Socrates: And yet, my boy, for you are one of Philebus’ boys, the point to be considered, is, whether the enquiry is relevant to the argument.
Protarchus: Surely.
Socrates: No tedious and irrelevant discussion can be allowed; what is said should be pertinent.
Protarchus: Right.
Socrates: I am always wondering at the question which has now been raised.
Protarchus: How so?
Socrates: Do you deny that some pleasures are false, and others true?
Protarchus: To be sure I do.
Socrates: Would you say that no one ever seemed to rejoice and yet did not rejoice, or seemed to feel pain and yet did not feel pain, sleeping or waking, mad or lunatic?
Protarchus: So we have always held, Socrates.
Socrates: But were you right? Shall we enquire into the truth of your opinion?
Protarchus: I think that we should.
Socrates: Let us then put into more precise terms the question which has arisen about pleasure and opinion. Is there such a thing as opinion?
Protarchus: Yes.
Socrates: And such a thing as pleasure?
Protarchus: Yes.
Socrates: And an opinion must be of something?
Protarchus: True.
Socrates: And a man must be pleased by something?
Protarchus: Quite correct.
Socrates: And whether the opinion be right or wrong, makes no difference; it will still be an opinion?
Protarchus: Certainly.
Socrates: And he who is pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or not, will always have a real feeling of pleasure?
Protarchus: Yes; that is also quite true.
Socrates: Then, how can opinion be both true and false, and pleasure true only, although pleasure and opinion are both equally real?