No.
Nor yet likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or to others?
Clearly not.
Well, and if nothing should be attributed to it, can other things be attributed to it?
Certainly not.
And therefore other things can neither be like or unlike, the same, or different in relation to it?
They cannot.
Nor can what is not, be anything, or be this thing, or be related to or the attribute of this or that or other, or be past, present, or future. Nor can knowledge, or opinion, or perception, or expression, or name, or any other thing that is, have any concern with it?
No.
Then the one that is not has no condition of any kind?
Such appears to be the conclusion.
II.aa. Yet once more; if one is not, what becomes of the others? Let us determine that.
Yes; let us determine that.
The others must surely be; for if they, like the one, were not, we could not be now speaking of them.
True.
But to speak of the others implies difference—the terms “other” and “different” are synonymous?
True.
Other means other than other, and different, different from the different?
Yes.
Then, if there are to be others, there is something than which they will be other?
Certainly.
And what can that be?—for if the one is not, they will not be other than the one.
They will not.
Then they will be other than each other; for the only remaining alternative is that they are other than nothing.
True.