Theaetetus: True.
Stranger: And the one will turn out to be only one of one, and being absolute unity, will represent a mere name.
Theaetetus: Certainly.
Stranger: And would they say that the whole is other than the one that is, or the same with it?
Theaetetus: To be sure they would, and they actually say so.
Stranger: If being is a whole, as Parmenides sings—
“Every way like unto the fullness of a well-rounded sphere, Evenly balanced from the centre on every side, And must needs be neither greater nor less in any way, Neither on this side nor on that—”
then being has a centre and extremes, and, having these, must also have parts.
Theaetetus: True.
Stranger: Yet that which has parts may have the attribute of unity in all the parts, and in this way being all and a whole, may be one?
Theaetetus: Certainly.
Stranger: But that of which this is the condition cannot be absolute unity?
Theaetetus: Why not?
Stranger: Because, according to right reason, that which is truly one must be affirmed to be absolutely indivisible.
Theaetetus: Certainly.
Stranger: But this indivisible, if made up of many parts, will contradict reason.
Theaetetus: I understand.
Stranger: Shall we say that being is one and a whole, because it has the attribute of unity? Or shall we say that being is not a whole at all?
Theaetetus: That is a hard alternative to offer.
Stranger: Most true; for being, having in a certain sense the attribute of one, is yet proved not to be the same as one, and the all is therefore more than one.
Theaetetus: Yes.
Stranger: And yet if being be not a whole, through having the attribute of unity, and there be such a thing as an absolute whole, being lacks something of its own nature?
Theaetetus: Certainly.
Stranger: Upon this view, again, being, having a defect of being, will become not-being?
Theaetetus: True.