Socrates: That was my meaning when I said that I was to blame in having put my question badly, and that this was the reason of your answering badly. For I meant to ask you not only about the courage of heavy-armed soldiers, but about the courage of cavalry and every other style of soldier; and not only who are courageous in war, but who are courageous in perils by sea, and who in disease, or in poverty, or again in politics, are courageous; and not only who are courageous against pain or fear, but mighty to contend against desires and pleasures, either fixed in their rank or turning upon their enemy. There is this sort of courage—is there not, Laches?
Laches: Certainly, Socrates.
Socrates: And all these are courageous, but some have courage in pleasures, and some in pains: some in desires, and some in fears, and some are cowards under the same conditions, as I should imagine.
Laches: Very true.
Socrates: Now I was asking about courage and cowardice in general. And I will begin with courage, and once more ask, What is that common quality, which is the same in all these cases, and which is called courage? Do you now understand what I mean?
Laches: Not over well.
Socrates: I mean this: As I might ask what is that quality which is called quickness, and which is found in running, in playing the lyre, in speaking, in learning, and in many other similar actions, or rather which we possess in nearly every action that is worth mentioning of arms, legs, mouth, voice, mind;—would you not apply the term quickness to all of them?
Laches: Quite true.
Socrates: And suppose I were to be asked by someone: What is that common quality, Socrates, which, in all these uses of the word, you call quickness? I should say the quality which accomplishes much in a little time—whether in running, speaking, or in any other sort of action.
Laches: You would be quite correct.
Socrates: And now, Laches, do you try and tell me in like manner, What is that common quality which is called courage, and which includes all the various uses of the term when applied both to pleasure and pain, and in all the cases to which I was just now referring?
Laches: I should say that courage is a sort of endurance of the soul, if I am to speak of the universal nature which pervades them all.
Socrates: But that is what we must do if we are to answer the question. And yet I cannot say that every kind of endurance is, in my opinion, to be deemed courage. Hear my reason: I am sure, Laches, that you would consider courage to be a very noble quality.
Laches: Most noble, certainly.
Socrates: And you would say that a wise endurance is also good and noble?
Laches: Very noble.
Socrates: But what would you say of a foolish endurance? Is not that, on the other hand, to be regarded as evil and hurtful?
Laches: True.
Socrates: And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful?
Laches: I ought not to say that, Socrates.
Socrates: Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to be courage—for it is not noble, but courage is noble?
Laches: You are right.
Socrates: Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is courage?
Laches: True.
Socrates: But as to the epithet “wise,”—wise in what? In all things small as well as great? For example, if a man shows the quality of endurance in spending his money wisely, knowing that by spending he will acquire more in the end, do you call him courageous?