Socrates: Then now we must ascertain the nature of the good more or less accurately, in order, as we were saying, that the second place may be duly assigned.
Protarchus: Right.
Socrates: Have we not found a road which leads towards the good?
Protarchus: What road?
Socrates: Supposing that a man had to be found, and you could discover in what house he lived, would not that be a great step towards the discovery of the man himself?
Protarchus: Certainly.
Socrates: And now reason intimates to us, as at our first beginning, that we should seek the good, not in the unmixed life but in the mixed.
Protarchus: True.
Socrates: There is greater hope of finding that which we are seeking in the life which is well mixed than in that which is not?
Protarchus: Far greater.
Socrates: Then now let us mingle, Protarchus, at the same time offering up a prayer to Dionysus or Hephaestus, or whoever is the god who presides over the ceremony of mingling.
Protarchus: By all means.
Socrates: Are not we the cupbearers? and here are two fountains which are flowing at our side: one, which is pleasure, may be likened to a fountain of honey; the other, wisdom, a sober draught in which no wine mingles, is of water unpleasant but healthful; out of these we must seek to make the fairest of all possible mixtures.
Protarchus: Certainly.
Socrates: Tell me first;—should we be most likely to succeed if we mingled every sort of pleasure with every sort of wisdom?
Protarchus: Perhaps we might.
Socrates: But I should be afraid of the risk, and I think that I can show a safer plan.
Protarchus: What is it?
Socrates: One pleasure was supposed by us to be truer than another, and one art to be more exact than another.
Protarchus: Certainly.
Socrates: There was also supposed to be a difference in sciences; some of them regarding only the transient and perishing, and others the permanent and imperishable and everlasting and immutable; and when judged by the standard of truth, the latter, as we thought, were truer than the former.
Protarchus: Very good and right.
Socrates: If, then, we were to begin by mingling the sections of each class which have the most of truth, will not the union suffice to give us the loveliest of lives, or shall we still want some elements of another kind?
Protarchus: I think that we ought to do what you suggest.
Socrates: Let us suppose a man who understands justice, and has reason as well as understanding about the true nature of this and of all other things.