The Lantern

Against Mani1

CCEL

S. Ephraim's Prose Refutations of Mani, Marcion and Bardaisan. Transcribed from the Palimpsest B.M. Add. 14623 by the late C. W. MITCHELL, M.A., C.F., volume 2 (1921). Against Mani.

AGAINST MANI.

ANOTHER DISCOURSE AGAINST MANI.

[P. 190.]

LET Mani be asked about that Archon, that if he be from the Evil Part, that is, from an essence loving adultery, as they say, why did he say 'Thou shalt not commit adultery,' etc. ? (Let him be asked this) that thou mayest know that he (the Archon) commanded that which was approved by him. And because of sins he extirpated the Hebrews altogether . . . and [ if ] he [1. 15.] is a Mixed Being, half and half, he ought to command that . . . how did he say 'There is none beside Me' ? And how [1. 22.] again did he kill Jesus ? And if 'men were intoxicated, they would not pay attention to these things, not even if he had commanded,' then a command to sin was really pleasant to [P. 191.] the sinners. For if when he said 'Do not commit adultery' they did go on committing adultery, how much more if he had commanded them to commit adultery ! But if he is a lover of Good things and on account of them makes commands, let them say who was annulling his commandments that they should not be performed ? If Satan was annulling them, lo, they are both from the one evil Essence, as they say ! How is it fighting half with the Good and half with the Evil ? But if because in this one the mixture of Good was greater this very thing is pleasing to him, then evil beings are good beings in whom he has not made another power greater. And lo, evil beings like good ones become related to him ! And why then did that Archon not receive Jesus, the Good ? For lo, as they say, there is a means whereby the Good may be mixed with him and be accepted by him, (so) that if it is mixed with him it is acceptable to him. Till Jesus had come, then, he was mixing (for men) his good words, why did he not mix in them ( i.e. in |xcii men) Good Parts ? When even those good words that are mixed in him he does not accept, neither therefore can he accept [P. 192.] the Parts. For as his evil hearing is strange to the good Word, so also his hateful essence is strange to the better Part. For if with their will the evil ones accept the mixture of Parts, how did they not accept the mixture of Words ? And if by force the Parts are mixed in them, why does the Good expect the Words to be mixed in them of their own (free-)will ?

But see that in fruits and in seeds and in fountains there exists evil that kills, but good that gives life [is also] in them for men, how does the evil overcome the good ? For lo, the good is in the majority. In fruits . . .

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[P. 193.] [ how was the ' mixture ' arranged in wolves and lambs ? If (the Maker) had wished, could not he have arranged for HULE the bodily organs of lambs ?]

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[1. 40.] ... for it would have been right that He (the Maker) should do to Himself that very thing which He does to others. But [they] say 'Even the Maker does first to [Himself] what He does to [P. 194.] others.' But let them know that the Maker [did] what He did

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[1. 13.] that is, that it will preserve itself and will destroy the other. That Entity, if it is an Entity, how does it bring forth anything the taste of which is not in its own essence and nature ?

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[1. 31.] [If] the Maker [rejoices] in it and also that which is made rejoices in it, that is, God and man, then the Destroyer will be grieved at that destruction and (so will) the destroyed, except things given in legislation on the condition that the chastiser is satisfied by them and the transgressor is grieved by them ? But as when a transgressor becomes of the same will as the chastiser there is no suffering, so when one who is to be destroyed submits to the [P. 195.] will of the destroyer there will be no destruction. And as the will of the chastiser is not that he should suffer, so also will be the will of the destroyer, that is, that he should not be pained. For the just Entity, as it is just in itself, so it is just also towards another : the contrary then of this should be found in the case of |xciii the wicked Entity. For the just Entity does not destroy itself nor others ; the wicked Entity, what is it ?—one that preserves itself as a just one and treats one that has not transgressed against it as a wicked one: which very thing with many (others), and more than many, bears witness against it that it is not an Entity but a compound.

And if they should say that the Sons of Darkness are divided one against another, then also about each one of them is said the same that is spoken about all of them, that is, that each one of them is divided also against his own members, as he is divided also against his mates. For if there is concord in each one of them it should be found in all of them, and so division also ; and if they with themselves are at war and do not cease from war one with another, how did they come to make war with the [P. 196.] Light ? For lo, that adversary that they have among themselves, it is either because he is akin to the Light their adversary, or he is a third party made to be an adversary to both of them, to [which] we ought to give a place and essence by itself. And then, in the nature of Light also is there an adversary ? But if there is none, because it is one nature, what I have said above has been verified, that it is because of two natures mingled in one another that division arises, as also Body and Soul bear witness. But which of the natures is greater, O Mani ? The Dark or the Light ? If the Dark was greater, it could not be overcome by Light. But if Sons of the Dark be killed, as they say, why not all of them, if so be that their nature is mortal ? And if so be that at the End it is actually bound, because it does not die, then he is refuted, in that he lied about their death.

And for what reason do the Natures hate one another ? For lo, Body and Soul that are from him (the Archon) are friendly to one another ! And if (it is) because one is mingled with the other, for the mixture can change our nature, then because, lo, in Body and in Soul there has been a change [ have they [p. 197. l.4] become one nature ?] . . .

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[l. 45.] ... for all I require . . . about these mixed things . . . how [P. 198.] [can] Heat receive Cold and be warm like it seeing that this Essence is in Heat ? But if by mixture with its fellow it becomes not-itself, then also [Evil] by mixture with Good becomes not-itself. And what then . . .

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[1. 16.] But know that if the strife becomes a discussion about one of the created things, it is from created things their fellows that we will bring an analogy for witness and not from a divine Nature. For God Who is not made—it is not possible for us to take an analogy from Him for things made ; so also about Entities—we do not take from created things an analogy for them, except from their own selves. Now let us take an analogy from this great Entity, about Whom we all bear witness, that if it can be subject to these sufferings it is necessary that we [P. 199.] believe about these other Entities also that they also can be subject to these sufferings ; but if the witness of this Entity (is) that it is not subject to these sufferings, it clears all the Entities that exist, that they also are [not] subject to these sufferings. Therefore by the witness of the True Entity the word of Error has been vanquished which brought Entities into the world. But if without witness thou compellest me to believe thee that there are Entities, be thou also compelled without evidence to believe me that there is no other Entity but the One. I have no witness greater than thy defeat, for what is the victory of the athlete but the vanquishing of his opponent ? Nor again can Entities remove themselves from those places that they are in, for who set them there that he should remove them thence ?

Now as to that thou blamest me, (saying) 'why is Evil found in the midst of the works of the Good, for that Good one that thou speakest about, is not Evil really found in the midst of His works ?' But if Evil in His works is mingled, how hast thou been profited by the new and strange opinion that thou hast [P. 200.] brought in ? For is it by the Evil that thou art offended or by the opinion ? If by the Evil thou art offended, how hast thou been profited by the purification whereby thou dost purge out the dregs |xcv from the [clear substance], for lo, the poison that is in the midst of His works is killing thee ! But if the opinion offends Freewill, Him that generated the opinion we ought to call the Evil. For see, that if that Evil is still established in our midst, Him therefore we are required to judge and blame for the Evil who was able to take away the Evil from our midst. For if no Evil ought to be found in the midst of His good works, how, lo, is it found ? For it is from that very thing which thou blamest that thou shouldest be blamed. For if it (the Evil) is left as a defect— worse and worse ! And if again it is left as a surplus, it is possible that by some means or other Good will be the cause of Evil. But if it is so, then the matter would be worse if Evil had not existed, for this would be a great evil, that those Good things should be annulled which are accomplished by means [P. 201.] of Evils. Just as therefore when a physician does not do evil things then he does evil, especially that (thereby) the alleviations are annulled that are accomplished by means of pains and drugs, so when he does the evil, that evil is good, where all the cures are generated by it.

Therefore it is about Diseases that we are having a discussion. The diseases of the Body, are they from mixtures?—let the Mixer be blamed ! But the diseases of the Soul, are they from Freewill ?—let the Giver of it be blamed. But God forbid that He should be blamed, by blaming Whom the blamers of Him are to be blamed, because they have dared to blame Him that is not to be blamed ! But from that which thou sayest to me, that 'Nothing can come to be, except from an Entity,' from this very saying learn that those Entities also cannot come to be. For this opinion of thine is harder than mine. For how will the Entities be found to be not made and not created ? With thy mind taste this that I say. But thou sayest 'Dost thou not believe that the one Entity exists?' Then to Faith thou dost conduct [P. 202.] me, and not to Discussion. Thou therefore that compellest me to concern myself with Faith, what compels thee to compel me to run to Discussion and not to Faith ? But if thou dost turn to Discussion I will leave Faith alone! What do I [acknowledge] ? There exists an Entity, called God. But thou sayest ' Lo, the world exists ; if thou wilt, call it an Entity, and |xcvi if thou wilt, [set down] that from Entities it is made. Is it not necessary for thee to acknowledge that that essence exists ?' Then that necessity which has bound me to acknowledge this paradox that 'it cannot really be investigated, but it is believed without investigation'—that necessity has bound me to believe that 'from Nothing everything comes to be,' another paradox which without investigation is to be believed !

But instead of all these things which thou hast said above, this which is unexceptionable I say 'How dost thou compel me to believe that there exists a God invisible and intangible?' Wilt thou compel ...

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[P. 203.] and how Four Entities that are visible . . . Now the Fire devoured the Water and the Dust and the Stones and the Ox, and they became nothing. But a thing that exists in essence cannot become nothing. Now (this came to pass) that God might make known that from nothing created things [will become] nothing. If therefore thou dost not believe this, learn by experiment as a fool, because . . .