S. Ephraim's Prose Refutations of Mani, Marcion and Bardaisan. Transcribed from the Palimpsest B.M. Add. 14623 by C. W. MITCHELL, M.A., volume 1 (1912). Third Discourse to Hypatius against the Teachings.
THE THIRD DISCOURSE AGAINST THE TEACHINGS
I. Marcion's teaching; the heavens of the stranger
I DESIRE to utter one more refutation against the three of them ( i.e., Marcion, Mani, and Bardaisan), that is against Marcion in the first place who (says) that a heaven is found also beneath the Stranger. Let us ask who bears up those heavens, and what is in them. For a power is necessary to bear them. Or can it be that the heavens of the Stranger are resting on the heavens of the Maker, so that he is the all-sustaining Maker, as indeed is the case? But if they say that the heavens of the Stranger hang by the power of the Stranger, we also will deal [P. 45.] frowardly with the froward, (and say) that he who is above the [Ps. xviii.26] heavens cannot support the heavens, but (only) if he were beneath them. But if he is the same person who is above the heavens and below them, it is clear that the place of his possessions is the same, and in the midst of it are collected those Souls whom ISU brought up hence. For a Supporter is required for those heavy Souls whom he brought up thence . . . [ inasmuch as when his possessions are found enfolded within his bosom there is required for them another power which supports them. ] For we cannot accept from them just as they do not accept from us [L. 26.] that there should be anything set up without a foundation.
The heavens of the Stranger and his boundaries.
But know that if the Stranger has heavens which have been created from nothing, we must inquire by whom they werecreated. And if they are his in virtue of (their) 'essential being' there is a fortified boundary of 'essential being' beneath him, which he cannot cross. And just as he is not able to go forth from that Place which surrounds him so as to be something which does not exist in a Place, and has no Creator, so he is not able [P. 46.] |lii to cross that boundary which is beneath him. Nor were the Souls able to go up hence to cross it.
The relations of the Stranger and the Maker.
But if that boundary was capable of being crossed so that also the Stranger crossed it and came down to us, as they say, and the Souls also rent it asunder and ascended, as they falsely state, then (it follows that) a boundary which could be crossed would not be able to prevent the Maker from going up to the Domain of the Stranger. If, therefore, when he was able to go up he was unwilling to trample down the boundary of his Companion, he is a God who is worthy of praise, since even those things which he ( i.e., Marcion) has invented, redound (lit., cry out) to his praise. But if he had the will to go up, and the Stranger above [L. 39.] allowed him, let them show us why. . . . And if the Good (Being) was guarding himself, he was verily afraid lest he ( i.e., the Maker) should injure him. And how did he who was afraid in his own Domain, come to the Domain of the Maker to struggle with him? And if he guarded his freedom that there should be no Strife and [P. 47.] Contention between him and his neighbour, let his Heralds be despised who make him quarrelsome and contentious. And if they say that the Maker did not perceive the Stranger, it is unlikely. For how did he not perceive him when he was his neighbour? And if they say that he was far from him, infinitely far, if it was a mountain immeasurable and an endless path, and a vast extent without any limit, then how was that Stranger able to proceed and come down the immeasurable mountain, and (through) a dead region in which there was no living air, and (across) a bitter waste which nothing had ever crossed? And if they make the improbable statement that "the Stranger like a man of war was able to come," well if he came as a man of war--[ though he did not come ], (take the case of) those weak Souls whom he brought up hence, how were these sickly ones able to travel through all that region which God their Maker and Creator was not able to traverse, as they say?
Surely the Maker could reach the Domain of the Stranger.
And if they say that these were able but their Maker was not, if they say anything they like, they must hear something they dislike, (namely), that if the Soul, which is all the creation of this Creator, was strong enough so that with the strength of the Stranger, it was able to cross and to go, and did not remain |liii anywhere (?) on that immeasurable journey, how much more able [P. 48, l.13.] would the Creator be to go, not only up to the Domain of the Stranger, but even to explore the other regions inside of it, if there were any there! . . . [ Thou mayest know that the system of statements which they make is impossible .] For (being) a Person who grows not old nor ever dies or grows weary, who has no need of a conveyance of any kind, and requires no food,--and in that Domain there were no walls to hinder him,--how was the Maker hindered from travelling to see what was above him, (to see) whether that Domain was empty or had something in it or not? But if he reached the heavens of the Stranger, even if he did not actually enter he must have struck them to see what they were or whose they were.
The Stranger and his Domain. How the Stranger may be both inside and outside of his Domain.
And when the Stranger went forth from his Domain to come hither, it is clear that he vacated his Domain. For anything which is limited, and in the midst of a place, when it goes forth from its place, the whole of it goes forth and no part of it remains in its place. But if half of it goes forth and half [P. 49, l.11.] remains, or some portion of it, these things prove concerning its nature that it is divisible. And if again they wish to change their ground, and say a thing which cannot be, (namely), that when he went forth to come from his Domain, his Domain was not deprived of him at all, because he is a Fullness which [P. 49, l.15.] does not lack, and a Greatness which is not lessened, then how was his Domain full of him, and the Domain which was in the middle full of him--a place infinite and unlimited? And, moreover, the Domain of the Maker would be full of him ( i.e., of the Stranger), and this creation would be full of him ; even unto Sheol beneath would his extent reach. If before he went out he was the sole occupant (lit., fullness) of that Domain wherein he dwelt, and after he went out that Domain was likewise full[P. 50.] of him as before, it is clear that he is something which was found to belong to that Domain, and was (nevertheless) outside. It is necessary that we should inquire whence this addition arose ; or perhaps some veil was upon his face as upon the face of the Sun; and when that veil was drawn aside he extended his |liv rays unto us. And when he gathered himself in and confined himself to his Domain he filled the whole of the Domain in which he dwelt from of old. And it is necessary that we should inquire from whence are those causes which arose in front of him, and impeded the Light; and here his nature is found to fill all (space), and our place is not found to be foreign to his rays, just as also the vault of creation is not foreign to the rays of the Sun, even if by means of other veils it is concealed from us.
If Marcionites use the Light of the Sun to illustrate the omnipresence of the Stranger, they dishonour him.
But the Sun is one thing and its effulgence is another thing. For the Sun has substance and a circumference, too, and the eye sets bounds to the Sun, but its effulgence has no limit and substance. For the eye cannot set bounds to it. And by this proof it is discovered that the child is greater than its parent, since the parent is limited and the child that springs from the parent unlimited. But it (i.e., the effulgence) is not really greater; it really is less than it, in that it has not substance like it (i.e., the Sun). But because also the Sun is fire we learn to know it (i.e., the Sun) from this lower fire; for thus also a flame of fire has a substance, [P. 61, l.28.] but the Light of the fire has no substance. And bodies come and go in the midst of its Light and are not injured, but bodies cannot approach very near to the substance (of the flame). And just as there are flowers or blossoms or one of the roots which have sweet-smelling fruits and one small place is able to accommodate them because they are substances, but their scent is diffused outside of them because it has no localised substance ; and we [P. 52.] do not say that the scent of spices is more than the spices, or the perfumes of ointments more than the ointments, for they themselves are sold for a price, but the scent of fragrant herbs is freely given to all who come near them ; and (just as) the censer cannot fill the house, but its smoke is greater than the house, for it is even diffused outside of it, (so) if they have made, therefore, their God like a perfume, which is dissipated and like a flame which is scattered, though they wish to honour him, they reduce him to inferiority, for they make him (to be) without an independent substantial Existence.
II. Bardaisan's teaching; what supports his Entities in Space?
Again, let the party of Bardaisan be asked concerning those Entities which he speaks of, what supports these things of his |lv also, seeing that they are placed in a deserted and empty Space in which there is no breath of air supporting all, especially inasmuch as he mentions that there are both light and heavy Entities there? For Light is lighter than Wind and Wind than Fire, just as also Fire is lighter than Water. But light and heavy things cannot exist unitedly in one enclosure without the force of another [P. 53.] (supporting them).
How could the Entities ever be mingled?
For the light (thing) must dwell above just as the heavy (thing) dwells beneath all. Therefore, Fire cannot exist in the same rank in which Light exists, nor can Water, which is heavy, be in the rank of Fire, or of Wind, because there is no force to support them. . . . Water puts an end to Fire, which is opposite it. For [L. 29.] heaviness and weight cannot exist in one rank just as they cannot [L. 39.] . . . by the same weight . . . things which are light and heavy in the midst of Water or in Air. These things convince concerning themselves how (far) the heavy approach the light. And if these which are heavier by measure than their companions, do greatly flee towards the depths, how much more distant from those things [P. 54.] which are beneath, without weight and without measure, will the Darkness be which exists more heavily than all! For lo, all its heaviness, too, is beneath all ... [ how did the Darkness ] go up from them because its heaviness. . . . But if it is able to exist [L. 16.] and be quiet, let them tell us what thing it was which came upon its heaviness (?) . . . for it is unable to be raised by itself. . . . [Ll. 12, 22.] But if they say that it crossed its boundary and when it crossed [L. 34.] it, it crossed it in an upward direction, then (let me ask), which is easier--for a heavy thing to go upwards, which is not natural, or to be sent downwards according to its nature? For so [L. 46.] . . . [ owing to some cause or other ] to cross its boundary and make an Assault upwards. Above all [ the proper nature of its [P. 55.] (i.e., of the Darkness ) heaviness, demands that it ] should be continually sent beneath. And because from of old and from eternity everything was actually going down and down the Fire would not be able [ to find its way down through the great |lvi distance to the Darkness beneath or to reach ] the Depths which are immeasurable.
If a Primal Wind stirred up the Entities, who caused this Wind? Was it God? 2
But let us inquire as to this Fire, what was the cause that stirred it up also to cross the Boundary which it had never crossed before? They say that the Wind beat upon it and stirred it up. Let us come to the succession of causes and let us ask also concerning the Wind,--what stirred it up too? And if the causes are multiplied, what, then, was that which was the Cause of all the causes? If it be not known, there is a great error, but if it be known, there is a right question in reply to which a true argument should be offered. For if it was God, then He is the cause of all confusion, He who disturbed things in their state of order and [Cf. p. lxxiii. 1. 15.] mingled things that were pure and introduced Strife and Contention among Natures that were at peace ; then He Who, they say, [P. 56.] is the real cause of all beauty turns out to be the cause of all ugliness.
But whoever stirred up that Evil which was asleep, and gave power to what was powerless and found out a method and arranged the Cause to make the Evil cross the Boundary, a thing that had never crossed its Boundary, that misdeed of his teaches us what name we should give him, with what eye we should look upon him, and with what amazement we should wonder at him!
Why would the Upper Being do so?
But if the same Upper Being stirred the Element of the Wind in a manner contrary to its nature, then that Upper Being must have crept and come down from his natural height; and what Cause, then, stirred him up, too, that he should hurl Contention [Cf. p. lxxiii. l. 15.] and Strife among the Entities and Natures which were in a peaceful state, and, if they know not, whence did this cause spring?
For as regards these other things which they say concerning the Entities, whence did they learn that they are as they say? If the spirit of revelation made (it) known to them, it ought to [P. 57.] have revealed to them (something) concerning the Cause on which all the causes depended.
Bardaisan's revelation was not accredited by Signs nor is it Scriptural.