S. Ephraim's Prose Refutations of Mani, Marcion and Bardaisan. Transcribed from the Palimpsest B.M. Add. 14623 by the late C. W. MITCHELL, M.A., C.F., volume 2 (1921) pp. i-xxii
AGAINST BARDAISAN'S "DOMNUS."
A DISCOURSE MADE BY THE BLESSED SAINT [P. 1] EPHRAIM AGAINST THE DISCOURSE WHICH IS CALLED "OF DOMNUS," WHICH WAS COMPOSED BY BARDAISAN AGAINST THE PLATONISTS.
KNOW, O my beloved, that in (?) everything it is right for us to know the (just) Measure of everything. For by this knowledge all [advantages] are found, just as ... all injuries are produced by all arrogance. For whenever we know how to approach anything by measure there is nothing that is able to hurt us. For even those hurtful things are not able to hurt us as long as we approach them by measure.
But that thou mayest know how great is the victory of correct measure, see that nowhere does it put us in the wrong ; for even in the case of fire, though it is a harmful thing, when our bodies [P. 2.] approach it by measure an advantage is produced for us out of its harmfulness. And if without measure starving men make use of food death is produced for them out of its ( i.e. the food's) vital force. O correct measure, which produces out of hurtful things advantages for those who may be hurt!
For as heavy burdens teach weakness to excuse itself from (lifting) any weight which it is unable to bear, so it would be right also for an uninstructed imagination to refrain from an investigation in which it is unable to speak convincingly. For some have been found who are wise in something or other, but |ii have come near to be detected in directions where they themselves are not wise. For their boldness has made them think that because they are wise in one direction, so also they are wise in all directions.
But any craftsman who makes a promise about any craft which has. not been learnt by him is reproved when he approaches the work which belongs to that craft. But if a craft is able to [P.3] reprove him who does not know how to deal with it, investigation is not too feeble to reprove also by its silence the ignorant man who desires to approach it ( i.e. investigation) as one who knows. For wise men, perfect and righteous, have humbled themselves that they might be as though they were ignorant men even in that which they knew—not that they wished to destroy their knowledge, but that by making themselves needy the Fulness which is enough to fill up all our needs might incline towards them. If therefore such just men as knew were not arrogant, how shall we sinful ones be arrogant in such matters as we do not know ? For whoever comes forward humbly as a learner, that humility of his places him under the weakness of confessing that he does not know ; but whoever comes forward with arrogance as one who knows, he is one who has exalted himself above (the limit of) moderation, because arrogance knows not how to be subject to moderation. For if arrogance allowed itself to be subject to moderation, it would not be arrogance at all. For arrogance [P.4] cannot be arrogance unless it exalts itself [ above its proper measure . . . for a man is not to be blamed (by being asked) why he does not know something which he could not know ] [l.10] . But if he says 'I know,' whereas it is known that he cannot know it, [ then his arrogance is really arrogance, because though he does not know ] he is unwilling to be humble [l.22]. . . . And if he teaches another. . . . For he who is humble and learns from a teacher, he is able . . .
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[P.5 l.27] Thus the Greeks spoke words of knowledge and . . . they said also various things that were in [ metaphor ] and as if in parables, and these without the tradition (of their meaning) no one [can] know . . .
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|iii we (?) blame the speaker, because he is not able to know what he [p. 6. l.9] says.
But this which I have mentioned is found in the case of great sages, namely that one confesses 'I do not know.' For this is their great knowledge that when they do not know a thing they confess that they do not know it. For that same knowledge is able to accuse ignorance, because that ignorance cannot accuse itself. For if a man confesses about something that he knows it and again about something else that he does not know it, he gains a victory as about that which he knows. For in both these cases he has spoken the truth, and because he does not lie in either of them his truth is victorious, since it triumphs and defeats fasehood and is crowned.
But thou knowest that it is said in the book (called) 'Of Domnus' that "the Platonists say that there are sw&mata and also a0sw&mata ," that is to say, corporeal and incorporeal things. But these inquiries do not belong to the Platonists, even if they [P. 7.] are written in the writings of the Platonists ; but they are the inquiries of the Stoics which Albinus introduced into his book which is called 'Concerning the Incorporeal,' according to the custom followed by sages and philosophers who in their writings set forth first the inquiries of their own party and then exert themselves to refute by their arguments the inquiries of men who are opposed to their school of thought.
But in the writings of the Stoics and the Platonists this took place, for the Platonists say that there are sw&mata and a0sw&mata , and the Stoics too (say) the same thing. But they do not agree in opinion as they agree in terms. For the Platonists say that corporeal and incorporeal things exist in nature and substance, whereas the Stoics say that all that exists in nature and substance is corporeal ( lit. is a body), but that which does not exist in nature, though it is perceived by the mind, they call incorporeal. But the Philosopher of the Syrians ( i.e. Bardaisan) made himself a laughing-stock among Syrians and Greeks, not only in that he [P. 8.] was unable to state but also in that he did not really know the |iv teaching of Plato ; and in (his) simplicity he hastened to calumniate Plato by (ascribing to him) the inquiries of others, though Plato had a great struggle against these (very) inquiries, which Bardaisan thinks belong to Plato.
But these inquiries (were conducted) according as the Stoics invented names for things, and because they (were expressed) as in parables . . .
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[l.24] [ as I have said above, Bardaisan accepts (as literal fact) the parables of the Stoics. ]
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[l.38] When [a man sees] a fire [burning] in a Temple or a [Palace] the sight [compels] him to be confused, and he will run in every direction, because he cannot extinguish that great fire . . . that [P.9] weakness hastens to contend for great things, and though it knows that its insignificance cannot produce conviction it is no longer able to remain quiet: lo, our insignificance also [ is stirred up by the hearing of these errors, and though our insignificance knows ] that it can[not] produce conviction about these things, yet it cannot refrain from argument about them.
[l.21] But see . . . "for they have not the three dimensions ( to_ trixh~ diastaton )," namely length and breadth and height, nor do they [have] colour (?) " . . . " and time and place . . . and outline and length and breadth and the [marks] that things are known [by]."
But . . . that a man should say concerning the sun that it is mortal, . . . it is on account of the appearance which he sees in the sun that he says this concerning it ; for it is produced ( lit. born) in the East and ... in the South . . . and extends (its rays) as far as the West . . . and called the sun mortal, he [P.10] hastens to blame (it) ; for he who blames is himself blameworthy. The fact therefore that the Stoics have called these things incorporeal I [admit] that I may say how and why and wherefore.
[l.19] . . . but they are names applied to (?) corporeal things and substances. For they have begun by saying concerning Space, namely (that) this Space exists in name and in meaning, as.I have said ; for because it has a name (lit. by reason of its name) |v it is expressed by a sound and because it has a meaning it is perceived by the mind. And, because it is perceived by the mind, if thou, O hearer, dost not hear (at all) with the mind thou canst not hear it. For consider that it is a necessary result that Space should both exist and not exist. And if these two (possibilities) cannot (both) be, Space cannot exist and receive a name, that is to say, exist in name, though it has no body or substance. [P. 11] For all things, whether they be substances or bodies, can exist in this thing ( i.e. Space) which is incorporeal.
But if Space likewise has a body and substance, it is found that it is not Space but something which is in the midst of Space ; so that the truth is found (to be) that the Space in which all bodies exist has no body or substance. For if it is a body it is limited somewhere ; but if it is limited it touches upon some body and is (thereby) limited. And again, what is that thing in the midst of which it is placed, so that it is a companion and a limiter for it (i.e. for Space) ? But if that body is an impediment to it, then also again something surrounds that body ; that is to say, that Space which belongs to it (i.e. the aforesaid "something ") cannot be surrounded by anything. And on this account note carefully with thy mind, 0 hearer, and see that necessity compels (us) to say that that Space will not have a body. For as long as we say that Space is some kind of body by that (statement) the [P.12] former reasoning continues to be overthrown and built up (afresh). And again let us turn back to the truth concerning it, namely to say that it ( i.e. Space) is incorporeal and also that on account of this it is not in a place, as the Stoics have said. For that which can dwell in the midst of a place is not (itself) a place, for one place cannot dwell in the midst of (another) place ; and if it be not so, all those things which were said above have been confuted. For if one corporeal Space be discovered which has substance and another Space be discovered which is incorporeal, then the corporeal may dwell in the midst of the incorporeal—this is a thing which can be stated indeed, but cannot be (in reality). But I venture to say ... as many have thought, even though |vi they were unable to demonstrate (it) in practice. But that two places exist (?) in one another one cannot even . . . assert . . . [P.13] For because a single entity is found . . .
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[l.17] which is also a substance, from that substance there is produced in us a likeness to this (substance) . . .