Theaetetus: True.
Socrates: If, then, anything happens to become like or unlike itself or another, when it becomes like we call it the same—when unlike, other?
Theaetetus: Certainly.
Socrates: Were we not saying that there are agents many and infinite, and patients many and infinite?
Theaetetus: Yes.
Socrates: And also that different combinations will produce results which are not the same, but different?
Theaetetus: Certainly.
Socrates: Let us take you and me, or anything as an example:—There is Socrates in health, and Socrates sick—Are they like or unlike?
Theaetetus: You mean to compare Socrates in health as a whole, and Socrates in sickness as a whole?
Socrates: Exactly; that is my meaning.
Theaetetus: I answer, they are unlike.
Socrates: And if unlike, they are other?
Theaetetus: Certainly.
Socrates: And would you not say the same of Socrates sleeping and waking, or in any of the states which we were mentioning?
Theaetetus: I should.
Socrates: All agents have a different patient in Socrates, accordingly as he is well or ill.
Theaetetus: Of course.
Socrates: And I who am the patient, and that which is the agent, will produce something different in each of the two cases?
Theaetetus: Certainly.
Socrates: The wine which I drink when I am in health, appears sweet and pleasant to me?
Theaetetus: True.
Socrates: For, as has been already acknowledged, the patient and agent meet together and produce sweetness and a perception of sweetness, which are in simultaneous motion, and the perception which comes from the patient makes the tongue percipient, and the quality of sweetness which arises out of and is moving about the wine, makes the wine both to be and to appear sweet to the healthy tongue.
Theaetetus: Certainly; that has been already acknowledged.
Socrates: But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon another and a different person?
Theaetetus: Yes.