The Lantern

Philocalia · The Philocalia of Origen10

CCEL

CHAP. XXIV. ---- Matter is not uncreated, or the cause of evil. From Book VII. of the Praeparatio Evangelica of Eusebius of Palestine.

1. I suppose you are aware that two uncreated things cannot exist together; though you seem to assume that they can, and to put the assumption in the forefront of your argument, when you say that one of two things must be admitted, either that God is separated from matter, or, on the contrary, that He is united to it. Now, if any one would maintain that God is united to matter, this is saying that there is one uncreated substance; for each of these two uncreated substances will be a part of the other, and, as they are parts of one another, they will not be two uncreated, but one, consisting of different parts. We do not because a man has different parts divide him into many created substances, but, as reason demands, we say that a single being, a man with many parts, has been created by God. Similarly, of necessity, if God is not separated from matter, we must allow that there is one substance, and that uncreated. But if any one will say that God is separated from matter, there must be something between |198 the two which also proves their separation; for it is impossible to arrive at any idea of distance between two objects, unless there be a third to form the basis of measurement. And this holds good not only of a single substance, as in the present case, but of any number you please; for our argument respecting the two uncreated substances must be no less sound if we suppose that there are three. For we should ask respecting these, whether they are separated from one another, or whether, on the contrary, each is united to its neighbour. If any one decides to assert the union, our reply will be the same as before; if, on the other hand, he holds to the separation, he will have to face the question of the necessary separating medium. And should any one thereupon say that there is a third account which may be fitly given of the uncreated substances, viz. that God is neither separated from matter nor united with it, but is, as it were, locally in matter, or matter in God, let me tell him, and it is the gist of the whole argument, that if we say matter is the place of God, we must of necessity affirm that He is finite and circumscribed by matter. He must, moreover, like matter, be subject to irregular disturbance; He cannot stay in one place, nor abide self-dependent, inasmuch as that wherein He is contained is carried first one way, then another. Besides this, it follows that we must affirm God to be in the lower forms of being. For if matter ever was unordered, and God of His own free choice ordered it with a view to progressive development, there was a time when God had no order of His own, and we might fairly ask whether God filled matter, or was in a part of it. If any one prefers to say that God was in a part of matter, he makes God infinitely smaller than matter: if a part really contained the whole of God. If he says that God is in all matter and pervades the whole of matter, let him tell us how God worked on matter. Either there was some contraction of God before He worked on that from which He withdrew, or He worked at Himself as well as |199 the matter, because He had no place to withdraw to. If any one will maintain that matter is in God, we must similarly inquire whether we are to suppose that God stood apart from Himself, and as living creatures are in the air, that He split up and divided Himself to receive the things in Him, or whether matter is in Him locally, like water in earth. If we say that matter is in Him like birds in the air, we are bound to admit that God is divisible; if we say that matter is in God as water is in earth, and if matter was in a state of confusion and disorder, and, moreover, contained even evil things, we must of necessity allow that God was the place of disorder and of evil, which does not seem to me consistent with piety, but to be rather dangerous. For you postulate the existence of matter, so that you may not have to admit that God is the Author of evil, and in your determination to avoid this error, you affirm that He is a receptacle of evil. If you told me that what you see in created substances leads you to suppose that matter was originally uncreated, I should have had many arguments to prove the impossibility of this conclusion; but as you say the origin of evil is the cause of such a supposition, I must, I think, proceed to inquire into the nature of evil. For once it is clear how evil comes to exist, and, if because matter is subject to God, we cannot possibly deny that He was the cause of evil, there will, I think, be an end of your supposition.

2. Do I understand you to say that unqualified matter is co-existent with God, and that out of it He created the world?

It seems so to me.

So, then, if matter had no qualities, and the world was made by God, and qualities are in the world, God is the Maker of the qualities.

Just so.

But I think you said before that nothing can possibly come out of nothing. Please tell me, therefore, whether |200 you think that the qualities of the world have not sprung from already existing qualities?

It seems so.

And that these qualities are quite distinct from the substances?

Yes.

Well, then, if God did not make the qualities out of existing qualities, and they have not come from the substances, because they are not substances, we are driven to the conclusion that they were made by God out of nothing. And this is why you seemed to me to urge in vain that we cannot possibly suppose that anything was made by God out of nothing. Let us look at the matter this way. Among ourselves we see men making various things out of nothing; out of nothing I say, though they certainly do seem to be creators in their own departments. Take architects, for example. They do not build cities out of cities, nor, similarly, temples out of temples. If because substances exist which are at their command, you suppose the architects to produce cities and temples out of existing things, you are mistaken, for it is not the substance which makes the city, nor the temples, but the skill in treating the substance. And the skill does not spring from any skill existing in the substances, but from a skill which has no existence in them. You may meet me with the objection that the artist out of the skill which he himself has makes the skill in the substance. It seems to me a fair rejoinder that the man's skill does not arise from any previously existing skill. It cannot be that skill as a self-existent entity gives the skill; for it belongs to the class of accidents, and to those things which receive a real existence when they inhere in substance. You may have the man without the architect's skill, but you cannot have the architect's skill unless the man first exist; and we must therefore maintain that the various forms of human skill have nothing out of which they arise. Now, if we have shown that this |201 is so with men, must we not much rather admit that God can make not only qualities out of nothing, but also substances? For if it is proved that anything arises out of nothing, it is also proved that the same holds good of substances.

3. But I know you are longing to investigate the origin of evil; I will therefore go on to the discussion of that topic. And I should like to briefly ask you, Do you regard evil things as substances, or qualities of substances?

I think it is right to say, qualities of substances.

But matter, you thought, was unqualified and unformed?

So I assumed when we began the discussion.

Well, then, if evil is a quality of matter, and matter was unqualified, and you affirm that God is the Maker of the qualities, it follows that God will also be the Creator of evil. Since, then, we cannot even thus avoid making God the cause of evil, it seems to me superfluous to make Him inseparable from matter. If you have any answer to this, pray say on. If we were disputing for victory, I should think the question of evil decided; but as we are making the inquiry more in a friendly spirit and to do one another good, I think we may re-open the discussion.

My aim and object must, I think, be very obvious, and you must be conscious how earnestly I desire in arguing not to score a victory on the strength of plausible lies, but by careful inquiry to point out the truth. And I am quite sure that you are so disposed. So please, therefore, without hesitation use such means as you consider best for the discovery of the truth, for by so doing you will profit not yourself only but me also, by showing me my ignorance. It seems clear to me that evil has a substantial existence, for I never see what is evil apart from substances.

4. Ho! Ho! If you say that things evil are substances, I must examine the meaning of substance. Do you think that substance is a kind of bodily compound?

I think so.

And the bodily compound is self-existent, needing nothing to give it existence? |202

Just so.

And do you think that evil things are a man's actions?

It appears so to me.

And the actions then only begin when the agent is present?

Of course.

And if there is no one to act, there are no actions?

There cannot be any.

Well, then, if substance is a kind of bodily compound, and the bodily compound needs nothing to give it existence: and if evil things are a man's actions, and the actions require some one to act, and when he acts they then begin to be, it follows that evil things are not substances. But if evil things are substances, and murder is an evil, murder will be a substance; murder, however, is a man's action; murder will therefore not be a substance. If you mean that the things in action are substances, I agree; as, for example, the murderer, inasmuch as he is a man, is a substance; but the murder which he commits is not a substance, but something, done by the substance. Now we say that a man is sometimes bad because he commits murder, and sometimes, on the contrary, we call him good because of his well-doing; and these names are accidentally associated with the substance, though the accidents are not the substance itself. For neither is murder a substance, nor adultery, nor is any such like evil thing. But as the grammarian is so called from grammar, and the rhetorician from rhetoric, and the medical man from medicine, though neither medicine nor rhetoric nor grammar is a substance, and the substance takes its title according to its accidents, neither of which it is; in the same way, it appears to me, the substance receives a name from what are considered evil things, though it is neither one nor the other of them. Consider further, that if you imagine some other deity to be the cause of the evil which men do, he too, inasmuch as he acts in men, is evil because of the evil which he does. For the reason why he too is said to be evil, is that he is |203 an author of evil; and what a man does, is not the man himself, but his actions, and it is from these the title "evil" is derived. If we were to say that a man is what he creates, and he creates murders, and adulteries, and thefts, and all sorts of such things, he will be all these. But if he is all these, and they exist only when they are being done, and have no existence when they are not being done, and if they are done by men, men will be the creators of them, and the causes of their existing or not existing. If you admit that these evil things are the man's actions, it is what from what he does that he has the quality of evil, not from what he is as a substance. For we said that he is called evil from the accidents of the substance, which accidents are not the substance itself, as the medical man is so-called from medicine. And if every man is evil through his actions, and his actions have a beginning, he himself began to be evil, and these evil things, too, had a beginning. If this be so, the man was not evil when his wickedness began, nor can the evil attaching to him be unoriginate; we say it did originate with him.

5. I think, my friend, you have given a sufficient answer to your companion, and I thought you drew an excellent conclusion from his own premises; for, in truth, if matter was unqualified, and God was the Creator of the qualities, and the qualities are evil, God will be the Author of evil. We are agreed, then, that he has been well answered. But it seems to me false to speak of unqualified matter, for we cannot say that any substance whatsoever is without qualities; in fact the very affirmation that it is unqualified, and the description of matter thus given, point out a particular kind of quality. So, if you please, once more discuss the matter with me; for matter seems to me to have had qualities from all eternity; and if I maintain that evil is an effluence of matter, it is that God may not be the cause of evil, but matter the cause of all the evil in the world.

I am delighted with your ready acquiescence, my friend, and commend your earnestness in the discussion: for every one who is desirous to learn ought not to give a mere |204 random assent to what is said, but should carefully weigh the arguments. For supposing one of two disputants to take up a false position, and thus lead his opponent to the conclusion he desires, that will not convince the man who hears him; but if there seems to be a good opening for a remark, the latter will make it on the spot; for one of two things will happen: he will either after hearing what has been said be absolutely benefited by his impressions, or he will convict his antagonist of not speaking the truth. And in my opinion you are not right in saying that matter was qualified from all eternity. For if this be so, what is there for God to create? If we say substances, we have admitted that they already existed; if, on the contrary, we say qualities, we have recognised their pre-existence also. So, then, if both substances and qualities are already in existence, it seems to me useless to call God a Creator. But that I may not seem to argue all on my own side, let me ask you a question: In what sense do you say that God was a "Creator"? Is it that He changed the substances so that they no longer were what they were before, but became something different? Or is it that He kept the substances as they previously were, but changed their qualities?

6. I do not suppose there was a change in the substances; that is to me an obvious absurdity; what I say is that there was a change of the qualities, and I maintain that in respect of them God is a Creator. For just as we may say that a house is built of stones, but cannot say that, because the stones have become a house, they do not remain stones in substance: for I maintain that the house is built in virtue of the quality of arrangement, the former quality of the stones having been of course changed; so, it seems to me, God, while the substance remained the same, created a change of its qualities, and I maintain that this change justifies us in saying that God made the world.

Well, then, since you say that a change of the qualities was brought about by God, I wish you would briefly tell |205 me whether you likewise think that things evil are qualities of the substances?

I think so.

And were these qualities themselves in matter from the very first, or had they a beginning?

I say that these qualities were eternally co-existent with matter.

But do you not say that God produced a change of the qualities?

Yes. That is what I say.

Was it for the better, or for the worse?

I think I must admit it was for the better.

Well, then, if the evil things are qualities of matter, and God changed its qualities for the better, we are bound to inquire into the origin of evil. For the qualities did not remain what they were by nature. If the qualities were not bad at first, and you say that through the change which God made, matter acquired its first bad qualities, God will be the cause of evil, because He changed qualities which were not bad, so that they became bad; or do you suppose God not to have changed the bad qualities into better ones, but that the only ones left, the indifferent ones, were changed by God for the sake of putting all in order?

That has been my view from the first.

7. How, then, do you account for His having left the qualities of bad things as they were? Do you say that He had the power to destroy them, but did not choose to do so, or that He had not the power? If you say that He could, but would not, you are bound to admit that He was the cause of these things: for though He had the power to abolish evil He allowed it to remain as it was, particularly when He began to work at matter. If he had not concerned Himself at all with matter, He would not have been the cause of those qualities which He allowed to remain; but since He worked upon a portion of it, and let alone another portion though He might have changed it for the better, it appears to mo that He deserves blame, because He left part of the matter in its evil state, to the |206 destruction of the part on which He worked. In truth, very great injustice seems to have been done to this part of matter; inasmuch as though He reduced it to order, it now partakes of evil. For if any one will carefully look into things, he will find that the present condition of matter is worse than that of the original chaos. Before it was differentiated, it had ho perception of evil; but now every part of it has the perception of evil. Take man, for instance. Before he was fashioned, and by the Creator's skill became a living creature, he had no natural participation in evil; but as soon as God made him a man, he became conscious of approaching evil; and what you say God intended for the benefit of matter is found to have done it more harm than good. If you say that the reason why evil was not stopped was that God could not remove it, you will affirm that God is impotent; and His impotence must either be caused by natural weakness, or be due to the fact that, as if He were the slave of some stronger power, He is overcome by fear. If you venture to say that He is weak by nature, you appear to imperil your salvation; and if you say that He is overcome by fear of some stronger power, you will be affirming that evil is mightier than God, inasmuch as it is strong enough to resist and overcome His will; and this seems to me an absurd statement to make about God. These things, which according to you are able to overcome God, must surely be the true gods, that is to say, if by God we mean Omnipotence.

8. And I should like to also ask you a short question about matter itself. Tell me, is matter simple or compound? for the difference in things brings me to this turn in the argument. If matter is simple and uniform, and the world is compound, and consists of different substances and commixtures, we cannot say that it is made of matter, because compound things cannot consist of one simple substance; for when we speak of "compound" we mean a mixture of several simple things. If, on the other hand, |207 you say that matter is compound, you will certainly affirm it to be compounded of simple things; and if it is compounded of simple things, there was a time when these simple things existed apart from one another, and it was by their being compounded together that matter was made; and this shows that matter was created. For if matter is compound, and compound things consist of simple things, there was a time when matter was not, that is, before the simple things came together; and if there was a time when matter was not, and there never was a time when the uncreated was not, it follows that matter cannot be uncreated. But from your view it follows that there will be many things uncreated. For if God was uncreated, and the simple things of which matter is compounded were uncreated, there will not be two and only two uncreated. But do you think that nothing opposes itself?

That is my opinion.

But water is the opposite of fire?

Certainly.

And, likewise, darkness is the opposite of light, and heat of cold? And moisture of drought?

Just so.

Well, now, if nothing opposes itself, and the things I have mentioned are opposed to one another, it follows that they are not one and the same matter, nor made of one and the same matter. And I wish to ask you a question like the others: Do you admit that the parts of a thing are not destructive of one another?

I do.

And that fire and water, and the others I mentioned, are parts of matter?

Just so.

And do you not also agree that water is destructive of fire, light of darkness, and so on with all similar things?

Yes.

If, then, the parts of a thing are not destructive of one another, and these things are destructive of one another, it follows that they are not parts of one another; and if they |208 are not parts of one another, they will not be parts of one and the same matter. But in fact they will not be matter at all, because that nothing is destructive of itself, as is the case with opposites. For nothing is opposed to itself, opposites being by nature opposed to things other than themselves; as for example, white is not the opposite of white, but is said to be opposed to black; light, too, is shown not to be opposed to itself, but to darkness, and similarly with countless other things. So then, if matter is a single substance, it cannot be its own opposite; and if this doctrine of opposites holds good, it appears that there is no such matter.

The foregoing is taken from Book VII. of the Praeparatio Evangelica of Eusebius; being, as he says, the work of Maximus, a Christian writer of some distinction. But it has been discovered word for word in Origen's discussion with the Marcionites and other heretics, Eutropius defending, Megethius opposing.

CHAP. XXV. ---- That the " separation " which arises from foreknowledge does not do away with Free Will. From Book I. of the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, at the words "separated unto the gospel of God."

1. The third point to notice is the phrase "separated unto the Gospel of God"; and in the Epistle to the Galatians the Apostle says the same thing about himself: "When it was the good pleasure of God, who separated me even from my mother's womb, to reveal his son in me." They who do not understand that any one who is predestined through the foreknowledge of God is the cause of the events foreknown, take hold of such expressions as these, and think they can by them establish their doctrine that men are so constituted by nature that they must be saved. And some employ such passages to destroy man's Free Will, and also make use of the words in the Psalms, "The wicked are estranged from the womb." We may |209 easily meet this by asking them to explain what comes next; for it is written, "The wicked are estranged from the womb; they go astray as soon as they be born, speaking lies. Their poison is like the poison of a serpent." And we will ask those who insist on the clearness of the words, whether the wicked who were estranged from the womb, as soon as they were born went astray and erred from the way of salvation, and whether this was their own doing. And how could the wicked who were estranged from the womb, both go astray as soon as they were born and also speak lies? For our opponents, I suppose, will never be able to show that in the moment of birth they uttered an articulate cry, and told lies. If, however, we observe the steps by which we approach predestination in the argument of the epistle which we are examining, we shall, once we have disposed of what inclines the simpler sort of readers to justify the charge of injustice brought against God's decree, be able to defend Him Who separated from his mother's womb, and separated unto the Gospel of God, Paul the servant of Jesus Christ, called to be an Apostle. The words stand thus: "We know that to them that love God all things work together for good, even to them that are called according to his purpose. For whom he foreknew, he also foreordained to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren: and whom he foreordained, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified."

2. Let us, then, attend to the order of these statements. God first calls, and then justifies, and He does not justify those whom He did not call; and He calls, having before the calling foreordained, and He does not call whom He did not foreordain; and the foreordaining is not the origin of His calling and justifying; for if it were the origin of all that follows they who bring in by a side wind the absurd doctrine of souls being "naturally constituted" |210 might very plausibly have claimed the victory; but the foreknowledge comes before the foreordaining, for "whom he did foreknow," says the Apostle, "he also foreordained to be conformed to the image of his Son." So then, God first surveyed the long series of events, and perceiving the will of certain men to be inclined to godliness, and also their efforts to attain thereto when their will was so inclined, and further, how they would wholly give themselves up to a virtuous life, He foreknew them, for He knows the present and foreknows the future; and whom He thus foreknew, He foreordained to be conformed to the image of His Son. Now we know there is a Person, Who is the image of the invisible God, and it is His image which is called the image of the Son of God; and we think that this image is the human soul which the Son of God assumed, and which for its merit became the image of the image of God. And it was to this, which we think is the image of the image of the Son of God, that God foreordained those to be conformed, whom, on account of His foreknowledge of them, He did foreordain. We must not therefore suppose that the foreknowledge of God is the cause of future events; but inasmuch as these events would follow the agent's own impulses, on this account He foreknew, for He knoweth all things before they be: and inasmuch as He knoweth all things before they be, He foreknew certain individuals and foreordained them to be conformed to the image of His Son; but others He saw |211 estranged. And if any one objects, and asks whether what God foreknows might possibly not occur, we shall say it possibly might not; but granting this possibility, there is no necessity that it should occur, or not occur; and the events will not in the least be necessitated, but there is also the possibility of their not occurring. The subject of possibilities, however, belongs to the science of the skilled logician; so that if a man will cleanse the eye of his mind, he may thus be able to follow the subtle arguments, and may understand how, even in the course of ordinary events, there is nothing to prevent the possibility of a given circumstance issuing many ways, though, in fact, there will be only one out of the many, and that not necessitated; and the foreknowledge of it means that it will be, but will not of necessity be; for though it may possibly not occur, the prediction of it will not be conjecture but real foreknowledge.

3. And let no one think that we have said nothing about the phrase "according to his purpose," because it may seem to hamper our argument; for Paul says, "We know that to them that love God all things work together for good, even to them that are called according to his purpose." The critic should observe that the Apostle also at once gave the reason for their being culled according to His purpose, saying, "Whom he did foreknow, them he also foreordained to bo conformed to the image of his Son." And who more fitting to be included in the justifying calling by the purpose of God, than those who love Him? And that the cause of the purpose and foreknowledge lies in our Free Will is clearly shown by the words, "We know that all things work together for good to them that love God"; for Paul all but said that if all things work together for good, the reason is that they who love God are worthy of their working together. And here let us ask our opponents a question, and let them give us an answer. Just for a moment let us assume that we have some measure of Free Will,----and we will tell them that this is a fact, though they |212 seek to destroy Free Will,----until on that assumption we can prove the unsoundness of their view. If Free Will is indeed a reality, will God, when He considers the chain of future events, foreknow what will be done by each possessor of Free Will through the exercise of that Free Will, or will He not foreknow? To say that He will not foreknow, is worthy of a man who knows nothing of the omniscience and majesty of God. But if they will admit His foreknowledge, let us ask them another question: Is His knowing the cause of future occurrences, assuming that men have Free Will? Or does He foreknow because the events will come to pass? And is it the truth that His foreknowledge is by no means the cause of what will result from man's Free Will? It is then possible for a man created free, under given circumstances, not to do one thing and to do another.

4. For these reasons, and others like them which might be adduced, we uphold the words, "Well done, good and faithful servant: thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will set thee over many things: enter thou into the joy of thy Lord," and meaning attaches to all commendation. There is sound reason also in the words, "Thou wicked and slothful servant, thou oughtest to have put my money to the bankers." Only thus can we maintain the justice of what is said to those on His right hand, "Come ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world: for I was an hungered, and ye gave me meat," and so on; and to those on the left hand, "Depart from me, ye cursed, into the eternal fire which is prepared for the devil and his angels: for I was an hungred, and ye gave me no meat," and so on. But even supposing that the words "Separated unto the gospel of God," and "He that separated me from my mother's womb," imply some necessity, how could the Apostle reasonably say, "I buffet my body and bring it into bondage, lest by any means, after that I have preached to others, I myself should be |213 rejected." And further, "Woe is unto me if I preach not the gospel." For he clearly shows hereby that if he did not buffet his body and bring it into bondage as much as he could, he would be rejected after preaching to others, and that woe might have been unto him if he did not preach the Gospel. Perhaps, then, it was under these conditions that God separated him from his mother's womb: God saw the cause of the just separation, viz. that Paul would buffet his body, and bring it into bondage, because he feared lest having preached to others he himself might be rejected, and that, knowing there would be woe to him unless he preached the Gospel, being moved with fear towards God so that he might not be in woe, he would not hold his peace but would preach the Gospel. And this He also saw Who separated him from his mother's womb, and separated him unto His own Gospel, viz. that he would be in labours more abundantly, in prisons more frequently, in stripes above measure, in death oft; that of the Jews he would five times receive forty stripes save one, that he would be thrice beaten with rods, once be stoned; and that he would suffer all this rejoicing in tribulations, and that, knowing that tribulation worketh endurance, he would endure. For these reasons it was meet that he should be separated unto the Gospel of God, as it was foreknown that he would be, and that he should be separated from his mother's womb. And he was separated unto the Gospel of God not because his nature was specially endowed and by its constitution surpassed the natures of men unlike him, but on account of his actions, first foreknown, but afterwards realised, every one of them, through his apostolic fitness and apostolic purpose. This is not the time to discuss the passage in the psalm, for it was a digression; so, God willing, it shall be discussed in its proper place, whenever we interpret the psalm. The foregoing will abundantly suffice for the term "separated." |214

CHAP. XXVI. ---- Of the question of things "good"and "evil"; that they partly depend on our own efforts and partly do not; and (that) according to the teaching of Christ, but not as Aristotle thinks. From the treatise on the 4th Psalm, at the words, "Many say, who will show us the good things? "

1. Seeing that there is so much discussion as to what things are "good," what "evil," some affirming that good things and the contrary do not depend on our own efforts, pleasure, for instance, as they declare, being a good thing, trouble an evil thing; while others identify "good" and "evil" with things dependent on our own efforts only, for they say that good things are the virtues only and virtuous actions, and that evil things are the vices and vicious actions; and a third set of thinkers unite the two views, and tell us that good and evil things partly depend on our own efforts, partly do not: no wonder, if distracted by these sophistries the majority of believers, longing to learn what are really good things, cry out with the psalmist, "Who will show us the good things?" That the good things naturally depend upon our own efforts, everybody who accepts the passage in the Gospel where the judgment is described, would unhesitatingly allow. For it says that a man is good, supposing him to hear the sentence, "Well done, good and faithful servant; thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will set thee over many things: enter thou into the joy of |215 thy Lord." And that is also good which proceedeth from the good man, out of his heart, as the Saviour says, "The good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good." And, in general, every fruit of a good tree, because it depends on a man's own efforts, is a good thing: such as love, peace, joy, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, self-control; and the contraries are evil things. And if, according to the teaching of Christ, there is a something good and evil, and we must still look for it in things independent of our choice, and it should prove to be independent of our efforts, we shall on further investigation very quickly show. But, at any rate, things so called by those who unite what is within our choice with what is not, could not be good and evil; for they think that some good things pertain to the soul, others to the body, and that others are external; and similarly with evil things. And in respect of the soul, they speak of virtue and virtuous conduct, or vice and vicious conduct; as concerns the body, of health and vigour and beauty, or disease and sickliness and deformity; as regards externals, wealth, good birth and reputation, or poverty, humble origin and disgrace.

2. And some will suppose that likewise according to the Scriptures there are three kinds of good things, and three of evil; for while they allow that virtues and vices are "good" and "evil," according to the recognised distinction between virtue and vice, and the corresponding conduct on either side, they will make use of passages which declare that oven things pertaining to the body, and things external, are good or evil. And as regards virtues and vices, need I say anything? for we are taught by ethics that we ought to choose righteousness, and temperance, and prudence, and courage, and regulate our conduct according to these virtues; and that we ought to shun the contraries to them. We therefore require no illustrations of good things which are the objects of |216 our own choice; but from many places they will adduce instances of good things which are bodily and external. On the present occasion it will suffice if we adduce certain passages from Exodus, Leviticus, and Deuteronomy, to prove that promises are made to those who keep the commandments' while there are threats and curses against those who transgress them; for example, that health is a blessing, and disease the opposite, the following quotation from Exodus will show: "If thou wilt keep my commandments and my ordinances, I will put none of the diseases upon thee, which I put upon the Egyptians; for I am the Lord that healeth thee." And the words also from Deuteronomy against sinners might be supposed to make bodily plagues and diseases an evil thing, and health and bodily strength, of course, a good thing. The passage stands thus: "If thou wilt not observe to do all the words of this law which are written in this book, that thou mayest fear this glorious and marvellous name, The Lord thy God; then The Lord thy God will make thy plagues wonderful, and the plagues of thy seed, even great plagues, and marvellous, and sore sicknesses, and very many. And he will bring upon thee again all the grievous plague of Egypt, which thou wast afraid of, and it shall cleave unto thee. Also every sickness, and every plague, which is not written in the book of this law, will the Lord bring upon thee, until it utterly destroy thee." And again to transgressors it is said, "I will appoint over you even fever and jaundice, that shall consume your eyes, and make your soul to pine away." Further, in Deuteronomy the Word threatens with incurable lockjaw those who forsake godliness.

3. And they who understand outward blessings to be promised by the Divine word in Leviticus, will make use of the following: "If ye walk in my statutes, and |217 keep my commandments, and do them: then I will give you the rain in its season, and the land shall yield her increase, and the trees of the plains shall yield their fruit. And your threshing shall overtake the vintage, and the vintage shall reach unto the sowing time, and ye shall eat your bread to the full, and dwell in your land safely," and so on. And from Deuteronomy they will take and use the passage, "And it shall be when ye shall pass over Jordan unto the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee, and ye observe to do all his commandments which I command thee this day, that the Lord thy God shall set thee on high above all: and all these blessings shall come upon thee, and overtake thee, if thou shalt hearken unto the voice of the Lord thy God. Blessed shalt thou be in the city, and blessed shalt thou be in the field. Blessed shall be the fruit of thy body, and the fruit of thy ground, the herds of thy kine, and the flocks of thy sheep. Blessed shall be thy garners and thy kneading-troughs," and so on. And so again, on the contrary, it is said to the ungodly, "Cursed shalt thou be in the city, and cursed shalt thou be in the field. Cursed shall be thy garners and thy kneading-troughs. Cursed shall be the fruit of thy body, and the fruit of thy ground, cursed the herds of thy cattle and the flocks of thy sheep." And countless other passages will be brought forward by those who will have it that good and evil things are bodily and external. And they lay hold of the Gospels also, and tell us that the Saviour when He came took away from men, inasmuch as He deemed them evil things, bodily blindness, and deafness, and palsy, and healed every disease and every sickness, and gave instead of the evil things which previously prevailed, clearness of bodily sight, and hearing, and every form of health and strength; and they will put you out of countenance by what they allege, unless we are prepared to admit possession by devils and lunacy |218 to be evil things, and, on the contrary, deliverance from them to be a good thing. Nay, the Apostles also in exercising the gifts of healing, and in working miracles, by the very nature of what they did brought good things to men and freed them from evil things. And they who say such things will pass over to the world to come, and allege that because pain is an evil thing sinners are committed to age-long fire; and if pain is an evil thing, pleasure must be a good one.

4. The foregoing clearly shows the arguments which mostly silence such readers as cannot dispose of the. scriptural statements which are adduced in favour of there being three kinds of good things and three of evil things. Moreover, not only have confessedly unsophisticated believers been thus beguiled, but even some of those who profess wisdom according to Christ have fallen into the snare; for they suppose such promises as these to be made by the Creator, and that beyond their literal signification the threats have no meaning. Well, then, in reply to all who so strangely apprehend the Scriptures, we must further inquire whether the Prophets, against whom no charge is brought, kept the law; Elias, for instance, the poorest of men, so poor that he had not bread of his own to eat, and was therefore sent to a woman of Zarephath which belonged to Zidon; and Eliseus, who at the house of the Shunammite had a very little chamber, and a bed, and a cheap candlestick, who also fell sick and died; and Isaiah, who went three years naked and barefoot; and Jeremiah, who was cast into a miry pit, and was constantly derided, so that he prayed he might have a lodging-place in the wilderness; and John, who was in the deserts and ate nothing but locusts and wild honey, who had a leathern girdle about his loins, and was clothed in raiment of camel's hair. They will, I suppose, admit that these men kept the law. And we will ask whether |219 what our opponents consider good things, were the lot of those who kept the law. And if they cannot show that this was so, there will be no escape for them; they will have to allow either that the promises which are said to be given to the godly are false, or that being true they must be anagogically interpreted; and once they are compelled to resort to allegory, there is an end of their supposition that the law threatens the ungodly with bodily disease, and such external things as are reckoned to be evils, and that the promise of bodily health and wealth is for those who follow after God.

5. And is it not foolish to make such a point of the ills of life, and to boast of those who suffer from them? For if tribulations are evil, and the Apostle speaks of rejoicing in tribulations, it is clear that he rejoiced in evil things; but this is foolish, and the Apostle was not a fool; and it follows that such exercises of the Apostle as he speaks of were not evil; being pressed on every side he is not straitened; he is perplexed, yet not unto despair; tempted, but not killed; thought to be poor, he maketh many rich, and supposed to have nothing, he possesses all things; for the whole world of wealth belongs to the believer, and not an obol to the unbeliever. And further, they who suppose that according to Scripture there are three kinds of good and three kinds of evil, have to face another fact, viz. that the righteous are ever in the midst of evils, for the word of prophecy says truly, "Many are the afllictions of the righteous." And they who suppose certain things to be evils might not unfitly remember what befell Job, to whom after that he had nobly borne the trials which compassed him about, the Divine word says, "And dost thou suppose that I dealt with thee for any other purpose than that thou mayest appear righteous?" For if Job is shown to be righteous no other way than through this and that befalling him, how can we say that the causes of his appearing righteous are evils to him? And it follows that even the Devil is |220 not an evil to the holy man. At all events, the Devil was not an evil to Job, for all things work together for good to those who love God, to those who are the called according to His purpose. And we further say that it is far from clear that, if the blessings are taken literally, the "righteous" man will be a partaker of those things which in the Scriptures are considered "good." For the story of many a holy man's life contradicts such interpretations. It is absurd to suppose that the holy man will be a money lender, opening banks in many nations, in town after town, distracted over payments and receipts, and following a prohibited business; for "the righteous man putteth not out his money to usury, and taketh not rewards against the innocent"; and "he that doeth these things shall never be moved." And, according to Ezekiel, "the holy man giveth not forth his money upon usury nor taketh increase." And as for thinking that fever is inflicted on account of sins, that is an opinion of very ignorant people, for the causes of such a sickness are often clear enough; either the neighbourhood, or the quality of the water, or the character of the food. And if health and wealth are rewards for the righteous, no ungodly man ought to have health or wealth. But we must look for this health in the constitution of a man's soul, and the wealth we must take to be that ransom of a man's soul of which Solomon speaks,----"The ransom of a man's soul is his own riches." But we must shun poverty, which is thus described: "A poor man endureth not a threat." And further, by wounds and bruises and sicknesses we must understand the evils which befall heedless souls through their wickedness; and the prophet blames the sufferers this way for being in such a condition, saying, "From the sole of the foot even unto the head, neither wound, nor bruise, nor festering sore (is healed); there is no plaster, nor oil, to put upon them, neither have they been bound up." |221

6. This will be enough to enable any but the very dull, when they read the distracting passages of Scripture, to arrive at a worthy conception of the action of the Holy Spirit. But in order to silence those who think that in these passages we have the good things which shall be given to the saints, and, on the other hand, the evil things which shall be awarded to sinners, we must further observe that everything which exists on account of a given object is less important than that for which it exists; for instance, surgical operations, cauteries, and plasters, which are means to health, are less important than the health in view. And even supposing that regarded as remedies of the physician these things are called "good," we must understand that they are not the final good things of the healing art, but causes of them; from the physician's standpoint bodily health is the final good. Similarly, if we must keep certain commands for the sake of securing certain blessings, and the rewards are bodily and external, the good actions will not be good as ends in themselves, but only as productive of the blessings; and the wealth which our opponents suppose the Scripture to promise, and the bodily health, will excel the righteousness, and the very holiness, piety, and fear of God which constitute the upright and virtuous conduct. It is for men who do not know the dignity of virtue, but prefer material things to virtue itself, to accept such doctrines; for of all things it is most absurd to say that wealth and bodily health surpass upright and virtuous conduct. And, in fact, it is on account of these detestable opinions that some persons have come to believe that even after the Resurrection one of the first things promised is that we shall eat and drink such and such things, and some hold that we shall even beget children. As soon as ever these opinions reach heathen inquirers, they will make Christianity appear a very foolish thing; for some who are strangers to the Faith hold far better views.

7. Now we will apply what appears to be the results of our investigation of the sacred oracles. We alleged that |222 we were content to say that "good" things and "evil" things, partly depend on our own efforts, and partly do not. We did not, however, reckon among the blessings which do not depend on our efforts, health and beauty and high descent and riches, and, as best we could, we endeavoured to briefly solve these perplexing passages. We must now say what the good things are which do not depend on our efforts; for it is true that "except the Lord build the house, they labour but in vain who build it"; and "except the Lord keep the city, the watchman waketh but in vain." Every one who is making progress is building a house, and every one that is perfect keepeth a city; and the work of him that buildeth is in vain, except the Lord build and the Lord watch. The power of the Lord which assists in the building of him that buildeth, and which cooperates with him who is himself unable to complete the edifice, is one of the good things which do not depend on our efforts; and we must take the same view of the city which is being watched. And just as if I were to say that the "good thing" of agriculture, that which produces the fruit, partly depends on ourselves in respect of the husbandman's skill, and partly does not so depend, in respect of the working of Providence for a genial atmosphere and an abundant supply of rain: so the "good thing" of the rational creature is made up of man's purpose, and the Divine power assisting him, when he has chosen the better life. There is need, therefore, both of our own purpose and of the Divine assistance, not only that we may become good and upright, but also that having become good and upright we may abide in virtue; for even if a man has been perfected he will fall away, if he be puffed up over his goodness and accounts himself the cause thereof, and does not fitly ascribe glory to Him who contributes more than all besides to the acquiring and keeping of his virtue. |223 Something like this, we think, explains how it was that he who in Ezekiel is said to have walked blameless in all his ways, until iniquity was found in him, fell from heaven, viz., as Isaiah tells us, Lucifer, once a morning star, afterwards, undone and cast clown to earth. For not only of the sons of men is it true that if a man be perfect and have not the wisdom of God, he is accounted but a thing of nought; but it is true even in the order of Angels, and of sovereign Powers, and in every rank of being that is Divine so far as God is with it. Anyway, perhaps because the holy Apostle sees that our purposing counts for far less than the power of God in the acquisition of the good things, he says that the result is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy; not as though God showeth mercy without our willing and running, but because our willing and running is as nothing in comparison with the mercy of God; and therefore, as is right and meet, he gives the credit of the good result rather to the mercy of God than to human willing and running.

8. Although we knew we should seem to be widely digressing, we have gone into all these details, for we are convinced of the necessity of the inquiry, if we are to handle the words, "Many say, who will show us the good things?" As far as we could we have clearly pointed out to the many who say "Who will show us the good things?" what the good things are, and, consequently, also, what are the evil things, in order that through our exercises and prayers we may acquire the good things, and repel the evil things from our souls. But since in speaking men sometimes use literal expressions, and sometimes, I suppose, even use words in a wrong sense, we must not be surprised if occasionally we find those who hold unsound opinions applying the terms "good" and "evil" to bodily things, and what we call things external. For example, in Job we read, "If we receive good at the hand of God, shall wo not endure evil? " And in Jeremiah, "Evil came down from |224 the Lord to the gates of Jerusalem." Instead of saying, "If we receive such and such useful and pleasant things at the hand of Providence, shall we not put up with the unpleasant and painful ones?" Job says, "If we receive good at the hand of God, shall we not endure evil?" And instead of, "These particular events providentially happened to Jerusalem for the chastisement of its inhabitants," we have, "Evil came down from the Lord to the gates of Jerusalem." So then, readers who understand the facts must not quibble over the names, but must ascertain when the names are to be taken literally, and when on account of their limited connotation they are not taken in their strict sense. And even if the Saviour healed some of these disorders, and gave health, and sight, and hearing to men, we must look chiefly for their spiritual meaning, since the narratives prove that the word of the Gospel does heal the disorders of the soul. And there is no absurdity in supposing in such cases that what is related in the narrative was done to astonish the men of that time; so that if any were not convinced by argument and instruction, they might be silenced through the marvellous miracles, and yield assent to the teacher.