But if they say that, although there was no dense body which hinders the Light, the Light was not able to enter the Domain of that Darkness ; they confess, though unwillingly, that they are 'bound Natures' in Essence, and that they are unable to depart from their (respective) territories. But if they are 'bound Natures,' fixed in their places like mountains, how did they make an Assault on one another and enter into one another? And it is very probable that if they do make an Assault on one another, the Light has extension and radiance and effulgence and rays, so that its effulgence may stretch afar. And if the rays of such a thing (as this Light) the nature of which is to scatter its rays afar, were limited by external compulsion, and it did not cross the border of the Darkness, how do they know how to [ announce ] that the Darkness made an Assault on the Light--when it (i.e., the Darkness) has no (such) nature? And the Light which ought to have been victorious did not even make a stand for itself.
Primitive Light and Light which is visible now must be different in kind.
For these things which they say do not occur in the case of this Darkness and Light which are here. Let them either appeal to the Light and Darkness which are here, or let them admit that this is not the same Light as exists there, but another. And if it is not the same, why do they worship this Sun if it is not the same as that which is in the Domain of the Good (Being)? And if the Light and the Darkness are not the same, then this world was not mixed and brought [P. 100, l.14.] into existence from these Natures. And whence then are these Luminaries which are in our sphere?
Mani's inconsistent Teaching.
O what (is to be said) of a Teaching whose failures are more than its artifices (can remedy)! For as often as they need an argument they bring forward such proofs as these, and as often as an allegory suits them they concoct such tales as these. For Mani did not know that his deceit would enter the furnace of Truth. For where it suits him, he says that the Darkness made an Assault; but he does not remember that this visible Light shows him clearly that this cannot |lxxix be so. Again, where it suits him, he asserts that the Light is the Light of Souls, that is to say, that the Luminous Nature of the Soul is created (in the form of) Light of the Soul. But the worship with which he worships the visible Luminaries refutes him. Or can it be that the visible Sun is perversely (represented as) the God of the invisible Souls? [P. 101.]
The Bright Ones whom the Primal Man cast to Darkness.
"But," he says, "the Primal Man cast his five Bright Ones (Z IWANE ) into the mouth of the Sons of the Darkness, in order that, as a hunter, he might catch them with his [ net ]." And here it is found that the Sons of the Light are their food, and that the Essence of the Sons of the Darkness [ is akin ] to the Sons of the Bright Ones. To which of them is it like-- to the Light, which is visible, or to the Wind which is invisible ; to the Water which is cold, or to the Fire which is hot? ...
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Know that this world was not made from these refined [L. 26.] Natures, and it is necessary that . . . the creation of the world which was from such Natures. But if it was mixed out of these Bright Ones (Z IWANE ), let them know that the refined Light was also made turbid by its opposite ; but, concerning its nature, he declared that it is visible, [ and it consists of ] hot Fire and cold Water. And still our question stands, (namely), to which of them (i.e., of the Bright Ones) was their ( i.e., of the Sons of the Darkness) Root (Essence) itself like? But know (?), O Mani, that the fish of the deep and birds of [P. 102.] the height are caught with a bait which is akin to them, as nature shows from which they bring illustrations. For from the quarter from which they bring illustrations, from there (they) can be refuted. . . . And if ... them, how does it [L. 15.] oppose them, if it is true that from their own (Elements), and from the (Elements) of Darkness, the whole of it (i.e., Creation) does exist as they say?
The Creator has given Freewill.
But as regards those who say that everything is created from nothing, and that devils and men have Freewill, and this Freewill produces good and evil actions--and if it be |lxxx not so they have no Freewill at all--it is impossible that we should stand up (and) contend (?) against them either in words or in writings. For a nature is changed into everything according to the will of the Creator ; in order that he may show that (Creation comes) not from 'bound Entities' . . . [L. 44] like the Freewill of mankind [ so the devils (?) have Freewill ] [P. 103.] . . . when those who persist in the arrogance of their Will do entreat and make supplication. And these (words) "thou has set thy heart on my servant Job, O (?) Satan ..." prove that he (i.e., Satan) has Freewill just as several passages from the Old Testament. But there are many (such passages) belonging to the New (Testament), and these are sufficient to stand on behalf of us and to contend against our enemies.
From which of the Natures does the ''Consuming Fire" come?
But, perhaps, this great confusion is a small thing to Mani ; and it is right that we should turn again and ask him of this Consuming Fire, from which of these Natures does its consuming nature come? If it is from the Darkness, how does it injure the body which is akin to its nature? And if it injures its nature, it would be right that it should injure itself also, if that nature which springs from it is injured. But if its harmfumess is from the Light, how could the Sons of the Darkness imprison it in their midst without being injured, seeing that bodies, their kinsmen, are not able to stand before its breath? And if they are two, as if from the two Natures of Good and Evil, then how did they receive [P. 104.] one another into union when they were opposed to one another? And all this (that he says, namely), 'they loved one another' is due to the fact that the difference between them is not known. And how did they become one mind, when they are both suspicious of the two Natures from which they have sprung? For when good and evil (persons) touch them (i.e., the Elements contained in Fire), they are both injured equally by both of them. And the good Fire which springs from the good Nature does not recognize the good, its kinsmen, just as also the evil Fire does not discern the evil, its |lxxxi relatives. And in virtue of the test applied to this one Compound (i.e., Fire), we have a right to say that all that Mixture of the two Natures consists of one mingling of love. But if there are some of the Minglings which struggle with one another because they are opposed to one another, why does Fire not struggle with Fire?
The Creation in all its diversity has come not from the Entities but from the Creator. The Diversity is due to the needs of mankind, not to Eternal opposition of Natures.
Is it not thus plain to an intelligent person that all the creatures exist in natures which are different from one another according to the Will of the Creator, He who prepared them for the numerous uses of mankind? And there are some that are akin to one another, and there are some which are opposed to one another, according as it pleased the Will which arranges everything. But when they agree and differ deliberately, and exist in agreement and disagreement [ it is obvious ] that they are not made from Entities which differ. For if, on [P. 105, l.12.] account of the enmity which they have towards one another, it is supposed that they are differentiated from one thing, then (it follows that) on account of the love which they have, they are known not to be made from Entities which are opposed to one another. For if those were created for our benefit (?) it is clear that we must recognize that likewise all of them were regulated for our sakes. For this is the true cause of their creation(?). For if Light and Darkness exist for their own sakes, and not for our sakes, perhaps he is right (?) in thinking that they have enmity towards each other. But if they exist for our sake and are both useful to us--the Light for toil and the Night for rest. . . .
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[ and they are useful to us ] even if they have a war with one [P. 106.] another, but for us they both bring much peace and health. For when hot fire is necessary for us on account of its heat which is necessary to [ warm us ] it is supposed that because it is a consumer it is an enemy opposed to the things which are injured by it, and [ why ] do I (?) weary myself (?) with many details? For these many things can be explained even in. . . . Since they are all useful to mankind they are |lxxxii all at peace with one another, (namely, those) which are supposed to be created from different Entities. For on account of the uses of man, which are unlike one another, creatures were created for his service, and are unlike one another. For if his use were (only) one, then it would be a single thing which was necessary for his service. And if his service were one, there would be one thing for his use. But because everything is useful to him, everything was created for his use.
And even those things which are considered unnecessary [P. 107.] are necessary (to promote) either his awe or his chastisement (?) or his fear, or in the course of his swimming through this world that this dwelling may not cause his nature to sink, (this dwelling) which also hated the true lodger (?); and the temporary lodging-place was acceptable to that Good [L. 15.] (Being) in His grace and not . . . but (he set) upon him the constraint of many troubles, that on account of the troubles that are in the world he should hate the dwelling and desire to return to his true profit. These are the true causes on account of which the different creatures which are unlike one another were created.
See how man is served by creatures possessing opposite qualities.
But seek out completely the creatures as related to one another, and seek them out again as related to man, and see that creatures which are not all useful to one another are all useful to man, and those which are thought to be strange (to one another) are all related to the service of man. For how is the bull like the horse in running? And (yet) the swiftness of the horse and the slowness of the ox are both useful to man. [P.108] And how is the winter like the summer in comparison? And (yet) the coldness of the one and the heat of the other are a source of help to man. And how are fierce things like gentle things? And (yet) they both do one common service. And, therefore, their histories are too long and their numbers are too great, and their kinds are too abundant that we should labour (?) to complete the comparison of them, but some tastes (i.e., specimens) of them are sufficient to convince concerning them all. |lxxxiii
Manichaeans attribute the usefulness of creatures to the Mixture of Light.
But those Heretics who do not examine creatures according to the reason of their use in relation to us, but compare creatures with one another (saying) "how is the Darkness like the Light, and sweet like bitter, and that which harms like that which is harmed," when they bring comparisons of one thing with another, they cause the simple to err by means of their names, and because childhood has not (sufficient) knowledge to oppose them, it is perplexed. But also they are refuted by their own words. For because they perceived that everything was created as for our service--for there is no single thing among all these which is benefitted but they must needs make an assumption and say "that it is due to the Light which is mingled with all," and to that cause the benefit [P. 109.] of everything is to be ascribed, [and] they have confessed, though unwillingly, that if a man is helped by them all, (then) they all were created on his account.
They fail to account for the fixed nature of animals.
We turn, again, to examine that thing which they also investigate, (namely), of what use are harmful creeping things which have been created. But being eager to win, they have been quickly defeated. For how does a creeping thing do harm, seeing that even in it, as they have said, there is mixed in it some of the Good Nature which is scattered through everything? And where is the Evil that is not mixed in an innocent lamb, if it is scattered in everything? And so it is possible to distinguish between Good and Evil by means of wolves and lambs, and by means of serpents and doves, and the Mixing of Good and Evil has appeared in man alone! And how are wolves always evil and rapacious, [Cf. p. xix. (in med.)] and lambs always illtreated and innocent, whereas men sometimes ravage like wolves and sometimes are illtreated like lambs? Who is he who arranged these things . . . and who [P.110, l.2.] is he who [ gave ] to creatures a 'bound Nature' so that creatures [ have a fixed disposition ], and to man gave an independent Will?
If Light and Darkness had originally Freewill, why do not all things possess it? Does man alone come from a Mixing?