Young Socrates: Exactly.
Stranger: Once more let us consider the nature of the righteous judge.
Young Socrates: Very good.
Stranger: Does he do anything but decide the dealings of men with one another to be just or unjust in accordance with the standard which he receives from the king and legislator—showing his own peculiar virtue only in this, that he is not perverted by gifts, or fears, or pity, or by any sort of favour or enmity, into deciding the suits of men with one another contrary to the appointment of the legislator?
Young Socrates: No; his office is such as you describe.
Stranger: Then the inference is that the power of the judge is not royal, but only the power of a guardian of the law which ministers to the royal power?
Young Socrates: True.
Stranger: The review of all these sciences shows that none of them is political or royal. For the truly royal ought not itself to act, but to rule over those who are able to act; the king ought to know what is and what is not a fitting opportunity for taking the initiative in matters of the greatest importance, whilst others should execute his orders.
Young Socrates: True.
Stranger: And, therefore, the arts which we have described, as they have no authority over themselves or one another, but are each of them concerned with some special action of their own, have, as they ought to have, special names corresponding to their several actions.
Young Socrates: I agree.
Stranger: And the science which is over them all, and has charge of the laws, and of all matters affecting the State, and truly weaves them all into one, if we would describe under a name characteristic of their common nature, most truly we may call politics.
Young Socrates: Exactly so.
Stranger: Then, now that we have discovered the various classes in a State, shall I analyse politics after the pattern which weaving supplied?
Young Socrates: I greatly wish that you would.
Stranger: Then I must describe the nature of the royal web, and show how the various threads are woven into one piece.
Young Socrates: Clearly.
Stranger: A task has to be accomplished, which, although difficult, appears to be necessary.
Young Socrates: Certainly the attempt must be made.
Stranger: To assume that one part of virtue differs in kind from another, is a position easily assailable by contentious disputants, who appeal to popular opinion.
Young Socrates: I do not understand.
Stranger: Let me put the matter in another way: I suppose that you would consider courage to be a part of virtue?
Young Socrates: Certainly I should.
Stranger: And you would think temperance to be different from courage; and likewise to be a part of virtue?
Young Socrates: True.