Protarchus: By all means.
Socrates: Philebus was saying that enjoyment and pleasure and delight, and the class of feelings akin to them, are a good to every living being, whereas I contend, that not these, but wisdom and intelligence and memory, and their kindred, right opinion and true reasoning, are better and more desirable than pleasure for all who are able to partake of them, and that to all such who are or ever will be they are the most advantageous of all things. Have I not given, Philebus, a fair statement of the two sides of the argument?
Philebus: Nothing could be fairer, Socrates.
Socrates: And do you, Protarchus, accept the position which is assigned to you?
Protarchus: I cannot do otherwise, since our excellent Philebus has left the field.
Socrates: Surely the truth about these matters ought, by all means, to be ascertained.
Protarchus: Certainly.
Socrates: Shall we further agree—
Protarchus: To what?
Socrates: That you and I must now try to indicate some state and disposition of the soul, which has the property of making all men happy.
Protarchus: Yes, by all means.
Socrates: And you say that pleasure, and I say that wisdom, is such a state?
Protarchus: True.
Socrates: And what if there be a third state, which is better than either? Then both of us are vanquished—are we not? But if this life, which really has the power of making men happy, turn out to be more akin to pleasure than to wisdom, the life of pleasure may still have the advantage over the life of wisdom.
Protarchus: True.
Socrates: Or suppose that the better life is more nearly allied to wisdom, then wisdom conquers, and pleasure is defeated;—do you agree?
Protarchus: Certainly.
Socrates: And what do you say, Philebus?
Philebus: I say, and shall always say, that pleasure is easily the conqueror; but you must decide for yourself, Protarchus.
Protarchus: You, Philebus, have handed over the argument to me, and have no longer a voice in the matter?
Philebus: True enough. Nevertheless I would clear myself and deliver my soul of you; and I call the goddess herself to witness that I now do so.
Protarchus: You may appeal to us; we too will be the witnesses of your words. And now, Socrates, whether Philebus is pleased or displeased, we will proceed with the argument.
Socrates: Then let us begin with the goddess herself, of whom Philebus says that she is called Aphrodite, but that her real name is Pleasure.
Protarchus: Very good.
Socrates: The awe which I always feel, Protarchus, about the names of the gods is more than human—it exceeds all other fears. And now I would not sin against Aphrodite by naming her amiss; let her be called what she pleases. But Pleasure I know to be manifold, and with her, as I was just now saying, we must begin, and consider what her nature is. She has one name, and therefore you would imagine that she is one; and yet surely she takes the most varied and even unlike forms. For do we not say that the intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate has pleasure in his very temperance—that the fool is pleased when he is full of foolish fancies and hopes, and that the wise man has pleasure in his wisdom? and how foolish would anyone be who affirmed that all these opposite pleasures are severally alike!