out the clear interpretation of the hard sayings and obscure passages in the Law and the Prophets, and the Gospels, which you have despised as containing nothing of any account, because you have not closely examined their sense, nor tried to enter into the meaning of the writers.

42CHAP. XIX. ---- And again, earlier in the same book, Origen says, That our faith in our Lord has nothing in common with the irrational superstitious faith of the Gentiles, and that it is both commendable, and accords with the original moral notions of mankind. In answer also to those who say, How do we think that Jesus is God seeing that He had a mortal body?

431. Faith in Antinous or some other Egyptian or Greek hero, is, if I may use the expression, unfortunate; but faith in Jesus would appear to be either fortunate, or to have its claims severely tested; for it seems to be fortunate with the many, and severely tested by very few. And if I say that a certain faith is fortunate, as the many |110 would call it, I refer the explanation of this good fortune to God, Who knows the causes of every human being's lot in life. And the Greeks will also admit that even in the case of those who are regarded as their wisest men, good fortune accounts for much, as for example the sort of teachers they have, and whether they meet with better ones (for other men teach opposite doctrines), and whether they have a better bringing up. For it is the lot of many to be so brought up that they cannot get even a faint perception of the higher life, but from their very earliest years are destined to be among the favourites of licentious men, or of tyrants, or to be in some other sad condition which prevents the opening of the eyes of the soul. I quite suppose that the causes of this are to be found in the rulings of Providence; but how the causes affect mankind is not easy to explain. I thought I would make this digression in passing, for we remember the old saying, "What wonders faith performs when it once takes hold of anything!" It was necessary to speak of different forms of faith on account of the different ways men are brought up; and from this to go on to show that what is called good or bad fortune would appear to assist even clever men in this very respect, that they appear more reasonable than other men, and with better reason for the most part to adopt their opinions. But enough of this.

442. But we must consider what Celsus says next. Amongst other things he tells us that "we are already under the influence of faith when we thus submit to Jesus." And in truth faith does effect this submission. Observe, however, whether the very act of faith does not exhibit something praiseworthy when we submit ourselves to God Who is over all, confessing our gratitude to Him Who has guided us to such a faith, and saying that He did not without God's help undertake and accomplish such a difficult task. And we believe also in the intentions of those who wrote the Gospels, as we mark the caution and |111 conscientiousness shown in their writings, and how they admit nothing spurious, hazardous, invented, or unscrupulous. For it strikes us that souls which knew nothing of the strange devices taught by the unscrupulous sophistry of the Greeks, and by the rhetoric bandied in the law-courts, could not thus invent incidents able of themselves to lead men to faith and to a life in keeping with their faith. And I suppose this was why Jesus wished to employ such teachers of His doctrines, that there might be no room to suspect them of plausible sophisms, but that they who are capable of understanding may see clearly that the writers' purity of intention with its, if I may so speak, great simplicity, was deemed worthy of Divine help, which accomplishes far more than diction, and composition, and right construction with its refinements and rules of Grecian art seems able to accomplish.

453. Now see whether the principles of our faith, being accordant with man's original conceptions, do not work a change in fair-minded hearers of the Word. For though the perverted doctrine, backed up with much instruction, has been able to implant in the minds of the many the belief that images are gods, and that things made of gold, and silver, and ivory, and stone, are worthy of worship; common sense, nevertheless, forbids us to think that God is by any means corruptible matter, or that He is honoured when He is fashioned by men in forms of dead matter, supposed to pictorially or symbolically represent Him. And we accordingly at once decide respecting images that they are not gods; and respecting such works of art that they are not to be compared to the Creator; and that they are insignificant when we think of God, Who is over all, the Maker, Preserver, and Governor of the universe. And the rational soul, as if it recognised its affinity, at once rejects what it hitherto imagined to be gods, and resumes its natural affection for the Creator; and because of that natural affection for Him, it eagerly accepts Him, Who first showed these truths to the Gentile world by means of the disciples whom He prepared, and whom He sent forth with |112 Divine power and authority to preach the Word concerning God and His kingdom.

464. And whereas Celsus, I know not how many times already, taunts us with holding that Jesus, though He had a mortal body, is a god, and with supposing that herein we show our piety, it is superfluous to say more, for more than enough has already been said. Still, I would have our accusers know that He Who we think and are persuaded was from the beginning God and Son of God, is the very Word, and very Wisdom, and very Truth; and we affirm that the mortal body and the human soul therein, not only by communication with Him, but by an union and intimate mixture, gained the highest honours, and having participated in the Divine Nature, were taken into God. And if, any one stumbles at our saying this concerning His body, let him attend to what is said by the Greeks about matter, in itself unqualified, acquiring whatever qualities the Creator wishes to invest it with; and how it frequently divests itself of its former qualities and assumes better ones of a different kind. For if this is sound doctrine, is it any wonder that the quality of mortality attaching to the body of Jesus should by the providence of God, Who so willed, change into one that was heavenly and Divine?

475. Celsus, then, did not show his dialectical skill when, comparing the human flesh of Jesus to gold, and silver, and stone, he saw it was more corruptible than they. For, to speak correctly, what is incorruptible cannot be more incorruptible than something else which is incorruptible, nor can what is corruptible be more corruptible than some other corruptible thing. But allowing that there are degrees of corruptibility, we shall still reply, that if it is possible for the matter which underlies all qualities to change its qualities, why should it be impossible for the flesh of Jesus to change its qualities, and become such as it ought to be if it is to live in the sky, and the upper realms, no longer having the qualities of fleshly |113 weakness, and whatever other qualities Celsus called "pollutions"? ----and in doing so did not speak like a philosopher. For in the proper sense pollution is the result of vice; but the nature of the body is not polluted; for as bodily nature it has no vice, which generates the pollution.

48CHAP. XX. ---- A reply to those who say that the whole world, including man, was made not for man, but for the irrational creatures; for the irrational creatures live with less toil than men; further, that they are wiser than we are, and are both dear to God, and have a conception of God, and foreknow the future; wherein we shall also oppose transmigration of souls, and have something to say concerning augury and the trickery connected with it. From Book IV. against Celsus.

491. He, Celsus I mean, then says, "But, not to confine my remarks to the Jews, for that is not my aim, but that I may deal with the whole of nature, as I promised, I will explain more clearly what I have said." What modest man who reads this and is conscious of human weakness, would not shrink from the offensiveness of a man who promises to give an account of the whole of nature, and so pretentious as Celsus in daring to give such a title to his book? Let us see, then, what it is he promises to tell us about the whole of nature, and what light he throws upon the subject.

502. Well, he proceeds to blame us at great length for alleging that God has made all things for man. And, drawing on the stories of animals and the sagacity they show, he wishes to prove that everything exists no more for the sake of men than for the sake of the irrational creatures. Here he seems to me to talk like those men who from hatred of the people they dislike, blame them for the very qualities for which their own friends are praised. For as enmity so blinds these men that they are not aware of accusing their friends when they think they are abusing their enemies: the same way, Celsus in this confusion of thought has not seen that he is blaming the Philosophers of the Porch, inasmuch as not unwisely they give man the first place, and in |114 general prefer rational nature to all irrational beings, and maintain that for the sake of the rational creation chiefly, Providence has made everything. And rational creatures, inasmuch as they are the leading objects of Providence, are regarded as children begotten; but irrational and lifeless creatures are like the after-birth. I moreover think that as in our towns the inspectors of provisions and of the market exercise their office only for the sake of men, but even dogs and other irrational creatures enjoy the abundance as well: so Providence chiefly provides for the rational creatures, but it follows also that the irrational creatures enjoy what exists for the sake of men. And as a man is in error if he says that the clerks of the markets provide no more for men than dogs, for that the dogs as well as men enjoy the abundance of what is on sale: so Celsus and they who are of his mind are much more guilty of impiety towards God, "Who provides for the rational creatures; for they pretend to ask. "What more is done for man's support than for plants, and trees, and roots, and thorns?"

513. For, in the first place, now more clearly showing his Epicurean views, he thinks that "thunder and lightning and rain are not works of God." And, secondly, he says that "if one were to grant that these are works of God, they exist no more for us men than they do for plants, and trees, and roots, and thorns"; thus, like a true Epicurean, allowing that they are the result of chance and not designed by Providence. If they are no more useful to men than they are to plants, and trees, roots, and thorns, it is clear that they are not the gift of Providence, or that they come from a Providence which no more provides for us than for trees, or a root, or a thorn. But the impiety is obvious whichever way you take it; and it is silly to oppose such views by withstanding a man who accuses us of impiety; for any one may see, from what has been said, who it is that is guilty of impiety. Then he adds, "Even if you say that these (he clearly means the plants, |115 trees, roots, and thorns) grow for men, what reason is there for saying that they grow more for the sake of men than for the sake of the wildest irrational creatures?" I wish Celsus would tell us plainly that the great variety in the produce of the earth is not the work of Providence, but that a fortuitous concourse of atoms is the cause of so many qualities, and that we are indebted to chance for so many kinds of plants, and trees, and grass, resembling one another; and that no reason designed them to begin with, and that they do not spring from an infinitely marvellous understanding. But we Christian people, who are dedicated to the service of the Creator of these things, the only God, even herein find motives for gratitude to the Maker of them all, because He prepared so fair a home for us, and, for our sakes, for the animals which serve us; "He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle, and herb for the service of man: that he may bring forth food out of the earth; and wine that maketh glad the heart of man, and oil to make his face to shine, and bread that strengtheneth man's heart." And if He also prepared food for the most savage beasts, it is no wonder; for these beasts, as some philosophers have maintained, were meant to be a training school for the rational creature. And one of our wise men somewhere says, "Say not, what is this? wherefore is that? for all things have been made for their uses"; and, "Say not, what is this? wherefore is that? for at time convenient they shall be sought out."

524. After this, Celsus wishing to show that Providence has not made the things that grow upon the earth any more for us than for the most savage beasts, says, "We wear ourselves out with unceasing toil, and yet with all our labour hardly get a living; but everything grows for the beasts without their ploughing and sowing." He does not see that because God wished man's intelligence everywhere to find a field for exercise, so that it might not remain idle and without some conception of the arts, He |116 made man a creature of many wants, intending him to be driven by his very necessities to discover various arts, some for his sustenance, others for his protection. For it was better that men who were not likely to search and study Divine things should be in want, so that they should have to use their understanding in discovering these various arts, than that they should through abundance altogether neglect their understanding. One result of the scarcity of the necessaries of life was agriculture, another vine-dressing, another the different styles of gardening, another the crafts of the carpenter and the smith, which furnish tools to the arts which minister to man's sustenance. And the want of protection brought weaving, which followed wool-carding and spinning, and also building; and thus man's intelligence rose even to architecture. And the lack of necessaries led also to the transport of commodities from certain places, through seamanship and the shipmaster's skill, to those who were without them; so that for these reasons, as well as others, a man might marvel at Providence for having made the rational creature, to its advantage, more necessitous than the irrational creatures. For the irrational creatures have their food prepared for them, because they have no means of cultivating the arts; and they have a natural protection, for they are covered with hair, or wings, or horny scales, or shells.

535. But some advocate of the dignity of man, he tells us, may object that the irrational creatures were created for man's sake. "If any one should call us lords of creation because we hunt and feast on the other creatures, we will ask in return, Is it not nearer the truth to say that we exist for their sakes, because they hunt and devour us? The fact is we must have nets and weapons, and a lot of men, and dogs, to assist us in our sport, while nature gave them their own weapons as soon as they were born, thus making us an easy prey to them." Now here, again, you see how the gift of understanding is a great help to us, and better than any weapon which the wild beasts seem to have. We, at any rate, though our bodily strength is far less than that of the animals, and |117 very far less than that of some of them, gain the mastery over them through our understanding, and hunt even such huge beasts as elephants. Some animals which were intended by nature to be domesticated, we tame by our gentleness; but in dealing with those which cannot be domesticated, or which it would appear useless to domesticate, we consult our own safety, and when we like we keep them shut up, or when we want them for food we kill them, just as we do the animals that are not wild. So then, the Creator has made all things to serve the rational creature, and to be in subjection to his rational intelligence. We want dogs for such purposes as guarding the flocks, or cattle, or herds of goats, or our houses; and cattle for tilling the land; while we use other beasts for drawing vehicles or carrying loads. So we may say that lions and bears, pards and boars, and all such animals, are given to us to exercise and develop our manhood.

546. Then, in defiance of mankind, who perceive their own superiority over the irrational creatures, he says, "In reply to your contention, that God has given us the power to capture and make full use of the wild beasts, we shall take up this position. It is probable that before towns were built, or crafts invented, or such-like social arrangements were made, before weapons and nets were devised, men were carried off and devoured by the wild beasts, while the beasts were only by the rarest chance captured by men." Now, in answer to this, observe that even though men capture the beasts and the beasts carry off men, there is a wide difference between men who prevail by intelligence, and the beasts whose savage and cruel nature gives them the mastery over men, and who do not use their intelligence to secure safety from them. When Celsus makes the remark about a time when there were no towns, nor arts, nor such means of social intercourse, he must, I think, have forgotten what he said before to the effect that "the world was uncreated and incorruptible, and that only the dwellers upon earth were exposed to deluges and conflagrations, and that their |118 misfortunes did not end there." As it is not for those who suppose the world to be eternal to talk of its beginning, so neither may they speak of a time when there were no towns of any sort and arts had not been discovered. Now, for argument's sake, let us allow that he and we are herein agreed, though he is not at all consistent with himself in what he said before. But has this anything at all to do with men's being at the first captured and eaten by the wild beasts, while as yet the beasts were not captured by men? Certainly, if the world came into being through the wisdom of Providence, and God is ruler over all, the small sparks of the human race must at first have been guarded by a higher power, so that at first there was intercourse between the Divine Nature and men. The poet of Ascra thought so, for he said----

55"Then the feasts were common, and seats common,

56To immortal gods and mortal men."

577. And the Divine Word according to Moses, introducing the first men, makes them hear a more Divine voice, and oracles, and sometimes see the angels of God coming to visit them. It is surely probable that at the beginning of the world human nature received more assistance than afterwards; until such time as, having advanced in understanding, and the other manly qualities, and having discovered various arts, men were able to live independent lives, and did not continually need guardians and governors, with miraculous manifestation of the service rendered to the will of God. It is consequently false to say that at the beginning "men were caught and eaten by the beasts, but the beasts were hardly ever captured by men." And this shows the falsity also of what Celsus thus expresses: "So that in this respect at least God subjected men to the beasts, rather than beasts to men." For God did not subject men to the beasts, but God gave |119 the beasts to be taken by the intelligence of men, and by the arts which intelligence suggests for their destruction. For not without God's help did men devise the means of saving themselves from the beasts, and of maintaining their dominion over them.

588. The noble critic, overlooking the fact that so many philosophers bring Providence into their arguments and affirm that it does everything for the sake of the rational creatures, does his best to destroy their doctrines, which are of use in showing the agreement of Christian teaching and philosophy in these respects; nor does he perceive what an injury and hindrance it is to piety to accept the view that with God there is no difference between man and ants or bees. Because he does not observe this, Celsus says: "If men seem to excel the irrational creatures, inasmuch as they dwell in towns, and have some form of government, and magistracies, and authorities, it is nothing to the purpose, for ants and bees have all this as well. Bees, at any rate, have their queen with her followers and attendants; they have also their wars and victories and capture the vanquished; they have their towns and even suburbs, the division of labour, and courts for trying the idle and bad members of the community; anyway, they drive the drones away and punish them." Now here, again, Celsus has not seen where the difference lies between what is accomplished by thought and reason, and what results from an irrational nature and a creature's mere make. No original gift of reason in the creatures accounts for these doings, for they have not reason; but the Most Ancient One, He Who is both Son of God and King of the subject universe, has created an irrational nature which by its very lack of reason helps the creatures not deemed worthy of reason. Towns, then, arose among men along with many arts and a legal system; and forms of government, and magistracies, and human authorities, whether those which are properly so called because they secure good habits and |120 activities, or those less properly so named, according as the former are imitated as far as possible; for it was by contemplating these habits and activities that legislators succeeded in establishing the best forms of government, magistracies, and authorities. But nothing like this can be found among the irrational creatures, though Celsus may transfer to ants and bees the names derived from reason, and institutions based on reason, "town," "government," "magistracies," "authorities." Even so we must not receive ants or bees, for they do not reason when they thus act; but we must admire the Divine nature, extending as it does to irrational creatures what I may call the imitation of the rational, perhaps to put rational creatures to the blush; so that when they look at the ants, they may become more diligent and may husband their own blessings better; and when they observe the bees, they may obey their authorities, and may take their share in such duties of government as tend to promote the welfare of the citizens.

599. Perhaps the so-called "wars" of bees are intended as a lesson in just and regular warfare among men, if the necessity should arise. And bees have no "towns" and "suburbs"; but their hives and hexagonal cells, their works, and their division of labour, are for the sake of men, who require honey for many purposes, for the healing of their bodies and for wholesome food. And we must not compare the treatment of the drones by the bees to the courts for prosecuting the idlers and bad characters in our towns, and to the punishments inflicted on them. But, as I said before, while we must admire the nature of the bees in these respects, we must allow that man is able to consider the details of everything, and to arrange everything, for he co-operates with Providence, and not only accomplishes the works of God's Providence, but also those of his own foresight.

6010. After speaking of bees, so that as far as possible he may disparage the towns, forms of government, magistracies, authorities, and patriotic warfare, not only of us Christians but of mankind generally, Celsus proceeds to |121 introduce an elaborate eulogy of ants, in order that by thus eulogising the ants he may upset the superiority of man in the management of his food supplies, and show his contempt for the provision which man makes for his winter quarters, as being nothing more than the irrational foresight of the ants where Celsus thinks they show it. Would not Celsus, so far as it depends upon him, turn any one of the simpler sort, and such as are not qualified to look into things all round, from helping a heavily-laden fellow-man, and from sharing his toil, by telling us that the ants when they see a fellow-ant labouring with a load help him to carry it? He who needs the instruction of the Word, and does not by any means give ear to it, will say, "It seems we are no better than the ants even when we help those who are weary with their heavy burdens; why go on doing so to no purpose?" Ants, indeed, since they are irrational creatures, would not be puffed up with pride because their works were compared to those of men; but men being able to learn through reason how their social life is belittled, might, if it depended on Celsus and his arguments, suffer injury; for Celsus does not see that in wishing to turn his readers from Christianity, he is also diverting the sympathy of those who are not Christians from the most heavily laden of his fellow-men. If he were a public-spirited philosopher, he ought not only to refrain from destroying at the same time both Christianity and the beneficent practices of human life, but he should, if possible, support the excellence which Christianity has in common with the rest of mankind. Supposing, however, that the ants do tear off the shoots of the corn they have in store, to prevent its swelling, so that it may last through the year for food, we must not imagine that this is the result of reasoning in ants, but must rather believe that Nature, mother of all things, has so constituted even irrational creatures as not to leave even the least without some trace of Nature's reason. It cannot be that Celsus----in a moment of forgetfulness, for in many things he likes to follow Plato----wishes to indicate that all souls are of |122 the same kind, and that the soul of man no way differs from that of ants and bees; that would be not only to bring down the soul from the vaults of heaven to the human body, but also to everything else. Christians will not assent to these views, for they have already grasped the truth that man's soul was made in the image of God; and they see that it is impossible for a nature created in the image of God to altogether obliterate its characteristics, and take others, copies of I know not what, in irrational creatures.

6111. And since Celsus says also that "when ants die the survivors choose a burial ground, and that there they have their family memorials," I must answer that the more he praises the irrational creatures, so much the more, in spite of himself, he exalts the work of that reason which ordered all things, and shows the cleverness of man, which is able by reason to order the natural advantages of the irrational creatures. Why do I say "irrational," seeing that Celsus thinks that the creatures so named by the general consent of mankind are not irrational? Nor does he who promised to discuss the whole range of nature, and boasted of his truthfulness in the title of his book, think that ants, at all events, are without reason. For he speaks of ants talking to one another, and makes the following remarks: "It really is a fact that when they meet they talk to one another, and this is why they never miss their way; so then they have a full measure of reason, and some general notions, and a voice, know what accidents are, and express what they mean." It is indeed true that when two persons talk to one another they use a voice which expresses some meaning, and frequently describes what are called "accidents"; but would it not be very ridiculous to say we find that sort of thing in ants?

6212. And he is not ashamed to add (that he may fully show the indecency of his opinions to those who shall come |123 after him), "Come! if one were to look down from heaven upon the earth, what difference would there seem to be between the doings of us men and those of ants and bees?" Now picture a spectator looking down from heaven, as Celsus supposes, and seeing the doings of men and ants: does he look upon the bodies of men and ants, and not perceive that in men the ruling principle is rational and set in action by reasoning power, and that, on the contrary, in ants the ruling principle is irrational, set in action without the help of reason, by impulse and fancy, along with some secret contrivance of nature? But it is absurd to suppose that any one who saw from heaven what is done upon earth should wish to look upon the bodies of men and ants from such a distance, and not be much more desirous to see the nature of the ruling principles and the source of impulses, whether rational or irrational. And if he once sees the source of all impulses, he will of course see also the difference, and the superiority of man not only to ants but also to elephants. For the spectator from heaven will discover in the irrational creatures, whatever their size, no other principle than, if I may so call it, irrationality; while in the rational creatures he will see reason, the common property of all men, and of beings heavenly and Divine, and perhaps also of the Supreme God Himself; and it is on account of reason that man is said to have been made in the image of God, for reason is the image of the Supreme God Himself.

6313. Next, as if he were doing his utmost to degrade the human race and make it resemble irrational natures, and as if he were reluctant to give up anything at all related of irrational creatures which shows their dignity, he says that some of them have magical powers as well as men; so that not even in this respect can men claim special distinction, or dream of having superiority over the brute creation. This is what he tells us: "If men pique themselves on magic, the fact is that serpents and eagles are wiser than men in this respect |124 also; they, at all events, are acquainted with many antidotes and means of averting mischief, and specially with the virtue of certain stones in saving their nestlings; when men come upon these stones they think they have got hold of something wonderful." Now, in the first place, I cannot understand how he applies the name "magic" to the, shall we say? experience, or kind of instinct the animals have in using the antidotes which nature provides, for the name has another familiar application; it may be that he forgets himself, and, like a true Epicurean, wishes to disparage the use of such arts altogether because it belongs to the profession of magic. However, let us grant that men do pride themselves on their knowledge of these things, whether they are magicians or not. Does it follow that serpents are wiser on this showing than men, because they use fennel to clear their sight and quicken their movements, the truth being that they take this natural remedy not because they calculate (the effect), but because they are so constituted? Men do not arrive at such methods, like serpents, through the mere promptings of nature, but partly by experiment, partly by reason, and sometimes by calculation and by following the rules of science. Even supposing that eagles do find and carry to the nest what is called the "eagle stone" to keep their nestlings safe, does it follow that eagles are wise, or wiser than men, who because they have the faculty of reason, discover by experiment what is given to the eagles as a natural remedy, and use it intelligently? Suppose that other antidotes come to be known by the animals, is this any proof that in them it is not nature but reason that makes the discovery? If reason made the discovery, there would not have been one discovery, or two or three, confined to snakes, and something different among eagles, and so on with the other creatures; the discoveries would have been as numerous as they are among men. But the fact that the remedies are exclusively adapted to the particular nature of each animal, shows that the animals have not wisdom or |125 reason, but that for their good they are naturally disposed to such remedies through the creative power of the Divine reason.

6414. If, indeed, I wished to join issue with Celsus on these lines, I might quote the words of Solomon in the Proverbs: "There be four things which be little upon the earth, but they are exceedingly wise: the ants are a people not strong, yet they provide their meat in the summer; the conies are but a feeble folk, yet make they their houses in the rocks; the locusts have no king, yet go they forth all of them by bands at one word of command; the lizard taketh hold with her hands, and though easily taken, yet is she in the strongholds of kings." But the words are not clear, and I therefore do not avail myself of them; in accordance with the title of the book (it is called "Proverbs ") I regard them as "dark sayings" and look for the meaning. For the inspired writers are wont to distinguish the many ways of conveying a deeper meaning than the literal, and one of them is the Proverb. Hence it is that even in our Gospels our Saviour is reported to have said, "These things have I spoken unto you in proverbs: the hour cometh when I shall no more speak unto you in proverbs." Now it is not the ants we see that are wiser than the wise, but the ants proverbially indicated. And we say the same of the other animals. But Celsus thinks the books of Jesus and Christians are very simple common-place productions, and he supposes that they who treat them allegorically do violence to the meaning of the writers. Let this suffice to show how futile it is for Celsus to slander us; and let it be the reputation of his argument to prove that snakes and eagles are wiser than men.

6515. And wishing to show at still greater length that even man's conceptions of God are no more remarkable than the mortal side of his nature, but that some of the irrational creatures have thoughts of God, concerning Whom the acutest thinkers everywhere, Greek and |126 Barbarian, have entertained such discordant opinions, he says, "If man because he has got hold of some Divine thoughts is supposed to surpass other animals, let me remind those who are of this opinion that many other animals will put in a claim to the same thing; and with very good reason; for what is more Divine than to foreknow and foreshow the future? Well, men learn the art from other animals, and specially from birds; and as many as profess to know what they point out are Soothsayers. Now, if birds, or any other oracular creatures gifted by God with foreknowledge, teach us by signs, it seems that they have naturally a closer intercourse with God, and are wiser than men and dearer to God. And intelligent men tell us that the birds have their assemblies, obviously more sacred than ours; and, further, that somehow or other they discover what the birds say, and that they give real proof of the discovery whenever they previously declare what the birds said, viz. that the birds would go away to some place and do this and that, and then show that the birds did go there and do what they foretold. And as for elephants, nothing could surpass their fidelity to oaths or be truer to Divine things, just because, I suppose, they have some knowledge of God." Now, here observe how often he begs the question, and takes for granted what is still speculative matter, the fact being that both Greeks and Barbarians have either discovered, or learned from certain demons, the ways of birds and other creatures, from which they are said to derive their powers of divination. In the first place, it is open to question whether there is any such art of augury, and, in general, any basis for divination by means of animals, or not. Secondly, among those who admit that there is an art of divination through birds, it is not agreed as to why the divination takes that form; for some say that it is from demons or gods of divination that the animals receive their impulses, the birds to different flights and cries, the other animals to such and such movements; while others hold that the souls of these animals are more |127 divine than others, and are adapted to the purpose; which is most improbable.

6616. If Celsus wished to prove by the foregoing that the irrational creatures have a Divine nature and are wiser than man, he ought to have fully shown that there is such an art as divination; then, he should have more clearly shown how it can be defended; then have given clear grounds for rejecting the arguments of those who would do away with such arts; and, lastly, should have decisively upset the arguments of those who say that it is from demons or gods the animals derive their divination impulses. Then would be the time for dealing with the question, whether the soul of irrational creatures is more Divine than that of men. If he had thus shown a philosophic spirit in treating such important matters, we would have withstood his plausible assertions to the best of our power; we would have upset his statement that the irrational creatures are wiser than men, and we would have proved how false it is that they have more sacred conceptions of God than we have, and that they hold certain sacred assemblies. But, as things are, the man who reproaches us with believing in the Supreme God expects us to believe that the souls of birds have more divine and clearer conceptions than men. If this be indeed true, birds have clearer conceptions of God than Celsus has, and no wonder if they surpass Celsus who so belittles man. Celsus certainly does his best to make it look as though the birds have greater and diviner conceptions, I do not say than we Christians have, or the Jews, who use the same Scriptures as ourselves, but than even the Greeks had, who treated of God and the Divine nature, for they were men. So, according to Celsus, the race of divining birds, forsooth, understand the nature of God better than Pherecydes, and Pythagoras, and Socrates, and Plato. And it seems that we must go and be taught by the birds, in order that, as, according to Celsus, they teach us by |128 means of divination what is going to happen, so they may also rid men of their doubts respecting the Divine Being, by passing on the clear conception of Him to which they have attained. It follows that Celsus, holding as he does that birds are superior to men, should go to the birds for instruction, and not to one of those distinguished Greek philosophers.

6717. But we must add a few remarks, out of many, in answer to the foregoing, for we wish to utterly refute the false opinions of Celsus and prove his ingratitude to his Maker; for Celsus, being a man, and being in honour, understandeth not; wherefore, he is not even like the birds and other irrational creatures which he considers to have the gift of divination; but yielding them the preeminence, he goes further than the Egyptians, who worship the irrational creatures as gods, and places himself, and, so far as he can, the whole human race, beneath the irrational creatures, for he believes that men have lower and meaner conceptions of God. Let our inquiry, then, be chiefly directed to the point whether there really is, or is not, an art of divination by birds, and the other animals believed to be "divining," for both ways the argument is to be treated with respect; on the one hand, it presses us not to accept any such thing as divination, lest the rational creatures should forsake the oracles of demons and resort to birds; on the other hand, it brings much clear evidence to show that many people have been preserved from the greatest dangers because they believed in divination by birds. For our present purpose let us allow that augury is a reality: my object is to show any persons who are prepossessed in its favour, that even if this is conceded, the superiority of man over the irrational creatures, and over the very creatures with powers of divination, is incomparably great. Let me then say that even though there were in them a Divine nature capable of predicting the future, and so passing rich, that out of its superfluity it could disclose the future to any man who |129 wished to know it, we must suppose that these creatures would much sooner know their own affairs. But if they knew their own affairs they would have taken care not to fly to any place where men set snares and nets to catch them, or archers make them a target and shoot them on the wing. And certainly, if eagles knew beforehand the designs upon their young ones, whether of serpents climbing to them and killing them, or of men trying to take them either for sport or to serve some other purpose, they would not have made their nests where they were likely to be exposed to these attacks; and, in general, not a single living creature could ever have been captured by men, inasmuch as it was more Divine and wiser than men.

6818. Moreover, if birds of omen converse with one another; if, as Celsus says, the divining birds and the other irrational creatures having a Divine nature and conceptions of God, and having the knowledge of the future, disclosed this knowledge to others, the sparrow in Homer would not have made her nest where the serpent would destroy her and her little ones; and the serpent would not, as the same poet relates, have failed to guard itself against being caught by the eagle. Homer, that marvellous poet, thus tells the story of the sparrow----

69"Behold a wonder! by Olympian Jove

70Sent forth to light, a snake, with blood-red back,

71Of aspect fearful, issuing from beneath

72The altars, glided to the plane-tree straight.

73There on the topmost bough, beneath the leaves

74Cowering, a sparrow's callow nestlings lay;

75Eight fledglings, and the parent bird the ninth.

76All the eight nestlings, uttering piercing cries,

77The snake devoured; and as the mother flew,

78Lamenting o'er her offspring, round and round,

79Uncoiling, caught her, shrieking, by the wing!

80Then, when the sparrow's nestlings and herself

81The snake had swallowed, by the God, who first

82Sent him to light, a miracle was wrought:

83For Jove, the deep-designing Saturn's son,

84Turned him to stone; we stood, and wondering gazed." |130

85Respecting the eagle he says----

86"A soaring eagle in his talons bore

87A dragon, huge of size, of blood-red line,

88Alive, and breathing still, nor yet subdued;

89For, twisting backward, through the breast he pierced

90His bearer, near the neck; he, stung with pain,

91Let fall his prey, which dropped amid the crowd;

92Then screaming, on the blast was borne away.

93The Trojans, shuddering, in their midst beheld

94The spotted serpent, dire portent of Jove."

95Shall we say that the eagle was a divining bird, but that the serpent, though the augurs make use of the creature, had not the gift of divination? The arbitrary distinction is easily refuted, and is not the supposition that both had the gift easily disproved? Would not the serpent, if he had possessed divining power, have taken care that the eagle did not treat him so? One might produce countless other instances to show that the animals have not in themselves a divining soul. But, as the poet says, and most men agree, "Olympian Jove himself sent him to the light"; and if Apollo also uses a hawk as his messenger, something symbolical is intended, for a falcon is said to be Apollo's swift messenger.

9619. Our view is that certain worthless demons (Titans or Giants, if I may say so), having sinned against the true God and the angels in heaven, and, having fallen from heaven, wallow in the grosser bodily existences and the unclean things of earth; they have some insight into the future, and inasmuch as they are not encumbered with earthly bodies, and are set on that sort of thing (for they desire to seduce the human race from their allegiance to the real God), they conceal themselves in the more rapacious and savage beasts, and others of a craftier kind, and make them at any time do what they choose; or they turn the fancies of such creatures to such and such nights and movements; so that men, caught in the snare of that divining power which is in the irrational creatures, may |131 not seek Him Who embraceth all, nor try to discover the pure form of worship, but may sink by their speculations to the level of the birds and serpents upon earth, and still lower to foxes and wolves. For it has been observed by the experts that the clearest indications of the future are given through such creatures as these; it may be because the demons cannot so fully "possess" the gentler animals as they can the wild ones, which they closely resemble in wickedness, though the wickedness is not really wickedness in such animals.

9720. And nothing in Moses appears to me more marvellous than what I am about to mention. Because he understands the different natures of animals, and has either learnt from God the facts about them and the demons which have affinity with each, or has by exercising his own wisdom made the discovery, all the animals which he classifies as unclean are those considered by the Egyptians and the rest of mankind to be connected with divination, while those not so connected are, generally speaking, clean animals. Amongst the unclean Moses places the wolf, the fox, the serpent, the eagle, the hawk, and such-like. And, speaking generally, you will find, not only in the Law but in the Prophets, that these animals are taken to represent the worst qualities, while there is no instance of a wolf or a fox being mentioned in connection with anything good. There seems to be, then, a fellowship between such kind of demons and each kind of animals. And as among men some are stronger than others, and not at all on account of their moral character: so some demons in things indifferent may be stronger than others; and some of them may use certain animals to deceive men, according to the pleasure of him who in the words of our Scriptures is called "the prince of this world"; and different ones may show the future by means of another kind of animal. And observe that the demons are so filthy that even weasels are seized by them for revealing the future. Now judge for yourself which |132 is the best view to take, that God over All, and His Son, impel the birds and other creatures for divination, or that they who give the impulse to such animals, and not to men, though men are present, are worthless, and, as our sacred Scriptures call them, "unclean" demons.

9821. But if the soul of birds is really Divine because the future is foretold by means of them, must we not much more admit that wherever omens are received by men, the soul of the medium through which the omens are heard is Divine? According to such teachers as these, we must believe that the slave in Homer who ground the corn was "divine"; for, speaking of the suitors, she said----

99"Would that they might eat their last meal here!"

100She was "divine": the great Ulysses, the friend of Homer's Athene, was not "divine," but understanding the omens given by the "divine" slave he rejoiced; in the words of the poet, "The noble Ulysses rejoiced at the omen." Again, observe that if the birds really have a Divine soul and perceptions of God, or, as Celsus says, "the gods," when we men sneeze, we sneeze, of course, because we have a certain divinity and divining faculty of soul. For many testify to this; and the poet accordingly says----

101"Telemachus sneezed as the prayer was offered."

102Wherefore, also, Penelope says----

103"Do you not see that my son sneezed as you spoke?"

10422. The true God, however, in imparting a knowledge of the future employs neither irrational creatures nor ordinary men, but the holiest and purest souls of men, such as He inspires with prophetic power. And this explains why amongst the other wonderful precepts of the law of Moses we must place such prohibitions as "Ye shall not practise augury, nor observe birds." And in another place, "For the nations, which the Lord thy |133 God shall destroy from before thy face, will hearken to omens and divinations; but the Lord thy God gave not so unto thee." And elsewhere, "The Lord thy God will raise up unto thee a prophet from among thy brethren." On one occasion God wished by means of an augur to turn His people from the practice of augury, and therefore caused a spirit in the augur to say, "Surely there is no augury with Jacob, nor is there divination with Israel; at the due season shall it be told to Jacob and to Israel, what God will perform." Just because we are acquainted with these and similar passages, we wish to observe the mystical command, "Keep thy heart with all diligence," lest some demon usurp the throne of reason, or some hostile spirit turn our imagination to follow his desires. And we pray that "the light of the knowledge of the glory of God" may shine in our hearts, the Spirit of God dwelling in our imagination and impressing on us the things of God; "for as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God."

10523. And we ought to know that the knowledge of the future is not necessarily Divine: for in itself it is a thing indifferent, and is found among both bad and good men. Physicians, at all events, by their medical knowledge know certain things beforehand, though they may be men of bad character; and so, also, shipmasters, though they may be rascals, know the signs of the weather, tempestuous winds, and atmospheric changes, through their peculiar experience and observation. I suppose no one will say that because they have this knowledge they are "divine," no matter what rascals they are. So then, when Celsus says, "What can be pronounced more Divine than to foreknow and foreshow the future?" he implies what is false. It is also false that "many of the animals have claims to Divine conceptions," for no irrational creature has a conception of God. It is also false that "the irrational creatures have |134 a closer intimacy with God"; for the fact is that bad men, however high their attainments, are far from intimacy with God. We maintain that only the truly wise and the sincerely godly approach at all near to intimacy with God: such men as our Prophets and Moses, to whom on account of the great purity of his character the Word has borne witness, saying, "Moses alone shall draw near to God, the rest shall not draw nigh." Is it not impiety for the man who accuses us of impiety, to say that "the irrational creatures are not only wiser than man, but are also dearer to God?" And who would not shrink from heeding a man who says that the serpent, the fox, the wolf, the eagle, and the hawk are dearer to God than human kind? He will have to admit that if these creatures are dearer to God than men, these same creatures are obviously dearer to God than Socrates, and Plato, and Pythagoras, and Pherecydes, and the other exponents of God and the Divine nature, whose praises he sang not long before. One might really offer up a prayer for Celsus, and say, "If these creatures are dearer to God than men, may you be as dear to God as they are, and may you come to resemble those creatures which, according to you, are dearer to God than men!" And let him not suppose that such a prayer is really an imprecation; for who would not pray that he may become altogether such as they who, he is persuaded, are dearer to God than others, so that he, like them, may become dear to God?

10624. And wishing to show that the assemblies of the irrational creatures are more sacred than ours, Celsus ascribes what he relates, not to ordinary mortals, but to "intelligent" men; though in truth only the good are intelligent, for no bad man is intelligent. Well, he speaks after this fashion: "Intelligent men say that the creatures have their assemblies, obviously more sacred than ours; and that they somehow discover what is said and show that they actually have the knowledge, inasmuch as they announce beforehand that the birds said they would go |135 away and do this or that, and then show that they did go away and do what they had already foretold." In reality, no "intelligent" person tells such stories, and no wise man says that the assemblies of the irrational creatures are more sacred than those of men. If, however, for the sake of testing the statements of Celsus, we examine what they lead to, it appears, according to him, that the assemblies of the irrational creatures are more sacred than those of the venerable Pherecydes, Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato, and the Philosophers in general, which, on the face of it, is not only unseemly, but most absurd. But if we are to believe that certain men, who have derived their information from the inarticulate cry of the birds, announce beforehand that the birds will go to some place and do this or that, we shall maintain that the information has been given to men by demons through certain signs, for the purpose of men being deceived by demons, and their understanding dragged down from heaven and from God to earth and places lower still.

10725. I do not know how Celsus came to hear tell of an oath being taken by elephants, and that they show more fidelity towards the Divine Being than we men, and that they have a knowledge of God. I know a good many marvellous stories about the animal and its docility, but I am not aware that any one has spoken of an elephant's oaths, unless, perhaps, Celsus calls their docility and the sort of covenant they make once for all with men, the keeping of an oath; but that again is absurd. There are instances, though rare, of elephants, after seeming to be tamed, fiercely attacking men and killing them, and of their being therefore condemned to death as of no further use. And. to prove his point, as he thinks, that the stork has more piety than men, our opponent adduces what is related about its loving and cherishing its parents and bringing them food. I must therefore add that even this conduct of the storks does not proceed from a regard to what is right, nor from reasoning, but from nature, it |136 being nature's aim in fashioning them, to set an example in irrational creatures strong enough to shame men into showing gratitude to their parents. If Celsus had known the vast difference between doing these things with the aid of reason and doing them without the aid of reason, and by the mere impulses of nature, he would never have said that storks have more piety than men. Further, as if determined to uphold the piety of irrational creatures, Celsus adduces the fable of the Arabian creature, the Phoenix, which is said to visit Egypt at long intervals, and to bring its father, dead and buried in a globe of myrrh, and deposit the remains at the temple of the Sun. Now, even supposing what is here related to be true, it may be the result of natural processes; for Divine Providence has even in the different constitutions of living creatures given proof to man of the rich variety to be found in the ordering of the world, a variety extending even to the birds; and it brought into being a unique creature, not that men might marvel at the creature, but at its Creator.

10826. To all this Celsus adds the following: "Just as all things have not been made for the sake of lion, eagle, or dolphin, so neither have they for the sake of man; but the aim was that this world, as God's work, might be a complete and perfect unity; and this is why all the parts have been proportioned, not to one another, except in a secondary sense, but to the whole, and God cares for the whole; and Providence never forsakes it, nor does it degenerate, nor does God in process of time turn it again to Himself, nor is He angry on account of men any more than on account of apes or flies; nor does He threaten these creatures, each of which has in its turn received its appointed lot." Let us, if only briefly, meet these allegations. I suppose I have already said enough to show how everything has been made for man, and for every rational creature; for it is chiefly on account of the rational creature that everything has been created. Celsus may tell us that the world exists no |137 more for man than it does for the lion, or the other creatures which he mentions; hut we shall maintain that the Creator has made these things not for the lion, the eagle, or the dolphin, but all things for the sake of the rational creature; and this is so, in the words of Celsus, "in order that this world may be, as God's work, a complete and perfect unity"; for we must acknowledge the good sense of this. But God's care is not merely universal, as Celsus thinks, but while He cares for the whole, He has a special care for every rational creature. And a general Providence will never fail; for it is His plan, even though there be a general deterioration because of the sinning rational portion, to purify all creation, and in process of time to turn it back to Himself. It is true that God is never angry on account of apes and flies; but inasmuch as men have transgressed the promptings of nature, He brings upon them judgment and chastisement, and threatens them through the Prophets and the Saviour Who came to save the whole human race; that through His threatening they who hear may be turned, and they who neglect the words intended to turn them may fitly pay the penalty which it is proper that God should, according to His own will, and as is expedient for the whole, inflict on those who need such painful treatment and correction. But our fourth book is now large enough, and we will therefore here end the discourse. God grant through His Son, Who is God the Word, and Wisdom, and Truth, and Righteousness, and whatsoever else the sacred Scriptures say of His Divinity, that we may begin the fifth volume to the profit of our readers, and finish it well, with the help of His Word abiding in our soul!